This text focuses from a philological perspective on media theories and their impact on traditional text-based disciplines. Therefore it looks at the problems that have emerged for Media Studies as well as for traditional studies in philology when reflecting on the concept of self-reference, since their subjects can seemingly no longer rely on the purity of the written word. If research work in the field of humanities is still mainly documented by texts, how does the advance of images as a (...) challenging research subject affect the text that is referring to that subject? Speaking in media terms: how is the medium `text', which still remains text when it is concerned with the medium `image', affected by the `other' medium? This question deals with the problem of self-reference, hence the construction of disciplinary limitations in various academic fields. Beginning with this question, I try to find out how the difference between self-reference and reference has been and still is being organized in texts. How can we compare different types of theorizing images in texts? These abstract problems will be exemplified by situating the word—image bias in a wider historical context. The text concludes by developing some possibilities for future research within this area of visual culture and academic writing. (shrink)

The hitherto neglected Pandechion epistemonicon, Ulisse Aldrovandi’s extant manuscript encyclopaedia, indicates that Renaissance naturalists did not necessarily apply the humanist jack-of-all-trades, the commonplace book, in their own field without considerably altering its form. Over many years the Italian natural historian tested and recombined different techniques to arrive at the form of paper technology that he considered to be the most fit for his purposes. Not all of these techniques were taught at school or university. Rather, Aldrovandi drew on administrative practices (...) as well as on the bookkeeping practices of early modern merchants that he knew first-hand. Reconstructing the formation and use of the Pandechion this article contributes to the historiography of learned reading and information management in Renaissance Europe. (shrink)

Commonplacing was one of the most widely practiced types of paper technology in the early modern period. Yet its place and function in medicine remain largely unexplored. Based on about two dozen manuscripts from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in which physicians used commonplacing to record excerpts from their reading as well as personal observations and ideas, this paper offers a first survey of the roles, forms and epistemic effects of medical commonplacing in the early modern period. Three principal types (...) of commonplacing are identified, namely the systematic, the alphabetical and the sequential. The advantages and disadvantages of each type with regard to economy of space and time, flexibility, and order are pointed out. Among the potential epistemic effects of collecting and ordering information under “heads” are, in particular, a heightened awareness of contradictions between authors or observations on a specific topic, an appreciation for snippets of information as fact-like elements of knowledge inviting rearrangement, and a certain shift towards the notion of diseases as distinct entities endowed with specific, empirically observable properties. (shrink)

Loci personarum, ‘topics for persons’ were used in Latin rhetoric for the description of persons, their external circumstances, physical attributes, or qualities of character. They stood in the way of fusing rhetoric and dialectic, the goal of sixteenth-century ‘humanistic’ logic: the project of a unified theory of invention depends on the exclusion of loci personarum from the domain of dialectic proper. But still they cannot easily be replaced in the class room. Bartholomaeus Keckermann resolved these difficulties: he proposed to abandon (...) the notion that loci personarum could play a role in finding new arguments concerning persons. So they pose no risks for a unified theory of invention, because they can only be used for the exposition of information that we already have. Since loci personarum are concerned with individuals, the knowledge about individuals that is available to us is inescapably circumstantial and contingent, defying the claim of generality or necessity of dialectic made by Keckermann’s sixteenth-century predecessors. However, our thinking about persons is primarily interested in those aspects that we do not share with other members of our species. For Keckermann, persons are therefore logically different from most individuals belonging to other species. (shrink)