This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology. The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy (...) and neighbouring fields, including those of mathematics, psychology, literature and film, and neuroscience. (shrink)

This thesis develops a hermeneutic philosophy of science to provide insights into physics education. -/- Modernity cloaks the authentic character of modern physics whenever discoveries entertain us or we judge theory by its use. Those who justify physics education through an appeal to its utility, or who reject truth as an aspect of physics, relativists and constructivists, misunderstand the nature of physics. Demonstrations, not experiments, reveal the essence of physics as two characteristic engagements with truth. First, truth in its guise (...) as correspondence enables a human being to prepare for the distinctive event of physics. -/- Second, the event of physics occurs in human perception when someone forces a hidden reality to disclose an aspect of itself. Thus, the ground of physics is our human involvement with reality achieved by way of truth. -/- To support this account of physics, the thesis reports phenomenological investigations into Isaac Newton’s involvement with optics and a secondary school physics laboratory. These involve interpretations of Heidegger’s theory of beings, schema and signification. The project draws upon, and contributes to, the hermeneutic phenomenology of modern physics, a tradition in continental philosophy that begins with Immanuel Kant, and advances particularly from Martin Heidegger to Patrick Heelan. -/- The thesis advocates an ontological pedagogy for modern physics which has as its purpose each individual student’s engagement with reality and truth. Students may achieve this through demonstrations of phenomena that will enable them to dwell with physics, an experience that contrasts with their embroilment in modernity, and which perpetuates nature’s own science. (shrink)

This paper examines Heidegger's critique of Husserl in its earliest extant formulation, viz. the lecture courses Ontologie from 1923 and Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung from 1923/4. Commentators frequently ignore these lectures, but I try to show that a study of them can reveal both the extent to which Heidegger remains committed to phenomenological research in something like its Husserlian form, and when and why Heidegger must part with Husserl. More specifically, I claim that Heidegger rightly criticizes Husserl's account of (...) 'equipmental objects', and that he is especially unsatisfied with the terminology in which Husserl presents his phenomenological analyses, not only of 'equipment', but of other types of entities as well. However, it will also emerge that Heidegger's own phenomenological work presupposes the performance of what Husserl calls the 'epoch ', the method of 'bracketing' natural knowledge. In this way, Heidegger's sometimes very severe critique must be understood as an internal critique. (shrink)

Heidegger claimed that Western philosophy ended, failed even, in the German Idealist tradition. In The Culmination, Robert B. Pippin explores the ramifications of this charge through a masterful survey of Western philosophy, especially Heidegger's critiques of Hegel and Kant. Pippin argues that Heidegger's basic concern was to determine sources of meaning for human life, particularly those that had been obscured by Western philosophy's attention to reason. The Culmination offers a new interpretation of Heidegger, German Idealism, and the fate of Western (...) rationalism. (shrink)

Despite their strong spatial connotations, nearness, remoteness and distance are terms discussed in Martin Heidegger in connection to technology, interpretation, difference and lived time. In this paper, I investigate the nature of nearness, the possibility of its elimination and the meaning of such contingency via Bernard Stiegler's critique. In order to do this, I look into the nature of interpretation as a process of time-synthesis that brings the world near and is conditioned by technology. At the same time, I give (...) special attention to childhood as a unique but telling stage of this process. Furthermore, I look into technologies of nearness, now instantiated as digital technologies, and interpret them as processes that challenge the very notion they appear to promote, that is nearness and difference. Finally, I discuss these technologies in connection to education's possible response and impossible responsibility. Education is discussed as a technology of nearness that forms the child and their interp.. (shrink)

