Once the preserve of philosophy and theology, what Weber called `the problem of theodicy' - the problem of reconciling normative ideals with the reality in which we live - recurs in the social sciences in the secular form of `sociodicy'. Within a functionalist framework, sociodicies have offered legitimizing rationalizations of social adversities, inequalities and injustice, but seldom address the existential meaning and ethical implications of human affliction and suffering in social life. We suggest that an apparent indifference to these questions (...) in social theory reflects a deeper tension between modernity's millennial expectations of moral progress and the escalating history of violence, exploitation and suffering in the modern world. The task of sociodicy, we argue, should be reconstructed as a critique of the decivilizing implications of this tension, not just to document the consequences of suffering on people's lives, but in order to reassess the experience of modernity at the end of one of the most disturbed and violent centuries the world has known. (shrink)

The body is both the subject and object of intentionality: qua Leib, it experiences worldly things and qua Körper, it is experienced as a thing in the world. This phenomenological differentiation forms the basis for Helmuth Plessner’s anthropological theory of the mediated or eccentric nature of human embodiment, that is, simultaneously we both are a body and have a body. Here, I want to focus on the extent to which this double aspect of embodiment relates to our experience of temporality. (...) Indeed, to question, does this double bodily relation correspond to a twofoldtemporality of embodied intentionality? In the first part of this paper, I differentiate between the intentional temporality of being a body and the temporal experience of having a body. To further my argument, in the second part, I present examples of specific pathologies, as well as liminal cases of bodily experiences, wherein these temporal dimensions, which otherwise go hand-in-hand, become dissociated. Phenomenologically, I want to argue that Husserl’s differentiation between Leib and Körper corresponds to two genetic forms of intentionality – operative and act intentionality – and that these are, in turn, characterized by different temporalities. Anthropologically, I want to argue that having a body – what occurs as an inherent break to human embodiment – is the presupposition for the experience of a stable and object-like time. I will conclude that the double aspect of human embodiment and in particular the thematic experience of having a body enables both the experience of a past, which is remembered, and a future that is planned. (shrink)

Drone warfare disrupts the generally understood experience of war, and drone operators’ distance from the battlefield has called into question the authenticity of their experiences as participants in conflict. This article examines the autobiographies of three US military drone operators, analysing how the narration is discursively oriented to particular spatial and ideological perspectives. It argues that the linguistic construction of point of view in each text reflects a dynamic and sometimes paradoxical relationship between drone operators and their distance from the (...) battlefield. Observing the position and shifting of deictic centres, the analysis draws parallels between spatial perspective, ideology, and the social identities of drone operators and victims of drone strikes. It concludes by reflecting on the variety of discursive strategies employed across these texts, and considers this variation itself to be an emerging trend in the discourse of drone warfare. (shrink)

Cruelty is the deliberate infliction of physical or psychological pain on other living creatures, sometimes indifferently, but often with delight. Though cruelty is an overwhelming presence in the world, there is no neurobiological or psychological explanation for its ubiquity and reward value. This target article attempts to provide such explanations by describing three stages in the development of cruelty. Stage 1 is the development of the predatory adaptation from the Palaeozoic to the ethology of predation in canids, felids, and primates. (...) Stage 2, through palaeontological and anthropological evidence, traces the emergence of the hunting adaptation in the Pliocene, its development in early hominids, and its emotional loading in surviving forager societies. This adaptation provides an explanation for the powerful emotions – high arousal and strong affect – evoked by the pain-blood-death complex. Stage 3 is the emergence of cruelty about 1.5 million years ago as a hominid behavioural repertoire that promoted fitness through the maintenance of personal and social power. The resulting cultural elaborations of cruelty in war, in sacrificial rites, and as entertainment are examined to show the historical and cross-cultural stability of the uses of cruelty for punishment, amusement, and social control. Effective violence prevention must begin with perpetrators, not victims. If the upstream approaches to violence prevention advocated by the public-health model are to be effective, psychologists must be able to provide violence prevention workers with a fine-grained understanding of perpetrator gratifications. This is a distasteful task that will compel researchers to interact with torturers and abusers, and to acknowledge that their gratifications are rooted in a common human past. It is nonetheless an essential step in developing effective strategies for the primary prevention of violence. Key Words: compassion; cruelty; entertainment industry; evolutionary psychology; intraspecific killing; pain; predation; punishment; torture; violence prevention. Correspondence:c1 Correspondence to: West Hill House, 6 Swains Lane, Highgate, London N6 6QS, United Kingdom. (shrink)

