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  1. How to Detect Insight Moments in Problem Solving Experiments.Ruben E. Laukkonen & Jason M. Tangen - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • There Is an ‘Unconscious,’ but It May Well Be Conscious.Bernardo Kastrup - 2017 - Europe's Journal of Psychology 13 (3):559-572.
    Depth psychology finds empirical validation today in a variety of observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called “meta-consciousness” in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an “unconscious.” The implied hypothesis is that all mental processes may in fact be conscious, the appearance of unconsciousness arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection for (...)
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  • An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem.Bernardo Kastrup - 2017 - Philosophies 2 (2):doi:10.3390/philosophies2020010.
    I argue for an idealist ontology consistent with empirical observations, which seeks to explain the facts of nature more parsimoniously than physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism. This ontology also attempts to offer more explanatory power than both physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism, in that it does not fall prey to either the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ or the ‘subject combination problem’, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: spatially unbound consciousness is posited to be nature’s sole ontological primitive. We, as well as (...)
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  • On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms.Bernardo Kastrup - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (44):13-34.
    Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these ontologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality in the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for this (...)
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  • The Physicalist Worldview as Neurotic Ego-Defense Mechanism.Bernardo Kastrup - 2016 - SAGE Open 6 (4):1-7.
    The physicalist worldview is often portrayed as a dispassionate interpretation of reality motivated purely by observable facts. In this article, ideas of both depth and social psychology are used to show that this portrayal may not be accurate. Physicalism—whether it ultimately turns out to be philosophically correct or not—is hypothesized to be partly motivated by the neurotic endeavor to project onto the world attributes that help one avoid confronting unacknowledged aspects of one’s own inner life. Moreover, contrary to what most (...)
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  • Experimenting with phenomenology.Shaun Gallagher & Jesper B. Sorensen - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):119-134.
    We review the use of introspective and phenomenological methods in experimental settings. We distinguish different senses of introspection, and further distinguish phenomenological method from introspectionist approaches. Two ways of using phenomenology in experimental procedures are identified: first, the neurophenomenological method, proposed by Varela, involves the training of experimental subjects. This approach has been directly and productively incorporated into the protocol of experiments on perception. A second approach may have wider application and does not involve training experimental subjects in phenomenological method. (...)
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  • Introspection during visual search.Gabriel Reyes & Jérôme Sackur - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 29:212-229.
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  • Self-report may underestimate trauma intrusions.Melanie K. T. Takarangi, Deryn Strange & D. Stephen Lindsay - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 27:297-305.
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  • Motivating meta-awareness of mind wandering: A way to catch the mind in flight?Claire M. Zedelius, James M. Broadway & Jonathan W. Schooler - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:44-53.
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  • Children with positive attitudes towards mind-wandering provide invalid subjective reports of mind-wandering during an experimental task.Yi Zhang, Xiaolan Song, Qun Ye & Qinqin Wang - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:136-142.
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  • Solely Generic Phenomenology.Ned Block - 2015 - Open MIND 2015.
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  • Environmental and mental conditions predicting the experience of involuntary musical imagery: An experience sampling method study.Georgia A. Floridou & Daniel Müllensiefen - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:472-486.
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  • Role of triggers and dysphoria in mind-wandering about past, present and future: A laboratory study.Benjamin Plimpton, Priya Patel & Lia Kvavilashvili - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:261-276.
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  • Differential recruitment of executive resources during mind wandering.Julia W. Y. Kam & Todd C. Handy - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 26:51-63.
    Recent research has shown that mind wandering recruits executive resources away from the external task towards inner thoughts. No studies however have determined whether executive functions are drawn away in a unitary manner during mind wandering episodes, or whether there is variation in specific functions impacted. Accordingly, we examined whether mind wandering differentially modulates three core executive functions—response inhibition, updating of working memory, and mental set shifting. In three experiments, participants performed one of these three executive function tasks and reported (...)
