This paper makes two essential claims about the nature of shame and shame punishment. I argue that, if we properly understand the nature of shame, that it is sometimes justifiable to shame others in the context of a pluralistic multicultural society. I begin by assessing the accounts of shame provided by Cheshire Calhoun (2004) and Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, & Fabrice Teroni (2012). I argue that both views have problems. I defend a theory of shame and embarrassment that connects both (...) emotions to “whole-self” properties. Shame and embarrassment, I claim, are products of the same underlying emotion. I distinguish between moralized and nonmoralized shame in order to show when, and how, moral and non-moral shame may be justly deployed. Shame is appropriate, I argue, if and only if it targets malleable moral or non-moral normative imperfections of a person’s ‘whole-self.’ Shame is unjustifiable when it targets durable aspects of a person’s “whole-self.” I conclude by distinguishing shame punishments from guilt punishments and show that my account can explain why it is wrong to shame individuals on account of their race, sex, gender, or body while permitting us to sometimes levy shame and shame punishment against others, even those otherwise immune to moral reasons. (shrink)

This article suggests that there are intrinsic links between humour and embarrassment and that both are crucial for the maintenance of social life. Goffman and others have claimed that embarrassment plays a key role in the maintenance of social order. However, it is argued that Goffman overlooked the role of ridicule in embarrassment. In consequence, he formulated a `nice-guy' theory of embarrassment, suggesting that onlookers empathize with the embarrassment of others and seek to diminish that embarrassment. By contrast, it is (...) suggested that the embarrassment of others is often a matter of laughter and enjoyment. Such a link between embarrassment and humour is crucial for the socialization of embarrassment, which depends on the possibility of ridicule. This is illustrated by an incident in Freud's classic case-history of Little Hans. The transformation of embarrassing incidents into humorous narrations is also discussed. It is suggested that the link between humour and embarrassment is theoretically significant, pointing the way to a reconstituted Freudian view for understanding the relations between the individual and social order. (shrink)

Questions about the relation between shame and embarrassment are often posed in discussion of emotion but have rarely been examined at length. In this study I assemble and examine distinctions that have been proposed in the literature with the aim of identifying the criteria that have been used to differentiate shame and embarrassment. Relevant empirical studies are also reviewed. Despite the attention paid to the question of the difference between shame and embarrassment consensus on differentiating criteria has not been reached (...) nor has there been consideration of what kind of question is being posed. Three positions that have been adopted are identified and critically evaluated. (shrink)

Reactive theories of responsibility see moral accountability as grounded on the capacity for feeling reactive-attitudes. I respond to a recent argument gaining ground in this tradition that excludes psychopaths from accountability. The argument relies on what Paul Russell has called the 'subjectivity requirement'. On this view, the capacity to feel and direct reactive-attitudes at oneself is a necessary condition for responsibility. I argue that even if moral attitudes like guilt are impossible for psychopaths to deploy, that psychopaths, especially the "successful" (...) and "secondary" subtypes of psychopathy, can satisfy the subjectivity requirement with regard to shame. I appeal to evidence that embarrassment and shame are grounded on the same affective process and data that psychopathic judgments about embarrassment are neurotypical. If I am right, then psychopaths ought to be open to shame-based forms of accountability including shame punishments. I conclude by considering why psychopaths rarely self-report shame. I argue that lacking a capacity to see oneself as flawed is a different sort of failure than lacking the capacity to feel. (shrink)

Little is known about the circumstances that give rise to blushing and there have been no systematic attempts to classify and analyze the types of situations where it occurs. The study reported here analyzes a sample of recollections of occasions and a selection of literary episodes. The two sources of evidence yield somewhat different patterns but prominent themes in both are being the centre of attention, whether this is positive, neutral or negative, and the disclosure, or threat of exposure, of (...) a private or sensitive topic. Inspection of example suggests that a blush is associated with self-consciousness. More specifically, it is elicited when circumstances cause someone to take another's perspective on the self, and this generates awareness of a discrepancy between his or her position and this position as it appears to the other. A blush does not require that the other take an adverse view of the actor's position. The blush shows sensitivity to the opinions of others and it is its capacity to communicate this that makes it effective in deflecting aggressive or rejecting responses from others. (shrink)