My research into Virtual Reality technology and its central property of immersion has indicated that immersion in Virtual Reality (VR) electronic systems is a significant key to the understanding of contemporary culture as well as considerable aspects of previous culture as detected in the histories of philosophy and the visual arts. The fundamental change in aesthetic perception engendered by immersion, a perception which is connected to the ideal of total-immersion in virtual space, identifies certain shifts in ontology which are relevant (...) to a better understanding of the human being. This understanding was achieved through a broad inquiry into the histories of Virtual Reality, philosophy, and the visual arts and has lead to the formulation of an aesthetic theory of immersive consciousness indicative of immersive culture. The primary subject of this discourse is immersion then: an experience which will be identified within the dissertation as the indispensable characteristic of Virtual Reality. The understanding of immersion arrived at here will be used to fashion a synchronous theory of art particularly informed by encounters and concepts of immersion into virtuality. To sufficiently address this subject in a scholarly fashion, I have researched, found and accumulated aesthetic and philosophic examples of immersive tendencies, as found within the histories of art and philosophy, which subsequently contributed towards the articulation of what I have come to call immersive consciousness. As a result of formulating such an immersive consciousness, a good deal of the basis for the questioning of the Western ontological tradition has been found in the Western tradition itself when we look with new eyes and ask new uncertain questions. Moreover, this immersive consciousness will be used to propose some abstract questions encircling today's electronic-based culture. Through the structuring of the argument within the thesis - and overtly within the conclusion - I have articulated a non-teleological creative strategy which provides the basis for an unconstraining integration of noologies (ways of semblancing the thinking process). This strategy provides a means of exemplifying - and for honoring - various methods of thinking. This structuring strategy is consistent with the 'hacker ethic' as defined by Steven Levy, as a demand that access to computers - and anything which might teach us something about the way the world works - should be unlimited and total. To follow this strategy, this dissertation has set out to understand how topical conceptions of virtual immersion connect to pre-existing systems of thought as revealed in art as they have extended out of antecedent ontological self-understandings, historical human self-understandings which have evidenced themselves in the elaboration of technological objectives. To do this I have forged a certain rhizomatic paternity/maternity for Virtual Reality within this dissertation by joining choice immersive examples of simulacra technology into mental connections with the relevant examples culled from the histories of art, architecture, information-technology, sex, myth, space, consciousness and philosophy. (shrink)

