Este documento ofrece una propuesta desde la perspectiva de la bioética para la elaboración de un protocolo de triaje en el contexto de la pandemia de COVID-19. Dicha propuesta incluye recomendaciones sobre las normas procedimentales y normas sustantivas que deben regir la asignación y reasignación de recursos terapéuticos en condiciones de escasez extrema.

In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a structural (...) explanation that overcomes their unattractiveness. The main idea is that discursive injustice is not the result of biased interlocutors, but of problematic discursive norms. (shrink)

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. (shrink)

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. (...) Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together—synergistically—to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing. (shrink)

This article discusses the category of foreigner in the context of academia. In the first part I explore this category and its philosophical significance. A quick look at the literature reveals that this category needs more attention in analyses of dimensions of privilege and disadvantage. Foreignness has peculiarities that demarcate it from other categories of identity, and it intersects with them in complicated ways. Devoting more attention to it would enable addressing issues affecting foreigners in academia that go commonly unnoticed. (...) In the second part of the article I argue that current efforts to make academia a more inclusive environment should address the disadvantages that many foreign academics face. I focus on two senses of foreigner: working and living in a country that is not your country of origin, and being a nonnative speaker of the language in which you work. (shrink)

In this note, my aim is to point out a phenomenon that has not received much attention; a phenomenon that, in my opinion, should not be overlooked in the professional practice of philosophy, especially within feminist efforts for social justice. I am referring to the way in which being a non-native speaker of English interacts with the practice of philosophy.1 There is evidence that non-native speakers are often perceived in prejudiced ways. Such prejudiced perception causes harm and, more importantly, constitutes (...) wrongdoing. As in other cases of prejudiced perception and biased behavior, it would be pretentious and misguided to expect philosophers and the philosophy profession to be free from this vice. There are good reasons to think that this prejudiced perception is bad not only for the persons who are perceived in such a way, but also for the profession, for it might make us miss important things that could improve philosophy in general. I claim we should be more sensitive to this phenomenon, both out of concern for justice, and for the sake of doing better philosophy. (shrink)

In a recent remarkable article, Froese (2023) presents his Irruption Theory to explain how motivations can make a behavioral difference in motivated activity. In this opinion article, we review the main tenets of Froese’s theory, and highlight its difficulty in overcoming the randomness challenge it supposedly solves, that is, the issue of how adaptive behavior can arise in the face of material underdetermination. To advance our understanding of motivated behavior in line with Froese’s approach, we recommend that future work should (...) endorse a multilevel pluralistic approach to causation and explanation in which motivations could genuinely play an irreducible role. Additionally, in line with the life-mind continuity thesis, we suggest that the best place to look for the interplay between motivations and nonmotivational physical, biological, and dynamical factors, may be at the level of the continuous feeling of being an embodied, living organism. (shrink)

Attempts to solve the issue of divine action in nature have resulted in many innovative proposals seeking to explain how God can act within nature without disrupting the created order but introducing novelty in the history of the universe. My goal is to show how Aquinas' doctrine of providence, mainly as expressed in his De Potentia Dei, fulfils the criteria for an account of divine action: that God's action is providential in the sense that God is involved in the individual (...) and particular here and now. -/- . (shrink)

The deep influence of affectivity on learning is now widely acknowledged (Keefer et al., 2018; Sánchez-Álvarez et al., 2021). For instance, it has been shown that affect influences key learning-relevant processes, such as motivation, perception, behavior, and critical thinking (Izard, 2002; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Evidence also shows that emotion and mood strongly influence attention, which in turn drives learning and memory (Elbertson et al., 2010; Elias et al., 1997). Intersubjective phenomena, such as the degree of affection and respect between (...) child and teacher, also affect the child’s learning processes, academic outcomes, and brain development (Kusché & Greenberg, 2006; Ryan & Patrick, 2001). However, the relevant literature is not paying attention to increasing evidence showing that affective phenomena are rooted in interoceptive and homeostatic self- and co-regulatory processes within and between people’s living bodies (Barrett, 2017; Carvalho & Damasio, 2021; Craig, 2015, 2018; Fotopoulou et al., 2022; Fotopoulou & Tsakiris, 2017; Seth & Friston, 2016). In this theoretical chapter, we explore this connection and its importance for learning. We argue that affective experience plays a fundamental role in learning, and that affective experience is rooted in the homeostatic self-/co-regulation of living bodies. Therefore, the homeostatic self-/co-regulation of living bodies plays a fundamental role in learning. In other words, there is an intra- and interpersonal somatic dimension of learning that demands explicit consideration in educational contexts. In this way, we aim to contribute to an understanding of learning and education that moves away from an individualistic, brain-centered information-processing conception toward one centered on sentient, interdependent living bodies. (shrink)

