This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between (...) the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas’ notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator. (shrink)

An experimental paradigm that purports to test young children’s understanding of social norms is examined. The paradigm models norms on Searle’s notion of a constitutive rule. The experiments and the reasons provided for their design are discussed. It is argued that the experiments do not provide direct evidence about the development of social norms and that the concepts of a social norm and constitutive rule are distinct. The experimental data are re-interpreted, and suggestions for how to deal with the present (...) criticism are presented that do not require abandoning the paradigm as such. Then the conception of normativity that underlies the experimental paradigm is rejected and an alternative view is put forward. It is argued that normativity emerges from interaction and engagement, and that learning to comply with social norms involves understanding the distinction between their content, enforcement, and acceptance. As opposed to rule-based accounts that picture the development of an understanding of social norms as one-directional and based in enforcement, the present view emphasizes that normativity is situated, reciprocal, and interactive. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine some of the presuppositions that underpin the practice and interpretation of multi-person dialogue – that is, in contexts involving more than two interlocutors – with particular thought for the university seminar. I outline the ‘dialogical phenomenology’ of Beata Stawarska as useful on this count; however, I argue that Stawarska’s account is steeped in a philosophical ‘dyadic paradigm’ which has limiting consequences for practitioners of dialogue looking to understand the nature of dialogue in a group context. (...) Against this paradigm, I argue that there are many varieties of intersubjectivity that have not been widely discussed, including we-you, we-yous, I-yous and we-they intersubjective structures. I will look further at how an understanding of these structures is valuable for dialogue within educational praxes and for the Humanities more broadly. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine some of the presuppositions that underpin the practice and interpretation of multi-person dialogue – that is, in contexts involving more than two interlocutors – with particular thought for the university seminar. I outline the ‘dialogical phenomenology’ of Beata Stawarska as useful on this count; however, I argue that Stawarska’s account is steeped in a philosophical ‘dyadic paradigm’ which has limiting consequences for practitioners of dialogue looking to understand the nature of dialogue in a group context. (...) Against this paradigm, I argue that there are many varieties of intersubjectivity that have not been widely discussed, including we-you, we-yous, I-yous and we-they intersubjective structures. I will look further at how an understanding of these structures is valuable for dialogue within educational praxes and for the Humanities more broadly. (shrink)