- Improvements in human reasoning and an error in L. J. Cohen's.David H. Krantz - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):340-340.details
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Propensity, evidence, and diagnosis.J. L. Mackie - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):345-346.details
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Lay arbitration of rules of inference.Richard E. Nisbett - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-350.details
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L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.details
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The importance of cognitive illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.details
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Overdetermination in Intuitive Causal Decision Theory.Esteban Céspedes - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico.details
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Competence, performance, and ignorance.Robert W. Weisberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-358.details
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Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding.Frank Arntzenius, Adam Elga & John Hawthorne - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):251 - 283.details
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More trouble for regular probabilitites.Matthew W. Parker - 2012details
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A Probabilistic Analysis of Causation.Luke Glynn - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):343-392.details
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Probabilistic measures of causal strength.Branden Fitelson & Christopher Hitchcock - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. pp. 600--627.details
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(1 other version)Probability.Branden Fitelson, Alan Hajek & Ned Hall - 2005 - In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge.details
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(1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Probabilistic causation.Christopher Hitchcock - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Explanatory generalizations, part I: A counterfactual account.James Woodward & Christopher Hitchcock - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):1–24.details
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A foundation for causal decision theory.Brad Armendt - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):3-19.details
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New foundations for practical reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (2):113-144.details
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(1 other version)Rational choice and action omnipotence.John L. Pollock - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):1-23.details
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Infinitesimal chances and the laws of nature.Adam Elga - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):67 – 76.details
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(1 other version)Waging War on Pascal’s Wager.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.details
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Is there a dutch book argument for probability kinematics?Brad Armendt - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588.details
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Laws, ceteris paribus conditions, and the dynamics of belief.Wolfgang Spohn - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (3):373-394.details
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Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.details
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(1 other version)Impartiality and Causal Decision Theory.Brad Armendt - 1988 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988 (1):326-336.details
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The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.details
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Can probability theory explain why closure is both intuitive and prone to counterexamples?Marcello Di Bello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2145-2168.details
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Should Explanations Omit the Details?Darren Bradley - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):827-853.details
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The future, and what might have been.R. A. Briggs & Graeme A. Forbes - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):505-532.details
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Path-Specific Effects.Naftali Weinberger - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):53-76.details
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Faith and steadfastness in the face of counter-evidence.Lara Buchak - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):113-133.details
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Causalidade.Eduardo Castro - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Ananlítica.details
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Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):371-398.details
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Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism.Alan Hájek - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):211-235.details
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Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.details
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L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.details
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A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part A.Hannes Leitgeb - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):26-84.details
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(1 other version)The logic of Simpson’s paradox.Prasanta S. Bandyoapdhyay, Davin Nelson, Mark Greenwood, Gordon Brittan & Jesse Berwald - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):185 - 208.details
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Instrumental rationality, epistemic rationality, and evidence-gathering.Lara Buchak - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.details
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Full Belief and Probability: Comments on Van Fraassen.William Harper & Alan Hajek - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (1):91 - 100.details
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Chance versus Randomness.Antony Eagle - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning.Niki Pfeifer & Igor Douven - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):199-221.details
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(1 other version)Deterministic Convergence and Strong Regularity.Michael Nielsen - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1461-1491.details
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Reward versus risk in uncertain inference: Theorems and simulations.Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):574-612.details
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Rationality & Second‐Order Preferences.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):196-215.details
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Are Newcomb problems really decisions?James M. Joyce - 2006 - Synthese 156 (3):537-562.details
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Bayesian Confirmation Theory and The Likelihood Principle.Daniel Steel - 2007 - Synthese 156 (1):53-77.details
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A role for normativism.Igor Douven - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):252-253.details
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Deterministic Laws and Epistemic Chances.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 73--85.details
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(1 other version)Two Problems with the Socio-Relational Critique of Distributive Egalitarianism.Christian Seidel - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 525-535.details
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Causation, Chance, and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence.Huw Price - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):483-538.details
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