The relationship between representative democracy and conflict in John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy has been interpreted in very different ways. While some scholars claim that Millian democracy is incompatible with political conflict, others identify in Mill a radical agonism that would offer a non-consensual model of deliberative democracy. This paper argues that neither of these views is accurate: although he highlights the centrality of conflict in political life, Mill believes that democratic deliberation presupposes a minimal level of consensus regarding the (...) formal value of the basic principles of democracy. Initially, I reconstruct the relationship between conflict and consensus in Mill’s conception of representative democracy. I then investigate his association of representation and advocacy and show that Mill’s encomium on political conflict was influenced by Guizot's work. Finally, I explain how a democratic debate riven with conflict is conducive to individual freedom. (shrink)

For Rousseau, the primary function of the republican constitution is not to contain state power, but rather to cultivate certain personal dispositions and social forms through which the stability of a political order based on the general will can be realised. Thus, his constitutional projects for Corsica and Poland formulate peculiar constitutional devices aimed at fostering a distinctive vision of austerity as the social horizon of republican politics. I outline how Rousseau's political thought translates to a peculiar conception of constitutionalism (...) as cultivating stability conditions for the realisation of his principles of political right. In particular, I focus on how Rousseau's conception of austerity illustrates his prescient sense of the source of inequality and domination in liberal societies, insidiously embedded in symbolic and ritual forms. I also address the limitations of austerity as a constitutional antidote to domination in liberal societies. (shrink)

Kant offers the following argument for the formula of humanity (FH): Each rational agent necessarily conceives of her own rational nature as an end in itself and does so on the same grounds as every other rational agent, so all rational agents must conceive of one another's rational nature as an end in itself. As it stands, the argument appears to be question-begging and fallacious. Drawing on resources from the formula of universal law (FUL) and Kant's claims about the primacy (...) of duties to oneself, I propose a contractualist reconstruction of this puzzling line of reasoning. (shrink)

In this article I argue that most biases in argumentation and decision-making can and should be counteracted. Although biases can prove beneficial in certain contexts, I contend that they are generally maladaptive and need correction. Yet critical thinking alone seems insufficient to mitigate biases in everyday contexts. I develop a contextualist approach, according to which cognitive debiasing strategies need to be supplemented by extra-psychic devices that rely on social and environmental constraints in order to promote rational reasoning. Finally, I examine (...) several examples of contextual debiasing strategies and show how they can contribute to enhance critical thinking at a cognitive level. (shrink)

For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, freedom functions as a foundational value for his entire political philosophy. Parallel to this emphasis is his deep and abiding condemnation of “slavery”, at least the slavery that he claims marked the social existence of his European contemporaries living under unrepresentative monarchical systems. However, the striking aspect of Rousseau's work is his virtually complete silence concerning the institution of chattel slavery of his day. Despite his ubiquitous condemnation of the “slavery” of his “civilized” contemporaries, Rousseau wrote next (...) to nothing about the actual enslavement of millions of people who pervaded the social landscape of the European–African–American triangle in the 18th century. In this paper, I trace out the various passages in Rousseau that could be seen as touching on the subject of contemporary slavery practices and show how very scant they were. I also discuss his views on the relation between climate, character, and persons' fitness for democratic forms of government (and hence freedom). I combine these points to draw particular lessons about the dangers of neglect and exclusion inherent in Rousseau's views of democratic freedom, suggesting how similar dangers lurk for contemporary visions of democracy inspired by his views. (shrink)

Leiter (2016) charges public philosophy with being “neoliberal”. To understand that charge better, I define, in §1, three versions of public philosophy which might be concerned and two pictures of its practice targeted by Leiter. I also compare two deliberative sites wherein those pictures may play out. In §2, I sketch how Leiter’s two paradoxes for “neoliberal” public philosophy lead to a revised public philosophy. §3 questions the paradoxes’ empirical grounding and scope. Lastly, in §4, I assume Leiter’s picture and (...) illustrate how philosophical dialogue, through appeal to personal self-image and “moral perceptions”, may still influence public discourse. I conclude that Leiter both over- and understates his case and that his conclusions require greater scrutiny. (shrink)

C.B. Macpherson's “Possessive Individualist” reading of Locke is one of the most radical and influential interpretations in the history of exegesis. Despite a substantial critical response over the past five decades, Macpherson's reading remains orthodox in various circles in the humanities generally, particularly in legal studies, and his interpretation of several crucial passages has unwittingly been followed even by his sharpest critics within Lockean scholarship. In order to present the definitive rebuttal to this interpretation, and so finally to lay it (...) to rest, I argue that every one of Macpherson's key pieces of textual evidence can be rejected entirely on its own terms; that is, by reference to no more than its immediate context. In this way I contend that fault of the Possessive Individualist reading lies far deeper than mere cherry-picking of the Lockean corpus, but centrally involves misreading, misplacing and misrepresenting the very parts of Locke's work Macpherson cites as evidence for his reading. (shrink)

