While scholars of, and participants in, social movements, electoral politics, and organized labor are deeply engaged in contrasting different theories of how political actors should organize, little recent philosophical work has asked what social organizing is. This paper aims to answer this question in a way that can make sense of typical organizing- related claims and debates. It is intuitive that what social organizing does is bring about some kind of collectivity. However, I argue that the varieties of collectivity most (...) amply theorized by analytic philosophers in recent years, including grouphood and collective intentionality, are not the right kinds to embed in a theory of social organizing. I ultimately argue that the sort of collectivity that organizing characteristically brings about is a special kind of causal complementarity among agents’ actions— and that while this can exist alongside grouphood and collective intentionality, it is not the same thing as either. The notion of social organizing that emerges is one that can clarify, without trivializing, a number of pressing contemporary debates about how normal people should conduct themselves as interconnected political actors. (shrink)

Allies of those experiencing injustice or oppression face a dilemma: to be neutral in the face of calls to solidarity risks siding with oppressors, yet to speak or act on behalf of others risks compounding the injustice. We identify what we call ‘a normative demand for deference’ (NDD) to those with lived experience as a response to this dilemma. Yet, while the NDD is prevalent, albeit sometimes implicitly so, in contemporary solidarity theory and activist practice, it remains under-theorised. In this (...) article, we analyse the potential benefits of adhering to the NDD, highlighting both a commonly accepted epistemic benefit, and a neglected but important good in bearing witness. Yet adhering to the NDD also raises real challenges. While the literature focuses on a gold standard model of direct engagement, we defend a valuable role for a second-order form of engagement through reading, films, and similar media, which, we argue, is particularly salient for global and transnational solidarity, an important element of contemporary global politics. (shrink)

Reshaping our methodological research tools for adequately capturing injustice and domination has been a central aspiration of feminist philosophy and social epistemology in recent years. There has been an increasingly empirical turn in recent feminist and political theorization, engaging with case studies and the challenges arising from conducting research in solidarity with unequal partners. I argue that these challenges cannot be resolved by merely adopting a norm and stance of deference to those in the struggle for justice. To conduct philosophical (...) research in an engaged and solidaristic manner, I suggest that deference be supplemented by three methodological and normative principles: 1) epistemic humility, 2) accountability, and 3) co-producing knowledge. I situate these principles within contemporary philosophical work on solidarity, and show how they might help confront power imbalances and other methodological hazards that arise when conducting research in solidarity with others. I arrive at these principles in part by critically reflecting on my own attempt to conduct research in solidarity with women’s rights activists in Senegal. (shrink)

Solidarität wird in Krisenzeiten sowie bei Ungerechtigkeit und Marginalisierung gefordert. Sie tritt dabei in unterschiedlichen Reichweiten und Akteurskonstellationen auf und basiert auf verschiedenen Motiven und Ausgangslagen. Julia Masurkewitz-Möller nimmt sich dieser Vielfalt an und erarbeitet eine Systematisierung der Solidarität, die Ordnung in den begrifflichen Dschungel des Konzepts bringt. Sie zeigt, dass verschiedene Solidaritätsformen trotz ihrer Unterschiede einen gemeinsamen Kern und eine Beziehung zueinander haben - und damit die Transformationen von Solidaritätsformen möglich machen.

Vulnerabilität und Solidarität sind in den vergangenen Jahren zu zwei Kernbegriffen der praktischen Philosophie geworden. Sie markieren nicht nur einen neuen thematischen Fokus, sondern auch eine Verschiebung theoretischer Grundannahmen, beispielsweise hinsichtlich des Verständnisses von Normativität oder dem Politischen. Innerhalb des Pragmatismus spielen beide Begriffe, bis auf Rortys Rekurs auf Solidarität, keine zentrale Rolle, obgleich die Grundintuitionen, die beiden Begriffen zugrunde liegen, eng mit dieser Strömung verbunden sind. Der Beitrag will vor dem Hintergrund dieser pragmatistischen Grundannahmen zentrale Argumentationsfiguren der Debatte über (...) Vulnerabilität und Solidarität in den pragmatistischen Theorierahmen übersetzen, um Leerstellen und Probleme des Diskurses aufzudecken und zu diskutieren. Es zeigt sich, dass der pragmatistische Zugriff in verschiedener Hinsicht Potenzial für die Klärung der beiden Begriffe hat. Impulse liegen u.a. in der Klärung des relationalen Charakters des Sozialen, dem Erfahrungsbezug und der Verschränkung der normativen und politischen Dimension. Durch eine pragmatistische Re-Konzeptualisierung kann deshalb der Diskurs über Vulnerabilität und Solidarität geschärft und damit innerhalb der praktischen Philosophie gestärkt werden. Zugleich kann damit pragmatistische Forschung in aktuelle Debatten der praktischen Philosophie stärker eingebracht werden. (shrink)