Holism and reductionism are usually seen as opposite and mutually exclusive approaches to nature. Recently, some have come to see them as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. In this book I have argued that, even stronger, they should be seen as mutually dependent and co-operating research programmes. I have discussed holism and reductionism in biology in general and in ecology in particular. After an introductory chapter I have provided an overview of holistic and reductionistic positions in biology, and of the (...) reduction problems to which they relate. I have argued that it is extremely important to distinguish between ontological, epistemological and methodological aspects of these problems. The overview has shown that there are actually several approaches to reduction problems in biology, which can be characterized as more or less radically or moderately holistic or reductionistic. It has shown also that there are three major ’contradistinctions’ between holism and reductionism in biology, to wit the doctrine of emergence versus the reduction thesis; functional explanations versus causal explanations; and phenomenology versus mechanicism. In later chapters I have shown that these ’contradistinctions’ are not really contradistinctions at all. In the next chapters I have discussed the terms ’reduce’ and ’reduction’ in science. In chapter 3 I have discussed the reduction of laws and theories. I have shown that there are many different types of reduction depending on the auxiliary hypotheses that are being used in addition to the reducing theory: approximation-, aggregation, correlation and/or identification-hypotheses. The distinctions between these types has later, in chapter 5, proved to be of great importance in defining the concept of ’emergence’. The major conclusion of chapter 3 was that reduction is an epistemological issue, pertaining to logical relations between statements or systems of statements. It should not be confused, therefore, with ’ontological reduction’, certainly not in one of its ordinary senses, such as diminishing, devaluating or the like. Scientific reductions are, with the exception of instrumentalistic reductions, kinds of explanation, and, moreover, non-eliminative kinds of explanation. This means that a reduced law or theory is not eliminated by the reducing theory but rather consolidated or even reinforced. The ontology of the reduced law or theory is thereby also being consolidated. In chapter 4 I have argued that the same holds for reductions of concepts. Concept reductions are supposed to be accomplished by means of so-called ontological identity relations, which are in turn supposed to connect terms in the law or theory to be reduced, which do not occur in the reducing theory, with theoretical terms of the reducing theory. Because they are called ontological identity relations, several philosophers have thought that concept reductions imply some form of ontological reduction. And because they often occur in the context of micro-reductions, some have even thought that concept reductions are themselves micro-reductions. As a result, the idea has arisen that ontological identity relations are connections between macro-concepts and micro-concepts. However, concept reductions by means of ontological identity relations cannot be micro-reductions, because micro-reduction is, by definition, reduction with an aggregation step. Moreover, ontological identity relations are relations between different representations of and the same type of thing or attribute. That is, they express different epistemological sides of the same ontological coin. Therefore, concept reductions cannot be considered ontological reductions either, certainly not in the ordinary sense of diminishing, devaluating or the like. Thus, concept reduction is, like law or theory reduction, an epistemological issue: it pertains to relations between, in this case, different concepts or representations of one and the same type of thing or attribute. ’Ontological reduction’, then, may, in the context of scientific reductions, actually be considered a contradiction of terms. In chapter 5 I have linked this conclusion to the emergence thesis and to the alleged contradistinction between this thesis and the reduction thesis. I have shown that the doctrine of emergence actually consists of two separate claims, namely an ontological thesis stating that a whole has emergent properties which the component parts do not possess, neither separately nor in other partial combinations; and an epistemological thesis stating that emergent properties of wholes are ’in principle’ irreducible. I have argued that the first claim may be regarded as a valid, universal thesis about relations between properties of wholes and properties of parts, but that the second claim is untenable. I have discussed many emergent properties of wholes, biological as well as physico-chemical, that have proved to be explainable in terms of micro-theories about the component parts and auxiliary hypotheses. Once again, however, it is important to realize that reduction is an epistemological issue, whereas emergence, in the sense of thesis, is an ontological one. It is not ’wholes’ or ’emergent properties of wholes’ that are being reduced but statements about them. Reduction is a kind of explanation, not of explaining-away. Thus, it leaves the ontology of whatever is reduced fully intact. I have developed a new definition of the term ’emergence’ which expresses emergence in terms of the auxiliary hypotheses that may be used in reductions, in particular aggregation-, correlation- and identification-hypotheses. This has even lead to two very remarkable conclusions. First, emergence may be considered the opposite of ontological identity. And second, if there were no emergence, there wouldn’t be any reductions either. to reduce.) In this respect, therefore, there is absolutely no contradistinction between holism and reductionism. On these grounds I have introduced my thesis that holism and reductionism should rather be seen as mutually dependent, and hence co-operating, research programmes than as conflicting views of nature or of relations between sciences. Holistic programmes play an important role in science as guide programmes for reductionistic programmes by discovering or developing macro-laws or -theories about phenomena at the level of wholes, which they themselves, however, cannot explain. For these explanations they depend on the fruits of reductionistic programmes. If the latter succeed in providing the explanations they act as supply programmes for the holistic guide programmes. Reductionistic programmes depend in turn on holistic programmes for providing the macro-laws or -theories that call for these explanations. In chapter 6 I have discussed an example of this mutual dependency in the form of the reduction of the Bohr-effect in animal physiology. I have shown that this law has been reduced to the theory of allostery, applied to hemoglobin molecules in red blood cells, and that this application of the theory of allostery has been reduced to the theory of chemical bonding. I have also shown that at least six research programmes were involved in these reductions, and that the relations between these programmes can be characterized very well in terms of the model of holistic guide programmes and reductionistic supply programmes. The only, but highly significant, qualification appearing from example was that the terms ’holistic’ and ’reductionistic’ are extremely relative and should always be related to a certain given level of organization. In chapter 7 I have resolved the remaining contradistinction between holism and reductionism in biology, viz. the need for functional explanations and the demand that explanations be causal. I have shown that functional explanations are perfectly legitimate explanations which in a sense can be reconstrued as causal explanations. I have argued that functional explanations are indispensable components of more comprehensive, causal-evolutionary explanations, because the latter appeal to the adaptive value, and hence the function, of the property to be explained. In that sense functions can be regarded as adaptations, and functional explanations can be regarded as a sort of ’short-hand’ for evolutionary explanations. Finally, I have shown that in the context of functional explanations, too, co-operation of holistic and reductionistic research programmes occurs. In part 2 I have applied my thesis to ecology. I have shown that in ecology too, holismreductionism disputes notwithstanding, co-operation of holistic and reductionistic research programmes occurs, or, in so far as this appears to be not the case, that it should be strived after. In chapter 8 I have given an overview of reduction problems in ecology and of the various approaches to these problems. I have noticed that in ecology, too, there are several, radical, moderate and anti-reductionistic research strategies, with respect to the levels of both ecosystems, communities and populations. I have also noticed, however, that concrete solutions to reduction problems in ecology are frustrated by what is called the intellectual immaturity or the anomalous status of ecology. This refers to the almost complete lack of general laws and theories in ecology, at least at the higher levels of communities and ecosystems. Of a number of possible causes I have lifted out two, which lend themselves to philosophical analysis and clarification. The first one is the ambiguity of a major part of the ecological vocabulary. This was the subject of chapters 9 and 10. The second is the inhibitory effect which holism-reductionism disputes have on the growth of knowledge. This was the subject of chapter 13. In chapter 9 I have discussed the concept of an community. It appeared that the term ’community’ is used for several different entities at various levels of organization. This ambiguity alone seems to be sufficient for the lack of ’general’ laws and theories about ’communities’. My purpose in chapter 9 was to try and contribute to a solution of this problem. In doing so I have argued, first, that it seems wise to use the term ’community’ only for groups of species belonging to a single taxonomic or phylogenetic group, and to use the term ’biocoenosis’ for the higher level of organization, defined as the biotic component of an ecosystem. Next I have argued that, although species within communities may of course interact with each other, interaction is itself not a necessary or sufficient condition for community membership. Finally, I have hit upon what is known as the most notorious problem in community ecology, to wit the boundary problem, as well as the problem of heterogeneity. I have found that the cause of these problems lies in the fact that communities are almost invariably being seen as groups of populations occurring together in space and time, whereas the empirical fact is rather that populations of different species mostly do not occur together in the same space, and, moreover, that the species composition of communities changes continuously. This has lead to the suggestion that a community had better be defined as the group of individuals of two or more species occurring in the area of intersection of populations of these species. It is only in such intersection areas that one can really talk of the co-occurrence of species. I have shown the empirical adequacy of this definition by discussing various salt marsh plant communities on the Dutch island of Schiermonnikoog. In chapter 10 I have clarified two other important, yet highly controversial, concepts in ecology, to wit habitat and niche. It appeared that there are at least four different habitat concepts in ecology, and as many niche concepts, the additional complication being that two of these habitat concepts correspond to two of these niche concepts, whence the distinction between habitat and niche is blurred. In addition, different habitat concepts appeared to correspond to different environment concepts and also to different biotope concepts. My purpose in chapter 10 was to disentangle all these concepts from one another and to supply each of them with a suitable term. I have done so by keeping a close eye on commonly accepted notions about habitat differentiation and niche differentiation, two ’principles’ allowing one to explain the coexistence or non-coexistence of species in communities. The results can be found in boxes 5 and 7 in chapter 10. In chapter 11 I was finally able to substantiate my claim that in ecology, too, co-operation of holistic and reductionistic research programmes occurs. I have discussed the reduction of the classical competition model of Lotka and Volterra to modern niche theory. The Lotka/Volterra model is a phenomenological model: it describes the possible effects of competition between two species. Modern niche theory, on the other hand, is a mechanistic theory, in which both the objects of competition and a mechanism are being specified. I have shown that the reduction was established with the help of a relatively simple identification hypothesis and two relatively simple aggregation hypotheses, making it yet another example of heterogeneous microreduction in biology. In the reduction, the Lotka/Volterra model acted as a holistic guide programme and modern niche theory acted as a reductionistic supply programme. In chapter 12 I have discussed another example of co-operation in the form of the approximative reduction of MacArthur and Wilson’s equilibrium theory of island biogeography. I have argued that this can be seen as a holistic model, which has been of great unifying and especially heuristic value, but which in time has been found to be a bit too simple and in some respects had to be corrected. Therefore, it can also be seen as an idealization in the sense of the model of idealization and concretization, which subsequent research programmes have concretized. Because these concretizations have a reductive character, we can see in this structure of idealization and concretization yet another example of the co-operation of holistic and reductionistic research programmes in ecology. A philosophically interesting side-conclusion was that the model of idealization and concretization thus appears to apply also to relations between research programmes, and not only to programme-internal developments. In chapter 13 I have discussed an example of the inhibitory effect that holism-reductionism disputes may have on the growth of knowledge. The example concerns a controversy in island biogeography over the role of interspecific competition in structuring communities. This controversy has lasted for about ten years, appeares to have died out rather than to have been resolved, and has produced nothing new in the field of explanations of community structure. I have shown that the major factors underlying the controversy were differing, in casu holistic and reductionistic, views of communities. Though this presented a problem for my thesis, I have argued that, ultimately, the controversy can be resolved, and in a sense has been resolved, in a way that corroborates my thesis. In the epilogue, finally, I have mentioned some remaining problems concerning the adequacy of the present reduction model in dealing with reduction in ecology. These problems pertain to the question of specificty of ecological laws and theories, the likelihood that reductions in ecology generally occur on the basis of several reducing micro-theories, and the possible relationship between the former two points. (shrink)