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a hipótese de que o conceito kantiano de contrato original é conservador em relação ao direito de resistência quando comparado à Locke e à Hobbes. Na filosofia política de Locke, a insurreição é legitima sempre que o governo não cumprir as cláusulas do contrato, a saber, proteger e assegurar a vida, a liberdade e a propriedade. Em Hobbes, encontramos a prerrogativa de desobedecer a autoridade, quando o soberano colocar em perigo a vida dos súditos. (...) Para Kant, o contrato original transforma-se em uma ideia da razão e oferece-se como um dispositivo a priori para a fundamentação do Estado e como um critério de legitimação política e jurídica. No entanto, diferentemente dos ingleses, Kant não permite o direito de desobedecer e resistir, mesmo quando a ideia do contrato não é considerada. (shrink)

In Why Not Socialism ?, G. A. Cohen argues that market society and capitalism are intrinsically repugnant. He asks us to imagine an ideal camping trip, which becomes increasing repugnant as it shifts from living by socialist to capitalist principles. In this paper, I expose the limits of this style of argument by making a parallel argument, which shows how an ideal anarchist camping trip becomes increasingly repugnant as the campsite turns from anarchism to democracy. When we see why this (...) style of argument fails to generate interesting objections to democracy, we then see why it also fails to generate interesting objections to market society. (shrink)

Le présent article vise à reconstruire la lecture que Rawls fait du Second Discours et du Contrat social de Rousseau sur les thèmes de l’amour-propre, de l’autonomie, de la volonté générale et de la stabilité. L’objectif est ainsi de mieux comprendre l’héritage rousseauiste dans la pensée politique rawlsienne. Lorsque Rawls développe les notions de liberté et de sens de la justice dans Théorie de la justice, de raison publique et de citoyenneté dans Libéralisme politique et d’utopie réaliste dans Le Droit (...) des peuples, il s’inspire en grande partie de sa lecture de la philosophie sociale et politique du penseur du xviii e siècle. L’idée est donc de lire Rawls dans le sillage de Rousseau, de montrer comment il s’est réapproprié certaines de ses thèses et certains de ses concepts afin d’en proposer quelque chose d’original et de profondément riche. (shrink)

The following interview took place between Jacques Bouveresse and Hilary Putnam on May 11, 2001 in Paris at the Collège de France. Sandra Laugier was present, preserved the transcription, and proposed that we publish the text here. It was translated into English by Marie Kerguelen Feldblyum LeBlevennec and lightly edited by Jacques Bouveresse, Juliet Floyd, and Sandra Laugier. Themes covered in the interview include the question of Wittgenstein’s importance in contemporary philosophy, Putnam’s development with respect to realism, especially in philosophy (...) of mathematics, and the differences and motivations for realism in mathematics, physics, and ethics. The editors thank Marie Kerguelen Feldblyum LeBlevennec for her translation, and Jacques Bouveresse, Mario De Caro, and Sandra Laugier for permission to publish this transcription. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the moral concept of harm in the context of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. This paper delineates between two concepts of wrongful harm: interactional versus architectural. It then examines these options with an eye toward developing a satisfactory normative approach for policy. While the interactional view of wrongful harm supports powerful arguments about moral responsibility, it has some clear limitations. This paper makes a case for the architectural view by underlining that it (...) is not only compatible with the features of the Paris Agreement but also supports a distinctive conception of justice. (shrink)

This article tries to develop a moderate reading of political liberalism applicable to post-Islamist, Muslim-majority societies. Contrary to the strong reading, which considers political liberalism as limited in its scope to those societies that already have a strong liberal tradition, I argue that Rawls’ project does have something to offer to reasonable post-Islamist, Muslim individuals. In part I of the article the idea of a post-Islamist, Muslim-majority society is conceptualized and explained. Part II focuses on the Rawlsian ideas of justification, (...) demonstrating that the conceptions of justification available in political liberalism, i.e. political constructivism, wide reflective equilibrium and a wide view of public reasoning with its ideas of declaration and conjecture, can justify the political conception of justice for reasonable individuals living in any society, including post-Islamist ones. Focusing on Rawls’ notions of stability in part III, I argue that the idea of overlapping consensus should not be considered as the only account of stability offered by political liberalism. Put another way, notwithstanding the strong reading of political liberalism in real western and post-Islamist democracies, liberal stability is always a mixture of overlapping consensus and modus vivendi. (shrink)