In consciousness studies there is a growing tendency to consider experience as (i) fundamentally affective and (ii) deeply interlinked with interoceptive and homeostatic bodily processes. However, this view still needs further development to be part of any rigorous theory of consciousness. To advance in this direction, we ask: (1) is there any affective type that is always present in consciousness?, (2) is it related to interoception and homeostasis?, and (3) what are its properties? Here we analyse and compare Jim Russell's (...) core affect and Thomas Fuchs' concept of vitality, and propose a more encompassing notion that subsumes both: continuous organismic sentience. It provides affirmative answers to questions 1 and 2, and, regarding question 3, a preliminary list of thirteen properties divided into ontological, phenomenological, and functional categories. This is the first of a series of studies that will systematically address different notions of a fundamental, homeostatically-rooted affective type, to achieve a rigorous, unified concept for consciousness science. (shrink)

I welcome with great enthusiasm Meling and Scheidegger’s (2023; henceforth “M&S”) timely contribution to advance an enactive approach to psychedelic therapy, especially to the complex causality involved. Their two main research questions concerned:(i) the causal interaction between the psychedelic molecule and brain activity; and (ii) the causal interaction between brain activity and the psychedelic experience. While I largely agree with and celebrate much of what is proposed by M&S, especially their employment of key enactive concepts to advance our understanding of (...) the first research question, in the following, I will present some worries regarding their answers to the second. Although I agree that there is probably a two-way reciprocal relationship between neural activity and experience, I have several points of contention regarding M&S’s proposal. My hope is to stimulate discussion on M&S’s important contribution, and to help advance a much-needed enactive science of psychedelics. (shrink)

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory’s most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just (...) “operational”. However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT’s idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT’s idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT’s realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one’s own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues. (shrink)

En este trabajo, nos proponemos redefinir las posturas que toman parte en el debate entre realismo y antirrealismo científicos, dejando de concebirlas únicamente como doctrinas o teorías que describen cómo es el mundo. En cambio, acorde al camino iniciado por van Fraassen en The empirical stance, optamos por definirlas como stances: políticas, estrategias o perspectivas a partir de las cuales construimos creencias fácticas. Así, en primera instancia nos dedicamos a entender qué es una stance y cómo caracterizar esta noción. En (...) segundo lugar, exploramos metodologías y enfoques para tratar el realismo y el antirrealismo como stances, y, en esta clave, definirlos adecuadamente. Por último, examinamos el impacto de esta propuesta en la explicación de los acuerdos y desacuerdos en el debate, evaluando los grados de afinidad o distancia en las perspectivas en juego. (shrink)

Contemporary debates on divine action tend to focus on finding a space in nature where there would be no natural causes, where nature offers indeterminacy, openness, and potentiality, to place God’s action. These places are found through the natural sciences, in particular quantum mechanics. God’s action is then located in those ontological ”causal-gaps’ offered by certain interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this view, God would determine what is left underdetermined in nature without disrupting the laws of nature. These contemporary proposals (...) evidence at least two unexamined assumptions, which frame the discussion in such a way that they portray God as acting as a secondary cause or a ”cause among causes’. God is somewhat required to act within these ”gaps’, binding God to the laws of nature, and placing God’s action at the level of secondary causes. I suggest that understanding God’s action, following Thomas Aquinas, in terms of primary and secondary causation could help dissolve this difficulty. Aquinas moves away from this objection by suggesting to speak of an analogical notion of cause, allowing for an analogical understanding of God’s causality in nature. With a radically different understanding of the interplay between secondary causes and God, Aquinas manages to avoid conceiving God as a cause among causes, keeping the distinctive transcendent character of God’s causality safe from objections. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to study the extent in which the semantics for different logical systems can be represented game theoretically. I will begin by considering different definitions of what it means to gamify a semantics, and show completeness and limitative results. In particular, I will argue that under a proper definition of gamification, all finitely algebraizable logics can be gamified, as well as some infinitely algebraizable ones (like Łukasiewicz) and some non-algebraizable (like intuitionistic and van Fraassen supervaluation (...) logic). (shrink)