This study presents and develops in detail (a new version of) the argumental conception of meaning. The two basic principles of the argumental conception of meaning are: i) To know (implicitly) the sense of a word is to know (implicitly) all the argumentation rules concerning that word; ii) To know the sense of a sentence is to know the syntactic structure of that sentence and to know the senses of the words occurring in it. The sense of a sentence is (...) called immediate argumental role of that sentence. According to the argumental conception of meaning a theory of meaning for a particular language yields a systematic specification of the understanding of every sentence of the language which consists in a specification of the immediate argumental role of the sentence. The immediate argumental role is a particular aspect of the use of a sentence in arguments. But it is not the whole use in arguments, nor is the whole use in arguments reducible to the immediate argumental role. That is why, by accepting the argumental conception of meaning, we can have epistemological holism without linguistic holism. The argumental conception distinguishes between the understanding and the correctness of a language. Such a distinction makes it possible to account for our understanding of paradoxical languages. Redundancy theory of truth, realistic conceptions of truth or epistemic conceptions of truth are all compatible with an argumental conception of sense. But here it is argued that an epistemic conception of truth is preferrable. Acceptance of the argumental conception of meaning and of an epistemic conception of truth leads to a rejection of the idea of analytic truth. The argumental conception is pluralistic with respect to the understandability of different logics, and neutral with respect to their correctness. (shrink)

