In a recent paper, David Albert has suggested that no quantum theory can yield a description of the world unfolding in Minkowski spacetime. This conclusion is premature; a natural extension of Stein's notion of becoming in Minkowski spacetime to accommodate the demands of quantum nonseparability yields such an account, an account that is in accord with a proposal which was made by Aharonov and Albert but which is dismissed by Albert as a ‘mere trick’. The nature of such an account (...) is clarified by an extension to a relativistic quantum context of David Lewis' picture of objective chances evolving in time. 1 Introduction 2 Classical relativistic becoming 3 Relativistic quantum becoming, without collapse 4 Relativistic quantum becoming, with collapse 5 Objective chance, conditional probability, and definite properties 6 The nature of the wave function 7 Conclusion. (shrink)

I discuss the idea of relativistic causality, i.e., the requirement that causal processes or signals can propagate only within the light-cone. After briefly locating this requirement in the philosophy of causation, my main aim is to draw philosophers' attention to the fact that it is subtle, indeed problematic, in relativistic quantum physics: there are scenarios in which it seems to fail. I set aside two such scenarios, which are familiar to philosophers of physics: the pilot-wave approach, and the Newton-Wigner representation. (...) I instead stress two unfamiliar scenarios: the Drummond-Hathrell and Scharnhorst effects. These effects also illustrate a general moral in the philosophy of geometry: that the mathematical structures, especially the metric tensor, that represent geometry get their geometric significance by dint of detailed physical arguments. (shrink)

I discuss various formulations of stochastic Einstein locality (SEL), which is a version of the idea of relativistic causality, that is, the idea that influences propagate at most as fast as light. SEL is similar to Reichenbach's Principle of the Common Cause (PCC), and Bell's Local Causality. My main aim is to discuss formulations of SEL for a fixed background spacetime. I previously argued that SEL is violated by the outcome dependence shown by Bell correlations, both in quantum mechanics and (...) in quantum field theory. Here I reassess those verdicts in the light of some recent literature which argues that outcome dependence does not violate the PCC. I argue that the verdicts about SEL still stand. Finally, I briefly discuss how to formulate relativistic causality if there is no fixed background spacetime. (shrink)

This paper surveys the issue of relativistic causality within the framework of algebraic quantum field theory . In doing so, we distinguish various notions of causality formulated in the literature and study their relationships, and thereby we offer what we hope to be a useful taxonomy. We propose that the most direct expression of relativistic causality in AQFT is captured not by the spectrum condition but rather by the axiom of local primitive causality, in that it entails a form of (...) local determinism for quantum fields which generalizes the constraint of no superluminal propagation of classical field theories to relativistic quantum field theory. We discuss the status of the axiom of micro-causality by locating its place within a large family of separability/independence/locality conditions developed for AQFT and also by relating it to so-called no-signalling theorems. And we also provide a critical survey of attempts to understand the implications for relativistic causality of the distant correlations endemic to the states in models of AQFT satisfying the standard axioms, and we provide an assessment of attempts to employ Reichenbach's common cause principle in AQFT to defuse worries that these distant correlations implicate direct causal connections between relatively spacelike events. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have often favoured reductive approaches to how-possibly explanation. This article identifies three alternative conceptions making how-possibly explanation an interesting phenomenon in its own right. The first variety approaches “how possibly X?” by showing that X is not epistemically impossible. This can sometimes be achieved by removing misunderstandings concerning the implications of one’s current belief system but involves characteristically a modification of this belief system so that acceptance of X does not result in contradiction. The second variety offers (...) a potential how-explanation of X. It is usually followed by a range of further potential how-explanations of the same phenomenon. In recent literature the factual claims implied by the second variety have been downplayed whereas the heuristic role of mapping the space of conceptual possibilities has been emphasized. I will focus especially on this truth-bracketing sense of potentiality when looking closer at the second variety in the paper. The third variety has attracted less interest. It presents a partial how-explanation of X. Typically it aims to establish the existence of a mechanism by which X could be and was generated. The third conception stands out as the natural alternative for the advocate of ontic how-possibly explanations. This article transfers Salmon’s view that explanation-concepts can be broadly divided into epistemic, modal, and ontic to the context of how-possibly explanations. Moreover, it is argued that each of the three above-mentioned varieties of how-possibly explanation occurs in science. To recognize this may be especially relevant for philosophers. We are often misled by the promises of various why-explanation accounts, and seem to have forgotten nearly everything about the diversity of how-possibly explanations. (shrink)

We distinguish two sub-types of each of the two causality principles formulated in connection with the Common Cause Principle in Henson and raise and investigate the problem of logical relations among the resulting four causality principles. Based in part on the analysis of the status of these four principles in algebraic quantum field theory we will argue that the four causal principles are non- equivalent.

