Comparing the relative sensitivity of direct and indirect measures of learning is proposed as the best way to provide evidence for unconscious learning when both conceptual and operative definitions of awareness are lacking. This approach was first proposed by Reingold & Merikle (1988) in the context of subliminal perception. In this paper, we apply it to a choice reaction time task in which the material is generated based on a probabilistic finite-state grammar (Cleeremans, 1993). We show (1) that participants progressively (...) learn about the statistical structure of the stimulus material over training with the choice reaction time task, and (2) that they can use some of this knowledge to predict the location of the next stimulus in a subsequent “generation” task. However, detailed partial correlational analyses of the correspondence between performance during the reaction time task and the statistical structure of the training material showed that large effects remained even when controlling for explicit knowledge as assessed by the generation task. Hence we conclude (1) that at least some of the knowledge expressed through reaction time performance can not be characterized as conscious, and (2) that even when associations are found at a global level of analysis, dissociations can still be obtained when more detailed analyses are conducted. Finally, we also show that participants are limited in the depth of the contingencies they can learn about, and that these limitations are shared by the Simple Recurrent Network model of Cleeremans & McClelland (1991). (shrink)

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consciousness. Such unconscious processing always " Cambridge, UK " tends to re?ect habitual or strong responses. From this.

In order to understand consciousness one would benefit from developing a more eclectic intellectual style. Consciousness is, as proposed by almost everyone except the stubborn reductionists, a truly mysterious concept. Its study and dissection merits a multidisciplinary approach. Waving this multidisciplinary flag has positively enlarged the discussion and neurologists, psychiatrists, mathematicians, and so on, have moved to the philosophy of mind arena, first with caution and now with a more powerful voice. Identifying what we mean by consciousness is a first (...) step even when we want to deny its existence. The link between consciousness and some other mental activity is a logical next step and there is abundant literature doing this, but not all of them differentiate among associated yet different phenomena. (shrink)

More often than not, theories of belief and of belief ascription restrict themselves to conscious beliefs, thus obliterating a vast part of our mental life and offering extremely incomplete, unrealistic theories. Indeed, conscious beliefs are the exception, not the rule, as far as human doxastic states are concerned, and a naturalistic, realistic theory of knowledge that aspires to completeness has to take unconscious beliefs into consideration. This paper is the elaboration of such a theory of belief.

This paper defends the view that a correct analysis of knowledge must take empirical data into consideration. The data here provided is from experimental psychology, namely from phenomena involving unconscious cognition.

The Chinese room thought experiment of John Searle militates against strong artificial intelligence, illustrating his claim that syntactical knowledge by itself is neither constitutive nor sufficient for semantic understanding as found in human minds. This thought experiment was put to a behavioural test, concerning the syntax of a finite algebraic field. Input, rules and output were presented with letters instead of numbers. The set of rules was first presented as a table but finally internalized by the participants. Quite in line (...) with Searle's argument, uninformed participants mastered the syntax but did not explicitly report semantic knowledge. In order to test the virtual mind reply to the Chinese room argument, the reaction time pattern of the participants was compared to that of an informed control group. The correlation was quite high but could be traced back to memory load and response priming, i.e. to syntactical factors. No trace of tacit semantic knowledge of the task could be found in the experimental group. (shrink)

Personnel selection has been criticised by scientific researchers for its intuitive interpersonal perception. Despite extensive scientific research in organizational setting, Human Resource practitioners attribute their successful decisions to intuition. In the Studies 1 to 4, personnel decisions made by the participants with different cognitive styles were tested. Participants were asked to select the best candidate based on his resume and recommendations. The candidates had to be evaluated after the structured interview or after the group discussion during the Assessment Center. Participants (...) also had the possibility to decide using the scores of the candidates achieved during the Assessment Center. The results of the first four studies revealed that the intuitive cognitive style was very successful in situations when working with information. This finding supports opinions of the organizational practitioners. At the same time, intuitive interpersonal judgment was significantly worse than rational. This finding supports the recommendations of organizational psychologists to use standardized methods. One explanation of these findings is that intuitive participants have a higher confirmation-bias than rational participants, which was found to influence negatively successful decision making. Intuitive participants showed higher confirmation bias than rational participants, especially in the step-by-step procedure. Rational articipants were interested in the controversial information, but not when asked to decide spontaneously. Alternative explanation of these considers the learning style preferences of the intuitive and rational participants. Rational participants tend to use Realistic Observation, which might explain their good observer qualities. Intuitive participants tend to use Active Experimentation and might handle data with ease, in comparison to the rational participants. Studies 3 and 4 continued investigation on the intuitive and rational decision making in different stages of the personnel selection. Intuitive decision makers were found to be better when handling with big amounts of partially missing, irrelevant information or handling scores of the standardized procedures. They also had higher preferences for cognitive bias and selecting the recommendations supporting their opinion then opposite to it. This could be explained by their learning style preferences – active and pragmatic. Looking for new things and implementing findings. Rational decision makers were more theoretical and looking for controversial information, except for the situations when under stress or forced to make a decision. In this case, similar to the intuitive participants, they also tend to search for consistent information. In the Study 5, we have measured the performance evaluation of groups with rational and intuitive cognitive styles, as well as heterogeneous groups. The findings supported the results of the previous studies that intuitive groups are more successful when working in the natural conditions. Intuitive members come along with each other and don’t report difficulties even when working in the virtual environment. Heterogeneous groups reported no difficulties in the mutual work or communication with each other. In sum, we have studied the influence of the intuitive and rational style on the personnel decisions made when using different personnel selection methods. We have also studied the mutual work of the participants with different cognitive styles. (shrink)