The significance of being an intellectual when taken prisoner and sent to a concentration camp by the Nazis is rarely discussed – instead, the importance of being either a Jew or a political prisoner is highlighted. By contrast, Jean Amery’s recollections of being tortured and sent to Auschwitz concentrate on his self-understanding as an intellectual. What difference does the identity and outlook as an intellectual make in the extreme circumstances found in Auschwitz? The paper discusses Amery’s views on this question, (...) invoking that of others who have also addressed it, like Primo Levi and Theodor Adorno. (shrink)

This essay outlines a normative theory of reparations for transitional democracies. The article situates the theory within current critical‐theory debates on recognition and redistribution, and it argues that any model of reparations should aim to achieve what Nancy Fraser calls “status parity.” Such a model should be conceptualized according to a typology of acknowledgment along one axis (symbolic and material) and a typology of recipients (individual and collective) along the other. I conclude by identifying several key contributions that reparations can (...) make to transitional societies. (shrink)

Las tecnologías de la inteligencia artificial (IA) hacen emerger con mayor fuerza una pregunta central para la filosofía contemporánea: ¿cómo se generan los desplazamientos éticos a través de la producción de nuevas formas de convivencia tecnológica? Saber en qué consisten estos desplazamientos y si contribuyen, o no, a determinados tipos de convivencia es más urgente que precipitarse a una producción de normativa que no se enfrenta a los cambios inherentes al nuevo entorno. Pero una de las consecuencias que apuntan en (...) este enfoque es que la programación, sometida a las lógicas de la anticipación, no puede resolver el problema simplemente. La programación tiende a la formación de nichos o esferas en los que los individuos se desenvuelven perdiendo visión de la complejidad; la delegación de los cálculos a las máquinas hace que disminuya no sólo la capacidad del cálculo aritmético sino la imaginación matemática, creando nichos epistémicos crecientemente reservados a las máquinas; la minería de datos borra las diferencias entre lo público y lo privado, afianzando modos de comportamiento que esquivan la autorreflexión y el escrutinio de nuestras acciones en relación al bien común. Pero ¿pueden los programas desenvolverse en un sentido contrario, fortaleciendo las destrezas epistémicas, haciendo visible la complejidad, la participación política y la diversificación de bienes comunes en un mundo tecnológicamente denso? O en otros términos, ¿podemos encontrar en ellos claves para una ética robusta de la convivencia tecnológica? Las contribuciones de este número desgranan las transformaciones en las nociones de autonomía, creatividad y precariedad en el contexto de la IA. (shrink)

While the turn to vulnerability in law responds to a recurrent critique by feminist scholars on the disembodiment of legal personhood, this article suggests that the mobilization of vulnerability in the criminal courts does not necessarily offer female drug mules a direct path to justice. Through an analysis of sentencing appeals of female drug mules in England and Wales, this article presents a feminist critique of the dispositif of the person and its relation to vulnerability. Discourses on drug mules’ vulnerability (...) mobilize the trope of the colonial victim in need of protection, which is often translated into legal mercy. But mercy is rather an expression of biopower which inscribes not only fragility onto the bodies of drug mules by figuring them as exemplar paradigms of colonial subjectivity, but also reinvigorates the dispositif of gender implicit in the legal person. In this set-up, it would appear as if law and politics totalize the registers of life, in this case the contours of vulnerable body. The article suggests we must revisit the image of the wounded body in order to carve out a space for resistance. Drawing on Elaine Scarry and Judith Butler, it suggests vulnerable bodies are marked by a semiotic openness, which renders them subject to appropriation but also able to signify the precarity produced by the law through their resistance to representation. (shrink)

While ethics has become accepted as an important field of inquiry within Anglo-American critical and feminist theory, the same thing cannot be said about ‘love’. I argue that ‘love’ needs to be taken as a serious, valid and crucial subject for academic study, and that feminist theory should have a special investment in the topic. Phenomenological theories of pain and psychoanalytic theories of melancholy can provide a negative definition of love by describing situations where love has lost its objects. These (...) theories help to map connections amongst pain, love, and language, and demonstrate how language — and for Julia Kristeva, how especially literary language — can play an important role in mediating these states. I propose that ‘love’ names not only a particular qualitative relation between a self and an Other, but also a process of altering oneself that involves the creation of an unusual and seemingly contradictory spacing or distance. Luce Irigaray’s work helps us conceive of this concept as an embodied one through her concept of proximate distance. I suggest a ‘poethics of love’ as a theory/methodology that could allow us to continue to think through these complex issues in a way that ties ethical, political and aesthetic concerns together. (shrink)