In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called ``Reality Criterion'' imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in (...) the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades. The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will. (shrink)

We distinguish two sub-types of each of the two causality principles formulated in connection with the Common Cause Principle in Henson (2005) and raise and investigate the problem of logical relations among the resulting four causality principles. Based in part on the analysis of the status of these four principles in algebraic quantum field theory we will argue that the four causal principles are non-equivalent.

Relativistic locality is interpreted in this paper as a web of conditions expressing the compatibility of a physical theory with the underlying causal structure of spacetime. Four components of this web are distinguished: spatiotemporal locality, along with three distinct notions of causal locality, dubbed CL-Independence, CL-Dependence, and CL-Dynamic. These four conditions can be regimented using concepts from the categorical approach to quantum field theory initiated by Brunetti, Fredenhagen, and Verch (2003). A covariant functor representing a general quantum field theory is (...) defined to be causally local if it satisfies the three CL conditions. Any such theory is viewed as fully compliant with relativistic locality. We survey current results indicating the extent to which an algebraic quantum field theory satisfying the Haag–Kastler axioms is causally local. (shrink)

We prove that under some technical assumptions on a general, non-classical probability space, the probability space is extendible into a larger probability space that is common cause closed in the sense of containing a common cause of every correlation between elements in the space. It is argued that the philosophical significance of this common cause completability result is that it allows the defence of the Common Cause Principle against certain attempts of falsification. Some open problems concerning possible strengthening of the (...) common cause completability result are formulated. (shrink)

Rédei and San Pedro discuss my “Comparing Causality Principles,” their main aim being to distinguish reasonable weakened versions of two causality principles presented there, “SO1” and “SO2”. They also argue that the proof that SO1 implies SO2 contains a flaw. Here, a reply is made to a number of points raised in their paper. It is argued that the “intuition” that SO1 should be stronger than SO2 is implicitly based on a false premise. It is pointed out that a similar (...) weakening of SO2 was already considered in the original paper. The technical definition of the new conditions is shown to be defective. The argument against the stronger versions of SO1 and SO2 given by Rédei and San Pedro is criticised. The flaw in the original proof is shown to be an easily corrected mistake in the wording. Finally, it is argued that some cited results on causal conditions in AQFT have little relevance to these issues, and are, in any case, highly problematic in themselves. (shrink)

We prove new results on common cause closedness of quantum probability spaces, where by a quantum probability space is meant the projection lattice of a non-commutative von Neumann algebra together with a countably additive probability measure on the lattice. Common cause closedness is the feature that for every correlation between a pair of commuting projections there exists in the lattice a third projection commuting with both of the correlated projections and which is a Reichenbachian common cause of the correlation. The (...) main result we prove is that a quantum probability space is common cause closed if and only if it has at most one measure theoretic atom. This result improves earlier ones published in [1]. The result is discussed from the perspective of status of the Common Cause Principle. Open problems on common cause closedness of general probability spaces (L, ϕ) are formulated, where L is an orthomodular bounded lattice and ϕ is a probability measure on L. (shrink)

A probability space is common cause closed if it contains a Reichenbachian common cause of every correlation in it and common cause incomplete otherwise. It is shown that a probability space is common cause incomplete if and only if it contains more than one atom and that every space is common cause completable. The implications of these results for Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle are discussed, and it is argued that the principle is only falsifiable if conditions on the common cause (...) are imposed that go beyond the requirements formulated by Reichenbach in the definition of common cause. (shrink)

In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner’s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism – different understandings (...) of explanatory pluralism both within philosophy of science and psychiatry – namely moderate/temporary pluralism, anything goes pluralism, isolationist pluralism, integrative pluralism and interactive pluralism. Next, I discuss the pros and cons of these different understandings of explanatory pluralism. Finally, I raise the question of how to implement or operationalize explanatory pluralism in scientific practice; how to structure the “genuine dialogue” or shape “the pluralistic attitude” Campaner is referring to. As tentative answers, I explore a question-based framework for explanatory pluralism as well as social-epistemological procedures for interaction among competing approaches and explanations. (shrink)