The general aim of this article is to give a critical interpretation of post-trial obligations towards individual research participants in the Declaration of Helsinki 2013. Transitioning research participants to the appropriate health care when a research study ends is a global problem. The publication of a new version of the Declaration of Helsinki is a great opportunity to discuss it. In my view, the Declaration of Helsinki 2013 identifies at least two clearly different types of post-trial obligations, specifically, access to (...) care after research and access to information after research. The agents entitled to receive post-trial access are the individual participants in research studies. The Declaration identifies the sponsors, researchers and host country governments as the main agents responsible for complying with the post-trial obligations mentioned above. To justify this interpretation of post-trial obligations, I first introduce a classification of post-trial obligations and illustrate its application with examples from post-trial ethics literature. I then make a brief reconstruction of the formulations of post-trial obligations of the Declaration of Helsinki from 2000 to 2008 to correlate the changes with some of the most salient ethical arguments. Finally I advance a critical interpretation of the latest formulation of post-trial obligations. I defend the view that paragraph 34 of ‘Post-trial provisions’ is an improved formulation by comparison with earlier versions, especially for identifying responsible agents and abandoning ambiguous ‘fair benefit’ language. However, I criticize the disappearance of ‘access to other appropriate care’ present in the Declaration since 2004 and the narrow scope given to obligations of access to information after research. (shrink)

Dos clases de desacuerdo han resultado de gran interés para la epistemología social durante las últimas décadas: los desacuerdos profundos, que tienen lugar cuando la disputa entre las partes es sistemática y particularmente difícil de resolver, y los desacuerdos entre pares epistémicos, ocasionados por el enfrentamiento entre agentes que tienen la misma evidencia y virtudes cognitivas respecto del tema en discusión. El propósito de este artículo es trabajar en la intersección de ellos, evaluando las consecuencias de que un desacuerdo entre (...) pares sea profundo. En particular, argumento que, cuando un desacuerdo llega a niveles de profundidad muy altos, es imposible que las partes se reconozcan entre sí como pares, dado que no pueden asumir que son igualmente racionales. (shrink)

Altruism and solidarity are concepts that are closely related to organ donation for transplantation. On the one hand, they are typically used for encouraging people to donate. On the other hand, they also underpin the regulations in force in each country to different extents. They are often used indistinctly and equivocally, despite the different ethical implications of each concept. This paper aims to clarify to what extent we can speak of altruism and solidarity in the predominant models of organ donation. (...) It also raises the ethical question of whether these categories are adequate as a basis for such models, bearing in mind that organs are a scarce resource and that a shortage of them may mean that fewer lives are saved or improved. (shrink)

I’m at the playground with my baby, and a smiling adult inquires, “Is it a boy or a girl?” Scientific studies show that if I say X, they will see my baby as doing A, being A, feeling A—versus if I say Y.1 They’ll likely make different assumptions about whether my baby is able to climb up the playground structures and sit without support, and they’ll encourage my baby to engage in different activities.2 And of course, they’ll respond to them (...) differently depending on whether they think the baby is a boy or a girl. What do I do if I don’t want that to happen? One way to respond to the question is not to reveal the gender, or rather, to reject the assumption that my baby already has a gender, which is arguably a weird move, breaking out of a smoothly functioning, well-oiled social exchange. Here I want to talk about this weird move: How weird it is? What are some of the reasons to make the move anyway, and what are some of the concerns? (shrink)

Metaphysical considerations aside, today’s inheritors of the tradition of natural philosophy are primarily scientists. However, they are oblivious to the human factor involved in science and in seeing how political, religious, and other ideologies contaminate our visions of nature. In general, philosophers observe human (historical, sociological, and psychological) processes within the construction of theories, as well as in the development of scientific activity itself. -/- In our time, feminism—along with accompanying ideas of identity politics under the slogan “diversity, inclusion, equity”—has (...) emerged in science policies. The vast majority of scientists (including myself) are convinced that discrimination is reprehensible. We also believe that all individuals of any sex, race, ethnic group, or ideology should be valued in academia solely based on his or her merits and potential through equality programs. However, as I will show in this article, political indoctrination has inadmissibly undertaken the struggle for equality in academic institutions in Western countries. I argue here that universities and research institutes should be politically free (neutral) to encourage academic freedom. -/- One negative aspect of equality programs is that worldwide, scientists are harassed for expressing opinions related to the “gender” issue. This situation severely restricts scientists’ freedom of expression, even within the limits of the law. Codes of conduct extending beyond legal boundaries are examples of this issue. Scientists who express their views about “gender” are often harassed, bullied, and socially or academically excluded. Thus, we are witnessing a wave of proselytizing in research institutes and science-associated media. Today, there is widespread biased propaganda of “victimhood”. This propaganda proposes positive discrimination and increasing women’s participation in unnatural ways. It also bends the history of science by overvaluing the creations of forgotten women, offering lectures on indoctrination, organizing congresses on gender and science, and persecuting anyone who sees the subject differently. All of this covered by a multitude of associations that financially benefit from these discourses through succulent subsidies of public money. Apparently, feminism is no longer about fighting against discrimination. Instead, it is about imposing an ideology and giving more power to one group of people. Thus, we must ask whether the end justifies the means. (shrink)

