Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Rationalization and the Ross Paradox.Benj Hellie - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 283--323.
    'Post this letter!' does not entail 'Post this letter or drink up my wine!' (the Ross Paradox) because one can be in a state with the content of the former without being in a state with the content of the latter; in turn, because the latter can rationalize drinking up my wine but the former cannot; in turn, because practical rationalization flows toward one's present situation, in contrast with the flow of theoretical rationalization from one's present situation. Formally, this is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The milk of human intentionality.Daniel Dennett - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):428-430.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Artificial intelligence—the real thing?John C. Marshall - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):435-437.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Decentralized minds.Marvin Minsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):439-440.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Mysticism as a philosophy of artificial intelligence.Martin Ringle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):444-445.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Verbal reports and visual awareness.Geoffrey Underwood - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):463.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • “Blindsight”: Some conceptual considerations.Reinhard Werth - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):467.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How to establish a difference in function.Austen Clark - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):451.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Unravelling intention: Distal intentions increase the subjective sense of agency.Mikkel C. Vinding, Michael N. Pedersen & Morten Overgaard - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):810-815.
    Experimental studies investigating the contribution of conscious intention to the generation of a sense of agency for one’s own actions tend to rely upon a narrow definition of intention. Often it is operationalized as the conscious sensation of wanting to move right before movement. Existing results and discussion are therefore missing crucial aspects of intentions, namely intention as the conscious sensation of wanting to move in advance of the movement. In the present experiment we used an intentional binding paradigm, in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action.Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
    According to a widely accepted constraint on the content of intentions, here called the exclusivity constraint, one cannot intend to perform another agent’s action, even if one might be able to intend that she performs it. For example, while one can intend that one’s guest leaves before midnight, one cannot intend to perform her act of leaving. However, Deborah Tollefsen’s (2005) account of joint activity requires participants to have intentions-in-action (in John Searle’s (1983) sense) that violate this constraint. I argue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Ii. intentions and conditions of satisfaction.Arthur R. Miller - 1981 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):115 – 121.
    This paper discusses a problem arising from the way in which John Searle marks the distinction between intentional and unintentional action (Inquiry, Vol. 22, pp. 253?80), namely, that of adequately distinguishing those events which we regard as unintentional actions on the part of an agent from those other events occasioned by or brought about as a result of his action which we (correctly) do not countenance as actions of any sort ? unintentional or otherwise. Searle's attempt to distinguish them in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • The intentional and the intended.J. L. A. Garcia - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209.
    The paper defends the thesis that for S to V intentionally is for S to V as (in the way) S intended to. For the normal agent the relevant sort of intention is an intention that one's intention to V generate an instance of one's V-ing along some (usually dimly-conceived) productive path. Such an account allows us to say some actions are intentional to a greater or lesser extent (a desirable option for certain cases of wayward causal chains), preserves the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Is blindsight an effect of scattered light, spared cortex, and near-threshold vision?John Campion, Richard Latto & Y. M. Smith - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):423-86.
    Blindsight is the term commonly used to describe visually guided behaviour elicited by a stimulus falling within the scotoma (blind area) caused by a lesion of the striate cortex. Such is normally held to be unconscious and to be mediated by subcortical pathways involving the superior colliculus. Blindsight is of considerable theoretical importance since it suggests that destriate man is more like destriate monkey than had been previously believed and also because it supports the classical notion of two visual systems. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   189 citations  
  • (1 other version)Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1780 citations  
  • Is agent-causality a conceptal primitive?John Bishop - 1986 - Synthese 67 (May):225-47.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Sperry's concept of consciousness.Charles Ripley - 1984 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 27 (December):399-423.
    This paper explores R. W. Sperry's view that consciousness is ?causally? effective in directing voluntary human behaviour. This view, formulated in the course of his split brain research, presupposes an earlier theory that motor behaviour is the sole output of the brain and that mental phenomena were developed for regulation of overt response. His view of the ?causal? effectiveness of consciousness is shown to be based on a theory of emergent properties like that of Bunge. It is also shown that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Are there subintentional actions?William Hornett - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    When I fiddle with my hair, or adjust my posture, it is plausible that these activities fall well below my cognitive radar. Some have argued that these are examples of ‘sub‐intentional actions’, actions which are not intentional under any description at all. If true, they are direct counterexamples to the dominant view on which the difference between actions and other events is their intentionality. In this paper, I argue that the case for sub‐intentional actions fails. Firstly, I show that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Propositionalism about intention: shifting the burden of proof.Lucy Campbell - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):230-252.