RESUMEN En Teoria de la justicia Rawls no prestó suficiente atención a cómo sus princípios podrian realizarse al interior de un régimen socioeconómico especifico, por lo que entre sus criticos ha habido desacuerdo sobre cuál de dichos regimenes resulta más adecuado para llevar a cabo su concepción de la justicia. Con la finalidad de contribuir a esta discusión, en este articulo examino los argumentos que Rawls presentó a favor del socialismo liberal y de la democracia de propietarios como los sistemas (...) sociales más adecuados para realizar su teoria. La discusión anterior me permitirá mostrar las criticas que Rawls presentó a las formas tradiciones del estado del bienestar. ABSTRACT In A Theory of Justice Rawls did not consider the question of how the principles of justice could be adapted to some of the different ideal types of political regimes. For this reason, there is no agreement amongst his critics about which is the best political system to carry out the principles ofjustice. Aiming to contribute to the discussion about this topic, first I examine the arguments that Rawls presented in favor of the Liberal Socialism and Property-Owning Democracy as ideal forms of social organization. In the second part of the article the discussion about these regimes will allow me to position Rawls as a staunch critic of the Welfare-State Capitalism. (shrink)

En Teoría de la justicia Rawls no prestó suficiente atención a cómo sus principios podrían realizarse al interior de un régimen socioeconómico específico, por lo que entre sus críticos ha habido desacuerdo sobre cuál de dichos regímenes resulta más adecuado para llevar a cabo su concepción de la justicia. Con la finalidad de contribuir a esta discusión, en este artículo examino los argumentos que Rawls presentó a favor del socialismo liberal y de la democracia de propietarios como los sistemas sociales (...) más adecuados para realizar su teoría. La discusión anterior me permitirá mostrar las críticas que Rawls presentó a las formas tradiciones del estado del bienestar. (shrink)

Rousseau's conception of virtue is puzzling, for he sometimes defines virtue as self-mastery and sometimes as patriotism. The prevailing Kantian interpretation emphasizes the first definition with its man-citizen thesis, while attributing the latter to Rousseau's inconsistency. This article challenges this reading and argues that Rousseau intentionally operates with two conceptions of virtue: political virtue as love of fatherland and moral virtue as love of humanity. While the former relies on a state-level amour-propre that draws motivation from the division between nations, (...) the latter hinges on conscience—an intelligent form of amour de soi—that reaches universal humanity. Underlying the two virtues is the irreconcilable tension between nature and politics. Where nature demands universal happiness incorporating all humans, politics necessitates passions that entail division. Retrieving Rousseau's dual conception of virtue highlights Rousseau's fundamental pessimism toward human politics, which has been blurred in the emerging Kantian-liberal scholarship. (shrink)

In the Critique of Gotha Programme, Karl Marx famously argues that a communist society will be characterised by the principle, ‘From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!’ I take up a question about this principle that was originally posed by G.A. Cohen, namely: what makes communism (so conceived) possible for Marx? In reply to this question, Cohen interprets Marx as saying that communism is possible because of limitless abundance, a view that Cohen takes to be (...) implausible for ecological reasons. I develop a new interpretation of Marx's position. On this interpretation, people in communist society achieve self-realisation through providing others with the goods and services required for their self-realisation. Coupled with a reasonably high (but not immense) development of productive power, self-realisation generates conditions in which people can produce according to their abilities and receive according to their needs. I defend this view as an interpretation of Marx and I argue that it represents a more plausible account of what makes communism possible than Cohen's interpretation in which technological advance and limitless abundance play the predominant role. (shrink)

The main goal of this thesis is to provide a clear basis for the analysis of alternative currencies, such as Bitcoin, LETS, Local currencies, the WIR or Carbon currencies. It attempts to determine whether alternative currencies might constitute just and workable alternatives, either in the form of small-scale experiments or in the form of more radical reforms. The first chapter proposes a new way to classify currencies. The second examines the case in favour of monetary plurality. The third analyses the (...) claims in favour of restricting the use of money locally, within a community, or to certain goods. The fourth studies the link between money and the market. Finally, a post-scriptum focuses on Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. This thesis highlights that these currencies are drivers of several potential conflicts. Their widespread use might conflict with the adequate management of monetary policy, with social justice, and with liberal values. These conflicts are potential, for they would come into existence only if alternative currencies increased in scope. However, there is no reason to disregard potential conflicts when the case in their favour relies mostly on their potential benefits. (shrink)

The paper argues that the moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is unified by a complex conception of reason that imposes consistency norms of both rationality and reasonableness. Hobbes’s conceptions of rightness as reciprocity, and moral goodness as sociability belong to an original and attractive moral theory that is neither teleological nor classically deontological, nor as interpreters have variously argued, subjectivist, contractarian, egoist, or dependent on divine command.

