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A paradox of promising

Philosophical Review 106 (2):153-196 (1997)

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  1. The Moral Value in Promises.Earl Conee - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):411-422.
    Holly Smith poses a challenging moral problem. She offers examples that appear to show that the moral significance of promising can be nefariously exploited. Her leading example is this.
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  • Are All Practical Reasons Based on Value?Benjamin Kiesewetter - manuscript
    According to an attractive and widely held view, all practical reasons can be explained in terms of the value of the action favoured by the reason. In this paper, I argue that this view incompatible with plausible assumptions about the practical reasons that go along with certain moral rights, including reasons to keep promises, reasons to obey legitimate authorities, reasons to respect property and reasons to distribute goods equally.
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  • The Morality of Creating and Eliminating Duties.Holly M. Smith & David E. Black - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3211-3240.
    We often act in ways that create duties for ourselves: we adopt a child and become obligated to raise and educate her. We also sometimes act in ways that eliminate duties: we get divorced, and no longer have a duty to support our now ex-spouse. When is it morally permissible to create or to eliminate a duty? These questions have almost wholly evaded philosophical attention. In this paper we develop answers to these questions by arguing in favor of the asymmetric (...)
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  • The Procreation Asymmetry : The Existence-Requirement Strategy and Some Concerns on Incompatibility.Jepser Söderstedt - unknown
    According to the procreation asymmetry there is no moral reason to create a new and foreseeably happy person just because this person will be happy, but there is however a moral reason against creating a new and foreseeably unhappy person just because this person will be unhappy. A common way to defend this conjunction of claims is by employing a so-called existence-requirement, according to which the happiness of a given person p in a world w depends on it being possible (...)
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  • Compromisos sociales y obligaciones racionales.Miranda del Corral de Filipe - 2015 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 66:27-40.
    Este artículo defiende que las obligaciones sociales emergen de las normas de la racionalidad. A través de un análisis de los requisitos normativos de la racionalidad que gobiernan los compromisos individuales, se muestra que los agentes poseen autoridad racional para revaluar sus razones, modificar sus juicios prácticos y cambiar sus intenciones. De esta autoridad depende su autonomía racional: uno y el mismo sujeto puede obligarse a hacer algo, y revocar esta orden. Mediante un compromiso social, el deudor renuncia a su (...)
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  • Morality Under Risk.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2019 - Dissertation,
    Many argue that absolutist moral theories -- those that prohibit particular kinds of actions or trade-offs under all circumstances -- cannot adequately account for the permissibility of risky actions. In this dissertation, I defend various versions of absolutism against this critique, using overlooked resources from formal decision theory. Against the prevailing view, I argue that almost all absolutist moral theories can give systematic and plausible verdicts about what to do in risky cases. In doing so, I show that critics have (...)
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  • On the Survival of Humanity.Johann Frick - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2-3):344-367.
    What moral reasons, if any, do we have to ensure the long-term survival of humanity? This article contrastively explores two answers to this question: according to the first, we should ensure the survival of humanity because we have reason to maximize the number of happy lives that are ever lived, all else equal. According to the second, seeking to sustain humanity into the future is the appropriate response to the final value of humanity itself. Along the way, the article discusses (...)
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  • Promising and Supererogation.Jason Kawall - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):389-398.
    A paradox involving promises to perform supererogatory actions is developed. Several attempts to resolve the problem, focusing in particular on changing our understanding of supererogatory actions, are explored. It is concluded that none of the proposed solutions are viable; the problem lies in promises with certain contents, not in our understanding of supererogation.
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