BackgroundThe evaluation of pain remains one of the most difficult challenges that healthcare practitioners face. Chronic pain appears to affect more than 35% of the population in the West, and indeed, pain is the most common reason patients seek medical care. Despite its ubiquity, studies in the last decades reveal that many patients feel their pain is dismissed by healthcare practitioners and that, as a result, they are denied proper medical care. Buchman, Ho, and Goldberg (J Bioethic Inq 14:31-42, 2017) (...) point to this phenomenon as a form of “epistemic injustice”: an unfair and harmful downgrading of credibility affecting some individuals and groups, which prevents them from receiving appropriate and beneficial medical care.MethodsBy exploring the existing literature on this downgrading of patients’ credibility written by healthcare professionals and scholars in medical humanities, I identify and examine the reasons patients are often not believed about their pain and why healthcare is too-often unhelpful or hurtful to people presenting with chronic pain. I also explore to what extent it is possible to forge an alternative epistemological model.ResultsI suggest that most of the causes of this downgrading of patient’s credibility result from either the difficulty in communicating pain or the widespread belief that pathology is always the result of objective tissue damage. I examine whether pain has to be effectively communicated and have an objective cause in order for it to be deemed credible. In the end, I argue that in the case of pain, both communication and objectivity are highly problematic.ConclusionsI conclude by suggesting that, although alternative epistemological models might be impossible to build, believing patients has both moral and clinical benefits, and this warrants further research. (shrink)

How might the psycho-social effects of chronic skin disease, its treatments (and discontents) be figuratively expressed in writing and painting? Does the art reveal common denominators in experience and representation? If so, how do we understand the cryptic language of these expressions? By examining the works of artists with chronic skin diseases—John Updike, Elizabeth Bishop, and Zelda Fitzgerald—some common features can be noted. Chronically broken skin can fracture the ego or self-perception, resulting in a disturbed body image, which leads to (...) personality disorders and co-morbid affective disorders such as anxiety and depression. The vertiginous feeling that results can be noted in the paradoxical characters, figures, and psyches portrayed in the works of these artists. This essay will examine the more specific ways in which artists disclose and/or conceal their experiences and the particular ways in which these manifest in their works. While certain nuances exist, the common denominators give us a starting point for developing an eczema aesthetic, a code for interpreting the ways in which artists’ experiences with skin disease manifest in their works. (shrink)

This article develops a phenomenology of suffering with an emphasis on matters relevant to medical practice and bioethics. An attempt is made to explain how suffering can involve many different things—bodily pains, inability to carry out everyday actions, and failure to realize core life values—and yet be a distinct phenomenon. Proceeding from and expanding upon analyses found in the works of Eric Cassell and Elaine Scarry, suffering is found to be a potentially alienating mood overcoming the person and engaging her (...) in a struggle to remain at home in the face of loss of meaning and purpose in life. Suffering involves painful experiences at different levels that are connected through the suffering-mood but are nevertheless distinguishable by being primarily about my embodiment, my engagements in the world together with others, and my core life values. Suffering is in essence a feeling , but as such, it has implications for and involves the person’s entire life: how she acts in the world, communicates with others, and understands and looks upon her priorities and goals in life. Suffering-moods are typically intense and painful in nature, but they may also display a rather subconscious quality in presenting things in the world and my life as a whole in an alienating way. In such situations, we are not focused directly upon the suffering-mood—as in the cases of pain and other bodily ailments—but rather, upon the things that the mood presents to us: not only our bodies, but also other things in the world that prevent us from having a good life and being the persons we want to be. Such suffering may in many cases be transformed or at least mitigated by a person’s identifying and changing her core life values and in such a manner reinterpreting her life story to become an easier and more rewarding one to live under the present circumstances. (shrink)

It is frequently said that pain is incommunicable and even that it destroys language . This paper offers a phenomenological account of pain and then explores and critiques this view. It suggests not only that pain is communicable to an adequate degree for clinical purposes, but also that it is itself a form of communication through which the person in pain appeals to the empathy and ethical goodness of the clinician. To explain this latter idea and its ethical implications, reference (...) is made to the writings of Emmanuel Levinas. (shrink)

Residual categories are those which cannot be formally represented within a given classification system. We examine the forms that residuality takes within our information systems today, and explore some silences which form around those inhabiting particular residual categories. We argue that there is significant ethical and political work to be done in exploring residuality.

There is a long tradition of employing a phenomenological approach to gain greater insight into the unique experience of psychiatric illness. Researchers in this field have shed light upon a distur...