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  • The neural basis of event-time introspection.Adrian G. Guggisberg, Sarang S. Dalal, Armin Schnider & Srikantan S. Nagarajan - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1899-1915.
    We explored the neural mechanisms allowing humans to report the subjective onset times of conscious events. Magnetoencephalographic recordings of neural oscillations were obtained while human subjects introspected the timing of sensory, intentional, and motor events during a forced choice task. Brain activity was reconstructed with high spatio-temporal resolution. Event-time introspection was associated with specific neural activity at the time of subjective event onset which was spatially distinct from activity induced by the event itself. Different brain regions were selectively recruited for (...)
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  • Anatomy of an error: A bidirectional state model of task engagement/disengagement and attention-related errors.J. Allan Cheyne, Grayden J. F. Solman, Jonathan S. A. Carriere & Daniel Smilek - 2009 - Cognition 111 (1):98-113.
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  • Mind-wandering and dysphoria.Jonathan Smallwood, Rory C. O'Connor, Megan V. Sudbery & Marc Obonsawin - 2007 - Cognition and Emotion 21 (4):816-842.
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  • Unnoticed intrusions: Dissociations of meta-consciousness in thought suppression.Benjamin Baird, Jonathan Smallwood, Daniel Jf Fishman, Michael D. Mrazek & Jonathan W. Schooler - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):1003-1012.
    The current research investigates the interaction between thought suppression and individuals’ explicit awareness of their thoughts. Participants in three experiments attempted to suppress thoughts of a prior romantic relationship and their success at doing so was measured using a combination of self-catching and experience-sampling. In addition to thoughts that individuals spontaneously noticed, individuals were frequently caught engaging in thoughts of their previous partner at experience-sampling probes. Furthermore, probe-caught thoughts were: associated with stronger decoupling of attention from the environment, more likely (...)
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  • Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data.Uljana Feest - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):927-939.
    This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate this point with a historical (...)
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  • Experimenting with introspection.Shaun Gallagher - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (9):374-375.
    Psychologists’ relationship with introspection is much like that between men and women: it is on again, off again and psychologists often feel they can neither live with introspection nor without it. In their often compelling article, Jack and Roepstorff argue that the fertility of the field depends on psychologists reuniting with the practice of introspection [1]. They suggest that, although reluctant to admit it, psychologists have been carrying on a surreptitious relationship with introspection that they should come clean and admit. (...)
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  • What is it like to be nonconscious? A defense of Julian Jaynes.Gary Williams - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):217-239.
    I respond to Ned Block’s claim that it is ridiculous to suppose that consciousness is a cultural construction based on language and learned in childhood. Block is wrong to dismiss social constructivist theories of consciousness on account of it being ludicrous that conscious experience is anything but a biological feature of our animal heritage, characterized by sensory experience, evolved over millions of years. By defending social constructivism in terms of both Julian Jaynes’ behaviorism and J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology, I draw (...)
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  • Neurophenomenology.Antoine Lutz & Evan Thompson - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.
    _sciousness called ‘neurophenomenology’ (Varela 1996) and illustrates it with a_ _recent pilot study (Lutz et al., 2002). At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology_ _pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the_ _neurophysiology of consciousness (Varela 1995; Thompson and Varela 2001;_ _Varela and Thompson 2003). At a methodological level, the neurophenomeno-_ _logical strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about_ _subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale_ _neurodynamics of consciousness (Lutz 2002). The paper (...)
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  • Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers.Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 40.
    • An adequate conceptual framework is still needed to account for phenomena that (i) have a first-person, subjective-experiential or phenomenal character; (ii) are (usually) reportable and describable (in humans); and (iii) are neurobiologically realized.2 • The conscious subject plays an unavoidable epistemological role in characterizing the explanadum of consciousness through first-person descriptive reports. The experimentalist is then able to link first-person data and third-person data. Yet the generation of first-person data raises difficult epistemological issues about the relation of second-order awareness (...)
