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  1. Are There Heavyweight Perceptual Reasons?Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-26.
    Genia Schönbaumsfeld has recently argued for the view that our ordinary perceptual reasons provide support for heavyweight metaphysical and epistemological views, such as that there is a mind-independent physical world. Call this the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis. I also argue that the rejection of the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis is compatible with the Factive Perceptual Reasons Thesis, the thesis that our perceptual reasons for our ordinary beliefs can be factive, (...)
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  • Disjunctivism and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & Diego E. Machuca (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic.
    An overview of the import of disjunctivism to the problem of radical scepticism is offered. In particular, the disjunctivist account of perceptual experience is set out, along with the manner in which it intersects with related positions such as naïve realism and intentionalism, and it is shown how this account can be used to a motivate an anti-sceptical proposal. In addition, a variety of disjunctivism known as epistemological disjunctivism is described, and it is explained how this proposal offers a further (...)
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  • Meta-Epistemological Scepticism: Criticisms and a Defence.Chris Ranalli - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    The epistemological problem of the external world asks: (1) “How is knowledge of the world possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible?” This is a “how-possible?” question: it asks how something is possible given certain obstacles which make it look impossible (cf. Cassam 2007; Nozick 1981; Stroud 1984). Now consider the following question, which asks: (2) “How is a philosophically satisfying answer to (1) possible?” Scepticism is the thesis that knowledge of the world is impossible. It therefore represents (...)
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  • Reflective Access, Closure, and Epistemological Disjunctivism.Giada Fratantonio - 2019 - Episteme 1 (online first view):1-21.
    In this paper, I consider the so-called Access Problem for Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012). After reconstructing Pritchard’s own response to the Access Problem, I argue that in order to assess whether Pritchard’s response is a satisfying one, we first need an account of the notion of ‘Reflective Access’ that underpins Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism. I provide three interpretations of the notion of Reflective Access: a metaphysical interpretation, a folk interpretation, and an epistemic interpretation. I argue that none of these three (...)
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  • Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.
    On a standard view about reasons, evidence, and justification, there is justification for you to believe all and only what your evidence supports and the reasons that determine whether there is justification to believe are all just pieces of evidence. This view is mistaken about two things. It is mistaken about the rational role of evidence. It is also mistaken about the rational role of reasons. To show this, I present two basis problems for the standard view and argue that (...)
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  • The Bifurcated Conception of Perceptual Knowledge: A New Solution to the Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism.Kegan Shaw - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2871-2884.
    Epistemological disjunctivism says that one can know that p on the rational basis of one’s seeing that p. The basis problem for disjunctivism says that that can’t be since seeing that p entails knowing that p on account of simply being the way in which one knows that p. In defense of their view disjunctivists have rejected the idea that seeing that p is just a way of knowing that p (the SwK thesis). That manoeuvre is familiar. In this paper (...)
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  • How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First. Oxford University Press.
    A defense of the idea that knowledge is first in the sense that there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts reasons or evidence in your possession. Includes a critical discussion of the idea that perception or perceptual experience might provide reasons and a defense of a knowledge-first approach to justified belief.
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  • Beliefless Knowing.Paul Silva - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):723-746.
    Orthodox epistemology tells us that knowledge requires belief. While there has been resistance to orthodoxy on this point, the orthodox position has been ably defended and continues to be widely endorsed. In what follows I aim to undermine the belief requirement on knowledge. I first show that awareness does not require belief. Next I turn my attention to the relation between knowledge and awareness, showing that awareness entails knowledge and thus that the cases of awareness without belief that I discuss (...)
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  • The Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism Revisited.Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1147-1156.
    Duncan Pritchard has defended a version of epistemological disjunctivism which holds that in a paradigmatic case of perceptual knowledge, one knows that \ in virtue of having the reflectively accessible reason that one sees that \. This view faces what is known as the basis problem: if seeing that \ just is a way of knowing that \, then that one sees that \ cannot constitute the rational basis in virtue of which one knows that \. To solve this problem, (...)
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  • Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.
    According to a view I’ll call Epistemic Normativism, knowledge is normative in the same sense in which paradigmatically normative properties like justification are normative. This paper argues against EN in two stages and defends a positive non-normativist alternative. After clarifying the target in §1, I consider in §2 some arguments for EN from the premise that knowledge entails justification. I first raise some worries about inferring constitution from entailment. I then rehearse the reasons why some epistemologists reject the Entailment Thesis (...)
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  • Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability.Chris Ranalli - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):183-205.
    According to Duncan Pritchard’s version of epistemological disjunctivism, in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge, one’s knowledge that p is grounded in one’s seeing that p, and one can, by reflection alone, come to know that they see that p. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability is incompatible with epistemological disjunctivism, so understood. This has the consequence that theories of the nature of sensory experience which accept the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability—such as phenomenal character (...)
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  • Epistemological Disjunctivism’s Genuine Access Problem.Tim Kraft - 2015 - Theoria 81 (4):311-332.
    Epistemological disjunctivism, as defended by, for example, McDowell, Neta and Pritchard, is the view that epistemic justification can be – and in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge actually is – both factive and reflectively accessible. One major problem for this view is the access problem: apparently, epistemological disjunctivism entails that ordinary external world propositions can be known by reflection alone. According to epistemological disjunctivism, seeing that the sun is shining is reflectively accessible and seeing that the sun is shining entails (...)
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  • The Antinomies of Serendipity How to Cognitively Frame Serendipity for Scientific Discoveries.Selene Arfini, Tommaso Bertolotti & Lorenzo Magnani - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    During the second half of the last century, the importance of serendipitous events in scientific frameworks has been progressively recognized, fueling hard debates about their role, nature, and structure in philosophy and sociology of science. Alas, while discussing the relevance of the topic for the comprehension of the nature of scientific discovery, the philosophical literature has hardly paid attention to the cognitive significance of serendipity, accepting rather than examining some of its most specific features, such as its game-changing effect, the (...)
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  • Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering.Steven James - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:109-127.
    Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non-epistemic theories will not do; they provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for remembering that p. I also argue that the shortcomings of the causal theory are epistemic in nature. Consequently, a theory of remembering must account for both (...)
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  • Reading as a Source of Knowledge.René van Woudenberg - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    This paper argues that reading is a source of knowledge. Epistemologists have virtually ignored reading as a source of knowledge. This paper argues, first, that reading is not to be equated with attending to testimony, and second that it cannot be reduced to perception. Next an analysis of reading is offered and the source of knowledge that reading is further delineated. Finally it is argued that the source that reading is, can be both transmissive and generative, is non-basic, once was (...)
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