This thesis articulates a novel interpretation of Heidegger’s explication of the being (Seins) of gear (Zeugs) in §15 of his masterwork Being and Time (1927/2006) and develops and applies the position attributed to Heidegger to explain three phenomena of unreflective action discussed in recent literature and articulate a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics. Since §15 of BT explicates the being of gear, Part 1 expounds Heidegger’s concept of the ‘being’ (Seins) of beings (Seienden) and two issues raised in the ‘preliminary methodological (...) remark’ in §15 of BT regarding explicating being. §1.1 interprets the being (Sein) or synonymously constitution of being (Seinsverfassung) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence: a property unifying a region (Region), district (Bezirk), or subject-area (Sachgebiet) – a highly general (‘regional’) class of entities. Although Heidegger posits two components of the being of a being, viz. material-content (Sachhaltigkeit, Sachgehalt) and mode-of-being (Seinsart) or way-of-being (Seinsweise, Weise des Seins, Weise zu sein) (1927/1975, 321), the unclarity of this distinction means that it does not figure prominently herein. §1.2 addresses Heidegger’s distinction between ontological and ontic investigations and his notion of ‘modes of access’ (Zugangsarten, Zugangsweisen). Part 2 expounds §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear. §2.1 analyses Heidegger’s two necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear and three core basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) enabling comprehension of these conditions and therewith a foundational comprehension of gear. Heidegger explicates the being of gear through content of unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective intentional states. I term such states ‘mundane concern’, which is almost synonymous with Hubert Dreyfus’s term ‘absorbed coping’ (1991, 69). Heidegger’s explication highlights around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen) as the peculiar species of property figuring in mundanely concernful intentional content. §2.2 clarifies Heidegger’s position on the relationship between to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit) and extantness (Vorhandenheit) in the narrow sense: two of Heidegger’s most widely discussed concepts. I reject Kris McDaniel’s recent reading of Heidegger as affirming that nothing could be both to-hand and extant simultaneously (McDaniel 2012). Part 3 develops and applies Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern. §3.1 explains the phenomena of situational holism, situated normativity, and mundanely concernful prospective control. §3.2 undertakes the metaphysical accommodation of around-for references, which §3.1 posited as featuring prominently within mundanely concernful intentional content. This thesis thus contributes not only to Heidegger scholarship, but also to contemporary debates within the philosophy of action and cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper examines how Heidegger's view that language is poetry might provide a helpful way of understanding the nature of religious language. Poetry, according to Heidegger, is language in its purest form, in that it both reveals Being, whilst also showing the difference between word and thing. In poetry, Heidegger suggests, we come closest to the essence of language itself and encounter its strangeness and impermeability, and its revelatory character. What would be the implications for viewing religious language in this (...) way? Through examining Heidegger's view that poetry is the purest form of language, I suggest that it would also be possible to view religious language as poetry in this way, in that it also shows the transcendence of what cannot be brought to presence in language, except as concealed. Such a view of religious language does not regard it as a problematic type of language, deserving special treatment, but rather suggests that in religious language the inarticulable relationship between word and world is revealed. (shrink)

The main goal of this article is to examine the link between the idea of language, being and nothingness by comparing 16th century Turkish-Azeri poet Fuzûlî’s poetry and 20th century German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s philosophy departing from the latter’s thinking of being. There are similarities between Heidegger and Fuzûlî’s respective thoughts concerning the role of the human being’s relation to finitude which grounds the relationship between being and nothingness. The article consists of three sections. The first section makes sense of (...) Heidegger’s early and late thought in terms of its ontological unity, explaining the ways in which being and nothingness topologically co-determine one another in poetic language. The second section focuses on clarifying the sources that nourish Fuzûlî’s poetry, such as Sufism and the literary style of “Rind” as observed in classical Ottoman poetry, elucidating how these influences underpin the philosophical foundations of Fuzûlî’s poetry. The third section offers a philosophical interpretation of Fuzûlî’s lyric poems by illustrating how and why being and nothingness are not to be thought as mere opposites, pointing out their ontological belonging together. In the concluding section, it is argued that a poetic mode of existence necessitates an authentic experience of human finitude both for Heidegger and Fuzûlî. Although Fuzûlî’s poetry involves onto-theological influences from Sufism, Fuzûli manages to form an original idea of poetic existence, emphasizing that the poetic agent needs to take a step back from the mundane world of multitudes in order to unify with Being itself. As for Heidegger, it is doubtful whether there is such a mystical idea of being. Nonetheless, for both figures the more originary experience of finite human existence lies in the poetic interplay between being and nothingness. The poetic meaning of being comes to manifest itself in the process of one’s existential annihilation, which takes place in the movement of being-towards-death. Accordingly, exploring how the meaning of being requires the poetic experience of nothingness and how such an experience appears through language in Fuzûlî’s lyric poems provides a more comprehensive account of his thinking. (shrink)

