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I*—The Presidential Address: The Schematic Fallacy

Timothy Smiley

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83 (1):1-18 (1983)

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A Two-Dimensional Logic for Two Paradoxes of Deontic Modality.Melissa Fusco & Alexander W. Kocurek - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (4):991-1022.details In this paper, we axiomatize the deontic logic in Fusco (2015), which uses a Stalnaker-inspired account of diagonal acceptance and a two-dimensional account of disjunction to treat Ross’s Paradox and the Puzzle of Free Choice Permission. On this account, disjunction-involving validities are a priori rather than necessary. We show how to axiomatize two-dimensional disjunction so that the introduction/elimination rules for boolean disjunction can be viewed as one-dimensional projections of more general two-dimensional rules. These completeness results help make explicit the restrictions (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Formality in Logic: From Logical Terms to Semantic Constraints.Gil Sagi - 2014 - Logique Et Analyse 57 (227).details In this paper I discuss a prevailing view by which logical terms determine forms of sentences and arguments and therefore the logical validity of arguments. This view is common to those who hold that there is a principled distinction between logical and nonlogical terms and those holding relativistic accounts. I adopt the Tarskian tradition by which logical validity is determined by form, but reject the centrality of logical terms. I propose an alternative framework for logic where logical terms no longer (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 13 citations
Against logical generalism.Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4813-4830.details The orthodox view of logic takes for granted the central importance of logical principles. Logic, and thus logical reasoning, is to be understood as a system of rules or principles with universal application. Let us call this orthodox view logical generalism. In this paper we argue that logical generalism, whether monist or pluralist, is wrong. We then outline an account of logical consequence in the absence of general logical principles, which we call logical particularism. Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
When is a Schema Not a Schema? On a Remark by Suszko.Lloyd Humberstone & Allen Hazen - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (2):199-220.details A 1971 paper by Roman Suszko, ‘Identity Connective and Modality’, claimed that a certain identity-free schema expressed the condition that there are at most two objects in the domain. Section 1 here gives that schema and enough of the background to this claim to explain Suszko’s own interest in it and related conditions—via non-Fregean logic, in which the objects in question are situations and the aim is to refrain from imposing this condition. Section 3 shows that the claim is false, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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