Despite the strength of arguments for veganism in the animal rights literature, alongside environmental and other anthropocentric concerns posed by industrialised animal agriculture, veganism remains only a minority standpoint. In this paper, I explore the moral motivational problem of veganism from the perspectives of moral psychology and political false consciousness. I argue that a novel interpretation of the post-Marxist notion of political false consciousness may help to make sense of the widespread refusal to shift towards veganism. Specifically, the notion of (...) false consciousness fills some explanatory gaps left by the moral psychological notion of akrasia, often understood to refer to a weakness of will. Central to my approach is the idea that animal exploitation is largely systemic and the assumption that moral motivation is inseparable from moral thinking. In this light, the primary obstacle to the adoption of veganism arises not so much from a failure to put genuine beliefs into action, but rather in a shared, distorted way of thinking about animals. Thus, common unreflective objections to veganism may be said to be manifestations of false consciousness. (shrink)

Social democracy based on welfare and the redistribution of social contributions is failing. The accumulation of wealth and the increase in inequalities are the two faces of Janus that social democracy has not been able to contain over the recent decades. In this context, it matters to discuss John Rawls’s influential difference principle. According to the maximin criterion put forth by Rawls, it does not suffice that no one becomes worse off; those who are worse off must also become better (...) off than they are. Here, we note that the existence and growth of inequality find no opposition in the maximin rule. Despite appearances, strictly speaking it merely introduces a factor of social compensation, a sort of “assistencialism” to the victims of the greatest inequality. Even the most robust formulation of the principle of difference, according to which the greatest advantage to the less advantaged is indispensable, does not per se preclude an aggregate growth of inequalities. It seems clear that it was an egalitarian goal what Rawls had in mind in A Theory of Justice. Rawls’s critical comments on welfare capitalism must indeed not be forgotten—especially in his further explanations about the application of the principles of justice in a property-owning democracy. Here, as in liberal socialism, the dispersion of property, capital and resources prevents economic and political powers from being concentrated into the hands of a minority. However, the egalitarian aim does not strictly follow from the difference principle as stated, whether taken literally as an application of the maximin rule or inferring from its strongest formulation. A reformulation that does justice to the egalitarian aim of the principle of difference is, however, possible: namely, a degrowthist reformulation, truly requiring a degrowth in accumulation and inequalities, making explicit a brake clause that hinders the aggregate growth of inequalities. Such a degrowthist conception of the difference principle may justify some concrete rules that are able to enforce the egalitarian commitments of social democracy. (shrink)

This chapter examines some central features to liberal conceptions of toleration and liberty of conscience. The first section briefly examines conceptions of toleration and liberty of conscience in the traditions of Locke, Rawls, and Mill. The second section considers contemporary controversies surrounding toleration and liberty of conscience with a focus on neutrality and equality. The third section examines several challenges, including whether non-religious values should be afforded the same degree of accommodation as religious values, whether liberty of conscience requires a (...) secular state, and how bias impedes understandings of toleration and liberty of conscience. The chapter concludes with brief comments on future directions for research on toleration and liberty of conscience. One is exploring toleration and liberty of conscience in non-Western contexts; another is exploring ways that varieties of religious and political identity impact conceptions of toleration and liberty of conscience. (shrink)

The Lockean theory of property licenses unilateral appropriation on the condition that there be ‘enough, and as good left in common for others’. However, the meaning of this proviso is all but clear. This article argues that the proviso is centered around the Lockean theory of freedom. To be free, I argue, we must be ‘non-subjected’ in the exercise of our rights, including our rights to appropriate. We enjoy such freedom only when the ability to exercise our rights does not (...) depend on others. That can obtain if literally enough and as good is left in common. But it can also obtain in other ways, for example through competitive labour markets. The latter offer something as good as ‘enough and as good’. (shrink)

This article starts off with a historical section showing that deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice are a characteristic feature of the history of political thought. Since no agreement or consensus on distributive justice is possible, the article argues that political philosophers should – instead of continuously proposing new normative theories of justice – focus on analyzing the reasons, significance, and consequences of such kinds of disagreements. The next two sections are analytical. The first sketches five possible (...) reasons for deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice. The second discusses the meta-ethical relevance of the lack of consensus on justice and rejects ethical realism and cognitivism based on the argument from deep disagreements. (shrink)

According to Kant, the universalization of the maxim of false promising leads to a contradiction, namely, to everyone adopting the maxim of false promising which would in effect make promising impossible. I first propose a reconstruction of Kant’s reasoning in four steps and then show that each of these steps is highly problematic. In the second part I argue that attempts by several prominent contemporary philosophers to defend Kant fail because they encounter similar difficulties.