The central question in Heidegger's philosophy, early and late, is that concerning the meaning of being. Recently, some have suggested that Heidegger himself interprets being to mean presence (Anwesen, Anwesenheit, Praesenz), citing as evidence lectures dating from the 1920s to the 1960s. I argue, on the contrary, that Heidegger regards the equation between being and presence as the hallmark of metaphysical thinking, and that it only ever appears in his texts as a gloss on the philosophical tradition, not as an (...) expression of his own ontological commitments. In his early work Heidegger seeks to confront and even correct the traditional interpretation of being by challenging its narrow preoccupation with presence and the present. By the 1930s, however, he abandons the idea that there is anything to?be intrinsically right or wrong about with regard to the meaning of being and turns his attention instead to what he calls ?appropriation? (Ereignis) or the truth of being, that is, the essentially ahistorical condition for the possibility of all historically contingent interpretations of being, including the metaphysical interpretation of being as presence. (shrink)

I advance a phenomenology of forgetting based on Husserl’s accounts of time-consciousness and passive synthesis. This theory of forgetting is crucial for understanding the transcendental constitution of the past. I argue that without forgetting, neither memory nor retention suffice for a consciousness of the past as past, since both are irreducibly connected to the Living Present. After an initial survey of the challenges that confront a phenomenology of forgetting, I provide a descriptive analysis of forgetting as a complex process that (...) integrates an accomplishment of retention that Husserl called “temporal contraction” with an accomplishment of passive synthesis that Husserl called “affective fusion.” Temporal contraction is the accomplishment that creates a qualitative distinction between near-retentions and far-retentions. Affective fusion enables us to provide a positive phenomenological description of the withdrawal of egoic investment in intentional experiences. Taken together, these two syntheses generate a double concealment in which consciousness both forgets its object and forgets that it has forgotten it, thereby constituting it as part of the truly absent past. (shrink)

This paper explores the human significance of crack cocaine abuse by submitting its manifestation (logos) to existential-phenomenological analysis. The author conducted over fifty, first-hand interviews of recovering and active crack cocaine abusers toward disclosing the meaning of his to-be.What is revealed is the way the addiction reacts upon the with-structure of existence. Active crack cocaine addiction is being-high-and-free-of-craving. The singularity of this event eclipses the interhuman significance that substantially constitutes concern, as the meaning and Being of There-being, and radicalizes existence (...) such that the “other” is unceasingly projected as a means to free transcendence. The crack abuser forsakes the existentials being-with and There-being-with-others, ways of to-be that accommodate and gear into the existence of “others,” to being-with-crack, a way of Being that is exclusively for the sake of the dependent’s “self.”. (shrink)

This paper offers a phenomenological or hermeneutic reading—employing Heidegger's notion of the 'ontological difference'—of certain central aspects of schizophrenic experience. The main focus is on signs and symptoms that have traditionally been taken to indicate either 'poor reality-testing' or else 'poverty of content of speech' (defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III-R as: “speech that is adequate in amount but conveys little information because of vagueness, empty repetitions, or use of stereotyped or obscure phrases"). I argue (...) that, at least in some cases, the tendency to attribute these signs of illness to the schizophrenic patient results from a failure to recognize that such patients—as part of a quasi-solipsistic orientation and alienation from more normal, pragmatic concerns—may be grappling with issues of what Heidegger would call an ontological rather than an ontic type, issues concerned not with entities but with Being (i.e. not with objects in the world but with the overall status of the world itself). An application of the Heideggerian concept of the ontological difference has the potential to alter one's sense of the lived-worlds of such patients, of what they may be attempting to communicate, and of why communication with them so often breaks down. (shrink)

Resumen: En el presente trabajo intentaremos destacar la necesidad que existe hoy, para la terapia ocupacional, de entablar un diálogo con la filosofía, enfatizando la relevancia de plantear la pregunta concerniente al ser humano en cuanto ocupación. Se plantea que la terapia ocupacional se encontraría en una situación de crisis de los fundamentos que la orientan y le brindan sentido a su práctica, proponiendo como posible solución una revisión de los aspectos principales de la analítica del Dasein de Martin Heidegger, (...) con el objeto de clarificar por qué y cómo el fenómeno de la ocupación puede ser considerado como un momento constitutivo de cada existencia humana.: This paper aims to emphasize the current need for occupational therapy to have a dialogue with philosophy, to highlight the question concerning the human being as occupation. The article argues that occupational therapy could be in a crisis concerning its fundamental grounds that, on the one hand, guide it and, on the other hand, give it sense to its own practice, proposing as a possible answer following Martin Heidegger’s analytics of Dasein. In this context, we will try to clarify why and how the phenomenon of occupation can be considered as an essential and constitutive moment of each human person. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Anaximander's pinax, the first map according to Western tradition. Its aim is to demonstrate that it is only after the realization of the pinax that it was possible to distinguish between Being and beings in a Heideggerian sense, that is to pose the question of the ontological difference. Consequently, all the history of Western thought is nothing but the history of the raising of cartographical representation, and of reason here embodied, from the dark rigidity of death (...) to the rarefied splendours of Pure Reason. (shrink)

