Carlo Rovelli’s inspiring “Relational Quantum Mechanics” serves several aims at once: it provides a new vision of what the world of quantum mechanics is like, and it offers a program to derive the theory’s formalism from a set of simple postulates pertaining to information processing. I propose here to concentrate entirely on the former, to explore the world of quantum mechanics as Rovelli depicts it. It is a fascinating world in part because of Rovelli’s reliance on the information-theory approach to (...) the foundations of quantum mechanics, and in part because its presentation involves taking sides on a fundamental divide within philosophy itself. (shrink)

A common understanding of quantum mechanics (QM) among students and practical users is often plagued by a number of “myths”, that is, widely accepted claims on which there is not really a general consensus among experts in foundations of QM. These myths include wave-particle duality, time-energy uncertainty relation, fundamental randomness, the absence of measurement-independent reality, locality of QM, nonlocality of QM, the existence of well-defined relativistic QM, the claims that quantum field theory (QFT) solves the problems of relativistic QM or (...) that QFT is a theory of particles, as well as myths on black-hole entropy. The fact is that the existence of various theoretical and interpretational ambiguities underlying these myths does not yet allow us to accept them as proven facts. I review the main arguments and counterarguments lying behind these myths and conclude that QM is still a not-yet-completely-understood theory open to further fundamental research. (shrink)

Aurélien Drezet has attempted in Found. Phys. 54(1), 5 (2023) to defend Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) against our recent critique, entitled Relational Quantum Mechanics is incompatible with quantum mechanics, published in Quantum 7, 1015 (2023). Drezet not only misrepresents our work, but he also misconstructs the very theory (RQM) that he claims to defend.

Relational quantum mechanics is an interpretation of quantum theory which discards the notions of absolute state of a system, absolute value of its physical quantities, or absolute event. The theory describes only the way systems affect each other in the course of physical interactions. State and physical quantities refer always to the interaction, or the relation, between two systems. Nevertheless, the theory is assumed to be complete. The physical content of quantum theory is understood as expressing the net of relations (...) connecting all different physical systems. (shrink)

We show that the formulations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics can be derived from an extended least action principle. The principle can be considered as an extension of the least action principle from classical mechanics by factoring in two assumptions. First, the Planck constant defines the minimal amount of action a physical system needs to exhibit during its dynamics in order to be observable. Second, there is constant vacuum fluctuation along a classical trajectory. A novel method is introduced to define the (...) information metrics to measure additional observability due to vacuum fluctuations, which is then converted to an additional action through the first assumption. Applying the variational principle to minimize the total actions allows us to recover the basic quantum formulations including the uncertainty relation and the Schrödinger equation in the position representation. In the momentum representation, the same method can be applied to obtain the Schrödinger equation for a free particle while further investigation is still needed for a particle with an external potential. Furthermore, the principle brings in new results on two fronts. At the conceptual level, we find that the information metrics for vacuum fluctuations are responsible for the origin of the Bohm quantum potential. Even though the Bohm potential for a bipartite system is inseparable, the underlying vacuum fluctuations are local. Thus, inseparability of the Bohm potential does not justify a non-local causal relation between the two subsystems.responsible for manifesting entanglement effects without underlying physical interactions, implying that entanglement effects are non-causal. At the mathematical level, quantifying the information metrics for vacuum fluctuations using more general definitions of relative entropy results in a generalized Schrödinger equation that depends on the order of relative entropy. The extended least action principle is a new mathematical tool. It can be applied to derive other quantum formalisms such as quantum scalar field theory. (shrink)

The idea that the dynamical properties of quantum systems are invariably relative to other systems has recently regained currency. Using Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) for a case study, this paper calls attention to a question that has been underappreciated in the debate about quantum relativism: the question of whether relativity iterates. Are there absolute facts about the properties one system possesses relative to a specified reference, or is this again a relative matter, and so on? It is argued that RQM (...) (in its best-known form) is committed to what I call the Unrestricted Iteration Principle (UIP), and thus to an infinite regress of relativisations. This principle plays a crucial role in ensuring the communicability and coherence of interaction outcomes across observers. It is, however, shown to be incompatible with the widespread, conservative reading of RQM in terms of relations, instead necessitating the adoption of the more unorthodox notion of perspectival facts. I conclude with some reflections on the current state of play in perspectivist versions of RQM and quantum relativism more generally, underscoring both the need for further conceptual development and the importance of the iteration principle for an accurate cost-benefit analysis of such interpretations. (shrink)

This article adopts a bottom-up approach to theory interpretation, following the slogan “meaning is use”, and applies it to quantum mechanics. I argue that it fits very well with the Consistent Histories formulation of quantum mechanics, interpreted in a particular way that is not the interpretation favoured by original proponents of the formulation. I examine the difficulties and advantages of this interpretation.

