- The Likelihood of Actions and the Neurobiology of Virtues: Veto and Consent Power.Claudia Navarini - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):309-323.details
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Emotional skillfulness and virtue acquisition.Mario De Caro, Maria Silvia Vaccarezza & Ariele Niccoli - 2022 - In Daniel Dukes, Andrea Samson & Eric Walle (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Emotional Development. Oxford University Press. pp. 503-512.details
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Harnessing Moral Psychology to Reduce Meat Consumption.Joshua May & Victor Kumar - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (2):367-387.details
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Moral Rationalism on the Brain.Joshua May - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (1):237-255.details
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Dual-process reflective equilibrium: rethinking the interplay between intuition and reflection in moral reasoning.Dario Cecchini - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):295-311.details
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Butchering Benevolence Moral Progress beyond the Expanding Circle.Hanno Sauer - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):153-167.details
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(1 other version)Moral Reasoning and Emotion.Joshua May & Victor Kumar - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 139-156.details
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Radical Rationalization Accommodates Rampant Irrationality.Joachim Lipski - 2018 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 25 (1):53-73.details
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COVID-19, uncertainty, and moral experiments.Ibo Van de Poel & Michael Klenk - 2021 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (1):1-5.details
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Revisiting the Social Origins of Human Morality: A Constructivist Perspective on the Nature of Moral Sense-Making.Andrés Segovia-Cuéllar - 2021 - Topoi 41 (2):313-325.details
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The case for moral empiricism.Shaun Nichols - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):549-567.details
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Implicit Cognition, Dual Process Theory, and Moral Judgment.Charlie Blunden, Paul Rehren & Hanno Sauer - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 105-114.details
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(1 other version)Reason and intuition in Aristotle's moral psychology: why he was not a two-system dualist.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):42-57.details
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Are emotions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement (and what would it tell us)?Daniel Eggers - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):214-233.details
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