This is an existential-phenomenological reading of Max Weber's "Class, Status, Party" that seeks a fuller understanding of meaning accomplishment in a stratified World. I appropriate stratification as a single meaning structure ontically defined by domination, intersubjectivity, and life-chances and ontologically determined by the power-to-be, There-being-with-others, and potentiality. I then discuss the significance of these structures in finite transcendence and describe ways they factually unfold in World achievement. I conclude with logotherapeutic reflections concerning meaning accomplishment in a stratified World and a (...) summary of key questions facing existential-phenomenology in light of the likelihood that There-being must embrace, indeed, live, the inherent equality of Being among Daseins to accomplish its authenticity. (shrink)

The author wishes to thank Professor Larry Grossberg for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

مارتین هایدگر در آثار متأخر خود تشریح می‌کند که متافیزیک به مثابه هستی‌ـ‌خداشناسی چگونه با توجه صرف به هستندگان آنها را از یک سو به جهت چیستی یا ذات مورد بررسی قرار می‌دهد و از سوی دیگر به جهت بودگی و قرار گرفتن در زنجیرۀ علّی ذیل برترین هستنده یا همان خداوند. وی با نگاه نقادانه به ساختار هستی‌ـ‌خداشناسی متافیزیک، بر آن است تا تبیین کند که رویکرد هستی‌ـ‌خداشناسانه هم سبب از دست رفتن فهم هستی شده و هم در نتیجۀ (...) آن الوهیت را از جایگاه اصلی خود خارج کرده است. در این مقاله بر آنیم تا معنای هستی‌ـ‌خداشناسی را در تفکر هایدگر متأخر بررسی کنیم و بدین منظور در پی آن هستیم که چگونه متافیزیک نزد هایدگر از نگاه همدلانۀ هستی‌شناسی بنیادین به رویکرد انتقادی هستی‌ـ‌خداشناسی تغییر جایگاه پیدا کرد و آثار دورۀ گذار و دورۀ متأخر وی را بدین منظور مورد تأمل قرار می‏دهیم. در این مقاله با تبیین ساختار هستی‌ـ‌خداشناسانۀ متافیزیک از منظر هایدگر نشان خواهیم داد که چگونه هستی مغفول واقع شده سبب تولد الهیات متافیزیکی شده است. (shrink)

This article examines select correspondences between the physics and phenomenology of time that beg elucidation and position phenomenology to contribute to the scientific investigation of reality. Its analysis yields four observations. The inherent tendency of things to change asymmetrically is the basis of time and temporality. Physics calls this tendency the “arrow of time.” Phenomenology calls it “άρχή κινήσεος”. The physics and phenomenology of time posit isomorphic interpretations of reality. They both interpret reality as a unity of time, space, and (...) beings. They also posit isomorphic interpretations of space. An analysis of the notions contemporary physics sometimes appears to presume suggests it is not immune to the prejudices induced by an ontic appropriation of reality, however. It also suggests a potentially constructive role for phenomenology in the scientific investigation of time and space. Physics and phenomenology reveal time as a relation between one set of transformations measured against another set of transformations. The human tendency to fall into the everyday comprehension of time may be complicating the scientific investigation of. (shrink)

Lichtung es una expresión que ha vertebrado el pensamiento de Martin Heidegger desde prácticamente sus comienzos como estudiante en la Universidad de Friburgo. En este sentido, dilucidaremos una de las primeras interpretaciones de Lichtung, en tanto claro del ser, que encontramos, dentro de la prolija obra del autor, en la obra Holzwege. Aquí, Heidegger intentar desprenderse de aquella percepción que pensaba el fenómeno de Lichtung como iluminación intencional del Dasein, a favor de otra, de menos compromisos para con la subjetividad (...) humana, que la piensa como el lugar de espaciamiento de la diferencia ontológica o el acontecimiento apropiador del ser, y que viene a ser unos de los modos en que se resuelve lo que se ha venido a llamar Kehre. (shrink)

