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Our Intuitions About the Experience Machine

Rach Cosker-Rowland

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):110-117 (2017)

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Consciousness Ain’t All That.Neil Levy - 2024 - Neuroethics 17 (2):1-14.details Most philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness underlies, or at any rate makes a large contribution, to moral considerability. This paper argues that many such accounts invoke question-begging arguments. Moreover, they’re unable to explain apparent differences in moral status across and within different species. In the light of these problems, I argue that we ought to take very seriously a view according to which moral considerability is grounded in functional properties. Phenomenal consciousness may be sufficient for having a moral value, but (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The Fourfold Route to Empirical Enlightenment: Experimental Philosophy’s Adolescence and the Changing Body of Work.Robert Barnard, Joseph Ulatowski & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (2):77-113.details The time has come to consider whether experimental philosophy’s (“x-phi”) early arguments, debates, and conceptual frameworks, that may have worn well in its early days, fit with the diverse range of projects undertaken by experimental philosophers. Our aim is to propose a novel taxonomy for x-phi that identifies four paths from empirical findings to philosophical consequences, which we call the “fourfold route.” We show how this taxonomy can be fruitfully applied even at what one might have taken to be the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The sentience argument for experientialism about welfare.Willem van der Deijl - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):187-208.details Can a person’s degree of wellbeing be affected by things that do not enter her experience? Experientialists deny that it can, extra-experientialists affirm it. The debate between these two positions has focused on an argument against experientialism—the experience machine objection—but few arguments exist for it. I present an argument for experientialism. It builds on the claim that theories of wellbeing should not only state what constitutes wellbeing, but also which entities are welfare subjects. Moreover, the claims it makes about these (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 18 citations
Intuitions and Values: Re-assessing the classical arguments against quantitative hedonism.David Lanius - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):53-84.details Few philosophers today embrace quantitative hedonism, which states that a person’s well-being depends only on the amount of her experienced happiness and suffering. Despite recent attempts to rehabilitate it, most philosophers still consider it untenable. The most influential arguments levelled against it by Mill, Moore, Nozick and Kagan purport to demonstrate that well-being must depend on more than only the amount of experienced happiness and suffering. I argue in this paper that quantitative hedonism can rebut these arguments by pointing out (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Ethical Theories and Controversial Intuitions.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):318-345.details We have controversial intuitions about the rightness of retributive punishment, keeping promises for its own sake, and pushing the heavy man off of the bridge in the footbridge trolley case. How do these intuitions relate to ethical theories? Should ethical theories aim to fit with and explain them? Or are only uncontroversial intuitions relevant to explanatory ethical theorising? I argue against several views that we might hold about the relationship between controversial intuitions and ethical theories. I then propose and defend (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The Good Life and the Life That’s Good for You: A Response to the Experience Machine.Nicholas Kreuder - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-19.details Download Export citation Bookmark

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