Is capitalism compatible with democratic equality? Rawls’s critique of welfare-state capitalism implies a negative answer. I argue that Rawls’s critique fails and that welfare-state capitalism can satisfy the demands of democratic equality. I articulate a social democratic interpretation of the ideal of democratic equality and show that it justifies welfare-state capitalism. This argument also implies that welfare-state capitalism can satisfy the demands of democratic equality as interpreted by Rawls’s justice as fairness. So, whether we accept Rawls’s interpretation of democratic equality (...) or the social democratic alternative, welfare-state capitalism can satisfy the demands of democratic equality. (shrink)

Contemporary debates about ideal and nonideal theory rest on an underlying consensus that the primary practical task of political theory is directing action. This overlooks other urgent practical work that theory can do, including showing how injustice can be made bearable and how resisting it can be meaningful. I illustrate this important possibility by revisiting the purpose for which John Rawls originally developed the concept of ideal theory: reconciling a democratic public to living in a flawed world that may otherwise (...) seem more of a home for catastrophe than justice. However, Rawls’s account of reconciliation is flawed; because of his methodology, the realistic utopia he constructs as a source of hope can be used to defend an unjust status quo. By drawing lessons from Theodor Adorno’s contrasting view of reconciliation after the Holocaust, I offer a more democratic method for political theory to offer sources of hope to the public. (shrink)

Alfred Stepan’s “twin-tolerations” thesis (2000) is a model for explaining different ways that religious and political authority come to be reconciled. In this paper, we investigate some obstacles and challenges to realizing a reconciliation between religious and political authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) that might result in a transition away from a theocratic monarchy to a more consultative form of political authority. Whereas most analyses of religion and politics in KSA focus on geopolitics, the rentier state model, (...) or economic and military aid from the United States, we also consider local factors that emphasize the agency of political and non-political actors within KSA, focusing in particular on education policy and how this policy is a barrier to political reform. Our position is not meant to replace the standard models, but rather to supplement them by offering a multi-variable perspective on the challenges and prospects for meaningful political reform in KSA. (shrink)

Rousseau’s project in his Social Contract was to construct a conception of human subjectivity and political institutions that would transcend what he saw to be the limits of liberal political theory of his time. I take this as a starting point to put forward an interpretation of his theory of the general will as a kind of social cognition that is able to preserve individual autonomy and freedom alongside concerns with the collective welfare of the community. But whereas many have (...) seen Rousseau’s ideas as a prelude to communitarianism or authoritarianism, we should instead see his project as articulating an alternative model of moral-cognitivist reasoning. In order to provide a framework for this interpretation, I propose reading his conception of the general will through the theory of collective intentionality and social ontology. I end with a consideration of how this interpretation of the general will can provide a more satisfying understanding of political and practical rationality contemporary debates over republicanism and liberalism. (shrink)

Monarchy is liberalism’s little secret. Given the number of articles and books appearing every year dealing with liberal democracy as the hallmark of contemporary Western societies, it is astonishing that monarchy is rarely ever mentioned despite the fact that monarchy, and not a republic, is the constitutional form of quite a number of Western liberal states. I argue that considering the political reality of the established monarchies in Europe leads into a dilemma: either contemporary liberalism is not the kind of (...) theory it claims to be or it has to reconsider its central tenets. In conclusion, I show that the dilemma cannot be solved or avoided but needs to be embraced by conceiving liberalism not as a applied moral theory but as a political theory that leaves room for various symbolic self-understandings and acknowledges the crooked timber of historical realities. (shrink)

This paper examines some of the ways that equality in political status is threatened by corporate political speech. I offer a critique of Citizens United v Federal Election Commission which emphasizes a democratic equality approach to law and politics.

