Michel Foucault is often criticised in English-speaking circles for being interested only in power as domination, and of being uninterested in freedom and social reform. This paper shows, however, that Foucault's overarching concern was with the constitution of the self under conditions of modernity. It emphasises the significance of his interest in the Classical project of ‘Self-care’, and of his countermodernist educational programme in which the skills of self-governance and the ethical (non-dominating) governance of others, as well as the practice (...) of freedom through self-creation, are the key ingredients. (shrink)

(1997). Wittgenstein and post‐analytic philosophy of education: Rorty or Lyotard? Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 1-32. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.1997.tb00018.x.

This article examines the relevance of post-criticality as a research stance across various traditions in educational research. After problematizing the dominance of critical approaches centred on deconstruction and denunciation, the authors advocate instead for an empirical philosophy of education. This article sets the stage for a suite of articles, published in this issue, which explore affirmative, engaged methodologies that prioritize proximity to educational practices over detached critique. Collectively, the articles investigate how post-critical methodologies can produce richer understandings of educational realities (...) and foster meaningful connections between theory and practice. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis introduction outlines the rationale of the symposium 'Vocabularies of Hope in Place of Vocabularies of Critique: Can Rorty Help Us to Redescribe Education?'. In particular, it argues that, despite some early statements of Richard Rorty, he may turn out to be a particularly timely thinker in reference to debates occurring in the field of educational theory and philosophy, especially by suggesting an engagement with the latter through vocabularies of hope. Moreover, after highlighting that a valuable dialogue may be established (...) between Rorty's stance and post-critical pedagogy, the introduction describes in broad strokes along which lines this conversation will unfold in the three papers and one response composing the symposium. (shrink)

In his recent work in social epistemology, Alvin Goldman argues that truth is the fundamental epistemic end of education, and that critical thinking is of merely instrumental value with respect to that fundamental end. He also argues that there is a central place for testimony and trust in the classroom, and an educational danger in over‐emphasizing the fostering of students’ critical thinking. In this paper I take issue with these claims, and argue that (1) critical thinking is a fundamental end (...) of education, independently of its instrumental tie to truth, and (2) it is critical thinking, rather than testimony and trust, that is educationally basic. (shrink)

Alasdair MacIntyre and Richard Rorty, in their different ways, have represented the tension between acculturation and individuation, truth and freedom, as central to modern education systems, a tension which, both agree, they have failed to resolve. The paper argues that an additional complication is that in the contemporary postmodern landscape, which prioritises the notion of lifelong learning in its policy discourse, the very notion of education is threatened, and asks whether we should care. It considers MacIntyre’s suggestion that the notion (...) of the educated public can solve the former tension and concurrently re-launch the notion of education in the postmodern world—central to MacIntyre’s plan is the reform of the university. And against it Rorty’s suggestion that acculturation and individuation be regarded as different but connected processes, with individuation conceived as self-creation and located in the non-vocational university. (shrink)

The RoutledgeFalmer Reader in Philosophy of Education brings together a number of book chapters and articles in the philosophy of education. These cover a wide range of issues that engage and, in many cases, trouble contemporary philosophers of education, beginning with the perennial and fundamental one of the relationship between philosophy and education. The other sections, which include a rich selection of readings, concern the nature of education and its politics, policy‐making and the moral dimensions of teaching. The whole is (...) preceded by a provocative introductory essay written by Wilfred Carr, the book's editor. In it he suggests a different Aristotelian perspective on these issues, a different narrative from the usual contemporary post‐analytic one we are used to and a means of responding to them, inspired mainly by the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. This essay both takes up Carr's provocations in this Introduction and comprehensively reviews the book and the chapters in it. (shrink)

In this contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium on Richard Rorty, the author attempts to identify what he calls “the heart of Rortyism.” Beginning with Rorty's query, as an undergraduate, about “what, if anything, philosophy is good for,” Višňovský associates this question, as Rorty did throughout his career, with the question of the meaning of human life. On the basis of this association—the association of a seriously, consistently pursued metaphilosophy with a defense of humanity against all comers, including theology and (...) science—Rorty moved methodically through the arguments of the “Linguistic Turn” analysts, the pragmatists, the antirepresentationalists, and postmodernists until he achieved an anti-absolutist, antiauthoritarian humanism all his own. (shrink)