Relational Quantum Mechanics is an interpretation of quantum theory based on the idea of abolishing the notion of absolute states of systems, in favor of states of systems relative to other systems. Such a move is claimed to solve the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics. Moreover, RQM has been argued to account for all quantum correlations without invoking non-local effects and, in spite of embracing a fully relational stance, to successfully explain how different observers exchange information. In this work, (...) we carry out a thorough assessment of RQM and its purported achievements. We find that it fails to address the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics—related to the lack of clarity in its ontology and the rules that govern its behavior—and that it leads to serious conceptual problems of its own. We also uncover as unwarranted the claims that RQM can correctly explain information exchange among observers, and that it accommodates all quantum correlations without invoking non-local influences. We conclude that RQM is unsuccessful in its attempt to provide a satisfactory understanding of the quantum world. (shrink)

The theories of pre-quantum physics are standardly seen as representing physical systems and their properties. Quantum mechanics in its standard form is a more problematic case: here, interpretational problems have led to doubts about the tenability of realist views. Thus, QBists and Quantum Pragmatists maintain that quantum mechanics should not be thought of as representing physical systems, but rather as an agent-centered tool for updating beliefs about such systems. It is part and parcel of such views that different agents may (...) have different beliefs and may assign different quantum states. What results is a collection of agent-centered perspectives rather than a unique representation of the physical world. In this paper we argue that the problems identified by QBism and Quantum Pragmatism do not necessitate abandoning the ideal of representing the physical world. We can avail ourselves of the same puzzle-solving strategies as employed by QBists and pragmatists by adopting a perspectival quantum realism. According to this perspectivalism objects may possess different, but equally objective properties with respect to different physically defined perspectives. We discuss two options for such a perspectivalism, a local and a nonlocal one, and apply them to Wigner’s friend and EPR scenarios. Finally, we connect quantum perspectivalism to the recently proposed philosophical position of fragmentalism. (shrink)

In the literature on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, not many works attempt to adopt a proactive perspective aimed at seeing how different interpretations can enrich each other through a productive dialogue. In particular, few proposals have been devised to show that different approaches can be clarified by comparing them, and can even complement each other, improving or leading to a more fertile overall approach. The purpose of this paper is framed within this perspective of complementation and mutual enrichment. In (...) particular, the Relational Quantum Mechanics and the Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation are compared, highlighting their differences and points of contact. The final purpose is to show that, in spite of their disagreements, they are not contradictory but, on the contrary, they can be made compatible from an overarching perspective and can even complement each other in a fruitful way. (shrink)

According to Husserl, the epochè (or suspension of judgment) must be left incomplete. It is to be performed step by step, thus defining various layers of “reduction.” In phenomenology at least two such layers can be distinguished: the life-world reduction, and the transcendental reduction. Quantum physics was born from a particular variety of the life-world reduction: reduction to observables according to Heisenberg, and reduction to classical-like properties of experimental devices according to Bohr. But QBism has challenged this limited version of (...) the phenomenological reduction advocated by the Copenhagen interpretation. QBists claim that quantum states are “expectations about experiences of pointer readings,” rather than expectations about pointer positions. Their focus on lived experience, not just on macroscopic variables, is tantamount to performing the transcendental reduction instead of stopping at the relatively superficial layer of the life-world reduction. I will show that quantum physics indeed gives us several reasons to go the whole way down to the deepest variety of phenomenological reduction, may be even farther than the standard QBist view: not only reduction to experience, or to “pure consciousness,” but also reduction to the “living present.”. (shrink)

The subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics and Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum mechanics are both notable for embracing the radical idea that measurement outcomes correspond to events whose occurrence is relative to an observer. Here we provide a detailed study of their similarities and especially their differences.

