Force, content and logic

In Gabriele M. Mras, Paul Weingartner & Bernhard Ritter (eds.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Vol. XXVI 41th International Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg am Wechsel. pp. 221-223 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The Frege point to the effect that e.g. the clauses of conditionals are not asserted and therefore cannot be assertions is often taken to establish a dichotomy between the content of a speech act, which is propositional and belongs to logic and semantics, and its force, which belongs to pragmatics. Recently this dichotomy has been questioned by philosophers such as Peter Hanks and Francois Recanati, who propose act-theoretic accounts of propositions, argue that we can’t account for propositional unity independently of the forceful acts of speakers, and respond to the Frege point by appealing to a notion of force cancellation. I argue that the notion of force cancellation is faced with a dilemma and offer an alternative response to the Frege point, which extends the act-theoretic account to logical acts such as conditionalizing or disjoining. Such higher-level acts allow us to present forceful acts while suspending commitment to them. In connecting them, a subject rather commits to an affirmation function of such acts. In contrast, the Frege point confuses a lack of commitment to what is put forward with a lack of commitment or force in what is put forward.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SCHFCA-14
Revision history
First archival date: 2018-06-03
Latest version: 2 (2018-10-30)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Assertion.Geach, P. T.
Force Cancellation.Recanati, François
On Cancellation.Hanks, Peter

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-06-03

Total views
56 ( #31,067 of 40,684 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #19,717 of 40,684 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.