There are two discourses that are used in connection with the provision of good healthcare: a rights discourse and a beneficial design discourse. Although the logical force of these two discourses overlaps, they have distinct and incompatible implications for practical reasoning about health policy. The language of rights can be interpreted as the ground of a well-designed healthcare system stressing the values of equality and inclusion, but it has less application when dealing with questions of cost-effectiveness. This difference reflects the (...) distinction between the deontological status of rights claims and a teleological approach presupposed in the language of beneficial design. However, the value of the separateness of persons contained in the discourse of rights can impose constraints on the adoption of a simple maximizing principle when thinking about the allocation of healthcare resources within a social contract for health. Throughout these issues are discussed by reference to the work of Peter Jones. (shrink)

O debate fomentado nos anos oitenta entre liberais e “comunitaristas” tende a contrastar radicalmente as concepções teóricas de John Rawls e Charles Taylor, sendo o primeiro o representante principal da vertente liberal e o segundo do “comunitarismo”. Ao contrário do que sustenta essa distinção, neste artigo proponho ir para além dela, a fim de defender que há convergências dos autores no que tange à discussão sobre o pluralismo. Em um primeiro momento, apresento os diagnósticos de Rawls e de Taylor quanto (...) ao fato do pluralismo nas sociedades modernas como uma característica contextual irreversível (I). Em um segundo momento, diante da tensão ética insuperável entre divergentes concepções bem, a saída mais viável caminha para a justiça. Para tanto, desenvolvo a concepção de “justiça política” de Rawls em “O Liberalismo Político” e as publicações mais recentes de Charles Taylor como em “Secularism and Freedom of Conscience”, “A Secular Age” e “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism?”, que parecem sustentar certa “virada liberal-rawlsiana” no pensamento do autor (II). Em um terceiro momento, efetuo uma distinção entre o fato do pluralismo (razoável) e o valor do pluralismo, para finalmente concluir o artigo argumentando que tanto Rawls como Taylor tendem a defender o pluralismo como um valor político para as instituições e não como um valor moral abrangente para os indivíduos. (shrink)

Every year, 1.35 million people are killed on roads worldwide and even more people are injured. Emerging self-driving car technology promises to cut this statistic down to a fraction of the current rate. On the face of it, this consideration alone constitutes a strong reason to legally require — once self-driving car technology is widely available and affordable — that all vehicles on public roads be self-driving. Here I critically investigate the question of whether self-driving, or autonomous, vehicles should be (...) legally mandated. I develop an argument — premised upon Mill’s Harm Principle — that any legislation mandating the use of self-driving vehicles on public roads is morally impermissible. The Harm Principle, under its most plausible interpretation, has it that the state is warranted in legislating against some activity only if that activity violates the rights of others. In brief, I argue that a human driver, who opts to drive herself on public roads rather than rely on self-driving technology, does not violate anyone’s rights when she so acts. Consequently, when granting the Harm Principle, it follows that the state is not warranted in mandating the use of self-driving vehicles on public roads. If I am correct, the proponent of a self-driving vehicle mandate must reject the Harm Principle. Given its intuitive plausibility and central place in liberal philosophical thought, this is a weighty cost. (shrink)

Though Rousseau is recognized to have treated the problem of self-knowledge with great sensitivity, very little is known about a centrally important aspect of that treatment—his understanding of self-deception. I reconstruct this conception, emphasizing the importance of purposive but sub-intentional processes that work to enhance agents' self-esteem. I go on to argue that Rousseau's fundamental concern about the theater is its capacity to manipulate these processes in ways that make spectators both complicit in their own falsification and vulnerable to elite (...) domination. This argument, with its focus on the pervasive and often subconscious character of self-deception, not only problematizes an influential reading of Rousseau which emphasizes the epistemic availability of the “true” or “sincere” self, but also highlights the ongoing civic and moral threat posed by self-deceptive mental states. (shrink)

In the works of Kant and Rawls, we find an acute sensibility to the pre-eminent importance of freedom of speech. Both authors defend free speech in democratic societies as a private and as a public entitlement, but their conceptions markedly differ when applied to non-liberal and non-democratic societies. The difference is that freedom of speech, for Kant, is a universal claim that can serve as a test of legitimacy of all legal orders, while for Rawls, some legal orders are owed (...) full recognition even if they do not in principle guarantee freedom of speech. I explain Kant’s account of free political speech and argue that the defence of individual rights should be seen as its core feature, both in republican and in autocratic states. I then argue that a much-overlooked shift in Rawls’s development toPolitical Liberalismlikewise ties his account of free speech in democratic societies to issues concerning rights and justice. In a next step, I discuss Rawls’s perspective on some non-democratic regimes in hisLaw of Peoples, regimes that he understands as well-ordered but which do not guarantee freedom of speech. I criticize Rawls’s account from Kant’s perspective and suggest to introduce a ‘module’ from Kant’s pre-republican thought into Rawls’s conception, aiming to secure a core area of rights- and justice-related speech. My claim is that under Kant’s view of autocratic legitimacy, an important extension of speech rights is called for even in non-liberal, non-democratic states, and that a Rawlsian account should and can adopt it. (shrink)