Relational Quantum Mechanics is an interpretation of quantum mechanics proposed by Carlo Rovelli. Rovelli argues that, in the same spirit as Einstein’s theory of relativity, physical quantities can only have definite values relative to an observer. Relational Quantum Mechanics is hereby able to offer a principled explanation of the problem of nested measurement, also known as Wigner’s friend. Since quantum states are taken to be relative states that depend on both the system and the observer, there is no inconsistency in (...) the descriptions of the observers. Federico Laudisa has recently argued, however, that Rovelli’s description of Wigner’s friend is ambiguous, because it does not take into account the correlation between the observer and the quantum system. He argues that if this correlation is taken into account, the problem with Wigner’s friend disappears and, therefore, a relativization of quantum states is not necessary. I will show that Laudisa’s criticism is not justified. To the extent that the correlation can be accurately reflected, the problem of Wigner’s friend remains. An interpretation of quantum mechanics that provides a solution to it, like Relational Quantum Mechanics, is therefore a welcome one. (shrink)

According to Relational Quantum Mechanics the wave function \ is considered neither a concrete physical item evolving in spacetime, nor an object representing the absolute state of a certain quantum system. In this interpretative framework, \ is defined as a computational device encoding observers’ information; hence, RQM offers a somewhat epistemic view of the wave function. This perspective seems to be at odds with the PBR theorem, a formal result excluding that wave functions represent knowledge of an underlying reality described (...) by some ontic state. In this paper we argue that RQM is not affected by the conclusions of PBR’s argument; consequently, the alleged inconsistency can be dissolved. To do that, we will thoroughly discuss the very foundations of the PBR theorem, i.e. Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization of ontological models, showing that their implicit assumptions about the nature of the ontic state are incompatible with the main tenets of RQM. Then, we will ask whether it is possible to derive a relational PBR-type result, answering in the negative. This conclusion shows some limitations of this theorem not yet discussed in the literature. (shrink)

The last decade has seen an increasing number of references to quantum mechanics in the humanities and social sciences. This development has in particular been driven by Karen Barad’s agential realism: a theoretical framework that, based on Niels Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, aims to inform social theorizing. In dealing with notions such as agency, power, and embodiment as well as the relation between the material and the discursive level, the influence of agential realism in fields such as feminist science (...) studies and posthumanism has been profound. However, no one has hitherto paused to assess agential realism’s proclaimed quantum mechanical origin including its relation to the writings of Niels Bohr. This is the task taken up here. We find that many of the implications that agential realism allegedly derives from a Bohrian interpretation of quantum mechanics dissent from Bohr’s own views and are in conflict with those of other interpretations of quantum mechanics. Agential realism is at best consistent with quantum mechanics and consequently, it does not capture what quantum mechanics in any strict sense implies for social science or any other domain of inquiry. Agential realism may be interesting and thought provoking from the perspective of social theorizing, but it is neither sanctioned by quantum mechanics nor by Bohr’s authority. This conclusion not only holds for agential realism in particular, it also serves as a general warning against the other attempts to use quantum mechanics in social theorizing. (shrink)

One of the criteria to a strong principle in natural sciences is simplicity. The conventional view holds that the world is provided with natural laws that must be simple. This common-sense approach is a modern rewording of the medieval philosophical/theological concept of the Multiple arising from (and generated by) the One. Humans need to pursue unifying frameworks, classificatory criteria and theories of everything. Still, the fact that our cognitive abilities tend towards simplification and groupings does not necessarily entail that this (...) is the way the world works. Here we ask: what if singularity does not pave the way to multiplicity? How will we be sure if the Ockham’s razor holds in real life? We will show in the sequel that the propensity to reduce to simplicity the relationships among the events leads to misleading interpretations of scientific issues. We are not going to take a full sceptic turn: we will engage in active outreach, suggesting examples from biology and physics to demonstrate how a novel methodological antiunitary approach might help to improve our scientific attitude towards world affairs. We will provide examples from aggregation of SARS-Cov-2 particles, unclassified extinct creatures, pathological brain stiffness. Further, we will describe how antiunitary strategies, plagiarising medieval concepts from William od Ockham and Gregory of Rimini, help to explain novel relational approaches to quantum mechanics and the epistemological role of our mind in building the real world. (shrink)

Relying on some auxiliary assumptions, usually considered mild, Bell’s theorem proves that no local theory can reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics. In this work, we introduce a fully local, superdeterministic model that by explicitly violating ‘settings independence’—one of these auxiliary assumptions, requiring statistical independence between measurement settings and systems to be measured—is able to reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics. Moreover, we show that contrary to widespread expectations, our model can break settings independence without an initial state (...) that is too complex to handle, without visibly losing all explanatory power, and without outright nullifying all of experimental science. Still, we argue that our model is unnecessarily complicated and does not offer true advantages over its non-local competitors. We conclude that while our model does not appear to be a viable contender to its non-local counterparts, it provides the ideal framework to advance the debate over violations of statistical independence via the superdeterministic route. (shrink)

