One of the main contentions of the framework for Responsible Innovation (RI) is that social and ethical aspects have to be addressed by deliberative engagement with stakeholders and the wider public throughout the innovation process. The aim of this article is to reflect on the question to what extent is deliberative engagement suitable for conducting RI in business. We discuss several tensions that arise when this framework is applied in the business context. Further, we analyse the place of deliberative engagement (...) in several theories of business ethics. We conclude that there remains a tension between the ideal of RI and the way in which the competitive market operates. Hence, RI scholars should reflect more critically on changes that are required in the market in order to make RI possible, modify the ideal of deliberative engagement for RI in business, or attempt to strike a balance between these two responses. (shrink)

The Market Failures Approach (MFA) is one of the leading theories in contemporary business ethics. It generates a list of ethical obligations for the managers of private firms that states that they should not create or exploit market failures because doing so reduces the efficiency of the economy. Recently the MFA has been criticised by Abraham Singer on the basis that it unjustifiably does not assign private managers obligations based on egalitarian values. Singer proposes an extension to the MFA, the (...) Justice Failures Approach (JFA), in which managers have duties to alleviate political, social, and distributive inequalities in addition to having obligations to not exploit market failures. In this paper I describe the MFA and JFA and situate them relative to each other. I then highlight a threefold distinction between different types of obligations that can be given to private managers in order to argue that a hybrid theory of business ethics, which I call the MFA +, can be generated by arguing that managers have obligations based on efficiency and duties based on equality to the extent that these latter obligations do not lead to efficiency losses. This argument suggests a novel theoretical option in business ethics, elucidates the issues that are at stake between the MFA and the JFA, and clarifies the costs and benefits of each theory. (shrink)

This article reviews and criticizes Joseph Heath’s market failures approach (MFA) to business ethics. Our criticism is organized into three sections. First, we argue that, even under the ideal assumptions of perfect competition, when markets generate Pareto-efficient distributions, Heath’s approach does not rule out significant harms. Second, we show that, under nonideal conditions, the MFA is either too demanding, if efficiency is to be attained, or not sufficiently demanding, if the goal of Pareto efficiency is abandoned. Finally, we argue that (...) Heath’s appeal to regulations and specific moral requirements as a remedy for market failures is unlikely to safeguard efficiency and exposes a number of general worries regarding the moral force of the MFA. We end this article with a constructive suggestion on how to adjust the MFA to avoid these problems while preserving its contractualist and Paretian spirit. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In this address I argue that different perspectives on the normative foundations of corporate responsibility reflect underlying disagreements about the ideal arrangement of tasks between market and state. I initially recommend that scholars look back to the “division of moral labor” inspired by John Rawls’ seminal work on distributive justice in order to rethink why, and to what extent, corporations take on responsibilities normally within the purview of government. I then examine how this notion is related to recent theoretical work (...) in the field of business ethics. I thereafter turn to provide a brief outline of an alternative view that sees corporations as having responsibilities in so far as markets are sites of delegated oversight over the production of social goods that might otherwise be administered by the state. (shrink)

This paper explores the notion that business calls for an adversarial ethic, akin to that of sport. On this view, because of their competitive structure, both sport and business call for behaviours that are contrary to ‘ordinary morality’, and yet are ultimately justified because of the goods they facilitate. I develop three objections to this analogy. Firstly, there is an important qualitative difference between harms risked voluntarily and harms risked involuntarily. Secondly, the goods achieved by adversarial relationships in sport go (...) beyond the function of sport, i.e. to entertain audiences. Thirdly, the most plausible account of the athlete’s motivational development starts with their love of the sport, which can explain a commitment to the sporting ethics in a way that is not paralleled in business. I close by drawing attention to the ways in which an Aristotelian conception of business ethics may be able to accommodate these objections. (shrink)