Is the principal concern of political philosophy the source of political authority? And, if so, can this source be located in individual consent? In this article I draw on Rousseau to answer the second question negatively; and in rejecting that answer, why we might answer the first question in the negative as well. We should be concerned with questions of legitimacy rather than with the source of authority and political obligation. Our principal concern, that is, should be with the question (...) how well political institutions meet the needs of individuals. I pursue these issues in the context of interpreting Rousseau's distinctive contribution to political thought. I start out by asking the question ‘What problem is the General Will designed to solve?’ I argue that Rousseau's challenge to Hobbes represents a crucial step in the move from the source of authority and political obligation to a focus on legitimacy. (shrink)

In Political Liberalism, J. Rawls describes a meta-ethical procedure — political constructivism — whereby political theorists formulate political principles by assembling and reworking ideas from the public political culture. To many of his moral realist and moral constructivist critics, Rawls's procedure is simply a recent version of the “popular moral philosophy” that Kant excoriates in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. I defend the idea of political constructivism on philosophical and political grounds. I argue that political constructivism is the (...) best available methodology for self-legislating, socially embedded and fallible human beings; then I show that political constructivism may produce principles that could garner the principled assent of Euro-American Muslims such as Taha Jabir Al-Alwani. The article considers how political constructivism might be employed to formulate new political principles for Euro-American societies experiencing and confronting the Islamic revival. [R]. (shrink)

In As Free and as Just as Possible: The Theory of Marxian Liberalism, Jeffrey Reiman proposes to develop a theory of “Marxian Liberalism.” ‘Liberalism’ here is defined by the principle that “sane adult human beings should be free in the sense of free from coercion that would block their ability to act on the choices they make.” While the idea of coercion could use some glossing, it is not obvious that poverty, unemployment, racism, and sexism are as such coercive. In (...) this book, it is, very broadly, economic inequality that is the focus, and the argument is that a previously insufficiently appreciated idea that is broadly Marxian shows us that we need a Rawlsian Difference Principle to counteract inherent coercion in the system of free enterprise capitalism. I argue that the book wrongly places the component of labor in the system of economic exchange. We do not as such exchange labor: we exchange services; and because of this there is no normative pull toward his thesis that there is something fundamentally wrong—some people are being unjustly exploited—when several hours of one person’s labor are required to purchase the output of just one of another person’s. Liberalism, I argue, rejects Marxism. (shrink)

En el intento de defender una interpretación de la ética y la filosofía política de David Hume cercana al utilitarismo clásico, se interpone de un modo clave el llamado problema del “ Sensible Knave ” planteado por este autor al final de su obra más utilitarista, la Investigación sobre los Principios de la Moral . Según la interpretación clásica de este fragmento, la racionalidad utilitarista en el ámbito político colisionaría con la moral volviendo a ésta última inútil. Por tanto, en (...) el ámbito político la defensa de un utilitarismo moral sería una tarea autocontradictoria. Con el fin de mostrar que, primero, Hume no dice nada parecido a esto y, segundo, que incluso señala la forma de superar esta aparente contradicción entre moralidad y racionalidad, se analizan brevemente los argumentos de los que procede básicamente esta interpretación “antiutilitarista” estándar y se defiende una interpretación de la discusión humeana sobre el problema del aparente conflicto entre moralidad y racionalidad, o de los incentivos racionales para el comportamiento inmoral, que permite explicar mejor la posición de Hume sobre este problema. Finalmente, se propone una instancia de superación de la contradicción moralidad/racionalidad por medio de un utilitarismo de la regla atemperado centrado en la idea del “desarrollo progresivo de instituciones artificiales de refuerzo de la moralidad”, que el propio Hume sugeriría en otros lugares en los que aborda el tema de la contradicción aparente entre “morality” y “knavery”. Se proponen también posibles líneas de desarrollo futuro de esta idea, entre ellas su uso para aclarar la posible relación del pensamiento de David Hume con ciertas formas de liberalismo contemporáneo. (shrink)

This article seeks to explain why the social movement had its historical origin in the 1760s. It argues that the rise of the social movement as a particular form of political action was closely linked to a new interpretation of sovereignty that emerged within eighteenth century British politics. This interpretation, which drew inspiration from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social contract thinking, not only resonated with the radicalism of John Wilkes and his followers’ struggle to promote civil liberties to Englishmen of all classes, (...) it also spurred a transformation of the repertoire of popular contention. The article traces the evolution of the concept of sovereignty in British political thought from the Restoration to the Wilkites and discusses how this evolution informed the contentious actions of the Wilkites as they formed the first mass movement to promote a specific political issue. (shrink)