Recently the relevance of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger has been critiqued in nursing literature. However, this critique is based primarily upon an appropriation of Heidegger that does not reflect an understanding of meaning as grounded in temporality. Therefore, this paper aims to (1) explicate Heidegger's grounding of meaning, (2) briefly contrast Heidegger's and Husserl's notions of the origin of meaning, (3) describe how Heidegger was first introduced to nursing, and (4) illustrate through examples from a research study how the (...) philosophy of Heidegger might inform the phenomenological researcher. (shrink)

This essay advances an interpretation of early Christian codex books, which goes beyond Catherine Pickstock’s critique of Jacques Derrida. Firstly, it summarizes Derrida’s deconstruction of Plato’s Phaedrus and introduces his understanding of writing as différance. Secondly, it outlines Pickstock’s After Writing in order to understand her emphasis upon the liturgical nature of platonic dialogue. It is here that an ambiguity emerges between writing and codex books in Pickstock’s account. In response, the insights of book historians such as Roger Chartier will (...) be brought to bear in order to understand the longer history of the codex, which sees the printing press as a continuation of the early transition from roll to codex in the second century of the Common Era. It has long been noted that Christians of this period were early and pervasive adopters of codex binding for their sacred literature. By summarizing the reasons why, it will be shown how the codex expressed early Christian religious concerns. (shrink)

This paper argues for a fundamental re-reading of Heideggerian philosophy, especially regarding the logical structures presented by Heidegger in the thirties and onward. The field, which this logic organizes, shows an explorative formal element of language in and of itself, and is therefore different from an analytic concept of logic. An analytic conceptualization of logic is understood here as a reflection on the inner structures of already existing notions. An explorative logic, on the other hand, explores the relations between already (...) existing notions and the possible, but yet unknown, development of new notions. The logic of Heidegger is explorative, as it describes the relational, formal structures between the already established semantic field and its virtual excess. This virtual excess, while formal, must be nonetheless considered the primary access to whatever we call external to language in the transcendental sense in Heidegger's philosophy. Therefore, the central question of this logical re-reading of Heidegger is the formal relation to the unknown real. (shrink)

Atypical among Heidegger’s numerous discussions of poets is the condemnation of Rilke in the 1942-43 lecture course Parmenides. At stake is the definition of “the open” (das Offene): Rilke reserves the open for animals as freedom from conceptual determinacy, whereas Heidegger reserves it for human beings as the place of Being in which things first appear as what they are. The open, for Heidegger, names the existential conception of place (as distinct from a geographical point) and features in his life-long (...) attempts to articulate the relations between language, human existence, poetry and the everyday. By denying that human beings have access to the open, Rilke runs athwart this project and by denying it in a poem he confounds the expectations that Heidegger harbours with respect to the work of art as a site of the opening up of aesthetic experience, within the everyday, to ontological questioning. (shrink)

This article sets the stage for a genealogy of the postgenomic body. It starts with the current transformative views of epigenetics and microbiomics to offer a more pluralistic history in which the ethical problem of how to live with a permeable body – that is plasticity as a form of life – is pervasive in traditions pre-dating and coexisting with modern biomedicine (particularly humoralism in its several ramifications). To challenge universalizing narratives, I draw on genealogical method to illuminate the unequal (...) distribution of plasticity across gender and ethnic groups. Finally, after analysing postgenomics as a different thought-style to genomics, I outline some of its implications for notions of plasticity. I argue that postgenomic plasticity is neither a modernistic plasticity of instrumental control of the body nor a postmodernist celebration of endless potentialities. It is instead closer to an alter-modernistic view that disrupts clear boundaries between openness and determination, individual and community. (shrink)

The Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom is the most coherent form of Schelling’s attempt to describe the absolute system or the system of freedom. For the first time in the twentieth century, with Heidegger’s careful reference to his treatise on freedom and his repeated commentary in 1936 and 1941, the importance of this treatise in the history of Western thought became apparent. Heidegger focuses on Schilling’s thinking, especially with Schilling’s treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, research (...) into the formation of the system, and the question of the possibility of a system of freedom as a question of the essence of being. Schilling bases his research on the system of freedom on a correct ontological basis in order to transcend formal freedom as an independent determinant of mechanical causation and to achieve the true definition of freedom as the ability to do good and evil. And after proposing the inadequacy of formal freedom in the idealist systems before it, it introduces the real and living concept of freedom as the ability to do good and evil. Heidegger demonstrates the independence of the Schelling system in comparison with the Fichte and Hegel systems, and his innovations in response to issues such as evil, freedom, identity, and the relation of being and “is” are most evident in the metaphysical realm of the will; however, remaining within the metaphorical framework also prevents Schilling from approaching the question of the truth of existence. Schilling’s important issue is the elimination of the opposition between freedom and necessity, which, in his view, is the focus of philosophy. For this reason, the discussion of freedom is at the heart of the system in its true sense, and in his opinion, his dissertation is for the first time the design of a system based on the idea of human freedom. The possibility of a system of freedom must be created in accordance with the principle of identity, which does not ignore the meaning of the relation of theology. In Schelling’s Heideggerian interpretation of the principle of identity, the priority of ontological issues in matters of theological nature such as all theism is given more importance and the question of all theism as a question of the system to the question of “is” and how to connect the structure of beings as a whole. The purpose of this paper is to analyze Heidegger’s interpretation of the concept of the system of freedom according to Schelling with emphasis on the ontological distinction between ground and existence. This study seeks to answer these two questions: how does the design of the real concept of freedom open the way to explain the ontological foundation of the possibility of evil and the possibility of freedom in the system? Also, how does the distinction between ground and existence lead to Schelling’s main goal in resolving the conflict between system and freedom? Moreover, according to Heidegger, to what extent does this distinction arise from Schilling’s metaphysical and subject-centered thinking? (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyse through an ontological approach the concept of φύσις/nature as the never-ending emergence of the beings and their being kept into steadfast appearance and presence. On the basis of Martin Heidegger’s interpretation, we will try to show that φύσις is not a mere sum of natural objects; φύσις could be better understood via our recognition of its pervading our own being and our own being/presenting as φύσις and through φύσις’ ceaseless eventuation in our (...) lives and thought. (shrink)

هایدگر متأخر، با واکاوی تاریخ تفکر مغرب‌زمین، فلسفه دوره مدرن را به مثابه تداوم سنت متافیزیک یونانی، و نه گسستی از آن، تبیین کرده و سوبژکتیویسم دکارتی را برآمده از هستی‌-‌خداشناسی یونان، خاصه افلاطون و ارسطو، تفسیر می‌کند. رشد خودآگاهی سوژه عقلانی به خویشتن، به مثابه بسط منطقی و ضروری عقلانیت یونانی ، منجر به این می‌شود که دکارت هستی را به عنوان تصورشدگی نزد فاعل شناسا تفسیر کند. در این صورت، تصورشدگی، به مثابه هستی هستندگان، وامدار سوژه انسانی خواهد (...) بود و در نتیجه فاعل شناسا را در جایگاه بنیاد هستندگان قرار می‌دهد. با این وصف، انسان، در مقام سوژه، پس از این می‌تواند جایگاهی را اشغال کند که پیش از این، و در متافیزیک و الهیات فلسفی، متعلق به خداوند بوده است. همین تصاحب جایگاه خداوند به وسیلۀ سوژه انسانی است که منجر به افول اعتبار او به مثابه بنیاد هستندگان می‌شود و تردیدهایی ملازم با وجود یا معناداری او را از پی می‌آورد. (shrink)