How should we distinguish between ethical and unethical ways of pursuing profit in a market? The market failures approach (MFA) to business ethics purports to provide an answer to this question. I argue that it fails to do so. The source of this failure is the MFA’s reliance on Pareto efficiency as a core ethical principle. Many ethically “preferred” tactics for seeking profit cannot be justified by appeal to Pareto efficiency. One important reason for this is that Pareto efficiency, as (...) understood by the theory of welfare economics upon which the MFA relies, assumes a static conception of efficiency. This is a problem because many ethically “preferred” tactics can only be justified by appeal to dynamic efficiency considerations. I argue that, instead of Pareto efficiency, we should look to the value of wealth creation to understand the ethical constraints on how market actors may pursue profit. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The distinction between what I call nonelective obligations and discretionary obligations, a distinction that focuses on one particular thread of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, helps us to identify the obligations that carry over from principals to agents. Clarity on this issue is necessary to identify the moral obligations within “shareholder primacy”, which conceives of managers as agents of shareholders. My main claim is that the principal-agent relation requires agents to fulfill nonelective obligations, but it does not always (...) require discharging discretionary obligations. I show that the requirement to fulfill nonelective obligations is more far-reaching than has been acknowledged by most defenders and critics of shareholder primacy. But I also show that managers are not bound by certain discretionary obligations like charity, showing that their moral obligations are more circumscribed than the obligations that apply to human beings in general. (shrink)

In recent years, insurance companies have begun tracking their customers’ behaviors and price premiums accordingly. Based on the Market-Failures Approach as well as the Justice-Failures Approach, I provide an ethical analysis of the use of tracking technologies in the insurance industry. I focus on the use of telematics in car insurance and on the use of fitness tracking in life insurance. The use of tracking has some important benefits to policyholders and insurers alike: it reduces moral hazard and fraud, increases (...) actuarial fairness, and incentivizes safe behavior. These benefits, however, are outweighed by significant moral objections. First, the use of tracking technologies significantly undermines the fairness of the interaction between insurance companies and policyholders. Specifically, the use of tracking eliminates information asymmetries, but in such a way that favors insurers exclusively. Furthermore, tracked behaviors and the ability to choose to behave safely are highly correlated with other variables such as income. Therefore, tracking-based insurance relies on and exacerbates existing inequalities and injustices, which undermines the benefits that tracking is supposed to introduce. (shrink)

Committees multiply in firms, whether stakeholder boards or committees, multi-stakeholder initiatives, ethics committees, or oversight boards. These arrangements aim to organise and legitimise the social and political activities of corporations. This article raises the question of the appropriate form of such governance structures. The examples above illustrate three possible ways of legitimising corporate quasi-public social and political activities: deliberation within the company, deliberation outside, and an approach we label _corporate constitutionalism_. While the first two models have been tested in practice (...) and assessed in theory, the third one is comparatively more recent, both in practice and in theory. This article focuses on the latter model and asks whether corporate constitutionalism offers a suitable addition, or alternative, to deliberation (with or within firms) for legitimising corporate quasi-public social and political activities. It examines the respective merits of the three models and argues that a corporate constitutional court may mitigate some of the limits of deliberative practices alone. It argues the court is needed in weak regulatory environments, whether they are failing or inherently limited. (shrink)

By considering what we identify as a problem inherent in the ‘nature of the firm’—the risk of abuse of authority—we propound the conception of a social contract theory of the firm which is truly Rawlsian in its inspiration. Hence, we link the social contract theory of the firm with the general theory of justice. Through this path, we enter the debate about whether firms can be part of Rawlsian theory of justice showing that corporate governance principles enter the “basic structure.” (...) Finally, we concur with Sen’s aim to broaden the realm of social justice beyond what he calls the ‘transcendental institutional perfectionism’ of Rawls’ theory. We maintain the contractarian approach to justice but introduce Sen’s capability concept as an element of the constitutional and post-constitutional contract model of institutions with special reference to corporate governance. Accordingly, rights over primary goods and capabilities are granted by the basic institutions of society, but many capabilities have to be turned into the functionings of many stakeholders through the operation of firms understood as post-constitutional institutional domains. The constitutional contract on the distribution of primary goods and capabilities should then shape the principles of corporate governance so that at post-constitutional level anyone may achieve her/his functionings in the corporate domain by exercising such capabilities. In the absence of such a condition, post-constitutional contracts would distort the process that descends from constitutional rights and capabilities toward social outcomes. (shrink)

