A promising recent approach for understanding complex phenomena is recognition of anticipatory behavior of living organisms and social organizations. The anticipatory, predictive action permits learning, novelty seeking, rich experiential existence. I argue that the established frameworks of anticipation, adaptation or learning imply overly passive roles of anticipatory agents, and that a fictionalist standpoint reflects the core of anticipatory behavior better than representational or future references. Cognizing beings enact not just their models of the world, but own make-believe existential agendas as (...) well. Anticipators embody plausible scripts of living, and effectively assume neo-Kantian or pragmatist perspectives of cognition and action. It is instructive to see that anticipatory behavior is not without mundane or loathsome deficiencies. Appreciation of ferally fictionalist anticipation suggests an equivalence of semiosis and anticipation. (shrink)

Das Leben hat sich auf unserem Planeten zu einer unermesslichen Fülle von Formen ausdifferenziert, die in komplexen Weisen interagieren. Durch die Zerstörung unserer natürlichen Umwelt bedrohen wir das Wunder der globalen Biodiversität in seinem Fortbestand. Dabei verdrängen wir, dass auch die Menschheit weiter von der Produktivität jener Ökosysteme abhängig bleibt, zu denen sich das Leben evolutionär organisiert hat. Doch wie lässt sich überzeugend für den Erhalt von Biodiversität argumentieren? Sind Arten und Ökosysteme nur als Voraussetzungen gelingenden menschlichen Lebens schützenswert? Oder (...) haben sie darüber hinaus einen von uns unabhängigen Eigenwert? Andreas Hetzel gibt philosophisch fundierte Antworten auf diese Fragen und diskutiert konkrete Möglichkeiten des Biodiversitätsschutzes. (shrink)

This book brings together papers from a conference that took place in the city of L'Aquila, 4–6 April 2019, to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the earthquake that struck on 6 April 2009. Philosophers and scientists from diverse fields of research debated the problem that, on 6 April 1922, divided Einstein and Bergson: the nature of time. For Einstein, scientific time is the only time that matters and the only time we can rely on. Bergson, however, believes that scientific time (...) is derived by abstraction, even in the sense of extraction, from a more fundamental time. The plurality of times envisaged by the theory of Relativity does not, for him, contradict the philosophical intuition of the existence of a single time. But how do things stand today? What can we say about the relationship between the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of time in the light of contemporary science? What do quantum mechanics, biology and neuroscience teach us about the nature of time? The essays collected here take up the question that pitted Einstein against Bergson, science against philosophy, in an attempt to reverse the outcome of their monologue in two voices, with a multilogue in several voices. (shrink)

This presentation discusses a notion encountered across disciplines, and in different facets of human activity: autonomous activity. We engage it in an interdisciplinary way. We start by considering the reactions and behaviors of biological entities to biotechnological intervention. An attempt is made to characterize the degree of freedom of embryos & clones, which show openness to different outcomes when the epigenetic developmental landscape is factored in. We then consider the claim made in programming and artificial intelligence that automata could show (...) self-directed behavior as to the determination of their step-wise decisions on courses of action. This question remains largely open and calls for some important qualifications. We try to make sense of the presence of claims of freedom in agency, first in common sense, then by ascribing developmental plasticity in biology and biotechnology, and in the mapping of programmed systems in the presence of environmental cues and self-referenced circuits as well as environmental coupling. This is the occasion to recall attempts at working out a logical and methodological approach to the openness of concepts that are still to be found, and assess whether they can operate the structuring intelligibility of a yet undeveloped or underdeveloped field of study, where a “bisociation" and a unification of knowledge might be possible. (shrink)

Explores the continuities and discontinuities in the work of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze.