This article contributes to recent existentialist interventions in critical criminology (see Lippens and Crewe 2009) and offers the existential concept of ‘event’ as a guiding image for critical victimology. Whereas existential criminologists have examined crime and wrongdoing, very little attention has been given to victimization. I utilize the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and Claude Romano to offer a critique of existing approaches to victimization within mainstream criminology and develop an evential analytic to understand the event of victimization. This paper (...) brings together existential philosophy and victimology to offer an alternative approach to victimization. I engage with the ‘problem of number’ in conventional victimology and offer a critique of quantitative approaches to victimization based on the unsubstitutability and singularity of existence. Through a discussion of selfhood and embodiment from an evential standpoint, this paper moves beyond existing victimological approaches to identity. I also consider the relationship between victimization and trauma. In the final section of the paper I carve out an alternative research agenda through a discussion of bearing witness and events of victimization. (shrink)

There is a scarcity of research on men’s experience of bereavement (Reiniche, 2006), particularly in relation to qualitative research that focuses on the meaning of such an experience. This paper seeks to address this scarcity by presenting the findings from a phenomenological study of the lifeworlds of a small number of bereaved men. The study looked specifically at how the loss of a spouse influences men’s experience of meaning, grief and loss. Three men aged between 32 and 54 years old (...) who had all lost their partners to cancer between 3 and 7 years ago were interviewed. The hermeneutic phenomenological method of Van Manen (1990) was used to uncover three key themes, labelled grief and self-reflection, meaning of life and loss, and refiguring the life-world. These themes are discussed in the light of broader existential concerns and the extant literature. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to describe how hermeneutic photography and one application of hermeneutic photography in particular, namely the photo-instrument, can be used as a health care intervention that fosters meaning (re-)construction of mental illness experiences. Studies into the ways how patients construct meaning in illness narratives indicate that aesthetic expressions of experiences may play an important role in meaning making and sharing. The study is part of a larger research project devoted to understanding the photostories that result (...) from groups of psychiatric patients using the photo-instrument. Within a focused ethnography approach we employed a qualitative design of a single case study. Text analysis of photostories was combined with observational data. Data were analyzed using hermeneutic theory. Participant observations were used for triangulation and complementarity. The interaction and collaboration between health care professionals and patients in the context of a photo group emerged as core concept that underlies the photo-instrument. The interaction triggered a reframing of meaning in the patient’s illness narrative that offered new perspectives on positive identity growth. The role of visualizing meaning in images was found to lend a dynamic power to the process and triggered a dialectic between real life circumstances and imagination played out in the context of situated action. The findings suggest that a positive reframing of meaning in illness narratives is facilitated by the photo-instrument. (shrink)

The article aims at reconstructing how pain is used in contemporary societies in the process of engraving power. Firstly, a social phenomenological analysis of pain is conducted: Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s ideas are used for clarifying the experience of pain itself; Elaine Scarry’s analyses are overviewed in order to reconstruct how pain contributes to the establishing of power. Secondly, this complex approach is applied in early modern context: the parallel processes of the decline of a transcendental and the emergence of a (...) medical interpretation of pain is introduced, along with the marginalization of violence. Thirdly, the era characterized by the triumph of medical pain management is analysed: it is argued that the constitutive role of pain in establishing power does not cease to exist with the emergence of technologies of discursive governance ; it is an open question, what sort of power is engraved through pain understood in strictly medical frames. (shrink)

This essay argues that Berger and Mohr’s A Fortunate Man (1967) – comprising social observation and photographs of the rural practitioner, Dr. Sassall and his patients – enacts an embodied, intersubjective empathy called “pain-work.” The book enacts “pain-work” through two strategies. Firstly, by conflating three ways of seeing – Berger’s observation, Mohr’s photography, and Sassall’s medical gaze – it shows that the clinical encounter embodies objective vision through intersubjective pain. Secondly, it employs the concepts of recognition and witnessing to show (...) how the subjectivity of the physician is distributed in his community. Thus, Berger and Mohr witness Sassall’s witnessing of his patients; even as Sassall and his patients are constituted intersubjectively, so too are Berger, Mohr, and Sassall. (shrink)

This paper presents the early findings of research into the experiences of pain for those who live with chronic pain and engage in BDSM (bondage and discipline, domination and submission, sadism and masochism), explored using a critical crip approach rooted in crip theory and feminist disability studies. The research took the form of a series of interviews with eight disabled people living with chronic pain who experience pain in their BDSM practices, developing a narrative of experiences. The majority of those (...) living with chronic pain, or who have diagnoses of chronic illnesses causing chronic pain, are women. Chronic pain is frequently assumed to be similar to acute pain; however, thinking through pain in terms of normativity and able-bodymindedness reveals the ableist structures that underpin normative attitudes towards pain and those who are in pain. Pain is understood as dehumanising—and thus the person living with chronic pain is understood as not human, abnormal, and disabled. The disabled body, the body in pain, is a horrifying object of abjection, and the non-disabled observer assumes that to be in pain is to suffer; therefore, living with chronic pain is understood as an ontological impossibility and must be stopped. BDSM is a series of practices forming a space in which the people living with chronic pain in this study are able to engage with their somatic experience in ways that do not expect normalcy, while being disabled and living with chronic pain gives them space to explore non-normative sexual practices. (shrink)

