Climate change poses grave risks to food security, and mitigation and adaptation actions have so far been insufficient to lessen the risk of climate-induced violations of the right to food. Could safeguarding the right to food, then, justify some forms of geoengineering? This article examines geoengineering through the analytical lens of the right to food. We look at the components of food security and consider how the acceptability of geoengineering relates to the right to food via its impacts on these (...) components. Our examination shows that results vary greatly between different forms of geoengineering: while some forms of geoengineering fail to respect the right to food, certain other forms may even become obligatory to protect the right to food. It appears that there is no support for aerosol-based solar radiation management, whereas some carbon dioxide removal methods can help protect or promote the right to food. The ethical challenges related to carbon dioxide removal methods are, we note, similar to those that will also be faced in the course of climate change mitigation. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

I argue that agents can have duties to cooperate with one another if this increases their combined efficiency and/or efficacy in addressing ongoing collective moral problems. I call these duties cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy. I focus particularly on collective agents and how agents ought to reason and act in the face of global moral problems. After setting out my account, I argue that a subset of cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy of collective agents are duties of justice (...) in virtue of the roles these agents have taken up. (shrink)

Though corporate social responsibility (CSR) is on the agenda of most major corporations, corporate executives still largely support the view that corporations should maximize the returns to their owners. There are two lines of defence for this position. One is the Friedmanian view that maximizing owner returns is the social responsibility of corporations. The other is a position voiced by many executives, that CSR and profits go together. This article argues that the first position is ethically untenable, while the latter (...) is not supported by empirical evidence. The implication is that there may be good reason for firms to deviate from a maxim of profit maximization. (shrink)

Distinguishing between reasonable partiality and reasonable impartiality makes a difference in resolving the serious clashes between priority for compatriots versus cosmopolitan global duties. Defenders of a priority for compatriots have to acknowledge two strong moral constraints: states have to fulfil all their special, domestic and trans-domestic duties, and associative duties are limited by distributive constraints resulting from the moral duty to fight poverty and gross global inequalities. In the recent global context, I see four main problems for liberal-nationalist defenders of (...) priority for compatriots: (i) Reasonable particularists often forget that associative duties for compatriots compete with many sub-national and trans-domestic associative duties. (ii) They tend to forget that associative national duties compete with other, strong special (contractual, reparative) obligations regarding not only citizens and residents inside nation-states but also trans-domestic obligations across state borders. (iii) They do not properly discuss the problem of unallocated duties in addressing global poverty and insecurity. (iv) The design of supra-national and global mediating institutions, and the crafting of policies to remedy the misallocation of duties and to coordinate the required state activities is an urgent task neglected by liberal nationalists. In the recent context, reasonable partialitys bias towards partiality is most unwelcome and morally dubious. Reasonable impartialitys bias towards cosmopolitanism helps to stimulate a drastic shift in obligations and stimulates productive trans-national institutional design. (shrink)

In this article I consider Thomas Pogge’s thesis that affluent countries are violating the human rights of the global poor by contributing support to the current global institutional order. My claim is that affluent countries are not violating the human rights of the global poor in the ways suggested by Pogge. I start by defining a set of conditions that ought to obtain in order to say that a human rights violation has taken place. Then I consider two possible interpretations (...) of Pogge’s thesis and argue that none of them fulfills the conditions required to speak of a human rights violation. On my view, as long as domestic states have the capacity to fulfill the human rights of their own people, poverty constitutes a domestic human rights violation even if the international institutional order somehow contributes to creating this state of affairs. Finally, I examine what transnational duties human rights entail and claim that affluent countries must contribute to the creation of an international order providing domestic states accurate background conditions for the promotion of human rights at the domestic level. (shrink)

While it is commonly accepted that corporations have negative duties to respect human rights, the question of whether rights also imply positive duties for corporations is contentious. The recent reports of the United Nations special representative on business and human rights contend that corporations do not have positive duties, but the arguments this is based on are flawed from an ethical point of view. In particular, the reports fail to consider the implications of interactions between corporations and states. For rights (...) to be secured, corporations may face duties to use their power to pressure governments into performing their assigned duties, and duties not to undermine the role of the government. The interaction of corporations and governments also has implications for choosing effective instruments to advance human rights. International initiatives that do not take this interaction into account will be ineffective or, at worst, counterproductive. (shrink)

This article argues, first, that there is an unappreciated and difficult problem of explaining why states have positive obligations to perform certain actions—such as providing minimum protection—for all those persons in their territories and, second, that one possible solution is to locate the source of the obligations in the political power that states assume over their territories. The article analyzes the principal, superficially plausible accounts of state territorial obligations and shows that they each fail. Among the reasons for the failure (...) is that these accounts cannot explain the existence of territorial obligations in important cases where we would expect the state to have such obligations. The article then argues for an account in terms of state political power that both avoids the major problems affecting other explanations and rests on prima facie plausible moral foundations. (shrink)

Do a threatened state’s obligations of assistance extend to the enemy’s needy people and the needy people in non-hostile countries equally? This paper examines five arguments defending the political boundary between hostile and non-hostile countries. The aid workers, defence capacity, and pre-emptive self-defence arguments highlight the unreasonable burdens for a threatened state to protect its own citizens, as a result of its assistance to the enemy’s needy people, while the limited and comprehensive negative duties arguments underscore a threatened state’s involvement (...) in harmful activities. Unfortunately, these five arguments cannot accomplish the task. Certain arguments (i.e. the aid workers argument and the negative duties approach in general) encounter the insufficiency problem by not completely denying the potential for assisting the enemy’s needy people, while other arguments (i.e. the defence capacity, the limited and comprehensive negative duties, the pre-emptive self-defence arguments) face the over-extension problem by prohibiting assistance to needy people in nonhostile countries. Therefore, when a threatened state provides assistance to needy foreigners, the distinction between hostile and non-hostile countries should not constitute a decisive reason to affect the distribution of its assistance, because it cannot clearly maintain this distinction. (shrink)