This article explores the cooperation of government and the private sector to tackle the ethical dimension of artificial intelligence. The argument draws on the institutionalist approach in philosophy and business ethics defending a ‘division of moral labor’ between governments and the private sector. The goal and main contribution of this article is to explain how this approach can provide ethical guidelines to the AI industry and to highlight the limits of self-regulation. In what follows, I discuss three institutionalist claims. First, (...) principles of AI ethics should be validated through legitimate democratic processes. Second, compliance with these principles should be secured in a stable way. Third, their implementation in practice should be as efficient as possible. If we accept these claims, there are good reasons to conclude that, in many cases, governments implementing hard regulation are in principle the best instruments to secure an ethical development of AI systems. Where adequate regulation exists, firms should respect the law. But when regulation does not yet exist, helping governments build adequate regulation should be businesses’ ethical priority, not self-regulation. (shrink)

This paper clarifies the usage of Albert Hirschman’s categories of market behaviour as of exit and voice in debates about workplace democracy by taking seriously his critique of the neoclassical analysis of competition. Pro-market liberals are generally hostile to the idea of workplace democracy and tend to favour top-down hierarchies as a way of organising labour. This hostility is generally inspired by the neoclassical analysis of exploitation and efficiency, which leads them to defend distributions achieved through exit-based competitive equilibria. Following (...) Hirschman, I propose to consider a hypothetical alternative: a democratic equilibrium, reached through the use of voice. I show that it would present the same appealing characteristics than its competitive counterpart while also accounting for the non-ideal conditions in which markets operate. Support for free markets should entail support for workplace democracy minimally understood as a strengthening of voice. (shrink)

Businesses often attempt to demonstrate their commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) by showcasing women in their leadership ranks, most of whom are white. Yet research has shown that organizations confer status and power to women who engage in sexist behavior, which undermines DEI efforts. We sought to examine whether women who engage in racist behavior are also conferred relative status at work. Drawing on theory and research on organizational culture and intersectionality, we predicted that a white woman who (...) expresses anti-Black racism is conferred more status in the workplace than a white woman who does not. A pilot study (N = 30) confirmed that making an anti-Black racist comment at work was judged to be more offensive than making no comment, but only for a white man, not a white woman. Study 1 (N = 330) found that a white woman who made an anti-Black racist comment at work was conferred higher status than a white woman who did not, whereas the opposite held true for a white man, with perceived offensiveness mediating these effects. Study 2 (N = 235) revealed that a white woman who made an anti-racist/pro-Black Lives Matter comment was conferred lower status than a white woman who did not, whereas the opposite held true for a white man. Finally, Study 3 (N = 295) showed that people who endorse racist and sexist beliefs confer more status to a white man than to a white woman regardless of speech, but that people low in racism and sexism confer the highest status to a white woman who engages in anti-Black racist speech. These studies suggest that white women are rewarded for expressing support for beliefs that mirror systemic inequality in the corporate world. We discuss implications for business ethics and directions for future research. (shrink)

ABSTRACTNoncompete clauses, or agreements by employees to not work for a competitor or start a competing business, have recently faced increased public scrutiny and criticism. This article provides a qualified defense of NCCs. I focus on the argument that NCCs should be banned because they unfairly restrict the options of employees. I argue that this argument fails because it neglects the economist Thomas Schelling’s insight that limiting exit options can be beneficial for a person. This employee-based defense of NCCs does (...) not absolve all their uses, but it does give us a rough test for evaluating the permissibility of NCCs. With this test in hand, I turn to some of the more controversial uses of NCCs. For those who weigh heavily the interests of employees, the question is not whether NCCs, but when. (shrink)