In this paper, I will explore Rorty’s recommendation to shift from a philosophical to a literary culture by addressing this theme through a philosophical-educational lens and in reference to the question of what kind of education we need in order to foster democratic ethos. In this perspective, I will establish a comparison/contrast between Rorty’s idea of sentimental education and Matthew Lipman’s Philosophy for Children understood as two (alternative?) ways of recontextualizing Dewey’s heritage. After discussing Rorty’s understanding of a need for (...) an end (instead of a “Deweyan” recovery) of philosophy starting from his dialogue with Castoriadis and by reconstructing his appeal to a poeticized culture, I will present Lipman’s case for education for philosophical inquiry in order to cultivate a democratic ethos in primary and secondary schools. I will contrast it with Rorty’s education as socialization and, contextually, I will illustrate their different stances towards Hirsch’s cultural literacy and his core curriculum approach to civic education. Finally, after problematizing Rorty’s views on the use of literature for a democratic culture, I will indicate the need to combine the Rortyan and Lipmanian thrusts and will claim that an aspect of the novel-driven education advocated by Rorty maintains a constitutive Socratic-inquiring dimension. (shrink)

Starting from an emblematic episode described by Rorty in Trotsky and the Wild Orchids, which is an effective narrative example of making public a private experience, the article provides an inquiry into Rorty’s thinking around education, with a particular focus on his notions of contingency and luck.In particular, the article offers an analysis of Rorty’s frequent use of the term “luck,” in accordance with a literary (non-philosophical) method, which informs his understanding of the role and function of education and his (...) view of the educational process. The use of a literary method is useful to give shape and meaning to the contingency of human experience, creating a narrative thread to connect the past and present and make meaning of the present through the images of the past. Within this framework, Rorty understands “luck” as a specific and crucial condition that highlights the presence of an undetermined space within which education can make a difference in individual life. (shrink)

Currently, the repetition of a critical way of speaking results in a stagnating tendency in educational debates. This had led to the endeavour of developing a ‘post-critical pedagogy’. This paper employs Rortyan and Latourian language in order to tackle the question of how such a post-critical pedagogy should deal with critique. It argues that if one takes critique as what Latour calls a debunking activity, then post-critical pedagogy should leave critique behind. If however critique means simply to say how something (...) should not be, then post-critical pedagogy should remain critical. In addition, however, there is a need for enriching the critical vocabulary with more affirmative language. For accomplishing this need, in contrast to recent suggestions to go back to ontology, the paper suggests that new propositions developed by literary theorists like Sedgwick and Felski are more promising. All these arguments are framed by Rorty’s notion of philosophy as cultural politics. (shrink)

En este artículo analizamos la crítica que Richard Rorty hace de la apelación al “método experimental” por parte de John Dewey. Defendemos que la categórica desestimación que Rorty presenta del vínculo entre el pragmatismo de Dewey y su concepción de método hubiera sido o bien matizada, o bien radicalmente diferente, de haber considerado seriamente la importancia que la reflexión sobre la educación tenía para el filósofo de Vermont. Nuestra estrategia interpretativa se apoya en la recuperación que Henry Cowles hace recientemente (...) de la apelación al método experimental que Dewey lleva a cabo en How We Think —uno de sus textos educativos más importantes—, en donde se muestra las vinculaciones relevantes entre pragmatismo, evolucionismo y método. Este marco histórico-conceptual nos permitirá cuestionar la reconstrucción de Rorty en torno de este aspecto de la filosofía deweyana tomando en cuenta, fundamentalmente, sus propias reflexiones sobre educación. (shrink)

Richard Rorty holds that the novel is the characteristic genre of democracy, because it helps people to develop and to stabilize two crucial capabilities the ideal inhabitants of democratic societies should possess: a keen sense for anti-foundationalism and a disposition for solidarity. He believes that novels help develop these capabilities by educating our capacity for criticism and our capacity for attentive-empathetic perception. This article argues in favor of this Rortyan idea, showing how anti-foundationalism and solidarity can be seen as important (...) instances of what I will call 'dispositions for democratic citizenship' and that art (and not only novels) and its reception, are valuable tools for advancing these dispositions. However, as the Rortyan public-private dichotomy assigns art’s function of criticism only to the private sphere, Rorty ignores its potential for stimulating democratic public deliberation and he misses the fact that art’s functions of criticism and of attentive-empathetic perception partially depend on each other if they are effectively to lead to increased solidarity and change social realities. Thus this article argues—taking these objections into account—to slightly modify, but nevertheless value Rorty’s idea that art and its reception are crucial resources for democratic citizenship and for the process of democratic deliberation. (shrink)