We give a few results concerning the notions of causal completability and causal closedness of classical probability spaces . We prove that any classical probability space has a causally closed extension; any finite classical probability space with positive rational probabilities on the atoms of the event algebra can be extended to a causally up-to-three-closed finite space; and any classical probability space can be extended to a space in which all correlations between events that are logically independent modulo measure zero event (...) have a countably infinite common-cause system. Collectively, these results show that it is surprisingly easy to find Reichenbach-style ‘explanations' for correlations, underlining doubts as to whether this approach can yield a philosophically relevant account of causality. 1 Introduction2 Basic Definitions and Results in the Literature3 Causal Completability the Easy Way: ‘Splitting the Atom’4 Causal Completability of Classical Probability Spaces: The General Case5 Infinite Statistical Common-Cause Systems for Arbitrary Pairs6 ConclusionAppendix A. (shrink)

This paper has two parts, a historical and a systematic. In the historical part it is argued that the two major axiomatic approaches to relativistic quantum field theory, the Wightman and Haag-Kastler axiomatizations, are realizations of the program of axiomatization of physical theories announced by Hilbert in his 6th of the 23 problems discussed in his famous 1900 Paris lecture on open problems in mathematics, if axiomatizing physical theories is interpreted in a soft and opportunistic sense suggested in 1927 by (...) Hilbert, Nordheim, and von Neumann. To show this, Section 2 recalls first some of Hilbert's views about the axiomatic approach to physical theories as these were formulated in his 6th problem. It will be .. (shrink)

It is often argued that no local common cause models of EPR correlation exist. However, Szabó and Rédei pointed out that such arguments have the tacit assumption that plural correlations have the same common causes. Furthermore, Szabó showed that for EPR correlation a local common cause model in his sense exists. One of his requirements is that common cause events are statistically independent of apparatus settings on each side. However, as Szabó knows, to meet this requirement does not entail that (...) different combinations of common cause events (e.g. meet and join in lattice-theoretic terminology) are statistically independent of measurement settings. This further condition is formulated in two ways. First, the apparatus settings are completely independent of such combinations. Second, the apparatus settings on each side are independent of such combinations. Does a common cause model which meets the former and the latter respectively exist? This problem is considered. In particular, the latter version is Szabó’s and Rédei’s open problem. Negative answers are given to both versions. (shrink)

To consider metaphysical claims a priori and devoid of empirical content, is a rather commonplace received opinion. This paper attempts an exploration of a contemporary philosophical heresy: it is possible to test metaphysical claims if they play an indispensable role in producing empirical success, i.e. novel predictions. To do so one, firstly, needs to express the metaphysical claims employed in the logico-mathematical language of a scientific theory, i.e. to explicate them. Secondly, one should have an understanding of what it is (...) to test and to verify or to falsify a metaphysical claim. Finally, one also need to consider the philosophical practice of testing a metaphysical claim. These three aspects are introduced in this paper and they are illustrated by means of the metaphysical concept of common cause and the principle of the common cause. (shrink)

Bell inequalities, understood as constraints between classical conditional probabilities, can be derived from a set of assumptions representing a common causal explanation of classical correlations. A similar derivation, however, is not known for Bell inequalities in algebraic quantum field theories establishing constraints for the expectation of specific linear combinations of projections in a quantum state. In the paper we address the question as to whether a ‘common causal justification’ of these non-classical Bell inequalities is possible. We will show that although (...) the classical notion of common causal explanation can readily be generalized for the non-classical case, the Bell inequalities used in quantum theories cannot be derived from these non-classical common causes. Just the opposite is true: for a set of correlations there can be given a non-classical common causal explanation even if they violate the Bell inequalities. This shows that the range of common causal explanations in the non-classical case is wider than that restricted by the Bell inequalities. (shrink)

In the paper it will be shown that Reichenbach’s Weak Common Cause Principle is not valid in algebraic quantum field theory with locally finite degrees of freedom in general. Namely, for any pair of projections A, B supported in spacelike separated double cones ${\mathcal{O}}_{a}$ and ${\mathcal{O}}_{b}$ , respectively, a correlating state can be given for which there is no nontrivial common cause (system) located in the union of the backward light cones of ${\mathcal{O}}_{a}$ and ${\mathcal{O}}_{b}$ and commuting with the both (...) A and B. Since noncommuting common cause solutions are presented in these states the abandonment of commutativity can modulate this result: noncommutative Common Cause Principles might survive in these models. (shrink)