Monique Deveaux’s Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-Led Social Movements makes a timely, compelling, and important intervention in the philosophical literature on poverty and global justice, and improves our understanding of the nature and extent of responsibilities of variously situated agents towards the poor. Deveaux’s focus on poor-led social movements emphasizes that effective poverty reduction requires building up the collective capacities of the poor to engage in joint collective action to oppose and dismantle unjust structures. This approach politicizes poverty and provides a (...) powerful refutation of some previous approaches that primarily formulated responses to global poverty to consist in mere charity to lighten the poor’s deprivations, or top-down solutions imposed by technocrats and other development experts. Deveaux then extends the concept of solidarity to characterize the political responsibility of the nonpoor, which consists of acting in political solidarity with poor-led organizations and movements. It is this latter move to extend the concept of solidarity to characterize poor-nonpoor cooperative activities that I question in this commentary. When the concept of solidarity, understood as identification-based joint action, is stretched to encompass cooperation between all those who may act together to resist, oppose, and dismantle the structures of domination and oppression that constitute poverty, there is the danger of obscuring the alienation and oppositional social positions that attend conditions of structural injustice. To acknowledge the limits and dilemmas of solidarity practices between the poor and nonpoor is perhaps a sober reminder of one of the major costs of living in conditions of structural injustice. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 51, Issue 3, Page 195-233, Summer 2023.

Through users’ cross-system comparative experience engaging with the health systems in Taiwan and other countries, this article probes into their understandings and value judgments and specifically their reasonings for the ‘solidarity with whom?’ question in the health sector solidarity. With the cross-system comparison approach, the study adopted semi-structured interviews with 30 Taiwanese participants who have studied, lived or worked abroad and engaged with the health system in Canada, the USA or the UK. This approach offers the opportunity for one to (...) evaluate the health system in the home country from a relative viewpoint from the host country. The participants suggested that the boundary of Taiwan’s National Health Insurance (NHI) should be as inclusive as possible, covering all legal residents in Taiwan regardless of their status, and that the citizens should share more financial responsibility. The ethical reasons for supporting the NHI include recognizing health sector solidarity among people, considering the coverage as a protection of the human right to health, humanitarian reasons and self-interest. Three archetypes of users emerged from the synthesis: Universalists, Rationalists and Republicans. The cross-system comparative experience makes the participants have more supportive attitudes toward the ideals of health sector solidarity. (shrink)

While it is largely agreed upon that solidarity is a kind of unity among persons, this agreement is short-lived – for if solidarity involves unity, what kind of unity is this? That is, does solidarity coalesce around shared identity or simply fellow-feeling? Shared action or fate? Or is solidarity merely a matter of commitment to a particular cause to achieve certain ends? Below, I look to examples of Mutual Aid to reject a piece-meal model of solidarity (where solidarity is this (...) but not that) in favor of a more pluralistic account. The notion of solidarity need not be constrained, all or nothing, by a specific strain of interpretation. Instead, we should recognize that solidarity is a matter of variety and degree. (shrink)

Demands calling for reparations for historical injustices—injustices whose original victims and perpetrators are now dead—constitute an important component of contemporary struggles for social and transnational justice. Reparations are only one way in which the unjust past is salient in contemporary politics. In my book, Injustice and the Reproduction of History: Structural Inequalities, Gender and Redress, I put forward a framework to conceptualise the normative significance of the unjust past. In this article, I will engage with the insightful comments and try (...) to address the concerns of the contributors to the symposium on my book. I will discuss whether and in what sense my framework incorporates past-regarding duties, how it is different from causal interpretations of the relationship between past and present injustice, whether it can carve out a greater place for blame in our thinking about responsibility for structural injustice, whether such a responsibility needs to hinge upon an account of solidarity, and how de-temporalising injustice can cast new light on immigration politics. In particular, I will stress and further clarify the importance that the notion of ‘structural debt’, which my book develops to reflect on historical responsibility, can play in thinking about what is owed to an unjust history. (shrink)