Resumen: En este ensayo discuto la crítica de John Campbell a la tesis de la inescrutabilidad de la referencia de Quine. Primero defiendo que los argumentos de Campbell no dan en el blanco, pues él pasa por alto la conexión que Quine traza entre referencia, cuantificación, y ontología. Luego discuto otra línea de argumentación contra la inescrutabilidad que invoca la concepción relacional de la atención de Campbell. Finalmente, sugiero que esta línea –aunque insuficiente y necesitada de complemento– pone de manifiesto (...) que tras las posturas de ambos autores sobre la referencia hay importantes ideales filosóficos hacia los cuales debe dirigirse la discusión. (shrink)

En este ensayo intento mostrar el estrecho vínculo entre el asunto de la fijación de la extensión de los términos de clase natural y el problema de la proyectabilidad puesto de relieve por Goodman con su nuevo enigma de la inducción. Por un lado argumento que el nuevo enigma de la inducción pone de manifiesto la presencia de un elemento fregeano en la teoría de la referencia directa de Putnam y, por el otro, señalo la necesidad de que una respuesta (...) realista a dicho enigma se articule con una tesis epistemológica de cómo conocemos las presuntas propiedades intrínsecas de los objetos. (shrink)

En este ensayo examino el conflicto aparente entre nuestro conocimiento de ciertas distinciones semánticas de nuestro lenguaje y la tesis de la indeterminación de la traducción de Ouine. Este examen nos permitirá entender la manera como se articula dicha tesis con otros sectores de su filosofía. En particular, argumento que la tesis de la indeterminación de la traducción, estrictamente hablando, cumple· una función legitimadora en el sistema quineano. Con ella Quine, más que obtener una nueva conclusión en el ámbito de (...) la semántica, logra validar sus compromisos previos con el fisicalismo extensionalista y el conductismo lingüístico. (shrink)

En este ensayo propongo una lectura de los contornos de la primera Meditación. Con ella intento resaltar una dimensión importante del pensamiento de Descartes en torno a la virtud de la precisión. Contrasto la preocupación por la verdad en la vida cotidiana y en la indagación cartesiana, exploro la manera en que Descartes enfrenta algunos riesgos epistémicos en el curso de su meditación, señalo algunos aspectos de su concepción de la agencia epistémica y concluyo con una breve disquisición alrededor de (...) la apuesta de Pascal. (shrink)

En este ensayo exploro cierta veta reduccionista del enfoque enactivo de Noë. Primero argumento que su concepción de nuestro encuentro perceptual con las propiedades intrínsecas de los objetos requiere una metafísica relacional revisionista para ser exitosa. Luego argumento que la propuesta de Noë sobre el rol de la percepción para el pensamiento espacial exige una concepción revisionista de nuestros conceptos espaciales cotidianos. Finalmente, sugiero que a la base de estas formas de revisionismo está una comprensión reduccionista de la egocentricidad perceptual (...) que debe abandonarse si queremos una concepción más substantiva de la percepción y su rol explicativo en el pensamiento. (shrink)

Joseph Hannon has expressed a most surprising objection to Aquinas scholar Prof William E. Carroll in his latest paper “Theological Objections to a Metaphysicalist Interpretation of Creation.” The main claim is that Prof. Carroll misunderstands Aquinas' doctrine of creatio ex nihilo by reducing it to a metaphysical notion, rather than considering it in its full theological sense. In this paper I show Hannon's misinterpretation of Carroll's and Thomas Aquinas' thought, particularly by stressing the dependence that the doctrine of providence through (...) secondary causes has on the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is tocompare how Thomas Aquinas expressedhis doctrine of providence through second-ary causes, making use of both Aristotelianand Neo-Platonic principles, in the seventharticle of the third question of his Quaes-tiones Disputatae De Potentia Dei and his Super Librum de Causis Expositio , in whichhe intends to solve the problem of themetaphysical mechanism by which God providentially guides creation. I will rst present his arguments as they appear inthe disputed questions, followed by a pre-sentation of his (...) thought on the matter inhis commentary of the Liber de Causis , andconcluding with my comparative analysisof Aquinas’ solution to the issue of God’sprovidential activity in nature. (shrink)

A lo largo del último siglo, se ha intentado examinar la naturaleza de los estados mentales desde numerosas perspectivas, aunque ignorando con frecuencia que toda teoría de la mente también debe analizar adecuadamente las emociones. El propósito de este trabajo es explicitar los requisitos que debe cumplir una buena teoría acerca de lo emocional, a partir del examen crítico de tres enfoques distintos: el conductismo, el funcionalismo y el enactivismo. Argumentaré que, entre ellos, solo el último constituye una teoría satisfactoria (...) porque explicita el rol precio que cumple la dimensión corporal en nuestra experiencia emocional. (shrink)