It is argued that in his critique of standard nonrelativistic quantum mechanics Einstein formulated three requirements as necessary for a physical theory to be compatible with the field-theorectical paradigm, and it is shown that local, relativistic, algebraic quantum field theory typically satisfies those criteria-although, there are still open questions concerning the status of operational separability of quantum systems localized in space like separated space-time regions. It is concluded that local algebraic quantum field theory can be viewed as a research program (...) that Einstein suggested informally in 1948 and that was realized only later in mathematical physics. (shrink)

The notion of common cause closedness of a classical, Kolmogorovian probability space with respect to a causal independence relation between the random events is defined, and propositions are presented that characterize common cause closedness for specific probability spaces. It is proved in particular that no probability space with a finite number of random events can contain common causes of all the correlations it predicts; however, it is demonstrated that probability spaces even with a finite number of random events can be (...) common cause closed with respect to a causal independence relation that is stronger than logical independence. Furthermore it is shown that infinite, atomless probability spaces are always common cause closed in the strongest possible sense. Open problems concerning common cause closedness are formulated and the results are interpreted from the perspective of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. (shrink)

In the paper the relation between the standard probabilistic characterization of the common cause and Bell's notion of local causality will be investigated. It will be shown that the probabilistic common cause follows from local causality if one accepts, as Bell did, two assumptions concerning the common cause: first, the common cause is localized in the intersection of the past of the correlating events; second, it provides a complete specification of the `beables' of this intersection. However, neither assumptions are a (...) priori requirements. In the paper the logical role of these assumptions will be studied and it will be shown that only the second assumption is necessary for the derivation of the probabilistic common cause from local causality. (shrink)

In the paper the relation between the standard probabilistic characterization of the common cause and Bell's notion of local causality will be investigated. It will be shown that the probabilistic common cause follows from local causality if one accepts, as Bell did, two assumptions concerning the common cause: first, the common cause is localized in the intersection of the past of the correlating events; second, it provides a complete specification of the `beables' of this intersection. However, neither assumptions are a (...) priori requirements. In the paper the logical role of these assumptions will be studied and it will be shown that only the second assumption is necessary for the derivation of the probabilistic common cause from local causality. (shrink)

I argue that algebraic quantum field theory (AQFT) permits an undisturbed view of the right ontology for fundamental physics, whereas standard (or Lagrangian) QFT offers different mutually incompatible ontologies.My claim does not depend on the mathematical inconsistency of standard QFT but on the fact that AQFT has the same concerns as ontology, namely categorical parsimony and a clearly structured hierarchy of entities.

This paper aims to implement Bell’s notion of local causality into a framework, called local physical theory, which is general enough to integrate both probabilistic and spatiotemporal concepts and also classical and quantum theories. Bell’s original idea of local causality will then arise as the classical case of our definition. First, we investigate what is needed for a local physical theory to be locally causal. Then we compare local causality with Reichenbach’s common cause principle and relate both to the Bell (...) inequalities. We find a nice parallelism: both local causality and the common cause principle are more general notions than captured by the Bell inequalities. Namely, Bell inequalities cannot be derived neither from local causality nor from a common cause unless the local physical theory is classical or the common cause is commuting, respectively. (shrink)

In recent years part of the literature on probabilistic causality concerned notions stemming from Reichenbach’s idea of explaining correlations between not directly causally related events by referring to their common causes. A few related notions have been introduced, e.g. that of a “common cause system” (Hofer-Szabó and Rédei in Int J Theor Phys 43(7/8):1819–1826, 2004) and “causal (N-)closedness” of probability spaces (Gyenis and Rédei in Found Phys 34(9):1284–1303, 2004; Hofer-Szabó and Rédei in Found Phys 36(5):745–756, 2006). In this paper we (...) introduce a new and natural notion similar to causal closedness and prove a number of theorems which can be seen as extensions of earlier results from the literature. Most notably we prove that a finite probability space is causally closed in our sense iff its measure is uniform. We also present a generalisation of this result to a class of non-classical probability spaces. (shrink)