Bioethical work on solidarity has yielded an array of divergent conceptions. But what do these accounts add to normative bioethics? What is solidarity’s distinctive social normative role? Prainsack and Buyx suggest that solidarity be understood as the ‘putty’ of justice. I argue here that the putty metaphor is deeply insightful and—when spelled out in detail—successfully explicates solidarity’s social normative function. Unfortunately, Prainsack and Buyx’s own account cannot play this role. I propose instead that the putty metaphor supports a conception of (...) solidarity as equity. This proposal enables us to answer whether and when we should act in solidarity, and with whom, while also capturing the putty metaphor and hence answering a basic question: what is solidarity for? (shrink)

Sustainability has become a major goal of domestic and international development. This essay analyzes the transitions of normative ideas embedded in the notion of sustainability by reviewing the discourses in the representative reports and literature from different periods. Three sets of ideas are proposed: inter- and intra-generational equity, stability of public systems, and a sense of solidarity, which confirms the scope of community and functions as a precondition for the previous two ideas. This essay uses the case of a health (...) system in a hypothetical country to illustrate that, besides securing financial sustainability, a genuinely sustainable public system must also meet the three normative ideas of sustainability. This essay also finds that these three ideas may create intrinsic tensions within the prevalent policy-making model—democracy. The pursuit of sustainability is not only the responsibility of a democratic government, but also a shared moral obligation of the body politic. (shrink)

To find out what is in one’s own best interest, it is helpful to ask one’s epistemic peers. However, identifying one’s epistemic peers is not a trivial task. I consider a stylized political setting, an electoral competition of ‘Masses’ and ‘Elites’. To succeed, the Masses need to know which alternative on offer is truly in their interest. To find out, the Masses can pool their privately held information in a pre-election ballot, provided that they can reliably find out with whom (...) they should pool information. I investigate the process of finding the relevant peer group for information pooling by modelling this group formation process as dynamic network change. The simulations show that the Masses can succeed in finding the right peers, but they also suggest reasons why the Elites may often be more successful. This phenomenon generalizes to the notion of Epistemic Network Injustice. Such injustice arises when a subset of citizens is systematically deprived of connections to helpful epistemic peers, leading to their reduced political influence. Epistemic Network Injustice is a new form of epistemic injustice, related to but distinct from the notion introduced by Miranda Fricker. (shrink)

The workers’ compensation system in Taiwan cannot provide sufficient coverage for all workers. This essay adopts a solidaristic approach to address this issue by analyzing the reasons why workers’ compensation is underdeveloped in Taiwan and what could be done to persuade more key actors to support the reform for a more just policy arrangement. First, through comparison with the healthcare system, it is argued that the lack of solidarity and the perception of relevant similarities could explain the underdevelopment of workers’ (...) compensation. Second, the essay turns to the normative aspect of the issue. Compared with other normative political theories, Iris M. Young’s social connection model provides specific normative guidance that is useful for justifying the allocation of responsibility for a more just workers’ compensation reform. (shrink)

Precarious work is a growing and alarming phenomenon. This paper analyses two of its distinctive normative features. First, precarity increases the risks workers face, blurring their capacity for prospection and lessening their security in accessing the opportunities associated with their jobs. Second, precarious work challenges workers’ collective action capacity. I will argue that both features threaten workers’ republican freedom. I develop the second point by presenting a conception of solidarity between workers and then showing how precarious work erodes it. On (...) the one hand, when the labour market is dualised, precarity is distributed unevenly and the risks undergone by groups of workers are different. Thus, dual labour markets create a potential conflict of interest between the preferences of different groups, insiders and outsiders. On the other hand, various economic changes hinder workers from acting based on shared purposes due to increased coordination costs. To the extent that workers’ power depends on their bonds and collective action, primarily through unions, the eclipse of their solidarity leaves them powerless and thus increases their domination. Finally, I consider various scenarios that could boost workers’ collective power. (shrink)

Critics of social injustice argue that the agent of transformative social change will (or should) be a mass agent; namely, an agent that is large, complex, and geographically dispersed. Traditional theories of collective agency emphasize the presence of shared intentions and common knowledge, but mass agents are too large for such cohesion. To make sense of mass agency, I suggest a new approach. On the solidarity theory of mass agency, a mass agent is composed of (a) organizers who intend to (...) fight for social change and (b) supporters who are in solidarity with organizers. (shrink)

