- When do representations explain?Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):406.details
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On the hypothesis that grammars are mentally represented.William Demopoulos & Robert J. Matthews - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):405-406.details
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Two types of thought: Evidence from aphasia.Jules Davidoff - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):20-21.details
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Church's thesis and representation of grammars.Martin Davis - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):404-404.details
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The ability versus intentionality aspects of unconscious mental processes.Maria Czyzewska, Thomas Hill & Pawel Lewicki - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):602-602.details
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Aspects and algorithms.Andy Clark - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):601-602.details
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Accessibility “in principle”.Noam Chomsky - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):600-601.details
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Conscious mental episodes and skill acquisition.Richard A. Carlson - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):599-599.details
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Intention itself will disappear when its mechanisms are known.Bruce Bridgeman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):598-599.details
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On a computational perspective without substance.Rudolf P. Botha - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):403-404.details
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Consciousness and accessibility.Ned Block - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):596-598.details
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Using what you know: A computer-science perspective.Robert C. Berwick - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):402-403.details
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Ontogeny and intentionality.Philip David Zelazo & J. Steven Reznick - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):631-632.details
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Consciousness, historical inversion, and cognitive science.Andrew W. Young - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):630-631.details
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Rules are not processes.Robert Wilensky - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):415.details
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Is the mind conscious, functional, or both?Max Velmans - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.details
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Conscious and unconscious representation of aspectual shape in cognitive science.Geoffrey Underwood - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):628-629.details
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Unintended thought and nonconscious inferences exist.James S. Uleman & Jennifer K. Uleman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):627-628.details
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Computation misrepresented: The procedural/declarative controversy exhumed.Henry Thompson - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):415.details
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The possibility of irreducible intentionality.Charles Taylor - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):626-626.details
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Culture, biology, and human behavior.Horst D. Steklis & Alex Walter - 1991 - Human Nature 2 (2):137-169.details
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How are grammers represented?Edward P. Stabler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):391-402.details
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Computational theories and mental representation.Edward P. Stabler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):416-421.details
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The neurophysiology of consicousness and the unconscious.Christine A. Skarda - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):625-626.details
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Unconscious mental states do have an aspectual shape.Howard Shevrin - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):624-625.details
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Who is computing with the brain?John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):632-642.details
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Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.details
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When functions are causes.Jonathan Schull - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):622-624.details
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Grammars-as-programs versus grammars- as-data.Jerry Samet - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):414-414.details
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On being accessible to consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):621-621.details
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The relevance of the machine metaphor.Thomas Roeper - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):413.details
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Constituent causation and the reality of mind.Georges Rey - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):620-621.details
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The rules versus similarity distinction.Emmanuel M. Pothos - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):1-14.details
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Somebody flew over Searle's ontological prison.Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):618-619.details
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On levels.John Morton - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):413.details
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The causal capacities of linguistic rules.Alice ter Meulen - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):626-627.details
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Zombies are people, too.Drew McDermott - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):617-618.details
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Execute criminals, not rules of grammer.James D. McCawley - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):410.details
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Word processor or video game?Robert May - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):412.details
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Does cognitive science need “real” intentionality?Robert J. Matthews - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):616-617.details
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How could you tell how grammars are represented?John C. Marshall - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):411-412.details
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On speculating across opaque barriers.Abe Lockman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):410-410.details
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Loose connections: Four problems in Searie's argument for the “Connection Principle”.Dan Lloyd - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):615-616.details
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Levels of grammatic representation: A tempest in a teapot.Michael R. Lipton - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):409-410.details
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Chomsky on the 'ordinary language' view of language.Francis Y. Lin - 1999 - Synthese 120 (2):151-191.details
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What's it like to be a gutbrain?John Limber - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):614-615.details
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Is Searle conscious?John C. Kulli - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):614-614.details
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Explanation by computer simulation in cognitive science.Jordi Fernández - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):269-284.details
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On doing research on consciousness without being aware of it.Daniel Holender - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):612-614.details
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“Consciousness” is the name of a nonentity.Deborah Hodgkin & Alasdair I. Houston - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):611-612.details
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