This article critically exposes Habermas’ discussion of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of Being and George Bataille’s heterology as a way of identifying the postmetaphysical stance as the guiding spirit of Habermas’ modernity. In his work The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas argues that whereas Heidegger’s Being sacrifices actuality in the name of interpretation, Bataille’s heterology sets up the unlimited experience which fails to provide an impetus for societal critique. Here a postmetaphysical approach is envisaged by Habermas as a way of going (...) beyond the confines of the metaphysical tradition, although it also needs to pay attention to charges of misreading in its attempt to deconstruct the discourse of the modern. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Studie unternimmt den Versuch, Gadamers Ideen zur Begriffsbildung und Textbedeutung einer rationalen Rekonstruktion im Licht neuerer Entwicklungen in der linguistischen und philosophischen Semantik zu unterziehen. Anschließend an eine Kritik gewisser auf Heidegger zurückgehender Annahmen in Gadamers Wahrheit und Methode werden seine Begriffe der Applikation und der Geschichtlichkeit von Textbedeutungen reformuliert. Dies geschieht unter Bezugnahme auf J. J. Katz' Bedeutungs- und Referenztheorie, H. Putnams Theorie der Stereotypen und J. M. E. Moravcsiks Begriff der 'aitiational frames'. Es wird im besonderen (...) die These vertreten, daß Gadamers Idee der Interpretation als eines Prozesses, bei dem Autor und Leser zu einer Übereinkunft über die 'Sache' kommen , neu und fruchtbar in Begriffen der Interaktion zwischen semantischer Kompetenz und Alltagswissen im Leseprozeß überdacht werden kann. In Verbindung mit weiteren Teilen linguistischer Theorie würde ein solcher Neuansatz es ermöglichen, die Frage zu beantworten wie Verstehen im Prinzip möglich ist. Eine rationale Rekonstruktion von Gadamers Begriff der Applikation in dieser Richtung würde es ferner erlauben, Antworten auf eine Reihe weiterer schwieriger Fragen wie zum Beispiel der nach dem Grad der Unbestimmtheit von Textbedeutungen und der 'Korrektheit' von Interpretationen zu erhalten. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIf we take Heidegger's ontology to be a philosophy of history, then, for Husserl, the problem of history is only one among the three major directions of his thoughts. After Husserl met Dilthey in 1905, he more and more attended to the problem of history and reflected upon the longitudinal intentionality of time-genesis-history. His basic idea is to grasp the condition of possibility of history by means of an eidetic intuition upon the longitudinal intentionality. However, because Husserl never explicates his (...) thoughts on history in his published works, he is often regarded as a “non-historical” philosopher. In fact, like Dilthey, Husserl purports to combine historical enlightenment with critique of knowledge. It is hence Dilthey-Yorck, Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer who established together the most important tradition of history of philosophy in the twentieth century, namely, phenomenological-ontological philosophy of history. (shrink)

This article is about our relationship with things; about the abundant material geographies that surround us and constitute the very possibility for us to be the beings that we are. More specifically, it is about the question of the possibility of an ethical encounter with things (qua things). We argue, with the science and technology studies tradition (and Latour in particular), that we are the beings that we are through our entanglements with things, we are thoroughly hybrid beings, cyborgs through (...) and through – we have never been otherwise. With Heidegger we propose that a human-centred ethics of hybrids will fail to open a space for an ethical encounter with things since all beings in the sociomaterial network – humans and non-human alike – end up circulating as objects, enframed as ‘standing reserve’, things-for-the-purposes-of the network. We suggest that what is needed is an ethos beyond ethics, or the overcoming of an ethics – which is based on the will to power – towards an ethos of letting be. We elaborate such a possibility with the help of Heidegger, in particular with reference to the work of Graham Harman and his notion of ‘tool-being’. From this we propose, very tentatively, an ethos that has as its ground a poetic dwelling with things, a way of being that lets being be (Gelassenheit). We show how such a poetic dwelling, or ethos of Gelassenheit, may constitute the impossible possibility of a very otherwise way of being with things – an ethos of a ‘community of those who have nothing in common’ as suggested by Alphonso Lingis. (shrink)

Embora saibamos que, nos passos iniciais do itinerário do pensamento de Heidegger, não haja um tratamento formal do conceito de natureza, existe, contudo, uma interpretação crítica do conceito naturalista do ser, pertencente à tradição metafísica, que o filósofo quer ultrapassar em direção a uma outra perspectiva de pensamento, guiada por uma fenomenologia hermenêutica e nascida do caráter humano de ser do homem, isto é, das condições ontológico-fácticas de sua existência. O presente artigo procura indicar o contraponto entre esses dois modos (...) de interpretação do ser, o natural e o humano, acompanhando os passos mais significativos dados pelo jovem Heidegger entre 1907, época de seu despertar para a filosofia, e meados dos anos 20, ocasião de suas pesquisas sobre o cristianismo primitivo e sobre escritos práticos sobre Aristóteles.Despite we know that there is not a formal treatment of nature′s concept in the initial steps of Heidegger′s thought, there is, although, a critical interpretation of the naturalist concept of Being, concerning to metaphysical tradition, which the philosopher wants go beyond to another perspective of thought. That perspective is guided by a hermeneutic phenomenology and born from human character of being of man, that is, from ontological and factical conditions of your existence. The present paper intends to indicate the counterpoint between these two ways of the interpretation of Being, the natural and the human, following the more expressive steps given by young Heidegger between 1907, age of his awakening to philosophy, and the early twenties, time of his researches about primal Christianity and Aristotle′s practical writings. (shrink)