In the literature the term “natural balance” occurs frequently and is used for highly divergent collections of facts and for results arrived at by different methods. In this paper it is attempted to give a review of the many possible meanings of “balance in nature”, and to evaluate the application of the term in the scientific literature.To achieve this twofold objective it seemed useful to start by giving as objective as possible a description of the “balance situation” in natural communities, (...) in analogy with the original physical concept and according to strict scientific criteria. On the basis of this working standard, part of the ecological literature is discussed with respect to statements and presumptions concerning “balance”. The extensive literature is classified according to several groups, on the one hand on the basis of the nature of the views , on the other hand according to the importance that certain authors attach to the theory of a given author. For each of these groups, an evaluation of the content of the term “balance” is given. It was found that the reasoning is not always sound and that the nature of the data on which the concept is based varies widely, which also holds for the method of reasoning applied in the conclusions drawn. In none of the publications arguments were found supporting the existence of a natural “balance situation” as formulated in the standard description. Consequently, it seemed justified to conclude that it is not correct to apply a concept “natural balance”, defined purely scientifically, to natural situations, either because “balance” in the indicated sense is simply not present or because the situation under consideration is not a natural one . The concept “natural balance” has had only heuristic value for scientific research. In other contexts it has a different value, because there criteria other than scientific or methodological ones hold for the content of a concept. It is therefore not objectionable to use the term “natural balance” in common parlance, especially since this usage makes it possible to convey to the layman a great deal in few words. (shrink)

