In this paper I consider Hume's position on the analogy between moral qualities and secondary qualities. Although some have suggested that Hume's use of the analogy is important to his moral philosophy, others have disputed its significance to Hume. My position in this paper is that Hume believes there are indeed similarities between moral and secondary qualities that illuminate the nature of virtue. This paper is divided into two parts. In the first, I consider Hume's point(s) in raising the analogy (...) by arguing for four similarities between moral qualities and secondary qualities that he likely had in mind; and in the second, I respond to various objections alleging that Hume did not, and indeed, could not, rely on the analogy in any substantial way. (shrink)

Sobocinski in his paper on Leśniewski's solution to Russell's paradox (1949b) argued that Leśniewski has succeeded in explaining it away. The general strategy of this alleged explanation is presented. The key element of this attempt is the distinction between the collective (mereological) and the distributive (set-theoretic) understanding of the set. The mereological part of the solution, although correct, is likely to fall short of providing foundations of mathematics. I argue that the remaining part of the solution which suggests a specific (...) reading of the distributive interpretation is unacceptable. It follows from it that every individual is an element of every individual. Finally, another Leśniewskian-style approach which uses so-called higher-order epsilon connectives is used and its weakness is indicated. (shrink)