A number of recent authors, most notably Joseph Heath, have persausively defended a market‐centered account of corporate responsibility that grounds standards of business conduct upon the normative presuppositions of the market. They have us focus on two important items: first, the value of welfare, or Pareto efficient outcomes, which underwrites the legitimacy of market arrangements; and second, the behavioral requirements needed to assure that corporations conduct business in a manner consistent with this value. This article critically examines the aspirations of (...) this literature by embracing its basic method but questioning how well it understands the aim of the market. It puts forth a limited case for corporate responsibility anchored in other dimensions of the public good, distinct from the value of efficiency, and argues that a plausible understanding of corporate responsibility arises from the notion that market arrangements are sites of delegated social authority to provision other aspects of the common good. (shrink)

Corporations can be powerful engines of economic prosperity, but also for the public good more broadly conceived. But they need to be properly incentivized to fulfil these missions. We propose an innovative plan called the Corporate Social Assessment (CSA). Every four years, a randomly selected Citizens’ Assembly will meet to decide a grading scheme for assessing companies’ conduct. At the end of the cycle, a professional assessment body will grade the companies and rank them. The ranking will be the basis (...) for subsidies to higher-tier companies, to be paid out of a fund to which all companies will contribute, to create a race to the top which financially rewards corporations taking public concerns seriously. The CSA radicalizes the corporate license to operate. To retain legitimacy in the eyes of wider segments of society, the proposal aims to democratize the way we hold corporations accountable for the power they wield. (shrink)

The “question of reasonable compliance” concerns how business firms should comply with morally reasonable laws that have been democratically enacted. This article argues that, out of respect for the governing authority of democratic citizens, firms should comply with the law in accordance with legislators’ normative expectations of compliance. It defends this view against arguments from the legal, economic and business ethics literatures that focus on the contentious nature of democracy and the competitive nature of the market. In response this article (...) argues that these adversarial features of democracy and capitalism do not limit the ability of democratic legislatures to set normative expectations of market actors, nor the duty of firms to comply with them. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, EarlyView.

A question facing nearly all private firms is whether they may keep employee pay secret. Many think it is obvious that firms are obligated to disclose a good deal of pay information once we properly appreciate the severity of pay discrimination in our economy and the autonomy-related interests that would be served by pay disclosure. This article puts forth a dissenting voice against the vast majority of recent commentary. It exploits a fissure between reasons we have to support certain coercive (...) regulations and reasons firms have to act in the absence of such regulation. While acknowledging that we may need transparency regulations for firms that fail to act morally, it argues that otherwise moral firms need not disclose pay on the surveyed grounds. (shrink)

I present a dilemma for the market failures approach to business ethics. On an orthodox interpretation, it takes moral requirements for businesses to require them not to profit from market failures to approximate Pareto efficiency. On a moralized interpretation, it also incorporates other considerations. However, the orthodox approach is extensionally inadequate, for it is legitimate to profit from many of the allegedly ruled-out market failures. The moralized approach does better but fails to be sufficiently comprehensive. First, it has not been (...) shown why we ought to adhere to any particular limited subset of norms of and for the market. Second, we have a very general reason to mitigate the moral horror of the world, which indicates that the market failures approach is too arbitrarily restricted. (shrink)