I examine John Polkinghorne's account of how God acts in the world, focusing on how his ideas developed with the consideration of the notion of kenosis, and how this development was not a rejection of his previous ideas, but on the contrary a fulfilling of his own personal philosophical and theological insights. Polkinghorne's thought can be distinguished in three different periods:1) divine action as input of active information (1988-2000/2001);2) Polkinghorne's reception of the notion of kenosis (2000-2004);3) Polkinghorne's "thought experiment" approach (...) to his ideas on divine action (2004- ). Finally, I consider the question of internal coherence of this theological development, focusing on the transition from the first to the second period, which I believe to be the most significant. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a distinction between design and teleology, referring mostly to thehistory of these two terms, in order to suggest an alternative strategy for arguments thatintend to demonstrate the existence of the divine. I do not deal with the soundness ofeither design or teleological arguments. I rather emphasise the differences between thesetwo terms, and how these differences involve radically different arguments for the existence of the divine. I argue that the term „design‟ refers to an extrinsic feature (...) that was in history understood to be imposed by God in nature, while one may argue for an internal tendency, what I call „teleology‟. I first offer a historical tour of design arguments and how the basic notion of design was understood in extrinsic terms. I then briefly present three kinds of objections available in history to these arguments: philosophical, scientific, and theological. I finally move to discussing an intrinsicunderstanding of teleology, and how this notion differs from that of extrinsic design. Iend the paper showing how this notion could be useful in interpreting processes innature, in particular the reproductive tendencies in living beings. (shrink)

En este ensayo planteo una dificultad que encuentro en la última propuesta de Quine sobre las oraciones observacionales. Argumento que esta dificultad impide que tales oraciones cumplan el rol que él les asigna en su filosofía y socavan su empirismo ilustrado. Luego exploro tentativamente un resquicio que encuentro en la propia filosofía quineana que eventualmente podría evitar los problemas derivados de dicha dificultad. El precio de seguir el camino apuntado por ese resquicio es, sin embargo, una cierta reinterpretación del espíritu (...) empirista de la filosofía de Quine. (shrink)

In this paper, I present and analyse the theological reasons given by contemporary authors such as Robert J. Russell, Thomas Tracy and John Polkinghorne, as well as thirteenth‑century scholar Thomas Aquinas, to admit that the created universe requires being intrinsically contingent in its causing, in particular referring to their doctrines of providence. Contemporary authors stress the need of having indeterminate events within the natural world to allow for God’s providential action within creation, whereas Aquinas focuses his argument on the idea (...) that a universe which includes contingent causes is a more perfect universe. I compare these two approaches, concluding that Aquinas’ seems to be better suited to account for true indetermination within the natural world, claiming that divine causality is not required to complement natural causality in its own level. (shrink)

En este ensayo planteo una dificultad que encuentro en la última propuesta de Quine sobre las oraciones observacionales. Argumento que esta dificultad impide que tales oraciones cumplan el rol que él les asigna en su filosofía y socavan su empirismo ilustrado. Luego exploro tentativamente un resquicio que encuentro en la propia filosofía quineana que eventualmente podría evitar los problemas derivados de dicha dificultad. El precio de seguir el camino apuntado por ese resquicio es, sin embargo, una cierta reinterpretación del espíritu (...) empirista de la filosofía de Quine. In this paper I set out a problem I find in Quine's last proposal on observation sentences. I argue that this problem prevents those sentences to play the role he ascribes to them in his philosophy and undermines his enlightened empiricism. Then I tentatively explore an option I find in Quine's own philosophy which can eventually avoid the issues raised by that problem. The price to pay in following this option, though, is a certain reinterpretation of the empiricist spirit of Quine's philosophy. Apresenta-se uma dificuldade na última proposta de Quine sobre as orações observacionais. Argumenta-se que essa dificuldade impede que essas orações cumpram o papel que ele concede a elas em sua filosofia e debilitam seu empirismo ilustrado. Explora-se tentativamente um resquício na própria filosofia quineana que eventualmente poderia evitar os problemas derivados dessa dificuldade. O preço de seguir o caminho indicado por esse resquício é, contudo, certa interpretação do espírito empirista da filosofia de Quine. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar la nueva formulación del principio de acceso posinvestigación en la más reciente (2008) revisión de la Declaración de Helsinki. Se identifican los artículos relevantes de la Declaración y se presentan dos interpretaciones posibles del principio de acceso posinvestigación: una interpretación robusta y otra permisiva, inspiradas cada una por modelos de justicia distintos. Luego, se hace una evaluación crítica de dichas interpretaciones y se intenta avanzar argumentos en contra de la interpretación permisiva. [The objective (...) of this study is to critically analyze the new formulation of the principle of post-trial access in the most recent (2008) revision of the Helsinki Declaration. The relevant articles of the declaration are identified and two possible interpretations of the principle of post-trial access are set out; one robust and one permissive, inspired by different models of distributive justice. A critical evaluation of both interpretations is presented and arguments against the permissive one advanced.]. (shrink)