Facts happen at every interaction, but they are not absolute: they are relative to the systems involved in the interaction. Stable facts are those whose relativity can effectively be ignored. In this work, we describe how stable facts emerge in a world of relative facts and discuss their respective roles in connecting quantum theory and the world. The distinction between relative and stable facts resolves the difficulties pointed out by the no-go theorem of Frauchiger and Renner, and is consistent with (...) the experimental violation of the Local Friendliness inequalities of Bong et al.. Basing the ontology of the theory on relative facts clarifies the role of decoherence in bringing about the classical world and solves the apparent incompatibility between the ‘linear evolution’ and ‘projection’ postulates. (shrink)

The present essay provides a new metaphysical interpretation of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) in terms of mereological bundle theory. The essential idea is to claim that a physical system in RQM can be defined as a mereological fusion of properties whose values may vary for different observers. Abandoning the Aristotelian tradition centered on the notion of substance, I claim that RQM embraces an ontology of properties that finds its roots in the heritage of David Hume. To this regard, defining what (...) kind of concrete physical objects populate the world according to RQM, I argue that this theoretical framework can be made compatible with (i) a property-oriented ontology, in which the notion of object can be easily defined, and (ii) moderate structural realism, a philosophical position where relations and relata are both fundamental. Finally, I conclude that under this reading relational quantum mechanics should be included among the full-fledged realist interpretations of quantum theory. (shrink)

According to Husserl, the epochè must be left incomplete. It is to be performed step by step, thus defining various layers of “reduction.” In phenomenology at least two such layers can be distinguished: the life-world reduction, and the transcendental reduction. Quantum physics was born from a particular variety of the life-world reduction: reduction to observables according to Heisenberg, and reduction to classical-like properties of experimental devices according to Bohr. But QBism has challenged this limited version of the phenomenological reduction advocated (...) by the Copenhagen interpretation. QBists claim that quantum states are “expectations about experiences of pointer readings,” rather than expectations about pointer positions. Their focus on lived experience, not just on macroscopic variables, is tantamount to performing the transcendental reduction instead of stopping at the relatively superficial layer of the life-world reduction. I will show that quantum physics indeed gives us several reasons to go the whole way down to the deepest variety of phenomenological reduction, may be even farther than the standard QBist view: not only reduction to experience, or to “pure consciousness,” but also reduction to the “living present.”. (shrink)

We introduce a realist, unextravagant interpretation of quantum theory that builds on the existing physical structure of the theory and allows experiments to have definite outcomes but leaves the theory’s basic dynamical content essentially intact. Much as classical systems have specific states that evolve along definite trajectories through configuration spaces, the traditional formulation of quantum theory permits assuming that closed quantum systems have specific states that evolve unitarily along definite trajectories through Hilbert spaces, and our interpretation extends this intuitive picture (...) of states and Hilbert-space trajectories to the more realistic case of open quantum systems despite the generic development of entanglement. We provide independent justification for the partial-trace operation for density matrices, reformulate wave-function collapse in terms of an underlying interpolating dynamics, derive the Born rule from deeper principles, resolve several open questions regarding ontological stability and dynamics, address a number of familiar no-go theorems, and argue that our interpretation is ultimately compatible with Lorentz invariance. Along the way, we also investigate a number of unexplored features of quantum theory, including an interesting geometrical structure—which we call subsystem space—that we believe merits further study. We conclude with a summary, a list of criteria for future work on quantum foundations, and further research directions. We include an appendix that briefly reviews the traditional Copenhagen interpretation and the measurement problem of quantum theory, as well as the instrumentalist approach and a collection of foundational theorems not otherwise discussed in the main text. (shrink)

