Resumen Según la teoría cognitivista, las proposiciones son tipos de actos predicativos, y un agente lleva a cabo una predicación cada vez que juzga o asevera algo. Ahora bien, la versión predominante de dicha teoría establece que el juicio es una actitud cognitiva hacia un contenido proposicional genuino, lo que significa que se lo entiende como una relación dual entre un agente y una proposición. Tras mostrar algunos problemas con esta versión, argumentaré a favor de una teoría cognitivista de las (...) proposiciones en la que el juicio se entiende como una relación múltiple entre un agente y entidades del mundo tales como objetos, propiedades y relaciones.According to cognitive theory, propositions are types of predicative acts, and an agent performs a predication every time she judges or asserts something. Now, the prevailing version of such a theory states that judgement is a cognitive attitude toward a genuine propositional content, which means that it is seen as a dual relation between an agent and a proposition. After showing some troubles with this version, I will argue for a cognitive theory of propositions in which judgement is seen as a multiple relation between an agent and worldly entities such as objects, properties and relations. (shrink)

Questions are not on all fours with assertions or directions, but higher-level acts that can operate on either to yield theoretical questions, as when one asks whether the door is closed, or practical questions, as when one asks whether to close it. They contain interrogative force indicators, which present positions of wondering, but also assertoric or directive force indicators which present the position of theoretical or practical knowledge the subject is striving for. Views based on the traditional force-content distinction take (...) the indicative mood for granted and therefore do not understand assertion in contrast to direction, but in contrast to questions and other higher-level acts such as logical and fictional acts. But a corresponding sign like Frege's judgement stroke can only redundantly signal the absence of a higher-level act. (shrink)