Este artículo considera el problema de justicia en la investigación biomédica en países en desarrollo. En particular se hace foco en la discusión de si el requisito de poner a disposición toda intervención probada efectiva puede ser considerado como una obligación post investigación de los patrocinadores hacia la comunidad anfitriona. Primero, se discuten las concepciones de la Comisión Nacional de Asesoramiento sobre Bioética (NBAC) de los Estados Unidos y de las guías éticas internacionales sobre la obligación post investigación hacia la (...) comunidad. Luego, se examinan las interpretaciones del modelo de disponibilidad razonable y el modelo de beneficios justos sobre la condición de acceso a los beneficios post investigación. Por último, presento y critico el argumento del carácter contraproducente de la obligación post investigación que afirma que la obligación post investigación limita el desarrollo de la investigación y empeora la situación de las poblaciones de los países en desarrollo. [ABSTRACT] This article refers to the problem of justice in biomedical research in developing countries and in particular it focus in the discussion of whether the requirement of making available any effective intervention could be consider a post-trial obligation of the sponsor towards the host community. First, the National Advisory Bioethics Commission’s (NBAC) conception and the international guidelines’ conception of post-trial obligations towards the community are discussed. Second, the interpretation of reasonable availability model and the fair benefits model of the condition of access to post trial benefits are examined. Finally, I present and criticize the moral counterproductive argument which affirms that post trial obligations towards the community prevent new drug research and make population in developing countries worse off. (shrink)

Love enhancement can give us as a say on whom we love and thus ‘free’ us from our brain chemistry, which is mostly out of our control. In that way, we become more autonomous in love and in our life in general, as long as love enhancement is a free, voluntary choice. So goes the argument in favour of this addition to medical interventions of relationships. In this paper, I show that proponents of love enhancement have overlooked, or at least (...) underestimated, the fact that love itself impacts people’s choices. Since this could include the choice for love or anti-love drugs, I call for a re-formulation of the underlying view on autonomy before this medical intervention is made available to the public. (shrink)

¿Qué ocurre con la continuidad del tratamiento de los sujetos de investigación después de que realizan la última visita del ensayo en el que participan? En algunos casos, la falta de continuidad de atención de la salud apropiada podría poner en peligro la salud de estas personas. Por lo tanto, es probable que los sujetos de investigación que al terminar su participación en un ensayo todavía se encuentran enfermos, necesiten continuar con el tratamiento en estudio u otra atención de la (...) salud adecuada por el resto de sus vidas, sean unos pocos meses o muchos años. No obstante, no todas las sociedades cuentan con los recursos e instituciones para resolver el problema de la continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso. La opinión de un sujeto de investigación norteamericano, al que llamaremos Pedro, sin seguro de salud que participó en un ensayo de largo plazo sobre diabetes ejemplifica el problema de la continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso: “de repente [ellos] simplemente cortan la cuerda, y uno está solo por su cuenta, ya sabes. O consigues trescientos o cuatrocientos dólares al mes para seguir con esto o simplemente sigues adelante y mueres”. En este trabajo intentaré dar un panorama de la reciente discusión en torno al problema de la continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso en la ética de la investigación. Por tratamiento beneficioso hago referencia a dos cosas. En primer lugar, el tratamiento beneficioso puede ser (1) el tratamiento en estudio, p. e. el tratamiento o intervención en investigación que estaba recibiendo Pedro para su diabetes en el ejemplo anterior. Una droga o un producto biológico es un tratamiento en estudio para un uso propuesto (indicación) desde el primer ensayo con seres humanos hasta el momento en que es aprobado para su comercialización por las autoridades reguladoras de fármacos. El segundo lugar, el tratamiento beneficioso también puede ser (2) otra atención de la salud apropiada para el sujeto de investigación distinta del tratamiento en estudio, p. e. si existiera un tratamiento alternativo disponible para la enfermedad o condición de Pedro, distinto del tratamiento en estudio, y se justificara hacer la transición a ese otro tratamiento por razones de un mejor perfil de efectividad, seguridad y/o toxicidad. En la sección 1 de este trabajo introduciré una taxonomía de las obligaciones éticas de acceso posinvestigación (1.1.), realizaré un relevamiento histórico del concepto basado en las guías éticas internacionales (1.2) y analizaré el surgimiento del término “continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso hacia los sujetos de investigación” y otros términos análogos como “atención después de la investigación” (1.3). En la sección 2 presentaré los casos ejemplares en la bibliografía: continuidad de tratamiento en investigación en VIH/SIDA (2.1), continuidad de tratamiento en investigación en cáncer (2.2.) y otros casos de continuidad de tratamiento (2.3). (shrink)