Citing corporate concentration and lax enforcement since the Reagan era, the Biden administration has declared a new era of aggressive antitrust prosecution, bringing antimonopoly actions against tech giants such as Meta, Google, and Amazon. But what’s so bad about monopoly or corporate concentration? The standard answer appeals to economic consequences, such as higher prices or deadweight losses. This paper offers a different framework. It argues monopolizing can be a form of cheating, which is a wrong that attaches to means, not (...) just ends; an athlete who cheats but loses still does wrong. In particular, this paper argues that certain market-controlling strategies constitute a form of cheating I call ‘structural cheating,’ best illustrated by the metaphor of creating an unlevel playing field: rather than compete fairly on merits such as product quality and price, a firm that acquires rivals biases the market in its favor, thereby entrenching a dominant position that effectively forces would-be competitors to compete uphill. By framing (alleged) antitrust violations as cheating, while using the FTC’s lawsuit against Facebook (now Meta) as a test case, this paper provides a needed corrective to those citing market success as evidence of merit or skill. A further upshot is the structural cheating account better explains the distinctively problematic features of social media market concentration than Heath’s Market Failures Approach. More generally, this paper provides a normative lens for analyzing fair market competition and shows why it’s not only winning or losing that counts in capitalism, but how one plays the game. (shrink)

How does a role—whether in business, law, government, or some other institution—change what is morally permissible or obligatory? Here I present three options and argue for the third. On the balancing model, a role simply gives its occupant additional normative reasons, to be weighed against all other normative reasons. On the shielding model, a role comes with its own moral code, blocking the force of all role-external reasons. On the filtering model, a role selectively filters its occupant’s reasons for action, (...) creating obligations or permissions to act on a narrowed range of considerations. I argue that the filtering model offers a superior analysis of the ethics of roles, including the concepts of professional integrity and discretion. I focus on three difficult cases: a nuclear safety regulator, a criminal defense lawyer, and a corporate lobbyist. I conclude by discussing the implications of the filtering model for business ethics. (shrink)

This paper argues that a proper evaluation of the notion of efficiency in business ethics requires that we separate efficiency qua human good from the originally value-neutral sense of the term. The adverse consequences of hyper-efficiency consist in paradoxically causing greater inefficiencies (‘perversity’) as well as a negative impact on the human capacities to pursue various forms of excellence (‘jeopardy’). In contrast to its negative consequences, the precious good of efficiency can be formulated in terms of Alasdair MacIntyre’s influential practice-institution (...) framework. The paper proposes that efficiency be defined in terms of the kind of success towards which it aims; while it never quite reaches the status of an internal good, efficiency fluctuates between being an external good proper and what we call a paradoxical good, with attributes of both internal and external goods. The archetype of a paradoxical good is the good of success qua victory in the domain of sports, which shares attributes of internal goods (since it is defined as a necessary and desirable goal by the practice itself) and external goods (since victory for one implies the defeat of another, a zero-sum logic). The paper fleshes out the consequences of this paradox in MacIntyre’s framework by proposing a three-stage model of success and efficiency for various practices. (shrink)

How important is the experience of risk in business endeavors for self-respect and moral development? Tomasi prompts this question with his attempt to reconcile Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness with free-market capitalism, by claiming that economic activity is a way for people to exercise their autonomy, responsibility, and self-authorship, including through voluntary risk-taking. Critics argue that the social environment generated through market institutions is ill-suited for developing a sense of responsibility and autonomy among citizens. We refine the case for (...) economic liberty by looking at the link between risk-taking and attitudes toward democratic citizenship. We highlight the critical role of ethical business practice as a contributor to the stability of liberal-democratic societies. (shrink)

Managers often have discretion in interpreting their ethical requirements, and they should seek democratic guidance in doing so. The undemocratic nature of managerial ethical discretion is shown to be a recurring problem in business ethics. Joseph Heath’s market failures approach (MFA) is introduced as a theory better positioned to deal with this problem than other views. However, due to epistemic uncertainty and conceptual indeterminacy, the MFA is shown to allow a much wider range of managerial discretion than initially appears. The (...) paper explores how this range can be narrowed down with democratic input, comparing models based on formal state institutions and on the informal public sphere. A case study from the pharmaceutical industry illustrates the merits of the informal public sphere approach. (shrink)

