The commercialization of academic science has come to be understood as economically desirable for institutions, individual researchers, and the public. Not surprisingly, commercial activity, particularly that which results from patenting, appears to be producing changes in the standards used to evaluate scientists’ performance and contributions. In this context, concerns about a gender gap in patenting activity have arisen and some have argued for the need to encourage women to seek more patents. They believe that because academic advancement is mainly dependent (...) on productivity (Stuart and Ding in American Journal of Sociology 112:97–144, 2006; Azoulay et al. in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 63:599–623, 2007), differences in research output have the power to negatively impact women’s careers. Moreover, in the case of patenting activity, they claim that the gender gap also has the potential to negatively affect society. This is so because scientific and technological advancement and innovation play a crucial role in contemporary societies. Thus, women’s more limited involvement in the commercialization of science and technology can also be detrimental to innovation itself. Nevertheless, calls to encourage women to patent on grounds that such activity is likely to play a significant role in the betterment of both women’s careers and society seem to be based on two problematic assumptions: (1) that the methods to determine women’s productivity in patenting activities are an appropriate way to measure their research efforts and the impact of their work, and (2) that patenting, particularly in academia, benefits society. The purpose of this paper is to call into question these two assumptions. (shrink)

The commercialization of academic science has come to be understood as economically desirable for institutions, individual researchers, and the public. Not surprisingly, commercial activity, particularly that which results from patenting, appears to be producing changes in the standards used to evaluate scientists’ performance and contributions. In this context, concerns about a gender gap in patenting activity have arisen and some have argued for the need to encourage women to seek more patents. They believe that because academic advancement is mainly dependent (...) on productivity (Stuart and Ding in American Journal of Sociology 112:97–144, 2006 ; Azoulay et al. in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 63:599–623, 2007 ), differences in research output have the power to negatively impact women’s careers. Moreover, in the case of patenting activity, they claim that the gender gap also has the potential to negatively affect society. This is so because scientific and technological advancement and innovation play a crucial role in contemporary societies. Thus, women’s more limited involvement in the commercialization of science and technology can also be detrimental to innovation itself. Nevertheless, calls to encourage women to patent on grounds that such activity is likely to play a significant role in the betterment of both women’s careers and society seem to be based on two problematic assumptions: (1) that the methods to determine women’s productivity in patenting activities are an appropriate way to measure their research efforts and the impact of their work, and (2) that patenting, particularly in academia, benefits society. The purpose of this paper is to call into question these two assumptions. (shrink)

In this paper, I distinguish three general approaches to public trust in science, which I call the individual approach, the semi-social approach, and the social approach, and critically examine their proposed solutions to what I call the problem of harmful distrust. I argue that, despite their differences, the individual and the semi-social approaches see the solution to the problem of harmful distrust as consisting primarily in trying to persuade individual citizens to trust science and that both approaches face two general (...) problems, which I call the problem of overidealizing science and the problem of overburdening citizens. I then argue that in order to avoid these problems we need to embrace a (thoroughly) social approach to public trust in science, which emphasizes the social dimensions of the reception, transmission, and uptake of scientific knowledge in society and the ways in which social forces influence both positively and negatively the trustworthiness of science. (shrink)

Background: Biomedical research is influenced by many factors, including the involvement of stakeholder groups invested in research outcomes. Stakeholder involvement in research efforts raises questions of justice as stakeholders’ specific interests and motivations play a role in directing research resources that ultimately produce knowledge, shaping how different conditions (and affected individuals) are understood and treated by society. This issue is highly relevant to child psychiatry research where diagnostic criteria and treatment strategies are often controversial. Biological similarities and stakeholder differences between (...) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) provide an opportunity to explore this issue by comparing research foci and stakeholder involvement in these conditions. Methods: A subset of ADHD and ASD research articles published between 1970 and 2010 were randomly selected from the PubMed database and coded for research focus, funding source(s), and author-reported conflicts of interest (COIs). Chi-squared analyses were performed to identify differences between and within ADHD and ASD research across time. Results: The proportion of ADHD research dedicated to basic, description, and treatment research was roughly similar and remained stable over time, while ASD research showed a significant increase in basic research over the past decade. Government was the primary research funder for both conditions, but for-profit funders were a notable presence in ADHD research, while joint funding efforts between nonprofit and government funders were a notable presence in ASD research. Lastly, COIs were noted more frequently in ADHD than in ASD research. Conclusions: Our study shows significant differences in research foci and funding sources between the conditions, and identifies the specific involvement of for-profit and nonprofit groups in ADHD and ASD, respectively. Our findings highlight the relationship between stakeholders outside the research community and research trajectories and suggest that examinations of these relationships must be included in broader considerations of biomedical research ethics. (shrink)

