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  1. Consciousness, Idealism, and Skepticism: Reflections on Jay Garfield’s Engaging Buddhism.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2018 - Sophia 57 (4):559-563.
    Jay Garfield’s Engaging Buddhism admirably shows the relevance of Indian philosophy to the interests of mainstream analytic Anglophone philosophers. Garfield deploys the Indian tradition to critique phenomenal realism, the view that there really are qualia or phenomenal properties—that there really is ‘something it’s like’ to be undergoing the experience you are undergoing right now. I argue that Garfield’s critique probably turns on a false dilemma that omits the possibility of introspection as a fallible tool for getting at a real stream (...)
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  • Dennett on Consciousness: Realism Without the Hysterics.Francis Fallon - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):35-44.
    Dennett’s theory of consciousness is often misread as broadly anti-realist. His aversion to ontology encourages readers to form their own interpretations, and the rhetoric he employs often seems to support the anti-realist reading. Dennett does offer defenses against the anti-realist charge, but these are piecemeal and diffuse. This paper examines Dennett’s most current expression, which proves insufficient on its own as a resolution to the ontological dispute. Drawing on related discussions in an attempt to find a resolution leads to a (...)
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  • A Conceptual Map of Scientism.Rik Peels - manuscript
    I argue that scientism in general is best understood as the thesis that the boundaries of the natural sciences should be expanded in order to include academic disciplines or realms of life that are widely considered not to belong to the realm of science. However, every adherent and critic of scientism should make clear which of the many varieties of scientism she adheres to or criticizes. In doing so, she should specify whether she is talking about (a) academic or universal (...)
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  • Time, Unity, and Conscious Experience.Michal Klincewicz - 2013 - Dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center
    In my dissertation I critically survey existing theories of time consciousness, and draw on recent work in neuroscience and philosophy to develop an original theory. My view depends on a novel account of temporal perception based on the notion of temporal qualities, which are mental properties that are instantiated whenever we detect change in the environment. When we become aware of these temporal qualities in an appropriate way, our conscious experience will feature the distinct temporal phenomenology that is associated with (...)
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  • The Logic of Appearance: Dennett, Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis.Jasper Feyaerts & Stijn Vanheule - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Phenomenological Skepticism Reconsidered: A Husserlian Answer to Dennett’s Challenge.Jaakko Belt - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues.Frederic Peters - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (4):441-461.
    Within the philosophy of mind, consciousness is currently understood as the expression of one or other cognitive modality, either intentionality , transparency , subjectivity or reflexivity . However, neither intentionality, subjectivity nor transparency adequately distinguishes conscious from nonconscious cognition. Consequently, the only genuine index or defining characteristic of consciousness is reflexivity, the capacity for autonoetic or self-referring, self-monitoring awareness. But the identification of reflexivity as the principal index of consciousness raises a major challenge in relation to the cognitive mechanism responsible (...)
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  • A Gap in Nisbett and Wilson’s Findings? A First-Person Access to Our Cognitive Processes.Claire Petitmengin, Anne Remillieux, Béatrice Cahour & Shirley Carter-Thomas - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):654-669.
    The well-known experiments of Nisbett and Wilson lead to the conclusion that we have no introspective access to our decision-making processes. Johansson et al. have recently developed an original protocol consisting in manipulating covertly the relationship between the subjects’ intended choice and the outcome they were presented with: in 79.6% of cases, they do not detect the manipulation and provide an explanation of the choice they did not make, confirming the findings of Nisbett and Wilson. We have reproduced this protocol, (...)
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  • How to Improve on Heterophenomenology: The Self-Measurement Methodology of First-Person Data.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):3 - 4.
    Heterophenomenology is a third-person methodology proposed by Daniel Dennett for using first-person reports as scientific evidence. I argue that heterophenomenology can be improved by making six changes: (i) setting aside consciousness, (ii) including other sources of first-person data besides first-person reports, (iii) abandoning agnosticism as to the truth value of the reports in favor of the most plausible assumptions we can make about what can be learned from the data, (iv) interpreting first-person reports (and other first-person behaviors) directly in terms (...)
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  • The Validity of First-Person Descriptions as Authenticity and Coherence.Claire Petitmengin - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10-12):10-12.
    This article is devoted to the description of the experience associated with listening to a sound. In the first part, we describe the method we used to gather descriptions of auditory experience and to analyse these descriptions. This work of explicitation and analysis has enabled us to identify a threefold generic structure of this experience, depending on whether the attention of the subject is directed towards the event which is at the source of the sound, the sound in itself, considered (...)
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  • Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic.Gerald Peterson - 2009 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 40 (1):121-125.
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  • Validating and Calibrating First-and Second-Person Methods in the Science of Consciousness.T. Froese, C. Gould & A. K. Seth - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):38.
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  • Comments on Evan Thompson, Mind in Life.Daniel C. Dennett - unknown
    I have learned a lot from Evan Thompson’s book–his scholarship is formidable, and his taste for relatively overlooked thinkers is admirable–but I keep stumbling over the strain induced by his self-assigned task of demonstrating that his heroes–Varela and Maturana, Merleau-Ponty and (now) Husserl, Oyama and Moss and others–have shattered the comfortable assumptions of orthodoxy, and outlined radical new approaches to the puzzles of life and mind. The irony is that Thompson is such a clear and conscientious expositor that he makes (...)
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  • The Empirical Case Against Introspection.Rik Peels - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2461-2485.
    This paper assesses five main empirical scientific arguments against the reliability of belief formation on the basis of introspecting phenomenal states. After defining ‘reliability’ and ‘introspection’, I discuss five arguments to the effect that phenomenal states are more elusive than we usually think: the argument on the basis of differences in introspective reports from differences in introspective measurements; the argument from differences in reports about whether or not dreams come in colours; the argument from the absence of a correlation between (...)
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  • Interactively Guided Introspection is Getting Science Closer to an Effective Consciousness Meter.Tom Froese - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):672-676.
    The ever-increasing precision of brain measurement brings with it a demand for more reliable and fine-grained measures of conscious experience. However, introspection has long been assumed to be too limited and fallible. This skepticism is primarily based on a series of classic psychological experiments, which suggested that more is seen than can be retrospectively reported , and that we can be easily fooled into retrospectively describing intentional choices that we have never made . However, the work by Petitmengin, Remillieux, Cahour, (...)
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  • Introspective Humility.Tim Bayne & Maja Spener - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
    Viewed from a certain perspective, nothing can seem more secure than introspection. Consider an ordinary conscious episode—say, your current visual experience of the colour of this page. You can judge, when reflecting on this experience, that you have a visual experience as of something white with black marks before you. Does it seem reasonable to doubt this introspective judgement? Surely not—such doubt would seem utterly fanciful. The trustworthiness of introspection is not only assumed by commonsense, it is also taken for (...)
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