In comparison to other art forms, dance remains underrepresented in the medical humanities, especially within the academic medical setting. Several factors, including perceived lack of applicability to patient care, contribute to this pattern. This paper contends that, to the contrary, learners across the medical education spectrum stand to gain much from engaging with the movement arts, including improvement of clinically-relevant skills such as physical self-awareness, observation, communication, and mindfulness. This paper makes the case for the nascent subdiscipline of Movement and (...) Medicine, developed by the authors and piloted for inclusion in medical humanities curricula within a medical education context. Movement and Medicine employs a dance-inspired pedagogy to a) promote awareness of personal movement and embodiment tendencies and b) harness that awareness to gain more profound, sensory insight into the embodied experiences of others—experiences of health, illness, or otherwise. This work outlines the research, rationale, and philosophy behind Movement and Medicine; concretely defines the subdiscipline and situates it within the medical humanities landscape; proposes practical approaches to engaging with and applying this material; and describes a Movement and Medicine course developed for one American medical school. (shrink)

This article is far less a position paper or a descriptive analysis than an attempt to illuminate the lines that connect commonly recognized realities of human life: unfamiliar others in the form of strangers, interpersonal feelings in the form of trust, and organized belief systems in the form of religion. Its epistemological and even ontological conclusion may be sketched as follows: where belief overtakes wonder, religion fails in its mission to enhance life. When fear overtakes wonder, individuals fail in the (...) promise of their aliveness. In particular, when belief overtakes wonder, religion fails in the sense of constraining or even shutting the individual off from investigation and exploration of the unknown or unfamiliar, or from what is not sanctioned as proper. When fear overtakes simple curiosity and the desire to know, the individual fails in the sense of simply reacting, prejudging a situation or a person as threatening or dangerous in advance of actual experience. When belief and fear together take over, human experience is shackled and crippled. It remains ideologically tethered and affectively maimed. The effect of this tethering and maiming has moral consequences having to do with a recognition or non-recognition of the foundational common humanness of humans. (shrink)

During the mid 1980s, the renowned American documentary filmmaker Fred Wiseman produced a four-part series of films that sought to record the operations of institutions in Talladega, Alabama, devoted to the care and training of people with disabilities. These films—designated as the Multi-handicapped Series—have received much less attention than Wiseman's earlier work, as if films about disability mark a drastic departure from his previous award-winning productions, such as Titicut Follies (1965) and Hospital (1970). The Multi-handicapped Series takes up general categories (...) of disabled populations as discrete documentary topics, Deaf (1986), Blind (1986), Multi-handicapped (1986) and Adjustment & Work (1986) as opposed to a specific location as in his earlier films. As a result, the latter series of films identify social and interpersonal structures developed in the name of specific conditions. Like Foucault's research on disciplinary tactics, Wiseman's films seek out many of the segregated social spaces typically occupied by persons classified as deviant: prisons, hospitals, charity networks, sheltered workshops, resident facilities, and vocational training structures. The Multi-handicapped Series focuses on the activities of professions and practitioners in education, administration, and therapy, as well as the institutional roles designed for bodies marked as disabled. Unlike its 19th century predecessor classification, feebleminded, the latter twentieth century U.S. policy answer has been waged as a matter of dividing disabilities into a binary structure of orthopedic or cognitive categories. Such a development has left many crossover bodies in a diagnostic no-body's-land. To analyze the history of these developments, this essay recognizes the formation of today's disability category as an effect of new regimes of power; a form of domination based upon the application of particularized diagnostic pathologies that provide the basis for cordoning off bodies which fail to fit neatly within the cognitive/orthopedic binary. As documents of the social spaces that are occupied by disabled people, Wiseman's films offer a rare contemplation of institutional practices and their application to populations viewed as nonnormative. (shrink)

Based on Lucy Grealy’s memoir, Autobiography of a Face, this article explores the relationship between gender and illness in our culture, as well as the paradox of “intimacy without intimacy” in the clinical encounter. Included is a brief review of how authenticity, vulnerability, and mutual recognition of suffering can foster the kind of empathic doctor-patient relationship that Lucy Grealy sorely needed, but never received. As she says at the end of her memoir, “All those years I’d handed my ugliness over (...) to people, and seen only the different ways it was reflected back to me.”. (shrink)

Our contemporary condition is deeply infused with scientific-technological rationales. These influence and shape our ethical reasoning on war, including the moral status of civilians and the moral choices available to us. In this article, I discuss how technology shapes and directs the moral choices available to us by setting parameters for moral deliberation. I argue that technology has moral significance for just war thinking, yet this is often overlooked in attempts to assess who is liable to harm in war and (...) to what extent. This omission produces an undue deference to technological authority, reducing combatants, civilians and scenarios to data points. If we are to develop a maximally restrictive framework for harming civilians in war, which in my view should be a goal of just war thinking, then it is imperative that the scientific-technological dimension of contemporary war is given due attention. (shrink)

In researching the biomedically-engineered drug Neulasta (filgrastim), a breast cancer patient becomes aware of the extent to which knowledge about the development and marketing of drugs influences her decisions with regard to treatment. Time spent on understanding the commercial interests of insurers and pharmaceutical companies initially thwarts but ultimately aids the healing process. This first-person narrative calls for physicians to recognize that the alignment of commercial interests transgresses the patient’s humanity.

In researching the biomedically-engineered drug Neulasta, a breast cancer patient becomes aware of the extent to which knowledge about the development and marketing of drugs influences her decisions with regard to treatment. Time spent on understanding the commercial interests of insurers and pharmaceutical companies initially thwarts but ultimately aids the healing process. This first-person narrative calls for physicians to recognize that the alignment of commercial interests transgresses the patient’s humanity.

In this paper, we use a phenomenological approach to compare the unusual ways in which language can be experienced by individuals with schizophrenia or severe mood disorders, specifically mania and melancholia. Our discussion follows a tripartite/dialectical format: first we describe traditionally observed distinctions ; then we consider some apparent similarities in the experience of language in these conditions. Finally, we explore more subtle, qualitative differences. These involve: 1, interpersonal orientation, 2, forms of attention and context-relevance, 3, underlying mutations of experience, (...) and 4, meta-attitudes toward language. Such distinctions appear to reflect significant differences in underlying forms of subjectivity; they are broadly consistent with work in phenomenological psychopathology on other aspects of experience, including body, self, and social world. An understanding of such distinctions may assist with difficult cases of differential diagnosis, while also contributing to a better understanding of suffering persons and of psychological factors underlying their disorders. (shrink)

Torture has reappeared in liberal democracies in the guise of anti-terrorism strategies. The acceptance of its use and the fascination with the images and documents that indicate the pain and suffering of the tortured point to more than a belief in the need for torture to counter terrorist threats. This fascination implies an enjoyment on the part of the liberal subject who is looking on while the other subject is being beaten. In this article I consider the liberal subject’s acceptance (...) of and fascination with the scene of torture. I argue that the scene of torture, as imagined by the subject looking on, provides a formula for the relief of anxiety in the liberal subject who does not know if s/he will be subject to torture at any time. To consider this scene I analyze Donald Rumsfeld’s annotation to the ‘Action Memo’ which sanctioned torture and, through the work of Freud, Lacan and Santner, I explore the position of contemporary sovereigns in their function as providing transcendental signification for the subject seeking recognition and relief in the sovereign’s gaze. (shrink)

In colonial nations, such as the land called Australia, the two registers of settler and Indigenous jurisdictions compete at the level of symbolic certainty. In Lacanian psychoanalytic theory neither can arrive at perfect symbolisation but the struggle and the proximity to their arrival can evoke anxiety. What insists to keep this anxiety at bay, in non-Indigenous Australia, is what Jacques Derrida calls justice. As an impossible object, similar to the Lacanian object petit a, justice must be interminably animated to hold (...) this object of desire in play. Humiliation of Indigenous people in Australia is, I argue in this article, one mode of this play. I interrogate the psychoanalytic discussions of anxiety by Freud and Lacan to consider firstly what might be the cause of anxiety for contemporary non-Indigenous Australians and secondly how this anxiety is ‘played out’ on the bodies of Indigenous people through practices of humiliation. As one example of this work of humiliation I consider several scenes of police practice in the Sydney suburb of ‘Redfern’ from the 1991 documentary Cop it Sweet. (shrink)

