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  1. One Cognitive Style Among Others. Towards a Phenomenology of the Lifeworld and of Other Experiences.Gregor Schiemann - 2014 - In D. Ginev (ed.), The Multidimensionality of Hermeneutic Phenomenology. Springer. pp. 31-48.
    In his pioneering sociological theory, which makes phenomenological concepts fruitful for the social sciences, Alfred Schütz has laid foundations for a characterization of an manifold of distinct domains of experience. My aim here is to further develop this pluralist theory of experience by buttressing and extending the elements of diversity that it includes, and by eliminating or minimizing lingering imbalances among the domains of experience. After a critical discussion of the criterion-catalogue Schütz develops for the purpose of characterizing different cognitive (...)
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  • Helmholtz on Perceptual Properties.R. Brian Tracz - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (3).
    Hermann von Helmholtz’s work on perceptual science had a fundamental impact on Neo-Kantian movements in the late nineteenth century, and his influence continues to be felt in psychology and analytic philosophy of perception. As is widely acknowledged, Helmholtz denied that we can perceive mind-independent properties of external objects, a view I label Ignorance. Given his commitment to Ignorance, Helmholtz might seem to be committed to a subjectivism according to which we only perceive properties of our own representations. Against this, I (...)
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  • Helmholtz and Philosophy: Science, Perception, and Metaphysics, with Variations on Some Fichtean Themes.Gary Hatfield - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (3).
    This article considers Helmholtz’s relation to philosophy, including Fichte’s philosophy. Recent interpreters find Fichtean influence on Helmholtz, especially concerning the role of voluntary movement in distinguishing subject from object, or “I” from “not-I.” After examining Helmholtz’s statements about Fichte, the article describes Fichte’s ego-doctrine and asks whether Helmholtz could accept it into his sensory psychology. He could not accept Fichte’s core position, that an intrinsically active I intellectually intuits its own activity and posits the not-I as limiting and determining that (...)
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