The Rovelli relational interpretation of quantum mechanics is based on the assumption that the notion of observer-independent state of a physical system is to be rejected. In RQM the primary target of the theory is the analysis of the whole network of relations that may be established among quantum subsystems, and the shift to a relational perspective is supposed to address in a satisfactory way the general problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Here I discuss two basic issues, that (...) I take to be serious open problems of the interpretation. First, I wish to show—mainly through an analysis of the so-called third person problem—that it is far from clear what a relativization of states to observers exactly achieves and in what sense such an approach really advances our understanding of the peculiar features of quantum phenomena. Second, I argue that the claim, according to which RQM is able to preserve locality, is at best dubious. I conclude that further work needs to be done before RQM may aspire to become a satisfactory interpretational framework for the main foundational issues in quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The relational interpretation of quantum mechanics proposes to solve the measurement problem and reconcile completeness and locality of quantum mechanics by postulating relativity to the observer for events and facts, instead of an absolute “view from nowhere”. The aim of this paper is to clarify this interpretation, and in particular, one of its central claims concerning the possibility for an observer to have knowledge about other observer’s events. I consider three possible readings of this claim, and develop the most promising (...) one, relativism, to show how it fares when confronted with the traditional interpretative problems of quantum mechanics. Although it provides answers to some problems, I claim that there is currently no adapted locality criterion to evaluate whether the resulting interpretation is local or not. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics is not about 'quantum states': it is about values of physical variables. I give a short fresh presentation and update on the *relational* perspective on the theory, and a comment on its philosophical implications.

The problem of measurement is often considered an inconsistency inside the quantum formalism. Many attempts to solve it have been made since the inception of quantum mechanics. The form of these attempts depends on the philosophical position that their authors endorse. I will review some of them and analyze their relevance. The phenomenon of decoherence is often presented as a solution lying inside the pure quantum formalism and not demanding any particular philosophical assumption. Nevertheless, a widely debated question is to (...) decide between two different interpretations. The first one is to consider that the decoherence process has the effect to actually project a superposed state into one of its classically interpretable component, hence doing the same job as the reduction postulate. For the second one, decoherence is only a way to show why no macroscopic superposed state can be observed, so explaining the classical appearance of the macroscopic world, while the quantum entanglement between the system, the apparatus and the environment never disappears. In this case, explaining why only one single definite outcome is observed remains to do. In this paper, I examine the arguments that have been given for and against both interpretations and defend a new position, the “Convivial Solipsism”, according to which the outcome that is observed is relative to the observer, different but in close parallel to the Everett’s interpretation and sharing also some similarities with Rovelli’s relational interpretation and Quantum Bayesianism. I also show how “Convivial Solipsism” can help getting a new standpoint about the EPR paradox providing a way out of the seemingly unavoidable non-locality of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

A large number of physicists now admit that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory. The EPR argument and the many experiments showing the violation of Bell’s inequalities seem to have confirmed convincingly that quantum mechanics cannot be local. Nevertheless, this conclusion can only be drawn inside a standard realist framework assuming an ontic interpretation of the wave function and viewing the collapse of the wave function as a real change of the physical state of the system. We show that this (...) standpoint is not mandatory and that if the collapse is not considered an actual physical change it is possible to recover locality. (shrink)

A large number of physicists now admit that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory. The EPR argument and the many experiments showing the violation of Bell’s inequalities seem to have confirmed convincingly that quantum mechanics cannot be local. Nevertheless, this conclusion can only be drawn inside a standard realist framework assuming an ontic interpretation of the wave function and viewing the collapse of the wave function as a real change of the physical state of the system. We show that this (...) standpoint is not mandatory and that if the collapse is not considered an actual physical change it is possible to recover locality. (shrink)

A large number of physicists now admit that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory. The EPR argument and the many experiments showing the violation of Bell’s inequalities seem to have confirmed convincingly that quantum mechanics cannot be local. Nevertheless, this conclusion can only be drawn inside a standard realist framework assuming an ontic interpretation of the wave function and viewing the collapse of the wave function as a real change of the physical state of the system. We show that this (...) standpoint is not mandatory and that if the collapse is not considered an actual physical change it is possible to recover locality. (shrink)

A large number of physicists now admit that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory. The EPR argument and the many experiments showing the violation of Bell’s inequalities seem to have confirmed convincingly that quantum mechanics cannot be local. Nevertheless, this conclusion can only be drawn inside a standard realist framework assuming an ontic interpretation of the wave function and viewing the collapse of the wave function as a real change of the physical state of the system. We show that this (...) standpoint is not mandatory and that if the collapse is not considered an actual physical change it is possible to recover locality. (shrink)