Distinguishing between reasonable partiality and reasonable impartiality makes a difference in resolving the serious clashes between 'priority for compatriots' versus cosmopolitan global duties. Defenders of a priority for compatriots have to acknowledge two strong moral constraints: states have to fulfil all their special, domestic and trans-domestic duties, and associative duties are limited by distributive constraints resulting from the moral duty to fight poverty and gross global inequalities. In the recent global context, I see four main problems for liberal-nationalist defenders of (...) priority for compatriots: Reasonable particularists often forget that associative duties for compatriots compete with many sub-national and trans-domestic associative duties. They tend to forget that associative national duties compete with other, strong special obligations regarding not only citizens and residents inside nation-states but also trans-domestic obligations across state borders. They do not properly discuss the problem of unallocated duties in addressing global poverty and insecurity. The design of supra-national and global 'mediating' institutions, and the crafting of policies to remedy the misallocation of duties and to coordinate the required state activities is an urgent task neglected by liberal nationalists. In the recent context, reasonable partiality's bias towards partiality is most unwelcome and morally dubious. Reasonable impartiality's bias towards cosmopolitanism helps to stimulate a drastic shift in obligations and stimulates productive trans-national institutional design. (shrink)

Negative duties are duties not to perform an action, while positive duties are duties to perform an action. This article focuses on the question of who holds the positive duties correlative to human rights. I start by outlining the Universal Scope Thesis, which holds that these duties fall on everyone. In its support, I present an argument by analogy: positive and negative duties correlative to human rights perform the same function; correlative negative duties are generally thought to be universal; by (...) analogy, we have reason to think that positive duties are held by everyone. I then consider three disanalogies that challenge the above argument. To address these worries, I introduce the notion of ‘aggregative duties’ – duties that can only be adequately grasped when we focus on the aggregate effect of the actions and omissions of different agents. This framework allows me to refine the initial thesis and address the objections. (shrink)

Modern democracy attempted to solve the dilemmas posed by opposing features from various traditions through two strategies: representation, which allowed it to incorporate citizens’ conflicting interests within a restricted collegiate group that permitted deliberation and agreement, on one side, and universal choice of representatives and governments for limited periods of time, on the other. Since the first decades of the 20th century, this notion of democracy within the framework of a republican constitution was opposed by another one that rejected all (...) forms of parliamentarianism, discussion and public deliberation in the name of a “democracy” based on the identity and homogeneity of a mass of people under the hegemonic leadership of a party, centered around the will and decisions of a managing elite and a charismatic leader, viewed as the sole representative of the people themselves. Both forms of democracy –strict and perverted – are being harassed by the powers unleashed by globalization and transnationalisation that are becoming alien oligarchies, opposed to the notion of citizenship and restrictive of its rights. In liberal parliamentary democracies the functional imperative issued by the financial sector is channeled through a crisis cabinet that assimilates demands and transforms them by managing an ever-changing budget whose aim is to add new sufferings to the bulk of the population that can only counteract through protest. Given the constitutional backdrop of these societies, with their deep democratic network, the gradual transformation of the European Union into a transnational arena fuelled by “a club of chiefs of state” has only made yet more patent the oligarchic turn of its post-crisis evolution. In plebiscite democracies the turn was operated through a sovereign entrenchment of the power of the oligarchy on the pretext of resistance to the pressure set by globalization. Since the onset of the 90s, Latin America as well as countries in Eastern Europe have witnessed a gradual turn toward what O’Donnell has termed “delegative democracies”, or neo-populism, according to other authors. These regimes are characterized by exalting a populist leader, upholding him as a savior who will gauge the needs and wishes of the mass of individuals without intermediaries, focusing mainly on those who feel excluded from the mainstream of institutionalized democracy. This ensures feedback to populist regimes supported by a hegemonic political party that lives on State resources and on the rampant corruption it protects in order to finance ‘clientelism’ among those excluded from the system by the policies of the State itself. (shrink)

In Habermas’s discourse theory of law, the guarantee of citizens’ private and public autonomy is a prerequisite of legitimate law. This includes social entitlements. They provide the living conditions necessary for equal opportunities in the use of private and public freedoms. A proceduralist paradigm of the welfare state ensures private and public autonomy in shaping social rights. This makes welfare state regulations a legitimizing institution. This legal theoretical approach is outlined and defended against objections. The focus falls on examining the (...) critique of the justification and quality of social entitlements. Also considered are possible measures to strengthen the basis of legitimation in shaping social rights. (shrink)

How much personal partiality do agent-centred prerogatives allow? If there are limits on what morality may demand of us, then how much does it permit? For a view Henry Shue has termed ‘yuppie ethics’, the answer to both questions is a great deal. It holds that rich people are morally permitted to spend large amounts of money on themselves, even when this means leaving those living in extreme poverty unaided. Against this view, I demonstrate that personal permissions are limited in (...) certain ways: their strength must be continuous with the reasons put forward to explain their presence inside morality to begin with. Typically, these reasons include non-alienation and the preservation of personal integrity. However, when personal costs do not result in alienation or violate integrity, they are things that morality can routinely demand of us. Yuppie ethics therefore runs afoul of what I call the ‘continuity constraint’. (shrink)