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Proportionality, Winner-Take-All, and Distributive Justice

Mark R. Reiff

Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (1):5-42 (2009)

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Fairness and Aggregation.A. C. Paseau & Ben Saunders - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (4):460-469.details Sometimes, two unfair distributions cancel out in aggregate. Paradoxically, two distributions each of which is fair in isolation may give rise to aggregate unfairness. When assessing the fairness of distributions, it therefore matters whether we assess transactions piecemeal or focus only on the overall result. This piece illustrates these difficulties for two leading theories of fairness before offering a formal proof that no non-trivial theory guarantees aggregativity. This is not intended as a criticism of any particular theory, but as a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Principles of stakes fairness in sport.Alexander Brown - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (2):152-186.details Fairness in sport is not just about assigning the top prizes to the worthiest competitors. It is also about the way the prize structure itself is organised. For many sporting competitions, although it may be acceptable for winners to receive more than losers, it can seem unfair for winners to take everything and for losers to get nothing. Yet this insight leaves unanswered some difficult questions about what stakes fairness requires and which principles of stakes fairness are appropriate for particular (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Incommensurability and moral value.Mark R. Reiff - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (3):237-268.details Some theorists believe that there is a plurality of values, and that in many circumstances these values are incommensurable, or at least incomparable. Others believe that all values are reducible to a single super-value, or that even if there is a plurality of irreducible values these values are commensurable. But I will argue that both sides have got it wrong. Values are neither commensurable nor incommensurable, at least not in the way most people think. We are free to believe in (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Neutrality and Excellence.Mark R. Reiff - 2022 - In Mark McBride & Visa A. J. Kurki (eds.), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 271-296.details In Liberalism with Excellence, Matthew Kramer makes an argument for how excellence may enter in into liberalism, despite liberalism’s strong commitment to neutrality. Kramer seeks to challenge not only the uncompromising rejection of this position by liberals such a Jonathan Quong, but also the so-called “blended” approach of “soft-perfectionist” scholars such as Joseph Raz and George Sher. In this essay, I do not so much challenge Kramer’s approach as offer an alternative for accomplishing the same thing. Under my proposal, certain (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Cómo resolver un conflicto distributivo.Francisco García Gibson - 2016 - Isegoría 54:275-288.details Cuando dos agentes reclaman legítimamente un mismo bien, una solución posible al conflicto consiste en que el agente con el reclamo de mayor peso normativo obtenga derecho a todo el bien. Pero existe otra solución, que consiste en que el agente con el reclamo de mayor peso obtenga derecho sólo a una parte bien –la parte mayor–, mientras que el agente con el reclamo de menor peso obtenga derecho al menos a una parte del bien –aunque la parte menor–. En (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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