This paper argues for the view that moral realism is irrelevant to ethics. It recalls Aristotle's claim that the Platonic Form of the Good is irrelevant because it is not the sort of thing we can desire or pursue. Moore's account of ethics in relation to conduct and of the Ideal is woefully inadequate as a morality to live by. Peter Railton's moral realism also involves a very weak first-order moral theory. These failures are due, I claim, to the fact (...) that Plato, Moore and Railton regard morality as a science; it is not a science, it is an art. (shrink)

The present issue of the EJPAP hosts a symposium on the theme of Pragmatist Ethics: Theory and Practice, exploring the many ways in which the contribution of pragmatism to moral philosophy and the moral life has been thought of and argued for. In particular, the symposium explores the distinctive nature, reaches, and limits of a pragmatist mindset in moral matters: the plurality of voices represented showcases the extent of approaches possible, within pragmatism, to the very question of how m...

Pilate asked an important and pertinent question of Jesus regarding truth. A simple answer to his question would be ‘a statement is true only if it says what is the case.’ What that means, however, is another matter. By exploring options, I hope to elucidate some common disagreements among believers and non-believers, as well as squabbles between different religious positions. While most attention will be given to examples within Christianity, similar sorts of disagreements also occur in other religions. It is (...) hoped that exploring such options will also help contribute to improved dialogue among the various contenders. (shrink)

Sergio Franzese (1963-2010) has been one among the most active and interesting scholars of William James in Europe. His intellectual biography is in fact shaped by an ongoing dialogue with the thought and writings of James, which guided both his incursions into the work of Nietzsche as well as the examinations of the conversations between pragmatism, Darwinism and phenomenology. Besides many fine books – both authored and edited – on James, he was also the translator and editor of the Italian...

Teniendo en cuenta la intensa migración actual de diversos grupos culturales a otros Estados, en este artículo defiendo la tesis de que miembros de diferentes culturas con normas y valores antagónicos pueden llegar a acuerdos de convivencia intercultural. Comienzo explicando la concepción política de la justicia de Rawls para indicar que esta postura democrática liberal no puede responder de forma adecuada a los contextos actuales de multiculturalidad. Posteriormente, expongo las propuestas principales de la ética universalista de J. Habermas con el (...) fin de contraponerla a lo que llamo la "ética pluralista" de J. Dewey y H. Putnam, y justifico por qué las normas, los hechos y los valores son contextuales. con base en ello, concluyo que es posible establecer acuerdos éticos plurales que pueden variar de una cultura a otra y, no obstante, ser legítimos como normas mínimas de convivencia. Given the intense current migration of diverse cultural groups to other States, in this article i defend the thesis that members of different cultures with norms and values in conflict are able to reach intercultural agreements of coexistence. I start explaining Rawls' political conception of justice to point out that this liberal democratic stance cannot respond adequately to the current context of multiculturality. i show then the main points of J. Habermas' universalist ethics in order to contrast it with what i call the "pluralist ethics" of J. Dewey and H. Putnam, and justify why norms, facts and values are contextual. Based on this, I conclude that it is possible to achieve plural ethical agreements that might differ from one culture to another and yet still be legitimate as minimum norms of coexistence. (shrink)

In what follows I shall investigate how the notions of truth and invention inform our moral life. In particular, I will show how this idea has been explored by William James in his seminal essay The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life (MPML), by far his most clear-cut piece of moral philosophy. I will claim that the dialectics of the essay cannot be apprehended independently from the understanding of the moral psychology and epistemology James elaborates in his writings on pragmatism (...) and the philosophy of mind. In fact, once framed in the relevant perspective, the essay conveys a very different and more radical position that the one usually acknowledged. In MPML James engages in an inquiry into the nature of moral thought and its ability to meet the difficulties of the moral life it should address. The essay criticizes a certain image of moral reflection by questioning its underlying assumptions about the nature of mindedness and the place of truth in the moral life. I shall thus articulate the discussion of James’ essay along two directions, one methodological and one substantive. They are, respectively, the anti-foundational and anti-theoretical character of moral reflection, and the rethinking of the relationship we have with our interiority that is relevant for ethics as informed by the notion of truth. (shrink)

In this essay, I will engage with the controversy that has sprung up between the proponents of the sharp separation thesis and those of the entanglement thesis. What I will be defending is a variant of the entanglement thesis. By drawing on contemporary action theory and on epistemic conceptualism, I will argue that, while objective facts and practical norms are indeed distinct categories of thought, that distinction does not amount to a conceptual gap—a dichotomy or unbridgeable divide. Their relation, in (...) other words, is not one of logical dualism but one of mere (analytical) distinction between interdependent categories of thinking. Hence the entanglement view on which distinction does not entail dichotomy. (shrink)