The Wigner’s friend type of thought experiments manifest the conceptual challenge on how different observers can have consistent descriptions of a quantum measurement event. In this paper, we analyze the extended version of Wigner’s friend thought experiment in detail and show that the reasoning process from each agent that leads to the no-go theorem is inconsistent. The inconsistency is with respect to the requirement that an agent should make use of updated information instead of outdated information. We then apply the (...) relational formulation of quantum measurement to resolve the inconsistent descriptions from different agents. In relational formulation of quantum mechanics, a measurement is described relative to an observer. Synchronization of measurement result is a necessary requirement to achieve consistent descriptions of a quantum system from different observers. Thought experiments, including EPR, Wigner’s Friend and it extended version, confirm the necessity of relational formulation of quantum measurement when applying quantum mechanics to composite system with entangled but space-like separated subsystems. (shrink)

The apparent nonlocality of quantum theory has been a persistent concern. Einstein et al. and Bell emphasized the apparent nonlocality arising from entanglement correlations. While some interpretations embrace this nonlocality, modern variations of the Everett-inspired many worlds interpretation try to circumvent it. In this paper, we review Bell's "no-go" theorem and explain how it rests on three axioms, local causality, no superdeterminism, and one world. Although Bell is often taken to have shown that local causality is ruled out by the (...) experimentally confirmed entanglement correlations, we make clear that it is the conjunction of the three axioms that is ruled out by these correlations. We then show that by assuming local causality and no superdeterminism, we can give a direct proof of many worlds. The remainder of the paper searches for a consistent, local, formulation of many worlds. We show that prominent formulations whose ontology is given by the wave function violate local causality, and we critically evaluate claims in the literature to the contrary. We ultimately identify a local many worlds interpretation that replaces the wave function with a separable Lorentz-invariant wave-field. We conclude with discussions of the Born rule, and other interpretations of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

We present an analysis of the Frauchiger–Renner Gedankenexperiment from the point of view of the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. Our analysis shows that the paradox obtained by Frauchiger and Renner disappears if one rejects promoting one agent’s certainty to another agent’s certainty when it cannot be validated by records from the past. A by-product of our analysis is an interaction-free detection scheme for the existence of such records.

We present a derivation of the third postulate of relational quantum mechanics from the properties of conditional probabilities. The first two RQM postulates are based on the information that can be extracted from interaction of different systems, and the third postulate defines the properties of the probability function. Here we demonstrate that from a rigorous definition of the conditional probability for the possible outcomes of different measurements, the third postulate is unnecessary and the Born’s rule naturally emerges from the first (...) two postulates by applying the Gleason’s theorem. We demonstrate in addition that the probability function is uniquely defined for classical and quantum phenomena. The presence or not of interference terms is demonstrated to be related to the precise formulation of the conditional probability where distributive property on its arguments cannot be taken for granted. In the particular case of Young’s slits experiment, the two possible argument formulations correspond to the possibility or not to determine the particle passage through a particular path. (shrink)

When a boat disappears over the horizon, does a distant observer detect the last moment in which the boat is visible, or the first moment in which the boat is not visible? This apparently ludicrous way of reasoning, heritage of long-lasting medieval debates on decision limit problems, paves the way to sophisticated contemporary debates concerning the methodological core of mathematics, physics and biology. These ancient, logically-framed conundrums throw us into the realm of bounded objects with fuzzy edges, where our mind (...) fails to provide responses to plain questions such as: given a closed curve with a boundary how do you recognize what is internal and what is external? We show how the choice of an alternative instead of another is not arbitrary, rather points towards entirely different ontological, philosophical and physical commitments. This paves the way to novel interpretations and operational approaches to challenging issues such as black hole singularities, continuous time in quantum dynamics, chaotic nonlinear paths, logarithmic plots, demarcation of living beings. In the sceptical reign where judgements seem to be suspended forever, the contemporary scientist stands for a sort of God equipped with infinite power who is utterly free to dictate the rules of the experimental settings. (shrink)

Since special relativity and quantum mechanics, information has become a central concept in our description and understanding of physical reality. This statement may be construed in different ways, depending on the meaning we attach to the concept of information, and on our ontological commitments. One distinction is between mind-independent ‘Shannon information’ and a traditional conception of information, connected with meaning and knowledge. Another, orthogonal, distinction is between information considered as a fundamental physical entity, and an ontological agnosticism where physics is (...) about our information of the world rather than about the world itself. Combinations of these lead to various possibilities. I argue that adopting mind-independent information as ontologically fundamental is a hitherto undefended position with important advantages. This position appears similar to Floridi’s informational structural realism, but is fundamentally different. Rather than ‘epistemically indistinguishable differences’, it requires a robust conception of information as consisting of readable and interpretable messages. (shrink)