Pain: the most senseless of things or the most vital of phenomena? This essay aims at a defense of the meaning of pain through an inquiry into the ek-static temporality that structures a being-in-pain. The argument considers the common understanding of pain as a symptom. As the present result of a source of injury that demands a cure, a being-in-pain pictures a movement from something to something else, that is, it pictures the ek-static structure discovered by Aristotle. Furthermore, the argument (...) recalls the Aristotelian apprehension of pain as responsible for the innermost secret of dynamics as such. Pain causes unease and demands change, and hence it opens up a future dimension that marks a beginning of motion and change in general, and of time in particular. When confronted with a pain bound to be chronic, when no change can be expected, time remains. The concluding reading of witness-literature, supports the guiding intuition of pain as a passion in service of things forgotten, in futural light of an eventually new beginning. (shrink)

En este trabajo se discute qué puede aportar la filosofía a la comprensión del dolor. Para ello, en la sección, apuntamos que la pregunta por el dolor tiene su origen en una experiencia personal. En, analizamos que, para conocer el dolor tenemos que tomar en consideración experiencias subjetivas. Razón por la cual la naturaleza del dolor es esquiva y tenemos que repensar constantemente su significado; al igual que los retos que deben afrontar la ciencia y la filosofía del dolor. Nuestra (...) conclusión sobre esta cuestión, es que la pregunta por el dolor requiere dos esfuerzos sociales: empatía y colaboración. La dimensión humana del dolor es inevitable y, por tanto, una la filosofía del dolor es necesaria. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of what it is that visual depictions of illness portray, particularly images executed by or on behalf of people who have suffered serious illness. It takes up two lines of inquiry, both to do with the work that such pictures might perform. On the one hand, as works of art, there are questions about the form of signification in visual representations of this kind. On the other, as works of illness, there are issues concerning the (...) role of image-making for sufferers bearing witness to their situation. The article examines the issue of what it is to look at pictures of bodies scarred by treatment for serious disease, and follows this into questions about what it is possible and necessary to show in order to render illness experience tangible. By examining, as exemplars, two particular images of sufferers, it is argued that such portrayals work not just through making visible certain objects for scrutiny, but by figuratively instantiating persons so as to produce a `vision of the non-visual'. In this way picturing illness finds its place in what might be called a politics of care. (shrink)

Patients with persistent pain who lack adetectable underlying disease challenge thetheories supporting much of biomedicalbody-mind discourse. In this context,diagnostic labeling is as inherently vulnerableto the same pitfalls of uncertainty that besetany other interpretative endeavour. The endpoint is often no more than a name ratherthan the discovered essence of a pre-existentmedical condition. In 1990 a Committee of theAmerican College of Rheumatology (ACR)formulated the construct of Fibromyalgia in anattempt to rectify a situation of diagnosticconfusion faced by patients presenting withwidespread pain. It was (...) proposed thatFibromyalgia existed as a ``specific entity'',separable from but curiously able to co-existwith any other painful condition. Epistemological and semiotic analyses ofFibromyalgia have failed to find any sign,clinical or linguistic, which coulddifferentiate it from other diffusemusculoskeletal pain states. The construct ofFibromyalgia sought to define a discernablereality outside the play of language and topass it off as a natural phenomenon. However,because it has failed both clinically andsemiotically, the construct also fails the testof medical utility for the subject inpersistent pain. (shrink)

In this paper, I will provide a phenomenological analysis of somatic obsessions at times present in obsessive–compulsive disorder. I will compare two different types of bodily obsessions, which have a different neurological-physiological underpinning: anguishing awareness of one’s own heartbeat and of one’s own breathing. In addition, I will contrast these two with how one experiences one’s own liver. I will use the concepts "tactility obsessions” and "motility obsessions”, which I have coined for the purpose of this comparison. In other words, (...) these are obsessions concerning the felt sense of one’s autonomous organs and obsessions concerning one’s ability to voluntarily move. Ultimately, I claim that the core lived experience in somatic obsessive–compulsive disorder should not only be understood as having to do with intruding and "distorted thoughts” concerning bodily processes, but could also be understood as having to do with a felt sense of our organs interrupting and intruding our daily lives. (shrink)

Pippin offers his reconstruction of Hegel's account of practical reason as a point of departure for contemporary social theory, yet he does not address the implications for us of Hegel's claim that social reflection can achieve its knowledge only on the basis of a world that has already become rational. After arguing that the unreasonableness of our world can be seen from the suffering it generates, I argue that an account of violence may be a way to retrieve the promise (...) of Hegelian insights so long as it draws in turn on existing challenges to violence and the suffering it causes. The argument discusses four kinds of violence (direct, formative, structural, and symbolic) and confronts these with a neo-Hegelian conception of social learning. (shrink)

