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Phenomenal awareness and consciousness from a neurobiological perspective

In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 121--137 (2000)

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The operative mind: A functional, computational and modeling approach to machine consciousness.Carlos Hernández, Ignacio López & Ricardo Sanz - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):83-98.details The functional capabilities that consciousness seems to provide to biological systems can supply valuable principles in the design of more autonomous and robust technical systems. These functional concepts keep a notable similarity to those underlying the notion of operating system in software engineering, which allows us to specialize the computer metaphor for the mind into that of the operating system metaphor for consciousness. In this article, departing from these ideas and a model-based theoretical framework for cognition, we present an architectural (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
What is a brain state?Richard Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):729-742.details Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making some other argument with the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations
Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers' Hard Problem.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2012 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. Springer. pp. 259--269.details According to David Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness consists of explaining how and why qualitative experience arises from physical states. Moreover, Chalmers argues that materialist and reductive explanations of mentality are incapable of addressing the hard problem. In this chapter, I suggest that Chalmers’ hard problem can be usefully distinguished into a ‘how question’ and ‘why question,’ and I argue that evolutionary biology has the resources to address the question of why qualitative experience arises from brain states. From this (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Artificial Consciousness: Misconception(s) of a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy.Dresp-Langley Birgitta - 2023 - Queios.details The rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has produced prophets and prophecies announcing that the age of artificial consciousness is near. Not only does the mere idea that any machine could ever possess the full potential of human consciousness suggest that AI could replace the role of God in the future, it also puts into question the fundamental human right to freedom and dignity. This position paper takes the stand that, in the light of all we currently know about brain evolution (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
First-person experiments.Carl Ginsburg - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):22-42.details The question asked in this paper is: How can we investigate our phenomenal experience in ways that are accurate, in principle repeatable, and produce experiences that help clarify what we understand about the processes of sensing, perceiving, moving, and being in the world? This sounds like an impossible task, given that introspection has so often in scientific circles been considered to be unreliable, and that first-person accounts are often coloured by mistaken ideas about what and how we are experiencing. The (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations

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