Pekka Lahti is a prominent exponent of the renaissance of foundational studies in quantum mechanics that has taken place during the last few decades. Among other things, he and coworkers have drawn renewed attention to, and have analyzed with fresh mathematical rigor, the threat of inconsistency at the basis of quantum theory: ordinary measurement interactions, described within the mathematical formalism by Schrödinger-type equations of motion, seem to be unable to lead to the occurrence of definite measurement outcomes, whereas the same (...) formalism is interpreted in terms of probabilities of precisely such definite outcomes. Of course, it is essential here to be explicit about how definite measurement results (or definite properties in general) should be represented in the formalism. To this end Lahti et al. have introduced their objectification requirement that says that a system can be taken to possess a definite property if it is certain (in the sense of probability 1) that this property will be found upon measurement. As they have gone on to demonstrate, this requirement entails that in general definite outcomes cannot arise in unitary measuring processes.In this paper we investigate whether it is possible to escape from this deadlock. As we shall argue, there is a way out in which the objectification requirement is fully maintained. The key idea is to adapt the notion of objectivity itself, by introducing relational or perspectival properties. It seems that such a “relational perspective” offers prospects of overcoming some of the long-standing problems in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Testable predictions of quantum mechanics are invariant under time reversal. But the evolution of the quantum state in time is not so, neither in the collapse nor in the no-collapse interpretations of the theory. This is a fact that challenges any realistic interpretation of the quantum state. On the other hand, this fact raises no difficulty if we interpret the quantum state as a mere calculation device, bookkeeping past real quantum events.

The Quantum Measurement Problem is arguably one of the most debated issues in the philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, since it represents not only a technical difficulty for the standard formulation of the theory, but also a source of interpretational disputes concerning the meaning of the quantum postulates. Another conundrum intimately connected with the QMP is the Wigner friend paradox, a thought experiment underlining the incoherence between the two dynamical laws governing the behavior of quantum systems, i.e the Schrödinger equation and (...) the projection rule. Thus, every alternative interpretation aiming to be considered a sound formulation of QM must provide an explanation to these puzzles associated with quantum measurements. It is the aim of the present essay to discuss them in the context of Relational Quantum Mechanics. In fact, it is shown here how this interpretative framework dissolves the QMP. More precisely, two variants of this issue are considered: on the one hand, I focus on the “the problem of outcomes” contained in Maudlin (1995)—in which the projection postulate is not mentioned—on the other hand, I take into account Rovelli’s reformulation of this problem proposed in Rovelli (2022), where the tension between the Schrödinger equation and the stochastic nature of the collapse rule is explicitly considered. Moreover, the relational explanation to the Wigner’s friend paradox is reviewed, taking also into account some interesting objections contra Rovelli’s theory contained in Laudisa (2019). I contend that answering these critical remarks leads to an improvement of our understanding of RQM. Finally, a possible objection against the relational solution to the QMP is presented and addressed. (shrink)

We examine the prevalent use of the phrase “local realism” in the context of Bell’s Theorem and associated experiments, with a focus on the question: what exactly is the ‘realism’ in ‘local realism’ supposed to mean? Carefully surveying several possible meanings, we argue that all of them are flawed in one way or another as attempts to point out a second premise (in addition to locality) on which the Bell inequalities rest, and (hence) which might be rejected in the face (...) of empirical data violating the inequalities. We thus suggest that the phrase ‘local realism’ should be banned from future discussions of these issues, and urge physicists to revisit the foundational questions behind Bell’s Theorem. (shrink)

The term ‘locality’ is used in different contexts with different meanings. There have been claims that relational quantum mechanics is local, but it is not clear then how it accounts for the effects that go under the usual name of quantum non-locality. The present article shows that the failure of ‘locality’ in the sense of Bell, once interpreted in the relational framework, reduces to the existence of a common cause in an indeterministic context. In particular, there is no need to (...) appeal to a mysterious space-like influence to understand it. (shrink)

In a recent paper on Foundations of Physics, Stephen Boughn reinforces a view that is more shared in the area of the foundations of quantum mechanics than it would deserve, a view according to which quantum mechanics does not require nonlocality of any kind and the common interpretation of Bell theorem as a nonlocality result is based on a misunderstanding. In the present paper I argue that this view is based on an incorrect reading of the presuppositions of the EPR (...) argument and the Bell theorem and, as a consequence, is unfounded. (shrink)