Upon first reading, the beginning of Chapter 2 of Difference and Repetition, with its talk of ―contemplative souls‖ and ―larval subjects,‖ seems something of a bizarre biological panpsychism. Actually it does defend a sort of biological panpsychism, but by defining the kind of psyche Deleuze is talking about, I‘ll show here how we can remove the bizarreness from that concept. First, I will sketch Deleuze‘s treatment of ―larval subjects,‖ then show how Deleuze‘s discourse can be articulated with Evan Thompson‘s biologically (...) based intervention into cognitive science, the ―mind in life‖ or ―enaction‖ position. Then I will then show how each in turn fits with contemporary biological work on E. coli chemotaxis (movement in response to changes in environment). (shrink)

Summary Based on Clausius’ phrasing of a “transformational content” and the resulting 2nd law of thermodynamics, I demonstrated that Gilbert Simondon’s On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects is historically situated at the threshold of understanding open systems thermodynamics and the related concepts of balance. Furthermore, I showed that Gestalt theory, as represented by Wolfgang Köhler, at least reproduced, if not partially anticipated or even prepared this development of 20th century thinking. Finally, I gave some short examples of how (...) Simondon applied the figure/ground distinction to human perception, memory, and a general theory of becoming and I introduced his proposal to analyse “the grounds” just as thoroughly as the laws of figuration. (shrink)

Uno de los problemas centrales que el filósofo francés Bernard Stiegler ha abordado para sostener una constitución tecno- lógica de la humanidad, es la cuestión del origen del hombre. El asunto recae en preguntarse si es posible pensar quién es el hombre desde esta tesis, sin volver a la metafísica o la filosofía trascendental. Esta posición ha de estar enraizada en una ontología que aprehenda el componente causal a nivel relacional, dejando de lado las explicaciones en las cuales la causa (...) es substancialista. Para dar desarrollo a esta propuesta, este artículo se compone de dos partes generales: la primera está destinada a presentar hasta dónde sigue y en dónde se separa Stiegler de la concepción zoo-antropológica de André Leroi-Gourhan sobre el origen del hombre; para luego explicar las bases epistemológicas y ontológicas sobre las que Stiegler erige sus tesis tecno-ontológica de la humanidad; a saber: los fundamentos de la transducción simondoniana y la diferancia derridiana. (shrink)

Straipsnyje analizuojamas žmogaus teisių paradoksas, atskleistas Hannah’os Arendt, Jacques’o Rancière’o ir Giorgio Agambeno darbuose. Žmogaus teisių konceptas veikia kaip biopolitinis aparatas, įdiegiantis žmogaus kaip gyvos būtybės ir žmogaus kaip politinio subjekto perskyrą. Ši gyvūniškumo ir žmogiškumo perskyra, atrandama pačiame žmoguje, rezonuoja su žmogiškumo ir gyvūniškumo klausimu filosofijoje. Klasikinė filosofija – nuo Aristotelio iki Heideggerio imtinai – postuluoja žmogaus ir gyvūno skirtingumą, o Agambenas ir Derrida teigia, kad žmogaus gyvūniškumas ir gyvūno humanizavimas yra tik dvi tos pačios problemos pusės. Toks klausimo (...) performulavimas leidžia pereiti prie Roberto Esposito filosofijos, kurioje teigiamas visų gyvų būtybių lygiavertiškumas bei pačios gyvybės imanentiškumas. Priešingai nei negatyvioji biopolitika, kuri siekė pajungti gyvybę normai ir įstatymui, Esposito nori sukurti teigiančiąją biopolitiką, kurioje norma laikoma imanentiška taisykle, leidžiančia gyvybei siekti maksimalios išraiškos. Nors atrodytų, jog tokia teorija turi mažai ką bendra su politiškumo konceptualizavimu, Esposito teigia, jog būtent ribos tarp zoē ir bios, tarp nuogos gyvybės ir politinės egzistencijos, panaikinimas ne tik nesumažina galimybių veikti politinėje plotmėje, bet, atvirkščiai, yra bet kokio bendro buvimo sąlyga. (shrink)