Although the impact of so-called “sponsorship bias” has been the subject of increased attention in the philosophy of science, what exactly constitutes its epistemic wrongness is still debated. In this paper, I will argue that neither evidential accounts nor social–epistemological accounts can fully account for the epistemic wrongness of sponsorship bias, but there are good reasons to prefer social–epistemological to evidential accounts. I will defend this claim by examining how both accounts deal with a paradigm case from medical epistemology, recently (...) discussed in a paper by Bennett Holman. I will argue that evidential accounts cannot adequately capture cases of sponsorship bias that involve the manufacturing of certainty because of their neutrality with respect to the role of non-epistemic values in scientific practice. If my argument holds, it further highlights the importance of integrating social and ethical concerns into epistemological analysis, especially in applied contexts. One can only properly grasp sponsorship bias as an epistemological problem if one resists the methodological tendency to analyze social, ethical, and epistemological issues in isolation from each other. (shrink)

Many scholars assume that industry meddles in scientific research in order to defend their products. But this article shows that industry meddling in science can have a variety of consequences. American food manufacturers long denied that trans fats were associated with disease. Academic scientists, government scientists, and activists in fact endorsed trans fats as a healthier alternative to saturated fats. But in 1990, a high-profile study showed that trans fats increased risk factors for heart disease more than saturated fats did. (...) Industry funded a U.S. Department of Agriculture study that they hoped would exonerate trans fats. But the industry-funded U.S. Department of Agriculture study also indicated that trans fats increased risk factors for heart disease more than saturated fats. Industry quickly began developing trans fat alternatives. This confirms that corporations get involved in science in order to defend their products. But involvement in science can be the very means by which corporations persuade themselves to change their products. (shrink)

Feyerabend is infamous for his defense of pluralism, which he extends to every topic he discusses. Disagreement, a by-product of this pluralism, becomes a sign of flourishing critical communities. In Feyerabend’s political works, he extends this pluralism from science to democratic societies and incorporates his earlier work on scientific methodology into a procedure for designing just policy. However, a description and analysis of Feyerabend’s conception of disagreement is lacking. In this paper, I reconstruct and assess Feyerabend’s conception of disagreement, with (...) a particular emphasis on the role of experts, and its role in the formation of science policy. I go on to assess this argument in light of recent literature on manufactured disagreement on politically contentious science policy. I conclude by suggesting some prospects and problems for de-idealizing Feyerabend’s position on disagreement to see whether it may be plausibly implemented. (shrink)

The growing commercialization of scientific research has raised important concerns about industry bias. According to some evidence, so-called industry bias can affect the integrity of the science as well as the direction of the research agenda. I argue that conceptualizing industry’s influence in scientific research in terms of bias is unhelpful. Insofar as industry sponsorship negatively affects the integrity of the research, it does so through biasing mechanisms that can affect any research independently of the source of funding. Talk about (...) industry bias thus offers no insight into the particular epistemic shortcomings at stake. If the concern is with the negative effects that industry funding can have on the research agenda, conceptualizing this influence as bias obscures the ways in which such impact is problematic and limits our ability to offer solutions that can successfully address the concerns raised by the growing role of private funding in science. (shrink)

Financial relationships in academic research can create institutional conflicts of interest because the financial interests of the institution or institutional officials may inappropriately influence decision-making. Strategies for dealing with institutional COIs include establishing institutional COI committees that involve the board of trustees in conflict review and management, developing policies that shield institutional decisions from inappropriate influences, and establishing private foundations that are independent of the institution to own stock and intellectual property and to provide capital to start-up companies.