After describing the disorder of psychopathy, I examine the theories and the evidence concerning the psychopaths’ deficient moral capacities. I first examine whether or not psychopaths can pass tests of moral knowledge. Most of the evidence suggests that they can. If there is a lack of moral understanding, then it has to be due to an incapacity that affects not their declarative knowledge of moral norms, but their deeper understanding of them. I then examine two suggestions: it is their deficient (...) practical reason or their stunted emotions that are at fault. The evidence supports both explanations. I conclude with an overview of the debate concerning whether they are morally or legally responsible for their actions. (shrink)

El presente artículo está dentro de la línea de una serie de trabajos cuyo motivo principal gira en torno a la no-dualidad; en él se reúnen algunas de las reflexiones que han prosperado en diversos espacios intelectuales de oriente. Doctrinas, textos, escuelas y pensadores han ido dando cuerpo y sentido a este escrito, constituyendo un espectro muy valioso de perspectivas y variantes interpretativas.

Some data from earlier work concerning the evolutionary correlation of anthophilous insects, entomophilous plants, herbivorous animals, and natural soil groups are briefly summarized. Presumed successive evolution of plant and animal communities from the early Paleozoic era to the more recent formation of prairies, steppes and other grassland areas is described and pictured in Fig. 6. A definite correlation has been found among the coevolution of flowering plants, pollinating insects, ruminant animals and fertility grades of natural soil groups .Plants, insects, animals (...) and soil are interrelated in evolution as reciprocal selective and regulating factors in certain biotic and abiotic environments. This complex system can be better studied by application of the coenogenic concept and hologenic and syngenic methods.Various stages of the development of an agricultural environment in the prairie areas of the North American plains are briefly described and illustrated in Plates I–VII. A new radical change in the development by the introduction of so-called “Circle Farming” is pictured in Plates VIII–IX. This new irrigated farming system is not only profitable for the increasing of yields, but promises to some extent the restoration of a biologically balanced environment in an extensively cultivated agricultural landscape. (shrink)

Scientific description of Nature is here based on geometry, number and energy. Geometry and number are the two only forms of our mind by which we describe Nature. Energy is here considered as the ultimate entity, which in physics is defined by the help of six propreties. The author holds that for an adequate description of physical Nature seven propreties of energy are required and eight are necessary in biology adding the holistic tendencies. On this basis an attempt is made (...) to show that holism is a scientific theory. As we can only perceive geometry and number, holistic propreties as such cannot be dealt with, we can only study the underlying physico-chemical manifestation. There are three holistic principles: 1) Interaction of parts leads to neocreation of propreties; this interaction can only be energetic. 2) The propreties of the whole are not potentially contained in the propreties of the parts. 3) The whole is more than the sum of its parts. Close interaction means fields of force and organisation, which implies that holism is organismic. The second principle is a safeguard against all unwarranted extrapolation. The whole and its parts only have additive propreties in common. Thus it is impossible to derive a macroscopic deterministic world from a microscopic undeterministic world because determinism is additive. The third principle is opposed to all attempts to describe holisation on a logical or mathematical basis. There is holisation in time and holisation in space and the latter can be subdivided into three groups according to their type of wholeness. Energy acts on energy and not on wholeness. All energetic interference with the basis has a holistic repercussion. The question of the egg and epigenetic organogenesis are also discussed from a holistic point of view.Naturbeschreibung ist hier auf Geometrie, Zahl und Energie begründet. Geometrie und Zahlenmässigkeit sind die einzigen Formen unseres Geistes durch die wir die Natur beschreiben. Energie, hier als Grundstein der Welt betrachtet, wird in der Physik durch sechs Eigenschaften definiert; zur vollständigen Beschreibung der physischen Welt seien aber sieben notwendig, während in der Biologie acht Eigenschaften nötig sind, indem Ganzheitsschöpfung als achte zählt. Auf dieser Basis wird gezeigt, dass der Holismus eine wissenschaftliche Theorie ist. Da wir nur Geometrie und Zahlenmässigkeit in der Natur erfassen, so können die holistischen Eigenschaften nicht direkt als solche betrachtet werden, sondern immer nur die ihnen zu Grunde liegenden physiko-chemischen Erscheinungen. Es gibt drei holistische Prinzipien: 1) Gegenseitige Beeinflussung führt zu Ganzheitseigenschaften. Beeinflussung kann nur energetisch sein. 2) Die Eigenschaften der Ganzheit sind nicht potential in den Eigenschaften der Teile enthalten. 3) Das Ganze ist mehr als die Summe seiner Teile. Gegenseitige Beeinflussung bedingt Kraftfelder und diese wieder Organisation. und so ist denn der Holismus seinem Wesen nach organismisch. Das zweite Prinzip legt Verwahrung gegen unstatthafte Extrapolation ein. Das Ganze und seine Teile haben nur additive Eigenschaften im gemein. Es ist also unmöglich eine deterministische makroskopische Welt von einer undeterministischen mikrophysischen abzuleiten weil Determinismus additiv ist. Das dritte Prinzip verwehrt sich gegen alle Anwendung von Logik und Mathematik zur Erklärung oder Beschreibung von Holisation . Es gibt Holisation 1) in der Zeit, 2) im Raum. Im Raum unterscheiden sich die Holisationen nach dem Wirkungskreis der Kraftfelder oder durch Abwesenheit solcher. Dies ist eine neue Aufteilung der Welt nach dem Wesen der Ganzheit. Die Einwirkung der Energie auf die Ganzheit ist mikrophysisch. Energie wirkt auf Energie und nicht auf die Ganzheit als solche. Jede energetische Einwirkung besitzt jedoch eine holistische Auswirkung. Das Problem der Eizelle und der epigenetischer Entwicklung wird auch besprochen. (shrink)