This article argues that, to distinguish between “critical” and “uncritical” solidarity, the normative concept of solidarity must be grounded on the principle of respect for persons. I start analyzing the principle of respect for persons from a modified Kantian perspective, arguing that it must be interpreted as a normative relation of power in which each person must recognize the autonomy of the other as a source of power. In this perspective, the principle of respect offers a foundation for an ethical (...) assessment of situations in which ethical solidarity is required. By drawing on the distinction between passive and active respect, I argue that solidarity is grounded on the duty of active respect in the face of danger or oppression and that this foundation allows us to distinguish between critical (i.e. appropriate) and uncritical (i.e. inappropriate) solidarity. (shrink)

The global age has confronted human beings with new and numerous challenges, from global poverty, to labour exploitation, to climate change. Many individuals, aware of such challenges, wish to act in solidarity, and give their contribution to countering them. Acting in solidarity in such contexts can be challenging, however, as which actions are most effective for reaching the desired goal is not obvious. Furthermore, an action that is intended in solidarity at times not only fails to promote the desired objective (...) but proves detrimental to it. In this article, I wish to propose a reflection on a prior duty of solidarity action: the epistemic duty to acquire information about the correct way to promote a cause. By analyzing the anti-sweatshop movement and climate action, I will show how acting in solidarity has significant epistemic requirements that should be considered as part of the solidarity action itself. (shrink)

Solidarity is one of the central concepts in social theory and has gained much attention due to the multiple challenges that the EU has been facing the last decade and due to the most recent COVID-19 pandemic. Although the debate on the nature and conditions of solidarity has been revitalized, there remains a large variety in how to conceptualize solidarity. In contrast to other approaches, we do not conceive solidarity as normative concept, but as descriptive–analytical one. Therefore, we provide a (...) theory-based definition that is prone to capture the empirical dimensions of solidarity. Accounting for the dynamic and interactive character of solidarity as subject to permanent societal and political renegotiation, we conceptualize solidarity from a discourse perspective and follow a multilevel design breaking down the understandings of solidarity on different levels. This approach contributes to the research of solidarity that is interested to capturing the ‘real world’ dimensions of solidarity. (shrink)

The concept of solidarity has been receiving growing attention from scholars in a wide range of disciplines. While this trend coincides with widespread unsuccessful attempts to achieve solidarity in the real world, the failure of solidarity as such remains a relatively unexplored topic. In the case of the so-called European Union refugee crisis, the fact that EU member states failed to fulfil their commitment to solidarity is now regarded as established wisdom. But as we try to come to terms with (...) failing solidarity in the EU we are faced with a number of important questions: are all instances of failing solidarity equally morally reprehensible? Are some motivations for resorting to unsolidaristic measures more valid than others? What claims have an effective countervailing force against the commitment to act in solidarity? (shrink)

Solidarity is a key concept in the European Union. However, the concept of solidarity lacks systematic theoretical examination to enable a sufficient understanding of its contextual meaning and to provide an operationalisable benchmark for analysis. To address this research gap, I propose an analytical framework for solidarity in the European Union that features four necessary conditions: particularity, instrumentality, reciprocity, and responsibility. I develop the framework through a transdisciplinary conceptual history approach, substantiated with a thorough document and legal analysis of European (...) integration and CJEU case law. I demonstrate the robustness and validity of the proposed framework by using EU asylum policy as a test case, a field where the question of solidarity is notoriously salient, which is exemplified by an area-specific expression of the concept: fair sharing of responsibility between the EU member states. Moreover, I show that the EU’s solidarity principle is necessary to maintain the bloc’s raison d’être. (shrink)

Solidarity between generations served as a prominent but controversially discussed normative reference point in public debates about the Coronavirus-pandemic. The aim of this contribution is the empirical reconstruction and ethical evaluation of prominent notions of intergenerational solidarity and their underlying assumptions in the public media discourse on the pandemic in Germany. After a brief introduction to the concept of intergenerational solidarity and the pertinent discourses during the pandemic, we present the results of a comprehensive qualitative content analysis of 149 articles (...) from leading media in Germany. On this basis, we carve out three typical understandings of intergenerational solidarity: (a) communal care, (b) mutual support, and (c) responsible use of freedom. We discuss these understandings and the underlying ‘moral paradigms’ and evaluate their theoretical and practical implications from an ethical point of view, drawing conclusions for discourses on future societal crises. (shrink)

The article intends to tackle two key questions: what solidarity means and why it is considered a valuable trait for a society to exhibit. In so doing, it aims to bridge the literature gap between solidarity’s nature and its normative value. In this article, an original hypothesis is explored, i.e. that solidarity ought to be understood in functionalist terms, and that we should want it accordingly because solidarity discharges the crucial function of societal cohesion.

