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  1. Merging of Opinions and Probability Kinematics.Simon M. Huttegger - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):611-648.
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  • Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A handful of well-known arguments (the 'diachronic Dutch book arguments') rely upon theorems establishing that, in certain circumstances, you are immune from sure monetary loss (you are not 'diachronically Dutch bookable') if and only if you adopt the strategy of conditionalizing (or Jeffrey conditionalizing) on whatever evidence you happen to receive. These theorems require non-trivial assumptions about which evidence you might acquire---in the case of conditionalization, the assumption is that, if you might learn that e, then it is not the (...)
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  • The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions.Franz Huber - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):299-329.
    The paper provides an argument for the thesis that an agent’s degrees of disbelief should obey the ranking calculus. This Consistency Argument is based on the Consistency Theorem. The latter says that an agent’s belief set is and will always be consistent and deductively closed iff her degrees of entrenchment satisfy the ranking axioms and are updated according to the ranktheoretic update rules.
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  • Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
    Degrees of belief are familiar to all of us. Our confidence in the truth of some propositions is higher than our confidence in the truth of other propositions. We are pretty confident that our computers will boot when we push their power button, but we are much more confident that the sun will rise tomorrow. Degrees of belief formally represent the strength with which we believe the truth of various propositions. The higher an agent’s degree of belief for a particular (...)
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  • Inference to the Best Explanation in Uncertain Evidential Situations.Borut Trpin & Max Pellert - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    It has recently been argued that a non-Bayesian probabilistic version of inference to the best explanation (IBE*) has a number of advantages over Bayesian conditionalization (Douven [2013]; Douven and Wenmackers [2017]). We investigate how IBE* could be generalized to uncertain evidential situations and formulate a novel updating rule IBE**. We then inspect how it performs in comparison to its Bayesian counterpart, Jeffrey conditionalization (JC), in a number of simulations where two agents, each updating by IBE** and JC, respectively, try to (...)
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  • Maximum Entropy Inference as a Special Case of Conditionalization.Brian Skyrms - 1985 - Synthese 63 (1):55 - 74.
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  • 'The Kinematics of Belief and Desire.Richard Bradley - 2002 - Synthese 156 (3):513-535.
    Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change: not as mechanical outputs of combinations (...)
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  • Updating, Supposing, and Maxent.Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Theory and Decision 22 (3):225-246.
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  • Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (2):103 - 148.
    There are narrowest bounds for P(h) when P(e) = y and P(h/e) = x, which bounds collapse to x as y goes to 1. A theorem for these bounds -- bounds for probable modus ponens -- entails a principle for updating on possibly uncertain evidence subject to these bounds that is a generalization of the principle for updating by conditioning on certain evidence. This way of updating on possibly uncertain evidence is appropriate when updating by ’probability kinematics’ or ’Jeffrey-conditioning’ is, (...)
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  • Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):312-320.
    Bayesianism is a collection of positions in several related fields, centered on the interpretation of probability as something like degree of belief, as contrasted with relative frequency, or objective chance. However, Bayesianism is far from a unified movement. Bayesians are divided about the nature of the probability functions they discuss; about the normative force of this probability function for ordinary and scientific reasoning and decision making; and about what relation (if any) holds between Bayesian and non-Bayesian concepts.
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  • Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.
    The foundations of probability are viewed through the lens of the subjectivist interpretation. This article surveys conditional probability, arguments for probabilism, probability dynamics, and the evidential and subjective interpretations of probability.
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  • Self-Doubts and Dutch Strategies.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):56 – 81.
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  • Dynamic Inference and Everyday Conditional Reasoning in the New Paradigm.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):346-379.
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  • Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), MIT Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press.
    This chapter is a philosophical survey of some leading approaches in formal epistemology in the so-called ‘Bayesian’ tradition. According to them, a rational agent’s degrees of belief—credences—at a time are representable with probability functions. We also canvas various further putative ‘synchronic’ rationality norms on credences. We then consider ‘diachronic’ norms that are thought to constrain how credences should respond to evidence. We discuss some of the main lines of recent debate, and conclude with some prospects for future research.
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  • On the Significance of Conditional Probabilities.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):311 - 344.
    The orthodoxy that conditional probabilities reflect what are for a subject evidential bearings is seconded. This significance suggests that there should be principles equating rationally revised probabilities on new information with probabilities reached by conditionalizing on this information. Several principles, two of which are endorsed, are considered. A book is made against a violator of these, and it is argued that there must be something wrong with a person against whom such books can be made. Appendices comment on Popper-functions, elaborate (...)
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