Addiction is one of the most significant problems facing contemporary society. Consequently many scholars, institutions and clinicians have sought to understand this complex phenomenon, as is evident in the abundance of etiological models of addiction in existence today. A literature review pointed that there is little consensus regarding the nature and etiopathogenesis of addiction, and integrative models have not yet been able to provide the sought-after integration. In addressing this problem, this study offers a theoretical analysis of the paradigmatic and (...) meta-paradigmatic suitability of Integral Theory in the design of an integrated metatheory of addiction. The data consisted of the most prominent etiological theories and models of addiction. The study focused on several essential features constituting the architectonic of any metatheory that attempts to provide conceptual scaffolding for the construction of a comprehensive metatheory of addiction. The criteria for the construction of a metatheory were conceptual integration, ontological span, ontological depth, empirical validity and internal consistency. Integral Theory was critically assessed in terms of each of the abovementioned criteria. The study suggests that Integral Theory is eminently suitable as a philosophical foundation for the development of an integrated metatheory of addiction. (shrink)

As the debate about holism and reductionism in ecology has ebbed in the last twenty years, this article aims to reassess the traditional opposition between holistic and reductionist epistemologies during the development of population biology. The history of the notion of carrying capacity, the upper demographic limit of a viable population, will be analyzed as a paradigmatic case of the progressive imposition of reductionist strategies, from both an epistemological and a semantic point of view, since the middle of the twentieth (...) century. Then, Richard Looijen’s reduction of the carrying capacity concept to the niche partitioning theory will be assessed and rebuked for both empirical and logical reasons. Eventually, some recent “weak” and “hard” emergent conceptualizations of the notion of carrying capacity, in logistic map models or in coupled niche-population systems, will be presented in order to show how they call into question the nature and the use of the notion of carrying capacity as a predefined ecological limit. (shrink)

In this work the doctrine of organicism will be addressed, as explained and seen mainly by Bertalanffy. We will study how this doctrine represents and embodies the ambiguity of Kantian teleology as a regulative principle, and how this same problem leads to consider a real problem as a knowledge problem. It will be concluded that organicism, conceived in this way, does not represent a true holism, but what we will call a syn-holism, a synthesis or assembly, and that to obtain (...) a true holism we must resort to the concept of true form. Finally, it will be established that since the fundamental characteristic of an organism is its development, a historical theory of the organism is required for which the concept of field can be useful and necessary. (shrink)