Este trabajo es un comentario sobre la primera traducción al español de las guías del Reino Unido “Atención después de la investigación: un marco para los comités de ética de investigación del NHS (borrador versión 8.0)”. El comentario se divide en tres partes. En la primera parte, se busca resumir la información básica necesaria para mejorar la lectura comprensiva de la traducción de las guías. En la segunda parte, se analiza una selección de la normativa argentina que trata sobre atención (...) después de la investigación. En la tercera parte, se presentan las principales limitaciones del borrador de las guías y su traducción. El propósito de este comentario es que los futuros lectores y lectoras puedan hacer un uso crítico y deliberado de las guías, en la evaluación de estudios clínicos o como base para la redacción de guías propias sobre atención después de la investigación. ***This work is a commentary on the first Spanish translation of the UK guidelines “Care after research: a framework for NHS research ethics committees (draft version 8.0)”. The commentary is divided into three parts. The first part seeks to summarize the basic information needed to improve reading comprehension of the translation of the guidelines. The second part analyzes a selection of Argentinean regulations dealing with care after research. The third part presents the main limitations of the guidelines draft and its translation. The purpose of this commentary is that future readers can make a critical and deliberate use of guidelines in the assessment of clinical studies or as a basis for drafting their own guidelines on care after research. (shrink)

El problema de la transición de los participantes desde una investigación hacia la atención de la salud apropiada es un problema global. La publicación de una nueva versión de la Declaración de Helsinki es una excelente oportunidad para repensar este problema. Según mi interpretación, la Declaración de Helsinki 2013 introduce dos tipos diferentes de obligaciones posinvestigación, a saber, (1) obligaciones de acceso a atención de la salud y (2) obligaciones de acceso a información. Los beneficiarios pretendidos de estas obligaciones son (...) los participantes individuales de estudios de investigación. Y la Declaración identifica a los patrocinadores, investigadores y gobiernos de los países anfitriones como los principales agentes responsables de cumplir con las obligaciones posinvestigación. Para justificar esta interpretación de los tipos, agentes y beneficiarios de las obligaciones posinvestigación, presento primero una clasificación tentativa de las obligaciones posinvestigación. Luego hago una breve reconstrucción conceptual de las formulaciones de las obligaciones posinvestigación en las versiones anteriores de la Declaración y reviso las principales críticas. Finalmente presento un análisis crítico de la nueva formulación de las obligaciones posinvestigación basándome en la discusión de las secciones anteriores. [ABSTRACT] The problem of transitioning research participants when the study is concluded to the appropriate health care is a global problem. The publication of a new version of the Declaration of Helsinki and its public discussion is a great opportunity to rethink this problem. According to my interpretation, the Declaration of Helsinki 2013 identifies two different types of post-trial obligations, namely, (1) obligations of access to health care and (2) the obligations of access to information. The intended beneficiaries of these obligations are individual participants of research studies. And the Declaration identifies the sponsors, researchers and host country governments as the main agents responsible for complying with the post-trial obligations mentioned above. To justify this interpretation of the types, agents and beneficiaries of post-trial obligations, I first introduce a tentative classification of post-trial obligations. Then I make a brief conceptual reconstruction of formulations of post-trial obligations in earlier versions of the Declaration and revise the main critiques. Finally I advance a critical analysis of the new formulation of post-trial obligations based on the discussion in the previous sections. (shrink)

En el año 2000 se publica la quinta revisión de la Declaración de Helsinki con el objetivo de responder a nuevos problemas éticos producidos en la última década por las investigaciones biomédicas realizadas en países en desarrollo. Una de las innovaciones más importantes que presenta la Declaración es la formulación del principio ético de acceso post investigación obligatorio para los participantes. En el presente trabajo, comienzo con la exposición del estado del consenso internacional sobre el carácter obligatorio del acceso post (...) investigación, de acuerdo con las guías y documentos de países desarrollados y en desarrollo. Luego, reconstruyo la justificación ética del principio de acceso post investigación y discuto algunos argumentos que se han presentado en su contra. De esta forma, defiendo la idea de que el acceso post investigación a las intervenciones probadas efectivas debe ser obligatorio siempre que los participantes se beneficien de las mismas y no tengan un acceso alternativo a ellas. (shrink)

