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On speaking thus: The semantics of indirect discourse.Jane Heal - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):433-454.details
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Keeping track of individuals: Brandom's analysis of Kripke's puzzle and the content of belief.Carlo Penco - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):177-201.details
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Definite Descriptions and the Gettier Example.Christoph Schmidt-Petri & London School of Economics and Political Science - 2002 - CPNSS Discussion Papers.details
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Thought by Description.Michael Mckinsey - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):83-102.details
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Baseball, pessimistic inductions and the turnover fallacy.M. Lange - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):281-285.details
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Coherence as an ideal of rationality.Lyle Zynda - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):175 - 216.details
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Weak speech reports.Martín Abreu Zavaleta - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2139-2166.details
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Quantifying In from a Fregean Perspective.Seth Yalcin - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):207-253.details
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Sentence-relativity and the necessary a posteriori.Kai-Yee Wong - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):53 - 91.details
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On Belief Content and That-Clauses.William W. Taschek - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (3):274-298.details
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Logical knowledge.Ruth Weintraub - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (1):3 – 18.details
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The metaethicists' mistake.Ralph Wedgwood - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):405–426.details
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Eternalism and Propositional Multitasking: in defence of the Operator Argument.Clas Weber - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):199-219.details
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How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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Complex demonstratives, singular thought, and belief attributions.José Manuel Viejo - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-27.details
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Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):183-200.details
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A Puzzle about Disagreement.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (37):283-297.details
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Propositions and Parthood: The Universe and Anti-Symmetry.Chris Tillman & Gregory Fowler - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):525 - 539.details
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De Re And De Dicto: Against The Conventional Wisdom.Ken Taylor - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s16):225-265.details
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Words on Kripke’s Puzzle.Maciej Tarnowski & Maciej Głowacki - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-21.details
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Descriptions and uniqueness.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):29-57.details
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The contingent a priori and implicit knowledge.Jonathan Supon - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):251–277.details
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Do conversational implicatures explain substitutivity failures?Cara Spencer - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):126–139.details
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Epistemic Intensions.Scott Soames - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):220-228.details
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Three Problems for Richard’s Theory of Belief Ascription.Theodore Sider - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):487 - 513.details
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LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room.Susan Schneider - 2009 - Synthese 170 (2):235 - 250.details
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From contextualism to contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.details
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Direct reference, psychological explanation, and Frege cases.Susan Schneider - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (4):423-447.details
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Still an attitude problem.Jennifer M. Saul - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (4):423 - 435.details
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Fictional Reports A Study on the Semantics of Fictional Names.Fiora Salis - 2010 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 25 (2):175-185.details
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The Myth of Reverse Compositionality.Philip Robbins - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (2):251-275.details
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Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions.David Ripley - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):97 - 118.details
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A semiquotational solution to substitution puzzles.Steven Rieber - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (3):267-301.details
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What are Propositions?Mark Richard - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5):702-719.details
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Why and How to Fill an Unfilled Proposition.Samuel C. Rickless - 2011 - Theoria 78 (1):6-25.details
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The Sense of Communication.Richard Heck - 1995 - Mind 104 (413):79 - 106.details
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Meaning and Attitude Ascriptions.M. Richard - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):683-709.details
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Against the Quotational Theory of Meaning Ascriptions.Andrea Raimondi - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (2):81-103.details
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Mental Graphs.James Pryor - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):309-341.details
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The price of innocent millianism.Stefano Predelli - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):335-356.details
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The Impersonal ‘you’ and Other Indexicals.Stefano Predelli - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):2-25.details
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The Impersonal ‘you’ and Other Indexicals.Stefano Predelli - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):2-25.details
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Hybrid Indexicals and Ellipsis.Stefano Predelli - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):385-403.details
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How to refrain from answering Kripke’s puzzle.Lewis Powell - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):287-308.details
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Mark Crimmins, talk about beliefs, cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1992, XI + 214 pp., $25.00 (cloth), ISBN 0-262-03185-X. [REVIEW]Philip L. Peterson - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (2):296-301.details
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The indexical character of names.M. Pelczar & J. Rainsbury - 1998 - Synthese 114 (2):293-317.details
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The indispensability of farbung.Michael W. Pelczar - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):49 - 77.details
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Forms and objects of thought.Michael W. Pelczar - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):97-122.details
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