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  • Describing one’s subjective experience in the second person: An interview method for the science of consciousness. [REVIEW]Claire Petitmengin - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):229-269.
    This article presents an interview method which enables us to bring a person, who may not even have been trained, to become aware of his or her subjective experience, and describe it with great precision. It is focused on the difficulties of becoming aware of one’s subjective experience and describing it, and on the processes used by this interview technique to overcome each of these difficulties. The article ends with a discussion of the criteria governing the validity of the descriptions (...)
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  • Introspection and subliminal perception.Thomas Zoega Ramsøy & Morten Overgaard - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):1-23.
    Subliminal perception (SP) is today considered a well-supported theory stating that perception can occur without conscious awareness and have a significant impact on later behaviour and thought. In this article, we first present and discuss different approaches to the study of SP. In doing this, we claim that most approaches are based on a dichotomic measure of awareness. Drawing upon recent advances and discussions in the study of introspection and phenomenological psychology, we argue for both the possibility and necessity of (...)
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  • Introspection and cognitive brain mapping: from stimulus–response to script–report.Anthony Ian Jack & Andreas Roepstorff - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (8):333-339.
    Cognitive science has wholeheartedly embraced functional brain imaging, but introspective data are still eschewed to the extent that it runs against standard practice to engage in the systematic collection of introspective reports. However, in the case of executive processes associated with prefrontal cortex, imaging has made limited progress, whereas introspective methods have considerable unfulfilled potential. We argue for a re-evaluation of the standard ‘cognitive mapping’ paradigm, emphasizing the use of retrospective reports alongside behavioural and brain imaging techniques. Using all three (...)
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  • The electrophysiology of introspection.Morten Overgaard, Mika Koivisto, Thomas Alrik Sørensen, Signe Vangkilde & Antti Revonsuo - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):662-672.
    To study whether the distinction between introspective and non-introspective states of mind is an empirical reality or merely a conceptual distinction, we measured event-related potentials elicited in introspective and non-introspective instruction conditions while the observers were trying to detect the presence of a masked stimulus. The ERPs indicated measurable differences related to introspection in both preconscious and conscious processes. Our data support the hypothesis that introspective states empirically differ from non-introspective states.
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  • A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness.Alain Morin - 2004 - Genetic Social And General Psychology Monographs 130 (3):197-222.
    In the past, researchers have focused mainly on the effects and consequences of self-awareness; however, they have neglected a more basic issue pertaining to the specific mechanisms that initiate and sustain self-perception. The author presents a model of self-awareness that proposes the existence of 3 sources of self-information. First, the social milieu includes early face-to-face interactions, self-relevant feedback, a social comparison mechanism that leads to perspective taking, and audiences. Second, contacts with objects and structures in the physical environment foster self–world (...)
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  • Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various neurocognitive views.Alain Morin - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):358-371.
    Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount (...)
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  • Possible links between self-awareness and inner speech: Theoretical background, underlying mechanisms, and empirical evidence.Alain Morin - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):115-134.
    been recently proposed (Morin, 2003; 2004). The model takes into account most known mechanisms and processes leading to self-awareness, and examines their multiple and complex interactions. Inner speech is postulated to play a key-role in this model, as it establishes important connections between many of its ele- ments. This paper first reviews past and current references to a link between self-awareness and inner speech. It then presents an analysis of the nature of the relation between these two concepts. It is (...)
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  • The mind’s best trick: How we experience conscious will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):65-69.
    We often consciously will our own actions. This experience is so profound that it tempts us to believe that our actions are caused by consciousness. It could also be a trick, however – the mind’s way of estimating its own apparent authorship by drawing causal inferences about relationships between thoughts and actions. Cognitive, social, and neuropsychological studies of apparent mental causation suggest that experiences of conscious will frequently depart from actual causal processes and so might not reflect direct perceptions of (...)