    ABSTRACTA widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • A cognitive account of agentive awareness.Myrto Mylopoulos - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):545-563.
    Agentive awareness is one's awareness of oneself as presently acting. Dominant accounts in cognitive science consider agentive awareness to be grounded in the states and processes underlying sensorimotor control. In this paper, I raise concerns for this approach and develop an alternative. Broadly, in the approach I defend, one is agentively aware in the virtue of intending to act. I further argue that agentive awareness is not constituted by intentions themselves but rather first-personal thoughts that are formed on the basis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Editorial Board.[author unknown] - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (6):ebi-ebi.
    Editor Wayne Martin Founded by Arne Naess Editor Emeritus Alastair Hannay Editorial Assistants Matthew Bennett Jeffrey Byrnes William Meakins Editorial Board Paul M. Churchland, University of Calif...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • There are No Primitive We-Intentions.Alessandro Salice - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):695-715.
    John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of his or her intended actions as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Reductionism and religion.Douglas R. Hofstadter - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):433-434.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Brains + programs = minds.Bruce Bridgeman - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):427-428.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Searle and the special powers of the brain.Richard Rorty - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):445-446.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Intrinsic intentionality.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):450-457.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   126 citations  
  • The chess room: further demythologizing of strong AI.Roland Puccetti - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):441-442.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The ‘causal power’ of machines.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):442-444.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   84 citations  
  • Independent evidence for neural systems mediating blindsight.Bruce Bridgeman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):450.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Some considerations about the further development of situational analysis.Dieter Bichlbauer - 1998 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (3):422-433.
    Popper gives the concept of social situation the role of key term in the method ology of situational analysis. The important characteristics of the social situation are aims and knowledge, which are attributed to the actor and are part of the situation. Furthermore, the elements of the situation create or are, as social institutions, obstacles to the actor. But more complex situations exist which here are called actor specific situations and are much more structured by the actor. The aims and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   113 citations  
  • Analytic philosophy and mental phenomena.John R. Searle - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):405-423.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Ecological laws of perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn.Michael T. Turvey, R. E. Shaw, Edward S. Reed & William M. Mace - 1981 - Cognition 9 (3):237-304.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   260 citations  
  • The content of intentions.Elisabeth Patherie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (4):400-432.
    I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  • On the non-propositional content of our ordinary intentions.Xavier Castellà - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (3):262-279.
    It is a widely-held thesis that the content of intentions can be characterized in terms of the truth of a proposition. In this paper I try to reject this idea. First, I argue that, at least for ordinary cases of intention, there cannot be any proposition such that the intention is fulfilled if, and only if, such a proposition is true. After that, I propose an alternative account for the content of intentions. I argue that this content must ultimately involve (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Practical knowledge and acting together.Blomberg Olle - 2018 - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-111.
    According to one influential philosophical view of human agency, for an agent to perform an action intentionally is essentially for her to manifest a kind of self-knowledge: An agent is intentionally φ-ing if and only if she has a special kind of practical and non-observational knowledge that this is what she is doing. I here argue that this self-knowledge view faces serious problems when extended to account for intentional actions performed by several agents together as a result of a joint (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Beliefs, machines, and theories.John McCarthy - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):435-435.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Searle's argument is just a set of Chinese symbols.Robert P. Abelson - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):424-425.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A dualist-interactionist perspective.John C. Eccles - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):430-431.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Structure, function, and consciousness in residual vision and blindsight.John Campion, Richard Latto & Y. M. Smith - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):469.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is hindsight better than blindsight?Whitman Richards - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):461.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Understanding Searle.Roger C. Schank - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):446-447.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The two visual system hypothesis loses a supporter.Ralph Norman Haber - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):453.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • The analysis of scattered light effects in hemianopic and normal vision.J. L. Barbur & K. H. Ruddock - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):448.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Artificial intelligence, biology, and intentional states.Terrell Ward Bynum - 1985 - Metaphilosophy 16 (4):355-77.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Thinking with portals: Revisiting kinematic cues to intention.Roland Pfister, Markus Janczyk, Robert Wirth, David Dignath & Wilfried Kunde - 2014 - Cognition 133 (2):464-473.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Searle on what only brains can do.J. A. Fodor - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):431-432.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Intentionality: Hardware, not software.Grover Maxwell - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):437-438.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Is the pen mightier than the computer?E. W. Menzel - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):438-439.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The primary source of intentionality.Thomas Natsoulas - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):440-441.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations