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Moods as multiple-object directed and as objectless affective states: An examination of the dispositional theory of moods

Matthias Siemer

Cognition and Emotion 19 (6):815-845 (2005)

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Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods.Matthias Siemer - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):256-263.details The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of mood. This article outlines (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 23 citations
Moods: From Diffusivness to Dispositionality.Alex Grzankowski & Mark Textor - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details The view that moods are dispositions has recently fallen into disrepute. In this paper we want to revitalise it by providing a new argument for it and by disarming an important objection against it. A shared assumption of our competitors (intentionalists about moods) is that moods are “diffuse”. First, we will provide reasons for thinking that existing intentionalist views do not in fact capture this distinctive feature of moods that distinguishes them from emotions. Second, we offer a dispositionalist alternative that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Moods and situations.Francisco Gallegos - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details Do moods have intentional objects? If so, what kinds of intentional objects might they have? Some theorists hold that moods are objectless affective states, not ‘about’ anything. Others argue that moods are directed toward a maximally general object like ‘the world’, and so they are about everything, in some sense. In this article, I advance a new theoretical account of the intentional object of moods. According to what I call the ‘present-situation view’, moods are directed toward, or about, the present (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Emotion regulation in depression: Examining the role of cognitive processes.Jutta Joormann & Catherine D'Avanzato - 2010 - Cognition and Emotion 24 (6):913-939.details Download Export citation Bookmark 16 citations
Why moods change: their appropriateness and connection to beliefs.Tatyana A. Kostochka - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11399-11420.details There are many more philosophical discussions of emotions than of moods. One key reason for this is that emotions are said to have a robust connection to beliefs while moods are said to lack that connection. I argue that this view, though prevalent, is incorrect. It is motivated by examples that are not representative of how moods typically change. Indeed, once we examine the notion of belief-responsiveness and look at a wider range of examples, we can see that moods are (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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