Drawing on virtue ethics and stakeholder theory, the article investigates the unfolding of business ethics in the wine industry, with a focus on family businesses. Attention is specifically paid to the interplay of internal (i.e., employees-centeredness and organizational inclusiveness) and external (i.e., people-centeredness and territorial development) ethical orientations. A unique sample of 164 Italian wine businesses was built to get evidence of how the nexus of internal and external ethical orientations is handled, emphasizing the distinctive traits of family businesses. We (...) found that employee-centeredness nurtured organizational inclusiveness and fostered people-centeredness. Interestingly, the family businesses’ concern for territorial development curbed the positive implications of employee-centeredness on people-centeredness. The study results extend scholarly knowledge, shedding light on a ‘grey’ side of family businesses’ ethics. (shrink)

This paper introduces the concept of business-related conspiracy theories. Drawing on Aristotelian virtue ethics and undertaking a narratological and ethical analysis of 28 BrCTs found online, I emphasize that BrCTs are narratives with structures rooted in other latent macro- and meta-narratives, including centuries-old myths. In particular, I reconstruct the fictional world of BrCTs – one in which CSR and social contracts have failed – before identifying eight different types of actors as which people can morally situate themselves in their relationships (...) with business. Finally, I elaborate on the actors’ performances and their use of external and legitimate forces to end the story. The paper concludes with a discussion of potential future research to help combat BrCTs, as well as a call for the critical study of political CSR. (shrink)

We evaluate the effectiveness of impact investing from the perspective of the market failures approach (MFA) to business ethics. Under the MFA, businesses are ethically obligated to contribute to market efficiency by mitigating market failures. The MFA ethics literature emphasizes a negative externality interpretation of market failures, with ethical practice as self-regulation. We argue that the MFA also obligates businesses, and investors, to produce positive externalities, a form of private provision of public goods. We develop a graphical MFA ethical framework (...) addressed to impact investing. The framework is based on impact projects’ dual financial and social returns. Dual returns trade-offs originate in market failures and increase with positive externalities. In practice, a key determinant of market failure and the size of returns trade-offs is the availability of intermediate public goods. This varies systematically across sectors and country-markets. We identify the market circumstances under which impact investing is feasible. We show how provision of positive externalities mitigates market failures. We show that the effectiveness of impact investing depends on the interaction of the determinants of feasibility and of the size of project trade-offs. We show how government supporting intervention, through blended finance vehicles, can improve impact investing effectiveness. Finally, we show that evidence of actual patterns of impact investing across sectors and countries supports our analysis. (shrink)

Business corporations hold an enormous amount of power towards employees, contractors, customers, and the general public and they do so largely without effective democratic control. Within the workplace democracy debate scholars have argued that this current state is unjustifiable and that corporations must be democratized. But what exactly does that mean? In my thesis, I explore three questions regarding the details of democratization. First, who should be enfranchised in a democratic business corporation? Second, what are plausible pathways towards democratic corporations? (...) And, third, how can we ensure that democratized business corporations last? I discuss these questions in the spirit of methodological realism, paying special attention to considerations of feasibility, ability, and motivation as well as empirical data and examples. I argue that democratization should involve a number of constituencies beyond workers, especially customers and local populations, because an all-affected principle of participation best captures what is distinctive about corporate power. I then offer a number of institutional innovations for the process of democratization. Building on the example of the Berlin expropriation campaign, I argue that expropriation policies can help circumvent the power of those opposed to democratization and provide a helpful path towards democratization. I suggest that a transitional democratic dictatorship modelled after Marx's dictatorship of the proletariat could solve problems of cooperation and sabotage for newly democratized corporations. And, finally, I propose a class-specific corporate tribunate and a right to strike for the democratic corporation to provide institutional counterpower in order to prevent elite capture and the degeneration of democratic corporations. (shrink)