A life form and its environment constitute an essential unit, a microcosm. This microcosm is sustained by a privileged dialectic relationship in which the embedded agent- an entity endowed with a particular physical architecture- and its specific environment, coupled, mutually influence each other. Identical principles rule both the basic forms of semiotic organisation and the upper forms. When we distinguish these two levels of semiotic structuring we are distinguishing the semiotic relations that involve a stimulus-response relationship, which is dyadic in (...) nature, from those that involve a more complex relationship where the capacity of symbolically encoding allows organisms to go beyond the immediacy of sensory awareness. However in all instances of semiotic structuring, there is the presence of a living system that evolves in an environment individuating and assigning a value to typical environmental features. Acknowledging this fact is crucial: the inquiry into how elemental life forms interact with their environments leads to the identification of the fundamental role played by the physical architecture of the agent and sheds light on the semiotic process that is common to all life forms, ultimately highlighting the very nature of meaning and reality. (shrink)

Bernard Stiegler is known as a leading philosopher of technics. He has developed an original interpretation of technics as an externalized epiphylogenetic memory that remembers in the p...

Animal camouflage is said to be a mode of being negative, implying a setback visibility. On the contrary, we try here to restore all its aesthetic positivity considering the singularity of extremely varied forms it produces. It soon becomes apparent that the camouflage forces us to question the privilege of individuality and traditional drawdown on singularity. The disruptive camouflage, especially, that crushes the individual formal unity provides the argument in favor of an individuation with the environment, and more with the (...) world: the animal camoufleur disappears under only an individual visibility; it appears on the contrary in all its pre-individual splendor when it involves with environment components to make them the most expressive. (shrink)

Em 1973, Georges Canguilhem publica, na Encyclopédie Universalis, um extenso verbete histórico do conceito “Vida” na biologia e nas ciências da vida. A seguinte tradução do verbete é baseada na segunda edição, reimpressão publicada em 1989, nas páginas 546-553.

Este artigo foi composto a partir da comunicação apresentada no Ciclo de conferências "Humanos e animais: os limites da humanidade", promovido pelo IEA/USP. Já bastante modificado desde então, o texto incorpora ainda comentários de interlocutores de diferentes áreas ou perspectivas de conhecimento, de modo a explicitar tanto as dificuldades quanto o caráter promissor de tais esforços interdisciplinares. No mesmo passo, as reflexões do artigo emergem do exame de uma bibliografia heterogênea, mas que, conforme o tratamento aqui despendido, converge para a (...) urgência contemporânea de se conceber e praticar um outro pacto entre os humanos modernos e os animais, sem o qual o próprio humanismo ver-se-á ameaçado. Para outro humanismo, outra natureza insiste em pedir passagem. This article was composed from a communication presented in the cycle of conferences "Humans and animals: the limits of humanity", promoted by IEA/USP. Amply modified since then, the text incorporates commentaries of interlocutors from different areas or perspectives of knowledge, so as making explicit both the difficulties and the promising character of such interdisciplinary efforts. In the same time, the reflections of the article emerge from the use of a heterogeneous bibliography, but that, in conformity with the treatment here used, converges to the contemporary urgency of conceiving and practicing another pact between modern humans and the animals. Without this pact humanism itself will be menaced. For other humanism, another nature insists in asking its place. (shrink)

The iconic and diagrammatic features of abduction, as expressed in Peirce’s works after 1890, allow one to re-read the Kantian concept of schema. By means of this new reading, it is possible to consider the dynamics between legality and creative acts, which, according to Emilio Garroni, keep cultures alive. This process can be analysed by a semiotic theory that could combine the features of Kant’s Aesthetic Judgment (as an answer to schema’s problems) and Peirce’s last theory of abduction. In this (...) way, it becomes possible to go beyond the simple subsumption, through Reflective Judgment, of sensible intuitions under a concept. Thus, creativity becomes the process, both mental and cultural, whereby a new regularity come from the background of the previous one as a result of the free play of our faculties (Musement), which sets links between universes of experience apparently very distant one from another. (shrink)

