- (1 other version)Intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties.Dan Marshall & Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Finding the world in the wave function: some strategies for solving the macro-object problem.Alyssa Ney - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4227-4249.details
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Self-made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.details
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Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.details
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Heavy Duty Platonism.Robert Knowles - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1255-1270.details
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Unrestricted animalism and the too many candidates problem.Eric Yang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):635-652.details
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∈ : Formal concepts in a material world truthmaking and exemplification as types of determination.Philipp Keller - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Genevadetails
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Vague Objects and the Problem of the Many.Thomas Sattig - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (2):211-223.details
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Panpsychism, aggregation and combinatorial infusion.William Seager - 2010 - Mind and Matter 8 (2):167-184.details
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Is there a conservative solution to the many thinkers problem?David Mark Kovacs - 2010 - Ratio 23 (3):275-290.details
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(2 other versions)Replies.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):727–744.details
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The asymmetric magnets problem.Brian Weatherson - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):479–492.details
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Humeans Aren’t Out of their Minds.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):529–535.details
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A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204.details
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The Weirdness of the World.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2024 - Princeton University Press.details
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The Many-Subjects Argument against Physicalism.Brian Cutter - forthcoming - In Geoffrey Lee & Adam Pautz (eds.), The Importance of Being Conscious. Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)How to Explain the Importance of Persons.Christopher Register - 2023 - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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What if We Contain Multiple Morally Relevant Subjects?Dustin Crummett - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (3):317-334.details
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No Such Thing as Too Many Minds.Luke Roelofs - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):131-146.details
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Is the Macro Grounded in the Micro?Martin Glazier - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):105-116.details
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Johnston versus Johnston.Kacper Kowalczyk - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.details
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Living without microphysical supervenience.Alex Moran - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):405-428.details
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(1 other version)Humean supervenience and tripartite entanglement relations.Lorenzo Lorenzetti - 2020 - Axiomathes 1:1-15.details
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Maximality, Function, and the Many.Robert Francescotti - 2019 - Metaphysica 20 (2):175-193.details
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Is Consciousness Intrinsic?: A Problem for the Integrated Information Theory.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30).details
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Kind‐Dependent Grounding.Alex Moran - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):359-390.details
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Are My Temporal Parts Agents?Alexander Dietz - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):362-379.details
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Persons, Stages, and Tensed Belief.Nicholas Rimell - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):577-593.details
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(2 other versions)Replies.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):727-744.details
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You Needn't Be Simple.Andrew M. Bailey - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):145-160.details
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Is My Head a Person?Michael B. Burke - 2003 - In Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons. Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 107-125.details
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Solitude without Souls: Why Peter Unger hasn’t Established Substance Dualism.Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.details
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Lewis vs Lewis on the problem of the many.Dan López de Sa - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1105-1117.details
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Humean supervenience and personal identity.Ryan Wasserman - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):582-593.details
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The Hard Problem of the Many.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):449-468.details
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A new problem of the many.Neil McKinnon - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):80-97.details
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Maximality and consciousness.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):150-158.details
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The future‐like‐ours argument, animalism, and mereological universalism.Andrea Sauchelli - 2018 - Bioethics 32 (3):199-204.details
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Merricks on the existence of human organisms.Cian Dorr - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):711–718.details
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(1 other version)How to Explain the Importance of Persons.Christopher Register - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):920-940.details
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Personal Identity, Consciousness, and Joints in Nature.Cody Gilmore - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (3-4):443-466.details
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Towards a Fictionalist Philosophy of Mathematics.Robert Knowles - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Manchesterdetails
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(1 other version)Humean supervenience and tripartite entanglement relations.Lorenzo Lorenzetti - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (2):217-231.details
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Overlapping minds and the hedonic calculus.Luke Roelofs & Jeff Sebo - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (6):1487-1506.details
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Thinking Parts and Embodiment.Rina Tzinman - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):163-182.details
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