In our time, innovation is considered an important way to address societal problems. That we expect so much from innovation to solve the challenges of our time, makes the question what could count as ‘responsible innovation’ more pressing. And that is what this thesis is about. The aim of this thesis is to offer philosophical reflections on responsible innovation in the business context. Since that is still a quite broad topic, the main title suggests its further focus: deliberation and food. (...) The first focus originates from the idea in the academic literature on responsible innovation, that innovators should not just assess by themselves what ‘responsible’ is, but should invite others to think along with them about the social and ethical aspects of innovation. Chapter 2 to 4 zoom in on this aspect of responsible innovation. The second focus has to do with the specific context of application, namely food and the food industry. Chapter 4 and 5 relate the topic of responsible innovation to this context. The question I raise in chapter 2 is whether the ideal of inclusive deliberation is suitable for innovation processes in businesses. I argue that this is not so easy, and provide different reasons why companies might not be willing to involve societal stakeholders into their innovation processes. First, the requirement of deliberation can be tension with the ability of companies to exploit their innovations commercially within a competitive market. Second, deliberation requires a certain degree of transparency about the innovation strategy of a company. Companies might not be willing to provide this transparency, because they fear knowledge leakage to other companies. Third, companies are controlled most often by people with a financial stake. Therefore, we can expect that financial considerations are decisive in the investment decisions of companies. This could conflict with the ideal of responsible innovation to ‘democratize’ innovation processes. Hence, I suggest that scholars should modify the ideal of deliberation in order to make it suitable to the business context, or they should suggest changes in the governance and regulation of markets so as to make deliberation more workable. Chapter 3 discusses the place of conflict and self-interest in deliberation. It starts with a discussion of the literature on stakeholder dialogue. In this literature, the ideal dialogue is presumed to aim at consensus. This also implies that participants avoid conflict and set self-interested considerations aside. I argue that this ideal of dialogue is problematic, especially for a dialogue between companies and NGOs. I show that companies can never completely set aside their profit-orientation, and hence that this ‘self-interest’ always influences their input in a dialogue. Furthermore, conflict and criticism can be necessary to make clear that societal problems require more attention, whether from the general public or from companies. Since the market is an imperfect institution, we need critical citizens and stakeholders such as NGOs to assess the behavior of companies. A certain degree of conflict between companies and NGOs may therefore be more desirable than a focus on consensus. For these reasons, I develop an alternative approach to dialogue in which conflict and self-interest have a legitimate place, and can even play a productive role. In chapter 4, a case-study is conducted to better understand how participants in a dialogue deal with conflicts. In this case-study, I analyzed different dialogues organized by the foundation ‘Ik Kies Bewust’, which issued a front-of-pack health label. In my analysis, I investigate the conflict between, on the one hand, the value of public health and healthy food, and, on the other hand, the commercial interests of companies. In the responses of companies to this conflict, three patterns became visible. First, companies frame their critics as not constructive, because, in their view, they only criticize but do not help to improve the label. Second, they stressed that they are really and genuinely motivated to make food healthier or to make a healthy food choice easier. Thereby, they seemingly tried to counter the image that they are just motivated to make profit. Third, they called on the government to take more control over the label, because this would make the label more reliable and more broadly adopted. I qualify these responses as defensive, which means that the conflict between commercial considerations and public interests is suppressed or ignored. An active response would require to recognize and confront the conflicts and dilemmas that companies face. The case-study makes clear how difficult it can be to engage in dialogue with critical stakeholders. In chapter 5, I reflect on how food innovation can be responsible. In trying to answer this question, I take a certain detour, by starting a discussion about the place of food in a life well-lived. For this purpose, I use the philosophy of Albert Borgmann. On the basis of my analysis of his philosophy, I argue that there are good reasons for engaging with food in active way, for example by growing your own vegetables and home-cooking, instead of consuming food merely passively. I also draw some implications for food innovation. In my view, people responsible for food innovation should critically assess whether new products or services enhance engagement or disengagement. Is it desirable, for example, to develop even more and better pre-packaged meals, or should we stimulate consumers to cook by themselves? I argue that it would be problematic if our overall pattern of dealing with food is characterized by disengagement and convenience, and hence that food innovation should not only go in this direction. (shrink)