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  1. A pragmatic treatment of simple sentences.Alex Barber - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):300–308.
    Semanticists face substitution challenges even outside of contexts commonly recognized as opaque. Jennifer M. Saul has drawn attention to pairs of simple sentences - her term for sentences lacking a that-clause operator - of which the following are typical: -/- (1) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out. (1*) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Clark Kent came out. -/- (2) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent. (2*) Superman is more successful (...)
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  • The Simple Sentence Puzzle and Ambiguous Co-referential Names.Tora Koyama & Yasuo Nakayama - 2001 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):127-138.
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  • Kypris, Aphrodite, and Venus: More Puzzles about Belief.Heidi Savage - manuscript
    My aim in this paper is to show that the existence of empty names raise problems for the Millian that go beyond the traditional problems of accounting for their meanings. Specifically, they have implications for Millian strategies for dealing with puzzles about belief. The standard move of positing a referent for a fictional name to avoid the problem of meaning, because of its distinctly Millian motivation, implies that solving puzzles about belief, when they involve empty names, do in fact hang (...)
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  • Self‐Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz's Law.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2018 - Noûs 52:900-920.
    I argue that an individual has aspects numerically identical with it and each other that nonetheless qualitatively differ from it and each other. This discernibility of identicals does not violate Leibniz's Law, however, which concerns only individuals and is silent about their aspects. They are not in its domain of quantification. To argue that there are aspects I will appeal to the internal conflicts of conscious beings. I do not mean to imply that aspects are confined to such cases, but (...)
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  • Omissions and Their Effects.Martin Montminy - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (4):502-516.
    According to what I call theidentity view, omissions are actual events. For example, the nominal ‘Ali's non-jogging’ denotes whatever Ali is doing at the time she is said not to be jogging. Some have objected that omissions (and more generally absences) cannot be events, since the two do not have the same causal relations. I show how advocates of the identity view can offer a pragmatic account of the data the objection relies on.
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  • On Qualification.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):385-414.
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  • Did Clinton say something false?J. M. Saul - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):255-257.
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  • Things and their aspects.Nicholas Asher - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):1–23.
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  • Intensional verbs in event semantics.Graeme Forbes - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):227 - 242.
    In Attitude Problems, I gave an account of opacity in the complement of intensional transitive verbs that combined neo-Davidsonian event-semantics with a hidden-indexical account of substitution failure. In this paper, I extend the account to clausal verbs.
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  • To Say the Least: Where Deceptively Withholding Information Ends and Lying Begins.Marta Dynel - 2018 - Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (2):555-582.
    This paper aims to distil the essence of deception performed by means of withholding information, a topic hitherto largely neglected in the psychological, linguistic, and philosophical research on deception. First, the key conditions for deceptively withholding information are specified. Second, several notions related to deceptively withholding information are critically addressed with a view to teasing out the main forms of withholding information. Third, it is argued that deceptively withholding information can be conceptualized in pragmatic-philosophical terms as being based on the (...)
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  • Simple Sentences, Substitutions, and Mistaken Evaluations.David Braun & Jennifer Saul - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (1):1 - 41.
    Many competent speakers initially judge that (i) is true and (ii) isfalse, though they know that (iii) is true. (i) Superman leaps more tallbuildings than Clark Kent. (ii) Superman leaps more tall buildings thanSuperman. (iii) Superman is identical with Clark Kent. Semanticexplanations of these intuitions say that (i) and (ii) really can differin truth-value. Pragmatic explanations deny this, and say that theintuitions are due to misleading implicatures. This paper argues thatboth explanations are incorrect. (i) and (ii) cannot differ intruth-value, yet (...)
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  • Ambiguity and knowledge of content.Anthony L. Brueckner - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):257-260.
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  • Propositional attitude reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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