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  • Emotion and cognition: Recent developments and therapeutic practice.Michael Lacewing - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (2):175-186.
    As is widely known, the last 25 years have seen an acceleration in the development of theories of emotion. Perhaps less well-known is that the last three years have seen an extended defense of a predominant, though not universally accepted, framework for the understanding of emotion in philosophy and psychology. The central claim of this framework is that emotions are a form of evaluative response to their intentional objects, centrally involving cognition or something akin to cognition, in which the evaluation (...)
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  • An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem.Bernardo Kastrup - 2017 - Philosophies 2 (2):10.
    I argue for an idealist ontology consistent with empirical observations, which seeks to explain the facts of nature more parsimoniously than physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism. This ontology also attempts to offer more explanatory power than both physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism, in that it does not fall prey to either the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ or the ‘subject combination problem’, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: spatially unbound consciousness is posited to be nature’s sole ontological primitive. We, as well as (...)
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  • Self-caught methodologies for measuring mind wandering with meta-awareness: A systematic review.Maria T. Chu, Elizabeth Marks, Cassandra L. Smith & Paul Chadwick - 2023 - Consciousness and Cognition 108 (C):103463.
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  • Revisiting consciousness: Distinguishing between states of conscious focused attention and mind wandering with EEG.M. R. Dias da Silva, Ó. F. Gonçalves, D. Branco & M. Postma - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 101:103332.
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  • Exploring the structure of mental action in directed thought.Johannes Wagemann - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (2):145-176.
    While the general topic of agency has been collaboratively explored in philosophy and psychology, mental action seems to resist such an interdisciplinary research agenda. Since it is difficult to empirically access mental agency beyond externally measurable behavior, the topic is mainly treated philosophically. However, this has not prevented philosophers from substantiating their arguments with psychological findings, but predominantly with those which allegedly limit the scope and conscious controllability of mental action in favor of automated subpersonal processes. By contrast, the call (...)
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  • On the relation between mind wandering, PTSD symptomology, and self-control.Nicholaus P. Brosowsky, Alyssa C. Smith, Dan Smilek & Paul Seli - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 99 (C):103288.
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  • The dynamic framework of mind wandering revisited: How mindful meta-awareness affects mental states’ constraints.Shaghayegh Konjedi & Reza Maleeh - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 95 (C):103194.
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  • Personality and Mind-Wandering Self-Perception: The Role of Meta-Awareness.Miguel Ibaceta & Hector P. Madrid - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    Mind-wandering is a psychological process involving the emergence of spontaneous thoughts in daily life. Research has shown that mind-wandering influences diverse psychological outcomes; however, less is known about possible individual differences that may drive mind-wandering. In this study, we argue that personality traits, expressed in neuroticism and openness to experience, may lead to the individual’s self-perception of their mind-wandering activity, due to meta-awareness processes. In a three-wave survey study with 273 college students, we gathered data which supported a positive association (...)
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  • Expressing experience: the promise and perils of the phenomenological interview.Elizabeth Pienkos, Borut Škodlar & Louis Sass - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):53-71.
    This paper outlines several of the challenges that are inherent in any attempt to communicate subjective experience to others, particularly in the context of a clinical interview. It presents the phenomenological interview as a way of effectively responding to these challenges, which may be especially important when attempting to understand the profound experiential transformations that take place in schizophrenia. Features of language experience in schizophrenia—including changes in interpersonal orientation, a sense of the arbitrariness of language, and a desire for faithful (...)
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  • Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness?Antonios Kaldas - 2019 - Dissertation, Macquarie University
    Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness? Call this central question of this treatise, “Q.” We commonly have the experience of consciously paying attention to something, but is it possible to be conscious of something you are not attending to, or to attend to something of which you are not conscious? Where might we find examples of these? This treatise is a quest to find an answer to Q in two parts. Part I reviews the foundations upon which the (...)
