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  1. A simple explanation of apparent early mindreading: infants’ sensitivity to goals and gaze direction.Marco Fenici - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):497-515.
    According to a widely shared interpretation, research employing spontaneous-response false belief tasks demonstrates that infants as young as 15 months attribute (false) beliefs. In contrast with this conclusion, I advance an alternative reading of the empirical data. I argue that infants constantly form and update their expectations about others’ behaviour and that this ability extends in the course of development to reflect an appreciation of what others can and cannot see. These basic capacities account for infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false (...)
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  • Are there signature limits in early theory of mind?Ella Fizke, Stephen A. Butterfill, Lea van de Loo, Eva Reindl & Hannes Rakoczy - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 162:209-224.
    Current theory-of-mind research faces the challenge of reconciling two sets of seemingly incompatible findings: Whereas children come to solve explicit verbal false belief tasks from around 4years of age, recent studies with various less explicit measures such as looking time, anticipatory looking, and spontaneous behavior suggest that even infants can succeed on some FB tasks. In response to this tension, two-systems theories propose to distinguish between an early-developing system, tracking simple forms of mental states, and a later-developing system, based on (...)
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  • Solving the Puzzle about Early Belief‐Ascription.Katharina A. Helming, Brent Strickland & Pierre Jacob - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (4):438-469.
    Developmental psychology currently faces a deep puzzle: most children before 4 years of age fail elicited-response false-belief tasks, but preverbal infants demonstrate spontaneous false-belief understanding. Two main strategies are available: cultural constructivism and early-belief understanding. The latter view assumes that failure at elicited-response false-belief tasks need not reflect the inability to understand false beliefs. The burden of early-belief understanding is to explain why elicited-response false-belief tasks are so challenging for most children under 4 years of age. The goal of this (...)
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  • Is Implicit Theory of Mind the ‘Real Deal’? The Own‐Belief/True‐Belief Default in Adults and Young Preschoolers.Lu Wang & Alan M. Leslie - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (2):147-176.
    Recent studies reveal spontaneous implicit false-belief understanding in infancy. But is this early ability genuine theory-of-mind? Spontaneous tasks may allow early success by eliminating the selection-response bias thought to underlie later failure on standard tasks. However, using anticipatory eye gaze, we find the same bias in non-verbal tasks in both preschoolers and adults. We argue that the bias arises from theory-of-mind competence itself and takes the form of a rational prior to attribute one's own belief to others. Our discussion then (...)
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  • Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default.Paula Rubio-Fernández - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (1):218-241.
    It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist. Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention to the (...)
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  • Task instructions and implicit theory of mind.Dana Schneider, Zoie E. Nott & Paul E. Dux - 2014 - Cognition 133 (1):43-47.
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  • Implications of pretend play for Theory of Mind research.Julia Wolf - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1–21.
    Research on the development of Theory of Mind has often focused predominantly on belief attribution, but recently moves have been made to include also other mental states. This includes especially factive mental states like knowledge, where factive Theory of Mind may turn out to be more basic than non-factive Theory of Mind. I argue that children’s early pretend play also carries important implications for Theory of Mind research. Although pretend play does not directly provide evidence of Theory of Mind in (...)
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  • Don’t Mention the Marble! The Role of Attentional Processes in False-Belief Tasks.Paula Rubio-Fernández & Bart Geurts - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):835-850.
    In the last 30 years, the key issue in developmental Theory of Mind has been if and when children are capable of representing false beliefs. Moving away from this research question, the aim of this study was to investigate the role of attentional processes in false-belief tasks. We focused on the design of the test phase and investigated two factors that may be critical for 3-year-old children’s success: the form of the wh-question and the salience of the target object. The (...)
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  • Implicit Learning of True and False Belief Sequences.Qianying Ma, Elien Heleven, Giulia Funghi, Min Pu, Kris Baetens, Natacha Deroost & Frank Van Overwalle - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    To investigate whether people can implicitly learn regularities in a social context, we developed a new implicit sequence learning task combining elements from classic false belief and serial reaction time tasks. Participants learned that protagonists were offered flowers at four locations. The protagonists' beliefs concerning the flowers were true or false, depending on their orientation, respectively, toward the scene or away from it. Unbeknown to the participants, there was a fixed belief-related sequence involving three dimensions. Participants had to indicate as (...)
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  • Anxiety impairs spontaneous perspective calculation: Evidence from a level-1 visual perspective-taking task.Andrew R. Todd & Austin J. Simpson - 2016 - Cognition 156 (C):88-94.
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  • Belief Files in Theory of Mind Reasoning.Ágnes Melinda Kovács - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):509-527.
    Humans seem to readily track their conspecifics’ mental states, such as their goals and beliefs from early infancy. However, the underlying cognitive architecture that enables such powerful abilities remains unclear. Here I will propose that a basic representational structure, the belief file, could provide the foundation for efficiently encoding, and updating information about, others’ beliefs in online social interactions. I will discuss the representational possibilities offered by the belief file and the ways in which the repertoire of mental state reasoning (...)
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  • The Situational Mental File Account of the False Belief Tasks: A New Solution of the Paradox of False Belief Understanding.Albert Newen & Julia Wolf - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):717-744.
    How can we solve the paradox of false-belief understanding: if infants pass the implicit false belief task by nonverbal behavioural responses why do they nonetheless typically fail the explicit FBT till they are 4 years old? Starting with the divide between situational and cognitive accounts of the development of false-belief understanding, we argue that we need to consider both situational and internal cognitive factors together and describe their interaction to adequately explain the development of children’s Theory of Mind ability. We (...)
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  • Under Pressure: Processing Representational Decoupling in False-Belief Tasks.Anna Ciaunica - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):527-542.
    Several studies demonstrated that children younger than 3 years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false-belief task, can anticipate others’ actions based on their attributed false beliefs. This gave rise to the so-called “Developmental Paradox”. De Bruin and Kästner recently suggested that the Developmental Paradox is best addressed in terms of the relation between coupled and decoupled processes and argued that if enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the (...)
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  • Theory of mind: a new perspective on the puzzle of belief ascription.Gabriella Airenti - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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