According to a widespread view, the Bell theorem establishes the untenability of so-called ‘local realism’. On the basis of this view, recent proposals by Leggett, Zeilinger and others have been developed according to which it can be proved that even some non-local realistic theories have to be ruled out. As a consequence, within this view the Bell theorem allows one to establish that no reasonable form of realism, be it local or non-local, can be made compatible with the (experimentally tested) (...) predictions of quantum mechanics. In the present paper it is argued that the Bell theorem has demonstrably nothing to do with the ‘realism’ as defined by these authors and that, as a consequence, their conclusions about the foundational significance of the Bell theorem are unjustified. (shrink)

A common understanding of quantum mechanics (QM) among students and practical users is often plagued by a number of “myths”, that is, widely accepted claims on which there is not really a general consensus among experts in foundations of QM. These myths include wave-particle duality, time-energy uncertainty relation, fundamental randomness, the absence of measurement-independent reality, locality of QM, nonlocality of QM, the existence of well-defined relativistic QM, the claims that quantum field theory (QFT) solves the problems of relativistic QM or (...) that QFT is a theory of particles, as well as myths on black-hole entropy. The fact is that the existence of various theoretical and interpretational ambiguities underlying these myths does not yet allow us to accept them as proven facts. I review the main arguments and counterarguments lying behind these myths and conclude that QM is still a not-yet-completely-understood theory open to further fundamental research. (shrink)

This paper addresses arguments that “separability” is an assumption of Bell’s theorem, and that abandoning this assumption in our interpretation of quantum mechanics (a position sometimes referred to as “holism”) will allow us to restore a satisfying locality principle. Separability here means that all events associated to the union of some set of disjoint regions are combinations of events associated to each region taken separately.In this article, it is shown that: (a) localised events can be consistently defined without implying separability; (...) (b) the definition of Bell’s locality condition does not rely on separability in any way; (c) the proof of Bell’s theorem does not use separability as an assumption. If, inspired by considerations of non-separability, the assumptions of Bell’s theorem are weakened, what remains no longer embodies the locality principle. Teller’s argument for “relational holism” and Howard’s arguments concerning separability are criticised in the light of these results. Howard’s claim that Einstein grounded his arguments on the incompleteness of QM with a separability assumption is also challenged. Instead, Einstein is better interpreted as referring merely to the existence of localised events. Finally, it is argued that Bell rejected the idea that separability is an assumption of his theorem. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on two related reductive theses in metaphysics—Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity—and on their status in light of the indications coming from science, in particular quantum mechanics. While defenders of these reductive theses claim that they can be updated so as to resist the quantum evidence, we provide arguments against this contention. We claim that physics gives us reason for thinking that both Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity are at least contingently false, as the (...) very process of composition determines, at least in some cases, the nature of composed systems. The argument has essentially to do with the fact that denying the reductive theses in question allows one to provide better explanations for the quantum evidence. (shrink)

El inspirador Relational Quantum Mechanicsde Carlo Rovelli cumple varios propósitosde manera simultánea: proporciona unanueva visión de cómo es el mundo de lamecánica cuántica y ofrece un programapara derivar el formalismo de la teoría deun conjunto de postulados simples quepertenecen al procesamiento de la información.Enesteartículopropongoquenosconcentremostotalmente en lo primero,para explorar el mundo de la mecánicacuántica tal como lo representa Rovelli.Es un mundo fascinante, en parte debidoa la dependencia de Rovelli sobre el enfoquedelateoríadelainformaciónparalosfundamentosdelamecánicacuántica,yen parte debido a que su presentaciónimplica asumir una postura en (...) un partefundamental en la filosofía misma.Ca r l o Ro v e l l i ’ s i n s p i r i n g Re l a t i o n a lQuantum Mechanics serves several aims atonce: it provides a new vision of what theworld of quantum mechanics is like, andit offers a program to derive the theory’sformalism from a set of simple postulatespertai ni ng to i nformati on processi ng.I propose here to concentrate entirelyon the former, to explore the world ofquantum mechanics as Rovelli depicts it.It is a fascinating world in part becauseof Rovelli’s reliance on the informationtheory approach to the foundations ofquantum mechanics, and in part becauseits presentation involves taking sides on afundamental divides within philosophyitself. (shrink)