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  • Dream Lucidity and the Attentional Network Task.Moo-Rung Loo & Shih-Kuen Cheng - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    This study investigated the relationship between dream lucidity, i.e., a dreamer’s insight to the ongoing dream, and attention by considering lucidity as a trait. We examined the ways in which lucidity correlates with the orienting, alerting, and conflict components of the attentional network. A total of 77 participants rated the lucidity of their dreams over 7 consecutive days with the LuCiD scale and then completed the attentional network task. A negative correlation between trait lucidity and the conflict score of the (...)
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  • Validity of attention self-reports in younger and older adults.Andra Arnicane, Klaus Oberauer & Alessandra S. Souza - 2021 - Cognition 206 (C):104482.
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  • Defining Contemplative Science: The Metacognitive Self-Regulatory Capacity of the Mind, Context of Meditation Practice and Modes of Existential Awareness.Dusana Dorjee - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Meta-awareness as a solution to the problem of Awareness of Intention.Ondřej Bečev - 2019 - E-Logos 26 (2):35-47.
    Awareness of intention je fenomenální zkušenost prožitku motorické intence, charakterizovaná jako vědomé uchopení akce, kterou se agent chystá provést. Typicky bývá ztotožňována s okamžikem, kdy si participant vzpomíná, že se rozhodl provést svou akci, reportovaným prostřednictvím pozice ručičky na ciferníku Libetových hodin. Intenzivní výzkum prožitku jednání (sense of agency) v posledních letech přinesl velké množství poznatků, ale také kritiku metodologických slabin, mezi které patří závislost výsledků na metodě reportování a závislost na arbitrárních vlastnostech reportovacích nástrojů. Filozofové si zase všímají intervenujících (...)
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  • The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Neurophenomenology – The Case of Studying Self Boundaries With Meditators.Aviva Berkovich-Ohana, Yair Dor-Ziderman, Fynn-Mathis Trautwein, Yoav Schweitzer, Ohad Nave, Stephen Fulder & Yochai Ataria - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:1680.
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  • Towards the Epistemology of the Non-trivial: Research Characteristics Connecting Quantum Mechanics and First-Person Inquiry.Urban Kordeš & Ema Demšar - 2019 - Foundations of Science 26 (1):187-216.
    The present article discusses shared epistemological characteristics of two distinct areas of research: the field of first-person inquiry and the field of quantum mechanics. We outline certain philosophical challenges that arise in each of the two lines of inquiry, and point towards the central similarity of their observational situation: the impossibility of disregarding the interrelatedness of the observed phenomena with the act of observation. We argue that this observational feature delineates a specific category of research that we call the non-trivial (...)
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  • Who wrote that? Automaticity and reduced sense of agency in individuals prone to dissociative absorption.Noa Bregman-Hai, Yoav Kessler & Nirit Soffer-Dudek - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 78 (C):102861.
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  • Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology.Bernardo Kastrup - 2019 - Dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegen
    This thesis articulates an analytic version of the ontology of idealism, according to which universal phenomenal consciousness is all there ultimately is, everything else in nature being reducible to patterns of excitation of this consciousness. The thesis’ key challenge is to explain how the seemingly distinct conscious inner lives of different subjects—such as you and me—can arise within this fundamentally unitary phenomenal field. Along the way, a variety of other challenges are addressed, such as: how we can reconcile idealism with (...)
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  • Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy.Bernardo Kastrup - 2018 - Constructivist Foundations 13 (3):341-361.
    > Context • The alleged dichotomy between mind and matter is pervasive. Therefore, the attempt to explain mat- ter in terms of mind (idealism) is often considered a mirror image of that of explaining mind in terms of mat- ter (mainstream physicalism), in the sense of being structurally equivalent despite being reversely arranged. > Problem • I argue that this is an error arising from language artifacts, for dichotomies must reside in the same level of abstraction. > Method • I (...)
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