Currently there is such a cornucopia of conflicting theories in the field of addiction studies that it has become exceedingly difficult for treatment providers, therapists, and policymakers to integrate this vast field of knowledge into effective treatment. Since such a chaotic overabundance of treatment theories, styles, and definitions cloud the field of addictionology, many therapists claim their field is in need of a paradigm shift. In the last 20 years an integrative and compound model has emerged known as the biopsychosocial (...) model, but without a solid and comprehensive meta-framework, syncretistic confusion can result when therapists pick and choose techniques without direction or an overall rationale. To address this problem, Guy du Plessis applies integral theory as a conceptual framework for understanding addiction, as well as a meta-therapeutic framework for therapists. The integral foundation of addiction outlined in this book provides researchers, academics, treatment providers, policy makers, and therapists with a conceptual architectonic of addiction and its treatment that is integrative, inclusive, and practical. An Integral Foundation for Addiction Treatment belongs on the shelf of every addiction treatment therapist, and anyone else who is impacted or influenced by the topic. (shrink)

This article outlines an integrally informed model for addictionon treatment and recover that is being pioneered and developed at Tabankulu Secondary Addiction Recovery Center in Cape Town, South Africa. Tabankulu is the world’s first inpatient Addictionon treatment center to implement an integrally informed treatment model. The Integrated Recovery model is a comprehensive, balanced, multi-phased, and multi-disciplinary approach to the treatment of and recovery from addiction. Its philosophy is derived from integrang a 12 Step abstinence-based methodology, mindfulness-based interventions, positive psychology, and (...) Integral Theory. The case is made that addictionon treatment facilities, therapists working with this population, and recovering addicts will become more proficient, effective, and consequently have higher success rates by becoming integrally informed. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that a comprehensive understanding of addiction and its treatment should include an existential perspective. I provide a brief overview of an existential perspective of addiction and recovery, which will contextualize the remainder of the essay. I then present a case study of how the six-step philosophical practice method of Logic-Based Therapy can assist with issues that often arise in addiction treatment framed through an existential perspective.

In 1927, Fritz Jahr coined the term “bioethics” to indicate an “environmental ethics based on biopsychics”. In 1970, Van Rensselaer Potter also coined the term “bioethics” to indicate a “new global ethics based on biology”. As the same Potter wrote, after 1971 “in the USA there was an immediate explosion of the use of the word bioethics” but with a completely different meaning which became dominant and spread worldwide. He went on to say, “their [the public's] image of bioethics delayed (...) the [global] emergence of what now exists”. Elsewhere I have analyzed how this happened, here I analyze why. (shrink)

Philosophy of biology is often said to have emerged in the last third of the twentieth century. Prior to this time, it has been alleged that the only authors who engaged philosophically with the life sciences were either logical empiricists who sought to impose the explanatory ideals of the physical sciences onto biology, or vitalists who invoked mystical agencies in an attempt to ward off the threat of physicochemical reduction. These schools paid little attention to actual biological science, and as (...) a result philosophy of biology languished in a state of futility for much of the twentieth century. The situation, we are told, only began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a new generation of researchers began to focus on problems internal to biology, leading to the consolidation of the discipline. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted narrative of the history of philosophy of biology. We do so by arguing that the most important tradition within early twentieth-century philosophy of biology was neither logical empiricism nor vitalism, but the organicist movement that flourished between the First and Second World Wars. We show that the organicist corpus is thematically and methodologically continuous with the contemporary literature in order to discredit the view that early work in the philosophy of biology was unproductive, and we emphasize the desirability of integrating the historical and contemporary conversations into a single, unified discourse. (shrink)

Agriculture occupies 38% of the planet’s terrestrial surface, using 70% of freshwater resources. Its modern practice is dominated by an industrial–productivist discourse, which has contributed to the simplification and degradation of human and ecological systems. As such, agricultural transformation is essential for creating more sustainable food systems. This paper focuses on discursive change. A prominent discursive alternative to industrial–productivist agriculture is regenerative agriculture. Regenerative discourses are emergent, radically evolving and diverse. It is unclear whether they have the potential to generate (...) the changes required to shift industrial–productivist agriculture. This paper presents a literature-based discourse analysis to illustrate key thematic characteristics of regenerative agricultural discourses. The analysis finds that such discourses: situate agricultural work within nested, complex living systems; position farms as relational, characterised by co-evolution between humans and other landscape biota; perceive the innate potential of living systems as place-sourced; maintain a transformative openness to alternative thinking and practice; believe that multiple regenerative cultures are necessary for deeply regenerative agriculture; and depart from industrialism to varying degrees. The paper concludes by reviewing three transformative opportunities for regenerative discourses—discourse coalitions, translocal organising and collective learning. (shrink)