ResumoO presente artigo visa mostrar o significado da filosofia biológica da técnica em Gilbert Simondon. Essa rubrica coloca em ação uma leitura da filosofia da técnica do filósofo francês como uma ontologia regional no interior de sua ontologia geral ontogenética, que, nesse regime específico, baseia-se em um modelo do orgânico. Para tanto, mostraremos que a individuação dos objetos técnicos, sua concretização marcada pela superdeterminação funcional, obriga-nos a pensá-los em sua organicidade e desde uma organologia geral. Ademais, os conceitos de adaptação (...) e de ambiente associado também contribuem enquanto aspectos biológicos que acompanham a concepção de Simondon do modo de existência dos seres técnicos. Como resultado, veremos que quanto mais concreto e adaptado - na série de sua evolução específica -, mais o objeto técnico se aproxima da individualidade propriamente biológica. Essa aproximação não terá, entretanto, o sentido de uma assimilação completa entre o técnico e o orgânico. Na autoprodução vital, permanece sempre um resto para além do maquínico, cuja demonstração é erigida por Simondon, por fim, com a ideia de uma origem vital absoluta dos objetos técnicos enquanto "mutação orientada". Apontaremos que tal origem não tem base meramente humana, mas se estende também para outras esferas do domínio vital.The present article aims to show the meaning of the biological philosophy of technique in Gilbert Simondon. This concept puts into action a reading of the French philosopher's philosophy of technique as a regional ontology within his ontogenetic general ontology, which in that particular scheme is based on an organic model. We will elaborate this to show that the individuation of technical objects, their concretization marked by their functional overdetermination, forces us to think of them in its organicity and from a general organology. Moreover, the concepts of adaptation and associated environment also contribute as biological aspects that accompany Simondon's conception of the mode of existence of technical beings. As a result, we will see that the more concrete and adapted the technical object is - in the series of its specific evolution - the more it comes closer to the proper biological individuality. This approximation will not have, however, the meaning of a complete assimilation between the technical and the organic. In the vital self-production, Simondon demonstrates that there always remains something beyond the machinical, namely, the idea of an absolute vital source of technical objects as a "guided mutation". We will show that such a source is not merely human, but also extends to other spheres of the vital domain. (shrink)

The paper asks how certain zones of technical practice or technologies come to matter as "the Technological", a way of construing political change in terms of technical innovation and invention. The social construction of technology (SCOT) established that things mediate social relations, and that social practices are constantly needed to maintain the workability of technologies. It also linked the production, representation and use of contemporary technologies to scientific knowledge. However, it did all this at a certain cost. To understand something (...) as socially constructed implies that it can be positioned on a pre-given social grid. Making this understanding stick risks affronting others with the claim that their position is not singular, only ordinary. It also runs the risk of not having purchase on those aspects of technological relationality that overflow the framing context of the social (Callon et al. 2002). Building on the ground prepared by SCOT and relying on the work of (Stengers 2000) and (Simondon 1964, 1989), the paper discusses how technologies could be understood as relational events within the contemporary political space. Developing an account of technologies centred on relationality, this paper outlines an epistemology and ontology of the anomalies of technological events, and suggests how excess could explain the Technological. (shrink)

Em 1973, Georges Canguilhem publica, na Encyclopédie Universalis, um extenso verbete histórico do conceito “Vida” na biologia e nas ciências da vida. A seguinte tradução do verbete é baseada na segunda edição, reimpressão publicada em 1989, nas páginas 546-553.

