Eseji su nastali u 2003. i 2004. godini kao dio realizacije mojih istraživanja holizma identiteta i socijalne triangulacije (identitet - znanje - društvena ontologija) tokom rada na istraživačkim projektima Znanstveno-raziskovalneg središča Republike Slovenije, Koper. Istovremeno je rad na projektima u Sarajevu, u sklopu međunarodnih i domaćih aktivnosti koje je organiziralo Filozofsko društvo "Theoria ", bio poticajan za promišljanje nekih značajnih pitanja koja se odnose na rearanžiranje ambijenta životnog svijeta modernog čovjeka.

En este artículo se analizan algunas alternativas posibles para el devenir de la filosofía. Los pronósticos de la filosofía continental y la filosofía analítica suponen dos caminos. Un tercero lo ofrece la eventualidad de una filosofía desinstitucionalizada y asistemática. A partir de ellas intentará derivarse una cuarta opción, la cual, si bien inusitada en su contextura futurista al prospectar una potencial utilidad de las tecnologías de inteligencia artificial al quehacer filosófico, serviría al propósito de dar unas pautas para una reivindicación (...) civilizatoria de la filosofía, si bien con importantes consecuencias epistemológicas en relación con los métodos de producción académica presentes. (shrink)

Constructivism is the idea that we construct our own world rather than it being determined by an outside reality. Its most consistent form, Radical Constructivism (RC), claims that we cannot transcend our experiences. Thus it doesn't make sense to say that our constructions gradually approach the structure of an external reality. The mind is necessarily an epistemological solipsist, in contrast to being an ontological solipsist who maintains that this is all there is, namely a single mind within which the only (...) world exists. RC recognizes the impossibility of the claim that the world does not exist. Yet, RC has the potential to go much further. I claim that RC provides the foundation of a new world-view in which we can overcome hard scientific problems. Thus, the paper is urging us to carry RC further, not just on philosophical grounds, but also into the domain of science. (shrink)

A relatively close account of the evolution of analytical philosophy shows that never enjoyed an unique methodology nor a common set of theses. In particular, if we understand that by ‘analytical philosophy’ we refer to a wider philosophical movement than the ‘ordinary language philosophy’, such lack of methodological or substantial coherence is even more evident. Then, it can be asked whether a conceptual description of analytical philosophy at the beginnings of XXI century is possible. As it is proposed, such description (...) is only feasible under an axiological basis, that is, under the commitment with a set of scholar values that give a minimal consistency to philosophical analysis such it is practised nowadays. The nature of those values can be included, generally speaking, in the realm of the epistemological, but what is concretely contended is that it is mandatory to pay attention to its discursive and argumentative nature. This shift of focus allows to surpass the virtues and flaws of analytical philosophy in the 20 nth century and facilitates the re evaluation of its function in the 21 nth one. (shrink)

Neurophilosophy is a controversial scientific discipline lacking a broadly accepted definition and especially a well-elaborated methodology. Views about what neurophilosophy entails and how it can combine neuroscience with philosophy, as in their branches and methodologies, diverge widely. This article, first of all, presents a brief insight into the naturalization of philosophy regarding neurophilosophy and three resulting distinguishable forms of how neuroscience and philosophy may or may not be connected in part 1, namely reductive neurophilosophy, the parallelism between neuroscience and philosophy (...) which keeps both disciplines rather strictly separated and lastly, non-reductive neurophilosophy which aims for a bidirectional connection of both disciplines. Part 2 presents a paradigmatic example of how these three forms of neuroscience and philosophy approach the problem of self, mainly concerning its ontological status. This allows me to compare all three neurophilosophical approaches with each other and to highlight the benefits of a non-reductive form of neurophilosophy. I conclude that especially non-reductive neurophilosophy can give full justice to the complementary position of neurophilosophy right at the intersection between neuroscience, philosophy, and psychology. (shrink)

This dissertation offers a phenomenological approach to the comprehension of Information Technology and Strategy, and of the relationships between these two phenomena. We argue that in order thoughtfully to understand the manifold connections between IT and Strategy, their contradictions, shortcomings, and possibilities, one has to rely on the essence of each of these phenomena. The rationale of this approach implied the need to make explicit the ontological assumptions on which the investigation relies. An essential uncovering of that which IT and (...) Strategy are can only take place as long as we lay bare a primary position on the nature of that which is. Martin Heidegger's Being and Time and, to a lesser extent, the theory of autopoiesis are the foundations of this investigation. We claim that these theories are paradigmatically consistent and show relevant complementarities, namely in what concerns the issues of action information, and knowledge. The matching of these two theories provides the ontological and epistemological grounds of the investigation. Within this fundamental setting we argue that IT and Strategy will only essentially show up as long as they are accessed in-the-world in which they are. The research applies the phenomenological method of investigation in its original form as developed by Edmund Husserl. However we extend the Husserlian formulation in a last phase by using the arguments of Heidegger on the opening up of possible concealed meanings of phenomena. The method sets the boundaries of the research. IT and strategy are phenomenological analysed not as empirical objects, event, or states of affairs, but as intentional objects of consciousness. These are formally indicated from the outset of the investigation as the ITness of IT and the Strategyness of Strategy. The central conclusions of the investigation are that IT is an ontological phenomenon substantively penetrating the being-in-the-world we, ourselves, are; and, Strategy, essentially choosing to choose, has been unfolding throughout History guided by the concealed meaning of a striving for an authentic identity. These essential notions uncover a complex set of relationships between the phenomena. Those relationships are thus described and characterised. We also show that although phenomenology is not empirical its results have many important implications for the empirical world. (shrink)