- Mismatching categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.details
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Self-attributions help constitute mental types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.details
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The anthropology of folk psychology.Steven Daniel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):38-39.details
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There's more to mental states than meets the inner “l”.Kimberly Wright Cassidy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):34-35.details
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The naked truth about first-person knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.details
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Are false beliefs representative mental states?Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):30-31.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
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What is an agent that it experiences P-consciousness? And what is P-consciousness that it moves an agent?Roger N. Shepard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):267-268.details
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Feeling of knowing and phenomenal consciousness.Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-272.details
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Blocking out the distinction between sensation and perception: Superblindsight and the case of Helen.Nicholas Humphrey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):257-258.details
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The ontology of aspectual shape.Martin Kurthen & Detlef B. Linke - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):612-614.details
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"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknowndetails
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Knowledge of Meaning, Conscious and Unconscious.Steven Gross - 2010 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication.details
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The Endogenous Feedback Network: A new approach to the comprehensive study of consciousness.Claudia Carrara Augustenborg - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):547-579.details
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Comments on Ned Block's target article “Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience”. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500.details
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Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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On the agency of certain collective entities: An argument from "normative autonomy".David Copp - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):194–221.details
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Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.details
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(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirlingdetails
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Self-ascription without qualia: A case study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.details
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Do androids dream of informed consent? The need to understand the ethical implications of experimentation on simulated beings.Alexander Gariti - forthcoming - Monash Bioethics Review:1-19.details
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The Border Between Seeing and Thinking.Ned Block - 2023 - New York, US: OUP Usa.details
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Identity: this time it's personal.Stephen Kearns - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Is music conscious? The argument from motion, and other considerations.Kevin O'Regan - 2017 - Psychomusicology: Music, Mind, and Brain 27 (4):327-333.details
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Blindsight in hindsight.T. D. Tapp - 1997 - Consciousness and Cognition 6 (1):67-74.details
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Seeing, visualizing, and believing: Pictures and cognitive penetration.John Zeimbekis - 2015 - In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 298-327.details
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Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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The role of concepts in perception and inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.details
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A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.details
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Functionalism can explain self-ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.details
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Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.details
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Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
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Consciousness without conflation.Anthony P. Atkinson & Martin Davies - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):248-249.details
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(1 other version)The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.details
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(1 other version)Searle, Syntax, and Observer Relativity.Ronald P. Endicott - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):101-22.details
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(1 other version)Searle, Syntax, and Observer Relativity.Ronald P. Endicott - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):101-122.details
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Why presume analyses are on-line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.details
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Qualia for propositional attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.details
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Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.details
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How directly do we know our minds?Maria Czyzewska & Pawel Lewicki - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-38.details
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Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
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Consciousness is not a natural kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.details
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Access denied.Dan Lloyd - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-262.details
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Block's philosophical anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.details
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More empirical cases to break the accord of phenomenal and access-consciousness.Talis Bachmann - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-251.details
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Phenomenal access: A moving target.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261.details
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Searle's argument that intentional states are conscious states.Norton Nelkin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):614-615.details
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