This paper examines three exemplary theories of living organization with respect to their common feature of defining life in terms of metabolic closure: autopoiesis, (M, R) systems, and chemoton theory. Metabolic closure is broadly understood to denote the property of organized chemical systems that each component necessary for the maintenance of the system is produced from within the system itself, except for an input of energy. It is argued that two of the theories considered—autopoiesis and (M, R) systems—participate in a (...) hylomorphist pattern of thinking which separates the “form” of the living system from its “matter.” The analysis and critique of hylomorphism found in the work of the philosopher Gilbert Simondon is then applied to these two theories, and on the basis of this critique it is argued that the chemoton model offers a superior theory of minimal life which overcomes many of the problems associated with the other two. Throughout, the relationship between hylomorphism and the understanding of living things as machines is explored. The paper concludes by considering how hylomorphism as a background ontology for theories of life fundamentally influences the way life is defined. (shrink)

This paper introduces Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming in a system theoretic framework and proposes an alternative ontological foundation to the study of systems and complex systems in particular. A brief critique of systems theory and the difficulties apparent in it is proposed as an introduction to the discussion. Following is an overview aimed at providing access to the ‘big picture’ of Deleuze’s revolutionary philosophical system with emphasis on a system theoretic approach and terminology. The major concepts of Deleuze’s ontology—difference, virtuality, (...) multiplicity, assemblages, quasi-causation, becoming, intensity and progressive determination are introduced and discussed. Deleuze’s work is a radical departure from the dogma of western philosophy that guides the foundations of science and systems theory. It replaces identity with difference and being with becoming; in other words, it provides systems theory with an ontological ground based on change, heterogeneity and the inexhaustible novelty-producing process that underlies all phenomena. The conceptual tools made available by this philosophy seem to capture the fundamental aspects of complexity and complex systems much better than the current conceptual system that is based on static transcendent ontological entities. (shrink)

In this article I will suggest ways in which adding the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze to the mix can complement and extend the 4EA approach to cognitive science. In the first part of the paper, I will show how the Deleuzean tripartite ontological difference (virtual/intensive/actual) can provide an explicit ontology for dynamical systems theory. The second part will take these ontological notions and apply them to three areas of concern to the 4EA approaches: (a) the Deleuzean concept of the virtual (...) will clarify the ontological status of perceptual capacity as sensorimotor skill; (b) the Deleuzean concept of “intensive individuation” will clarify the ontological status of the genesis of perceptually guided behavior; (c) the Deleuzean critique of confusing the actual and the virtual will enable us to intervene in the realism/idealism debate. These aspects will not be addressed sequentially but will be interwoven into an unfolding argument. (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of objectivism vs constructivism in two areas,biology and cognitive science, which areintermediate between the natural sciences suchas physics (where objectivism is dominant) andthe human and social sciences (whereconstructivism is widespread). The issues inbiology and in cognitive science are intimatelyrelated; in each of these twin areas, the objectivism vs constructivism issue isinterestingly and rather evenly balanced; as aresult, this issue engenders two contrastingparadigms, each of which has substantialspecific scientific content. The neo-Darwinianparadigm in biology is closely resonant (...) withthe classical cognitivist paradigm in cognitivescience, and both of them are intrinsicallyobjectivist. The organismic paradigm inbiology, based on the concept of autopoiesis,is consonant with the paradigm of enaction incognitive science; the latter paradigms are bothprofoundly constructivist.In cognitive science, the objectivism vsconstructivism issue is internal to thescientific field itself and reflexivity isinescapable. At this level, strong ontologicalobjectivism is self-contradictory and thereforeuntenable. Radical constructivism isself-coherent; but it also rehabilitatesa weak form of objectivism as a pragmaticallyviable alternative. In conclusion, there is aneven-handed reciprocity between objectivistand constructivist perspectives. Finally, thearticle examines the consequences of thisconclusion for fields other than cognitivescience: biology; physics and the naturalsciences; and the human and social sciences. (shrink)

Deleuze's text on dramatization has a peculiar place in his philosophy. In this text, he attributes, for the first time in his own name, a singular function to philosophy. I aim to show that all the notions developed in ‘The Method of Dramatization’ – such as the transformation of the status of Ideas, the first development of a theory of individuation, the decentring of subjectivity, the critique of representation – are part of one general function: to grant events the importance (...) they call for. If a method is required for such an endeavour, it is because thought must become the site of the maximal intensification of what – beyond a psychological or an anthropological point of view – is of importance. (shrink)

In this paper I try to bring together two contexts in which the term “gene” is used. Perhaps this is overly hasty. But I’m trying to bring a term from an evolutionary context (“unexpressed genetic variation”) together with one from a developmental context (“constructed functional gene”).