En este trabajo se comparan dos representaciones en competencia sobre el origen de la bioética para llamar la atención sobre un posible cambio de marco teórico dentro de la disciplina. Por un lado, una representación parroquiana del origen de la bioética, centrada en problemas tecnológicos locales, y fundamentada en tradiciones culturales particulares. Por otro lado, una representación universal y pluralista, que enfrenta problemas de justicia y salud globales y que intenta buscar el fundamento normativo del discurso de la bioética en (...) los derechos humanos. Luego de compararlas, desarrollo algunas razones para mostrar por qué las relaciones entre bioética y derechos humanos están sólidamente justificadas. Por último, planteo dos observaciones críticas que deberían tenerse en cuenta al pensar la relación entre bioética y derechos humanos. (shrink)

Perception of time is susceptible to distortions; among other factors, it has been suggested that the perceived duration of a stimulus is affected by the observer’s expectations. It has been hypothesized that the duration of an oddball stimulus is overestimated because it is unexpected, whereas repeated stimuli have a shorter perceived duration because they are expected. However, recent findings suggest instead that fulfilled expectations about a stimulus elicit an increase in perceived duration, and that the oddball effect occurs because the (...) oddball is a target stimulus, not because it is unexpected. Therefore, it has been suggested that top-down attention is sometimes sufficient to explain this effect, and sometimes only necessary, with an additional contribution from saliency. However, how the expectedness of a target stimulus and its salient features affect its perceived duration is still an open question. In the present study, participants’ expectations about and the saliency of target stimuli were orthogonally manipulated with stimuli presented on a short (Experiment 1) or long (Experiment 2) temporal scale. Four repetitive standard stimuli preceded each target stimulus in a task in which participants judged whether the target was longer or shorter in duration than the standards. Engagement of top-down attention to target stimuli increased their perceived duration to the same extent irrespective of their expectedness. A small but significant additional contribution to this effect from the saliency of target stimuli was dependent on the temporal scale of stimulus presentation. In Experiment 1, saliency only significantly increased perceived duration in the case of expected target stimuli. In contrast, in Experiment 2, saliency exerted a significant effect on the overestimation elicited by unexpected target stimuli, but the contribution of this variable was eliminated in the case of expected target stimuli. These findings point to top-down attention as the primary cognitive mechanism underlying the perceptual extraction and processing of task-relevant information, which may be strongly correlated with perceived duration. Furthermore, the scalar properties of timing were observed, favoring the pacemaker-accumulator model of timing as the underlying timing mechanism. (shrink)

Berkeley’s immaterialist philosophy has been frequently underestimated as a result of the misunderstanding of his ontological proposal, specifically because of the complexity of his concept of idea. The aim of this paper is then to clarify and explain that concept because from it depends the correct understanding of Berkeley’s ontological and immaterialist proposal. To do this, 1) I will show some examples of the misunderstanding that the berkeleian proposal has had, mainly due to his concept of idea; 2) I will (...) track how this notion was being developed in Berkeley’s early notes, known as Philosophical Commentaries; 3) I will analyze and explain the concept of idea from the published work of Berkeley, that is, from the Principles and Dialogues. -/- La filosofía inmaterialista de Berkeley ha sido muchas veces infravalorada por la mala comprensión de su propuesta ontológica, específicamente por la dificultad que presenta su concepto de idea. El propósito de este artículo es, entonces, esclarecer y explicar dicho concepto porque de ello depende entender correctamente la ontología y el inmaterialismo filosófico berkeleyano. Para realizar esto 1) mostraré algunos ejemplos de la mala comprensión que ha tenido la propuesta berkeleyana, debido principalmente a su concepto de idea; 2) rastrearé cómo se fue conformando dicho concepto en las notas de juventud conocidas como Comentarios Filosóficos; 3) analizaré y explicaré el concepto de idea a partir de la obra publicada de los Principios y los Diálogos. (shrink)

This paper critically assesses the model of evaluation of scientific research for democratic societies defended by Philip Kitcher. The “significant truth” approach proposes a viable alternative to two classic images of science: that of the “critics”, who believe that science always serves the interests of the powerful and that of the “faithful”, who argue that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is always valuable and necessary. However, the democratic justification of Kitcher’s proposal is not compatible with the ethical problems generated by (...) the international biomedical research in developing countries. To overcome this problem, I revise the national democratic framing of the significant truth approach in light of the theory of justice of John Rawls. (shrink)

A commentary on “Models of Consent to Return of Incidental Findings in Genomic Research,” by Paul S. Appelbaum, Erik Parens, Cameron R. Waldman, Robert Klitzman, Abby Fyer, Josue Martinez, W. Nicholson Price II, and Wendy K. Chung, in the July‐August 2014 issue.