Pharmaceutical companies fund the bulk of clinical research that is carried out on medications. Poor outcomes from these studies can have negative effects on sales of medicines. Previous research has shown that company funded research is much more likely to yield positive outcomes than research with any other sponsorship. The aim of this article is to investigate the possible ways in which bias can be introduced into research outcomes by drawing on concrete examples from the published literature. Poorer methodology in (...) industry-funded research is not likely to account for the biases seen. Biases are introduced through a variety of measures including the choice of comparator agents, multiple publication of positive trials and non-publication of negative trials, reinterpreting data submitted to regulatory agencies, discordance between results and conclusions, conflict-of-interest leading to more positive conclusions, ghostwriting and the use of seeding trials. Thus far, efforts to contain bias have largely focused on more stringent rules regarding conflict-of-interest (COI) and clinical trial registries. There is no evidence that any measures that have been taken so far have stopped the biasing of clinical research and it’s not clear that they have even slowed down the process. Economic theory predicts that firms will try to bias the evidence base wherever its benefits exceed its costs. The examples given here confirm what theory predicts. What will be needed to curb and ultimately stop the bias that we have seen is a paradigm change in the way that we treat the relationship between pharmaceutical companies and the conduct and reporting of clinical trials. (shrink)

Although there is increased recognition of the inevitable--and perhaps sometimes beneficial-- role of values in scientific inquiry, there are also growing concerns about the potential for commercial values to lead to bias. This is particularly evident in biomedical research. There is a concern that conflicts of interest created by commercialization may lead to biased reasoning or methodological choices in testing drugs and medical interventions. In addition, such interests may lead research in directions that are unresponsive to pressing social needs, when (...) it is profitable to do so. Feminist philosophy of science seems particularly well situated to provide resources to help address such concerns because this literature has both 1) theorized about how to minimize biases in science, e.g., sexist or androcentric biases, and 2) generated accounts of objectivity that do not require individual scientists to be value-neutral or disinterested. Two such accounts are assessed in relation to concerns about commercial bias: those offered by feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism. We argue that standpoint feminism is more promising because it has resources to address, not just the epistemological, but also the inescapably ethical dimensions of commercial bias. (shrink)

Hierarchies of evidence are an important and influential tool for appraising evidence in medicine. In recent years, hierarchies have been formally adopted by organizations including the Cochrane Collaboration [1], NICE [2,3], the WHO [4], the US Preventive Services Task Force [5], and the Australian NHMRC [6,7]. The development of such hierarchies has been regarded as a central part of Evidence-Based Medicine, a movement within healthcare which prioritises the use of epidemiological evidence such as that provided by Randomised Controlled Trials. Philosophical (...) work on the methodology of medicine has so far mostly focused on claims about the superiority of RCTs, and hence has largely neglected the questions of what hierarchies are, what assumptions they require, and how they affect clinical practice. This thesis shows that there is great variation in the hierarchies defended and in the interpretations they are, and can be, given. The interpretative assumptions made in using hierarchies are crucial to the content and defensibility of the underlying philosophical commitments concerning evidence and medical practice. Once this variation is been identified, it becomes clear that the little philosophical work that has been done so far affects only some hierarchies, under some interpretations. Modest interpretations offered by La Caze [11], conditional hierarchies like GRADE [12-14], and heuristic approaches such as that defended by Howick et al. [15,16] all survive previous philosophical criticism. This thesis extends previous criticisms by arguing that modest interpretations are so weak as to be unhelpful for clinical practice; that GRADE and similar conditional models omit clinically relevant information, such as information about variation in treatments’ effects and the causes of different responses to therapy; and that heuristic approaches lack the necessary empirical support. The conclusion is that hierarchies in general embed untenable philosophical assumptions: principally that information about average treatment effects backed by high-quality evidence can justify strong recommendations, and that the impact of evidence from individual studies can and should be appraised in isolation. Hierarchies are a poor basis for the application of evidence in clinical practice. The Evidence-Based Medicine movement should move beyond them and explore alternative tools for appraising the overall evidence for therapeutic claims. (shrink)