As a significant extension of our previous calculus of logical differentials and moving logic, we propose here a mathematical diagram for specifying the emergence of novelty, through the construction of some “differentials” related to cohomological computations. Later we intend to examine how to use these “differentials” in the analysis of anticipation or evolution schemes. This proposal is given as a consequence of our comments on the Ehresmann–Vanbremeersch’s work on memory evolutive systems, from the two points of view which are characterization (...) of life and use of categorical modeling. It would not be possible to conceive of the “differentials” outside the frame of a MES. Furthermore, we hope that this diagram will be useful to exhibit the “emergence of sense” in discourses, and this idea is supported here by a brief examination of how a discourse could be seen as a living system. (shrink)

This paper deals with the notion of physico-chemical distance between the living being and its environment, as the result of their separate evolution (see Solignac VI and VIII). Then, it attempts (in vain) to understand it in the theory of information.

Ce texte a déjà paru dans M.-J. Menozzi, F. Flipo & D. Pécaud Énergie et Société : sciences, gouvernances et usages, Aix-en-Provence, Edisud, 2009, p. 25-34. Pour lire ce texte, si vous êtes éclairé par une lumière artificielle ou que vous utilisez un ordinateur, vous avez recours à l'électricité. Le bâtiment dans lequel vous vous trouvez et l'éclairage ou l'ordinateur dont vous faites peut-être usage sont probablement reliés par des conducteurs électriques à une infrastructure municipale ou - Sciences de l'information (...) et de la communication – Nouvel article. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo apresentar as críticas de Martin Heidegger e de Gilbert Simondon à concepção corrente da técnica, referida por Heidegger como a “concepção instrumental e antropológica da técnica”. Trata-se de mostrar que as críticas desses pensadores, por mais diferentes que possam ser seus universos conceituais, seus objetivos e seus métodos, são ambas realizadas a partir de um processo de interpretação desconstrutiva dos conceitos de “instrumentalidade”, “alienação” e “hilemorfismo”, num conjunto crítico que a cada vez relaciona diretamente (...) crítica da técnica à crítica da filosofia. Nesse sentido, as análises são apresentadas a partir dos respectivos horizontes de reflexão filosófica de cada autor: no caso de Heidegger, o projeto de elaboração da ontologia fundamental e, posteriormente, o pensamento da história do ser e, no caso de Simondon, a questão da individuação. (shrink)

Advancing the reductionist conviction that biology must be in agreement with the assumptions of reductive physicalism (the upward hierarchy of causal powers, the upward fixing of facts concerning biological levels) A. Rosenberg argues that downward causation is ontologically incoherent and that it comes into play only when we are ignorant of the details of biological phenomena. Moreover, in his view, a careful look at relevant details of biological explanations will reveal the basic molecular level that characterizes biological systems, defined by (...) wholly physical properties, e.g., geometrical structures of molecular aggregates (cells). In response, we argue that contrary to his expectations one cannot infer reductionist assumptions even from detailed biological explanations that invoke the molecular level, as interlevel causal reciprocity is essential to these explanations. Recent very detailed explanations that concern the structure and function of chromatin—the intricacies of supposedly basic molecular level—demonstrate this. They show that what seem to be basic physical parameters extend into a more general biological context, thus rendering elusive the concepts of the basic level and causal hierarchy postulated by the reductionists. In fact, relevant phenomena are defined across levels by entangled, extended parameters. Nor can the biological context be explained away by basic physical parameters defining molecular level shaped by evolution as a physical process. Reductionists claim otherwise only because they overlook the evolutionary significance of initial conditions best defined in terms of extended biological parameters. Perhaps the reductionist assumptions (as well as assumptions that postulate any particular levels as causally fundamental) cannot be inferred from biological explanations because biology aims at manipulating organisms rather than producing explanations that meet the coherence requirements of general ontological models. Or possibly the assumptions of an ontology not based on the concept of causal powers stratified across levels can be inferred from biological explanations. The incoherence of downward causation is inevitable, given reductionist assumptions, but an ontological alternative might avoid this. We outline desiderata for the treatment of levels and properties that realize interlevel causation in such an ontology. (shrink)