Threats to the stability of liberal democracies are of obvious contemporary import. Concern with stability runs through John Rawls’s work. The stability that concerned him was that of fundamental terms of cooperation. Rawls long believed that the terms which would be stable were his two principles, but he eventually conceded that even a well-ordered society was more likely to be characterized by “justice pluralism” than by consensus on his own conception of justice. Contemporary liberal democracies, too, are divided about what (...) justice demands. I believe Rawls’s treatment of stability can help us understand the conditions under which fundamental terms of cooperation can be stable under non-ideal conditions such as ours. But because Rawls never worked through the consequences of his concession, his view needs to be developed before we can draw on it. Rawls’s treatment makes use of elementary game theory. Thus in _Theory of Justice_ he said -- and in _Political Liberalism_ he implied -- that stability would result from citizens with a sense of justice “playing” strategies which combined for what was, in effect, a Nash equilibrium. I argue that his concession requires a new conception of stability and implies that Rawls cannot appeal to a Nash equilibrium to show how stability would be maintained. His concession therefore forces open a troubling gap in his analysis. I fill that gap by proposing a weaker equilibrium concept that serves Rawlsian purposes. I conclude with what this project suggests for challenges facing the fragile liberal democracies of our own time. (shrink)

The term “social world” is increasingly familiar in philosophy and political theory. Rawls uses it quite often, especially in his later works. But there has been little explicit discussion of the term and the idea of social worlds. My aim in this paper is to show that political philosophers, Rawlsian or not, should think seriously about social worlds and the roles these things play and ought to play in their work. The idea of social worlds can help political philosophers think (...) about what they do in new and fruitful ways and enrich debates about the roles, aims, and methodology of political philosophy. I begin by analyzing Rawls’s uses of “social world.” I then propose a broadly Rawlsian conception of social worlds as logically possible closed networks of social relations between agents. Next, I put this conception to work, arguing that the idea of navigating the landscape of social worlds can help us better understand the four apparently disparate roles of political philosophy that Rawls presents. Moving beyond Rawls interpretation, I use the idea of social worlds to develop an analogy and distinction between world-oriented and principle-oriented approaches to political philosophy. While principle-oriented approaches grant centrality and importance to engagement with principles of justice, legitimacy, or other political concepts, world-oriented approaches grant centrality and importance to engagement with social worlds. I propose two examples of world-oriented approaches, political philosophy as navigation and political philosophy as world-building, and argue that they are viable and worthy of further consideration. (shrink)

Is the principal concern of political philosophy the source of political authority? And, if so, can this source be located in individual consent? In this article I draw on Rousseau to answer the second question negatively; and in rejecting that answer, why we might answer the first question in the negative as well. We should be concerned with questions of legitimacy rather than with the source of authority and political obligation. Our principal concern, that is, should be with the question (...) how well political institutions meet the needs of individuals. I pursue these issues in the context of interpreting Rousseau's distinctive contribution to political thought. I start out by asking the question 'What problem is the General Will designed to solve?' I argue that Rousseau's challenge to Hobbes represents a crucial step in the move from the source of authority and political obligation to a focus on legitimacy. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine John Rawls’ claim in the first edition of A Theory of Justice that Justice as Fairness cannot include considerations about the environment and non-human animals. The paper aims to resolve the tension in this statement, as the idea of a Rawlsian well-ordered society without concern for the rest of nature presents as a contradiction. Through a more charitable reading of Rawlsian theory that borrows from anti-capitalist and environmental justice frameworks, we can see how Rawlsian justice (...) connects tightly to these issues. I conclude that the Rawlsian well-ordered society must be committed to anti-capitalist environmental justice. (shrink)

What role do human relationships play within the moral domain? There appears to be a lot of agreement that relationships play an important role in and for morality, but certainly not any foundational one. Yet, there has been a recent interest in seeking to explain the foundation of morality in relational terms. According to these relational proposals, the very foundation of impartial morality, and in particular the domain of “what we owe to each other” can be found in the same (...) normative structures that are characteristic of interpersonal relationships and the partial reasons they give rise to. This suggestion has been met with serious criticism, according to which any seeming appeal to a so-called moral relationship does no work in grounding morality and the obligations that we owe to each other. The present paper intends to challenge this conclusion by arguing that the objections rendered are not decisive, as a result of which we can begin to make sense of the idea that we do share a reason-giving relationship with each other in the moral sphere. The moral relationship, the paper argues, is one we simply share with each other in virtue of our shared vulnerability to attitudinal injury as rational agents. (shrink)