In the twenty-first century, a widening array of unassuming fruits, vegetables, seeds and grains have been crowned “superfoods.” While many are exotic imports marketed to Western consumers through neocolonial narratives, others are familiar domestically-grown supermarket staples spectacularly rebranded. Why has “superfood” status become so central to the American produce industry? What sort of subjectivities does a superfood cultivate among consumers? This paper charts the ascent of the almond to superfood status as the latest in a series of spatial fixes alleviating (...) the pains of chronic overproduction. The spatial-fix is a material-semiotic process with important psychosocial dimensions often downplayed in the historical materialist tradition. Drawing on historical archives, advertising materials, interviews with current and recently retired almond industry marketing professionals, and observation at the annual industry conference from 2015 to 2018, I show that as almond production surges the industry must constantly work to change the way consumers see almonds and the way they see themselves. While consumers resist and reinterpret the shifts in food meanings fashioned to compensate for overproduction, a century of effective material-semiotic fixes attests to the industry’s influence on foodways. The case of almonds is used here to theorize the broader superfood trend and its imagined “super” subjects as produced through the political economy of industrial agriculture. Understanding the political economic underpinnings of superfoods reveals not only the historical foundation of this contested contemporary food phenomenon, but also sheds light on the metamorphoses of food meanings fundamental to agrarian capitalism. (shrink)

A growing body of literature has identified potential problems that can compromise the quality, fairness, and integrity of journal peer review, including inadequate review, inconsistent reviewer reports, reviewer biases, and ethical transgressions by reviewers. We examine the evidence concerning these problems and discuss proposed reforms, including double-blind and open review. Regardless of the outcome of additional research or attempts at reforming the system, it is clear that editors are the linchpin of peer review, since they make decisions that have a (...) significant impact on the process and its outcome. We consider some of the steps editors should take to promote quality, fairness and integrity in different stages of the peer review process and make some recommendations for editorial conduct and decision-making. (shrink)

More than 40 primary studies, and three recent systematic reviews and meta-analyses, have shown a clear association between pharmaceutical industry funding of clinical trials and pro-industry results. Industry sponsorship biases published scientific research in favour of the sponsors, a result of the strong interest commercial sponsors have in obtaining favourable results.Three proposed remedies to this problem are widely agreed upon among those concerned with the level of sponsorship bias: financial disclosure, reporting standards and trial registries. This paper argues that all (...) of these remedies either fail to address the mechanisms by which pharmaceutical companies’ sponsorship leads to biased results—design bias, multiple trials with predictable outcomes, fraud, rhetorical effects and publication bias—or else only inadequately address those mechanisms. As a result, the policies normally proposed for dealing with sponsorship bias are unable to eliminate it. Only completely separating public clinical research from pharmaceutical industry funding can eliminate sponsorship bias. (shrink)

Disclosure has become the preferred way of addressing the threat to researcher objectivity arising from financial conflicts of interest. This article argues that the effectiveness of disclosure at protecting science from the corrupting effects of FCOIs—particularly the kind of disclosure mandated by US federal granting agencies—is more limited than is generally acknowledged. Current NIH and NSF regulations require disclosed FCOIs to be reviewed, evaluated, and managed by officials at researchers’ home institutions. However, these reviewers are likely to have institutional and (...) personal interests of their own that may undermine the integrity of their evaluations. This paper presents experimental findings suggesting that such interests affect third-party assessments of FCOIs. Over 200 participants gauged the ethical significance of various hypothetical yet realistic FCOIs in academic research settings. Some of them were led to believe they had a small personal interest in allowing conflicted research... (shrink)