A recent widely reported study found that some participants would prefer to self-administer a small electric shock than be bored. This flawed study serves as a departure point to diagram pain and sensation beyond the boundaries of the individual body, consisting of four sections. First, in terms of laboratory-based experimentation and auto-experimentation with pain, there is a long history of viewing pain and touch through introspective means. Second, later theories of pain successively widened the scope of the physiological mechanisms and (...) external influences on the organism, such as Melzack and Wall’s cybernetics-influenced gate control theory. Third, we briefly consider the nervous system as a homeostatic system, which finds an historical parallel in explanations of the milieu intérieur of the organism, via Claude Bernard and Kurt Goldstein. Fourth, pain helps tip the organism as a whole from perception to action, but also operates beyond the organism as a biopsychosocial phenomenon. (shrink)

This contribution intends to explore patients’ lived experience, with a focus on the temporal dimension. On the basis of a qualitative study that led me to interview persons with Parkinson’s disease, caregivers, and medical professionals, I develop an empirical and philosophical investigation of the temporalities surrounding the implementation of deep brain stimulation in Greece. I raise the issue of access to DBS medical care, and show how distinct temporalities are implied when the patients face such a matter: that of linear (...) time, linked with the medical discourse, the bureaucratic time linked to administrative and financial hurdles in the implementation and maintenance of DBS, and the technological time of the body/technology fusion. I consider initially the impact of technology and health care settings on the lived experience of patients and the enactment of multiple bodies which are interrelated with the social world. I then expand my analysis in order to show that this experience cannot be a solipsistic one, or specific to one physician/patient relationship. It is fully socially shaped. (shrink)

'Ruin, Repair, and Responsibility' explores and Arendtean conceptualization of the three and their interrelations. At issue is how to understand (a) ruin in its socio-historical specificity but also in terms of what it is that breaks down in the weave of human relations, (b) the possibility or impossibility of repair, and (c) what responsibility may mean when repair is impossible since the very conditions for its possibility have been destroyed.

Pain is multidimensional, complex; it affects the ontological structures of the human being and exceeds spatio-temporal boundaries. Therefore, it is universally felt with an impact in the past, moving to the present, and projecting to the future. There are efforts to ease or completely eliminate the impact of pain, however, a good understand- ing of its biological and anthropological dimensions is necessary for proper orientation of such undertakings. This article identifies some social, cultural, medical-scientific, and individual factors that account for (...) the changes in modes of experiencing and managing pain. It posits that there is a general unpreparedness on the physical, psychological, and spiritual levels for continued pain in the future. It thus analyses factors that need to be learnt in order to promote favourable alterations in mental attitudes, pain sensitivity, and tolerance to pain. Preparing for a future of pain requires interdisciplinary reflection on the bodily, emotional, and spiritual components that constitute the pain experience so as to re-direct its trajectory. (shrink)

In Why pains are not mental objects Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of experiencebecome (...) a mental object. I shall finally argue that, thoughextreme pains cannot serve as paradigm cases, they do showthe general importance of taking pain states to be objects. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMost recently, debates on decolonization, transformation, and Africanization raise, again, critical questions about the continuous dominance of the Western practice of philosophy in an African place. Such debates bear particular reference to colonization; however, they are relevant to any place where displacement is an issue and transformation demanded. Yet, the concept of displacement receives surprisingly little attention in these debates or in literature on place. I argue that place and displacement are inherently related, and explore some implications of this relation (...) with regard to the practice of philosophy. My contention is that while displacement is an issue that raises specific challenges to the practice of Western philosophy in an African context, it is in fact a defining feature of philosophy as such in search of its place in the world. In conclusion, I propose what I call a distopological approach towards a philosophical practice that takes seriously its place and inherent relation to... (shrink)

This article explores the phenomenon of “phantom pain.” The analysis is based on personal experiences elicited from individuals who have lost a limb or live with a paralyzed body part. Our study reveals that the ways in which these individuals express their pain experience is an integral aspect of that experience. The material consists of interviews undertaken with men who are living with phantom pain resulting from a traumatic injury. The phenomenological analysis is inspired by Zahavi :151–167, 2001) and Merleau-Ponty. (...) On a descriptive level the metaphors these patients invoke to describe their condition reveal immense suffering, such as a feeling of being invaded by insects or of their skin being scorched and stripped from their body. Such metaphors express a dimension of experience concerning the self that is in pain and others whom the sufferer relates to through this pain, as well as the agony that this pain inflicts in the world of lived experience. This pain has had a profound impact on their lives and altered their relationship with self, others and the world. Their phantom pain has become a reminder of their formerly intact and functioning body; they describe the contrast between their past and present body as an ambiguous and disturbing experience. We conclude that these sensitive and personalized experiences of phantom pain illuminates how acts of expression—spoken pain—constitute a fundamental dimension of a first-person perspective which contribute to the field of knowledge about “phantom pain”. (shrink)