el presente artículo propone un discurso indirecto libre entre el pensamiento de G. Deleuze y los de Schelling y Hölderlin a través de las síntesis del tiempo deleuzeanas. Desde el criticismo contemporáneo notamos que la filosofía de Deleuze es heredera del idealismo de Schelling o, más bien, de su grieta. Sin embargo, mostramos cómo sin Hölderlin no es posible ni la grieta del sistema de Schelling ni la apertura al por-venir. Por-venir es como llama Deleuze a la tercera síntesis del (...) tiempo o al espacio del virtual; posibilidad de que haya algo nuevo: el acontecimiento. (shrink)

This article questions Balibar’s claim that Simondon’s concept of the transindividual does not fulfil all the requirements for a materialist ‘philosophical anthropology’. In fact, we demonstrate that Simondon’s philosophy of individuation, and notably his concept of the transindividual, can be, as it were, included in a genealogy of aleatory materialism. Simondon’s philosophy of individuation is indeed a philosophy of the transindividual insofar as it involves the constant revision of the different historical forms taken by social relations in the coevolution of (...) human beings and their techno-social and natural milieu. Simondon’s way of conceiving anthropogenesis as an open and ‘metastable’ field in which individuals and processes relate to each other maintaining their own knowledge in motion, marks, in our view, a materialist style of thinking. Against this background we analyse Simondon’s overcoming of the dichotomy between the individual and society through a ‘double rejection’, we sketch his theory of a ‘double source’ for social relations, and we explain in what sense, from his perspective, the transindividual ‘can be said in many ways’. (shrink)

By considering the way in which the mechanism of the scapegoat in René Girard's work is predicated on a phenomenal and anthropic understanding of violence, the following shows how Girard's anthropological conception of religion determines and limits from the beginning relations between the violent and the nonviolent and the phenomenal and the nonphenornenal. This conception is then inscribed within a larger economy of violence that opens up Girard's account of victimization and sacrifice to wider determinations. Important distinctions are made along (...) the way between the human sciences, religion, ethics and philosophy. If the work of Jacques Derrida in particular and deconstruction in general permit this widening in this article, I then argue however that such concepts as originary violence also short‐circuit the differentiations, with which we are concerned, to address, with and beyond Girard, a radical ethics of the lesser violence. (shrink)

In this paper I trace pictorial acts that move beyond figuration and narration, particularly focusing on Gwen John's portraits of women and girls, the work of her maturity as an artist. In doing this I make connections between John's and Cézanne's letters about their painting techniques and direction. The analysis draws on Deleuze and Guattari's approaches to the work of art. I discuss in particular the concept of faciality in the Thousand Plateaus and the problem of painting forces in Deleuze's (...) work on Bacon, The Logic of Sensation. My argument is that an analysis that goes beyond phenomenology and semiotics opens new ways of seeing and appreciating a modernist woman artist's paintings, and sheds new light on the way her art allows the female figure to emerge as a woman-becoming-imperceptible within a patriarchal regime of signs. (shrink)

In this paper I try to bring together two contexts in which the term “gene” is used. Perhaps this is overly hasty. But I‟m trying to bring a term from an evolutionary context (“unexpressed genetic variation”) together with one from a developmental context (“constructed functional gene”).

"This book does nothing less than to set new standards in combining philosophical with political theology.

This is a translation of the original text, published on Multitudes, realized with the generous permission of the author. Being the transcription of a lecture we decided to maintain the evocative style, as well as the formula "CsO" where originally used.