- That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationism.Benj Hellie - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.details
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The Metaphysics of Sensory ExperiencePapineau, David, The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 176, £33.49 (hardback). [REVIEW]Benj Hellie - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.details
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First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.details
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On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.details
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Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.details
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Theories and illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.details
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Theories and qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.details
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Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.details
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Competing accounts of belief-task performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.details
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Does mentality entail consciousness?Rocco J. Gennaro - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):331-58.details
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Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.details
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Qualia and vagueness.Anthony Everett - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):205-226.details
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Recall or regeneration of past mental states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.details
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The inscrutability of colour similarity.Will Davies - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):289-311.details
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The anthropology of folk psychology.Steven Daniel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):38-39.details
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How directly do we know our minds?Maria Czyzewska & Pawel Lewicki - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-38.details
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Color and a priori knowledge.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):293-315.details
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Introspection, Intentionality, and the Transparency of Experience.Tim Crane - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):49-67.details
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The naked truth about first-person knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.details
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Self-ascription without qualia: A case study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.details
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Categorization, theories and folk psychology.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-37.details
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There's more to mental states than meets the inner “l”.Kimberly Wright Cassidy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):34-35.details
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Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.details
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Towards an ecology of mind.George Butterworth - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):31-32.details
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The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.details
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Are false beliefs representative mental states?Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):30-31.details
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Causes are perceived and introspected.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-29.details
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"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknowndetails
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Experience and Content: Consequences of a Continuum Theory.W. M. Davies - 1996 - Avebury.details
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An externalist's guide to inner experience.Benj Hellie - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145.details
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Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Love in the time of cholera.Benj Hellie - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. pp. 241–261.details
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The appearance of unity: A higher-order interpretation of the unity of consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2001 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Conference of The Cognitive Science Society.details
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Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirlingdetails
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A natural view of perceptual experience.Andrew Scott MacGregor - unknowndetails
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Qualia and representations.Elisabeth Pacherie - 1999 - In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer. pp. 119--144.details
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