Many lament that solidarity is declining, implying there is something good about it; but what is solidarity and why should we want it? Here, we defend an original functionalist re-interpretation of solidarity. Political solidarity plays a key functional role in a polity’s persistence through time. Thus, we should want institutions that foster solidarity. This paper is divided into three parts. In the first, we draw on the philosophy of biology to pinpoint what counts as a proper function, in a way (...) that is naturalistic, objective, and selective. On this aetiological account, a sharp distinction between functional needs (e.g. the pumping of blood) and functional mechanisms (e.g. the valve that pumps blood) is drawn. In the second part of the paper, we propose that solidarity should be understood as an aetiological function of society. This new conception sheds light on the widely acknowledged, yet seldom clarified connection between two common readings of solidarity: solidarity as a set of feelings of mutual kinship (its functional need), and solidarity as a set of redistributive institutions (a key functional mechanism). The third part concludes that this new functional conception of solidarity provides normative reasons to foster solidarity. (shrink)

This paper reclaims the concept of solidarity for democratic theory. It does this by proposing a theory of solidarity as social involvement that is construed through the integration of three better known conceptions of solidarity that have played an influential role in the political thought of the last two centuries. The paper begins by explaining why solidarity should receive more sustained attention from political theorists with an interest in democracy, and proceeds by presenting two indispensability arguments. Section three outlines the (...) three rival conceptions of solidarity and contends that whilst individually incomplete, each provides an important insight, so that a fuller and more satisfying conception of solidarity can be developed by weaving together some features of these three conceptions. This task is undertaken in section four, which introduces the theory of solidarity as social involvement, defining solidarity in terms of acting-for and acting-with. Section five briefly discusses some of its potential implications for democratic theory, before bringing the article to a close. (shrink)

This article examines whether restrictions on access to welfare rights for EU immigrants are justifiable on grounds of reciprocity. Recently political theorists have supported some robust restricti...

Introduction Groups and solidarity are, separately, widely debated concepts in contemporary social philosophy, yet their interplay remains largely unexplored and undertheorized. In fact, when it comes to investigating one of these concepts, more often than not the other is at best vaguely mentioned as a background assumption, and vice versa. To be fair, this poor attention to the connections between groups and solidarity is not to be addressed to social philosophers only, for it is easily rec...

The concept of community of persons, which focuses on both persons and the whole, helps understand solidarity. The latter is based on the social nature of persons. Community of persons and solidarity seems to be able to move away from the individualist perspective or the individualism-collectivism dichotomy. Using autopraxeography in a pragmatic constructivism epistemological paradigm, this article aims to explore how organizations can develop solidarity in a workplace. The experience presented takes place in a bank. It shows that communities of (...) persons with employees and customers are both ethical and financially efficient. These communities build a dialogue between persons and organizations. Nevertheless, it is impossible to force solidarity because it could generate derision that is contrary to the wished goal. Finally, while this model is based on solidarity, it focuses solely on internal solidarity. (shrink)

Publicly-funded health systems, including those national health services and social or National Health Insurances, are institutionalized solidarity in health. In Europe, solidarity originated from the legacies of labor movements, the Judeo-Christian traditions, and nationalist sentiments in the re-construction Era after the WWII. In middle-to-high income East Asian countries, such as Japan, Taiwan, Korea, the health systems were built on different grounds and do not have such ethical origins of solidarity. As health systems in Europe and East Asia are both facing (...) sustainability crises due to aging population, stagnant economy, changing boundaries, and advancing medical technologies, how those systems with the European solidaristic ethical traditions can be revived and how those without the European traditions could survive become a matter of theoretical interests and an urgent policy problem to be addressed. Drawing on contemporary theories of solidarity, this essay analyzes the boundary problem and its impact on the sustainability of the health system in Taiwan. It then considers two plausible origins of solidarity in Taiwan. One is the re-emerged civic nationalism, and the other is an ethos of common life. It is argued that after years of implementation, the National Health Insurance in Taiwan might have shaped the social values and people’s habits and formed an ethos of common life. Such ethos could be an ethical origin of solidarity in non-western societies and help the health systems endure the prolonged sustainability crises. (shrink)

In this article, we explore why solidarity has not worked according to expectation in EU migration and asylum law and why it is unlikely to work in the future. First, we consider discourses of burden-sharing and solidarity in EU law from the 1990s up to the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 to identify emergent path dependencies. This period saw the introduction of primary law provisions on solidarity, such as Article 80 TFEU, as French and Dutch electorates had rejected a European constitution. (...) Second, we perform an analysis of Article 80 through the conceptual history of solidarity, in particular, the dominant Roman law tradition of obligation in solidum and the French tradition of solidarism. We submit that the term ‘solidarity’ is actually a misnomer: already on structural grounds, Article 80 should be read as an alliance clause, countering a threat of irregular immigration. Third, we find that the practice under Article 80 as it develops during the period between 2015 and the 2020 European Commission Pact on Migration and Asylum corroborates this finding. Overall, we find that the concept of solidarity in EU asylum and migration law engenders outcome expectations that it cannot deliver as the defence alliance it is. (shrink)

This paper examines Nuti’s accounts of structural injustice and historical injustice in the light of a political dilemma that confronted Young’s work on structure injustice. The dilemma emerges from a paradox that can be stated simply: justly addressing structural injustice would require that those subject to structural injustice enjoy the kind of privileged position of decision-making power that their being subject to structural injustice denies them. The dilemma thus concerns how to justly address structural injustice. I argue that Nuti’s account (...) is currently unable to provide an adequate theorization of how to address this dilemma because it lacks an account of political solidarity, but also that her account provides important resources for dissolving a dispute between two competing theories of solidarity in a way that facilitates the articulation of an account of political solidarity that is adequate to addressing the political dilemma. (shrink)

The role and importance of solidarity for effective health provision is the subject of lengthy and heated debate which has been thrown into even sharper relief by the COVID-19 pandemic. In various ways, and by various authorities we have all been asked, even instructed, to engage in solidarity with one another in order to collectively respond to the current crisis. Under normal circumstances, individuals can engage in solidarity with their compatriots in the context of public health provision in a number (...) of ways, including paying taxes which fund welfare state initiatives, and avoiding others when ill. While there has been significant engagement in solidarity worldwide, there have also been high profile examples of refusals and failures to engage in solidarity, both by individual agents, and governments. In this paper I examine the consequence of these failures with reference to the actions of the current British government, which has failed to deliver an effective response to the crisis. This failure has effectively devolved responsibility for responding to the crisis to people who are simultaneously more vulnerable to infection, and less able to do anything about it. I argue that such responses represent mismanagement of a public health crisis, and a rejection of important democratic and egalitarian norms and values. (shrink)

In this essay, we aim at framing the ‘negative emotion’ of indifference, starting from its diachronic declination, which seems to beneficiate from a form of justification from the moral point of view (§1). In order to prevent indifference as an outcome – together with its intrinsic motivational strength –, we introduce a methodological account to frame the struggle of motivation internal to the single agent, by classifying different forms of ‘reasons to act’ (§2). We will develop a two-move strategy. Firstly, (...) we deploy what we could call a positive emotion – the sense of solidarity diachronically understood – against that negative one, in order to show that indifference is not the sole possible destination for the humankind (§3). Secondly, to integrate and strengthen the motivational role of that positive emotion, we will rehabilitate a moral approach aimed at setting up a unique normative linkage among generations, by reshaping the interplay between ‘wide’ and ‘narrow obligations’ presented by Kant (§4). The ultimate goal is to contrast the moral strength which is offered by indifference as negative emotion by articulating a motivational path devoted at legitimizing the diachronic moral commitment and duties of justice among generations. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to demonstrate the respects in which private schools are unfair, and why they pose a threat to the well-being of not only those who are excluded on financial grounds, but to democratic equality and social cohesion in general. The shortcomings associated with relying on a form of educational provision that is merely ‘adequate’ are rendered explicit, and the article concludes with a consideration of a variety of measures that might go some way towards nullifying (...) the harmful effects of private schools, the objections to which are sufficiently strong as to warrant a prima facie case for the abolition of such schools. (shrink)

I will study the concept of solidarity by looking at patterns of practical reasoning leading to behaviour that can be taken to exemplify solidarity. By studying which kinds of premisses are necessary for taking the motivation to display solidarity, in contrast to altruistic or moral motivation, I try to find necessary conditions for solidarity. I will argue that practical reasoning leading to solidary behaviour is a form of we-reasoning in which some of the premisses are in first person plural form (...) and attribute actions or attitudes to a collective. If this is correct, solidarity is a group concept, and intentional solidary behaviour presupposes identification with a group where others have shared goals or interests. This distinguishes solidary motivation and behaviour from altruistic or moral motivation and behaviour. (shrink)