Time series of macroscopic quantities that are aggregates of microscopic quantities, with unknown one‐many relations between macroscopic and microscopic states, are common in applied sciences, from economics to climate studies. When such time series of macroscopic quantities are claimed to be causal, the causal relations postulated are representable by a directed acyclic graph and associated probability distribution—sometimes called a dynamical Bayes net. Causal interpretations of such series imply claims that hypothetical manipulations of macroscopic variables have unambiguous effects on variables “downstream” (...) in the graph, and such macroscopic variables may be predictably produced or altered even while particular microstates are not. This paper argues that such causal time series of macroscopic aggregates of microscopic processes are the appropriate model for mental causation. (shrink)

Edward O. Wilson’s recent decision to abandon kin selection theory has sent shockwaves throughout the biological sciences. Over the past two years, more than a hundred biologists have signed letters protesting his reversal. Making sense of Wilson’s decision and the controversy it has spawned requires familiarity with the historical record. This entails not only examining the conditions under which kin selection theory first emerged, but also the organicist tradition against which it rebelled. In similar fashion, one must not only examine (...) Wilson’s long career, but also those thinkers who influenced him most, especially his intellectual grandfather, William Morton Wheeler (1865–1937). Wilson belongs to a long line of organicists, biologists whose research highlighted integration and coordination, many of whom struggled over the exact same biological riddles that have long defined Wilson’s career. Drawing inspiration (and sometimes ideas) from these intellectual forebears, Wilson is confident that he has finally identified the origin of the social impulse. (shrink)

Organizational integrity is a key concept with and through which a company can assume its responsibility for ethical and societal issues. It is a basic premise for sustainable corporate success, as ethical risks ultimately become economic risks for a company. Recent research shows the potential of integrity‐based governance models to reduce corporate risks and to improve business performance. However, companies are not yet able to assess nor evaluate their level of organizational integrity in a sound and systematic way. We aim (...) to develop a theoretical model as a basis for the measurement of organizational integrity by conceptualizing the construct and sizing the theoretical model's scope. We suggest that the theoretical model follows a holistic approach and involves three types of dimensions: prerequisite dimensions, independent dimensions, and dependent dimensions. The organizational integrity triad—consisting of active commitments to self‐imposed norms and principles, their transparent institutionalization into corporate processes and structures, and their implementation into action—plays a key role in this context. (shrink)

This thesis is about the contemporary challenges facing herbal medicine. Specifically it concerns the difficulties faced by Australian herbalists in their attempts to maintain authority over the knowledge base of their craft and a connection with traditional understandings of the uses of plant medicines, while at the same time engaging with biomedicine and the broader Australian healthcare system. It contributes to the study of the nascent field of qualitative studies in contemporary western herbal medicine by making three main arguments. Firstly, (...) Australian herbal medicine is characterised by its origins as a European colonial practice and its history of professional marginalisation during most of the 20th century. Secondly herbal practitioners have been unable to capitalise significantly on a surge of public popularity in the closing years of the 20th century which brought with it the interest of industry, the scrutiny of regulators and the renewed attention of biomedicine. Herbalists continue to struggle for recognition in the face of these more powerful interests. Thirdly it is argued that herbalists are attempting to gain legitimacy and acceptance as a healthcare profession through a process of underpinning their knowledge base with science, which is replacing their traditional philosophical basis. This has the effect of weakening the ability of herbalists to maintain their identity as an independent profession and makes its knowledge base vulnerable to appropriation by other healthcare professions. Gross’ model of the cultural location of traditions in contemporary societies is used to clarify the situation of herbalists and to identify problems consequent to the political choices they have made or which have been forced upon them. Gross suggests that traditions which place themselves close to power have difficulty in maintaining their own character and integrity, but that other cultural locations are also problematic and limit full participation in society. vi It is argued that there are compelling reasons to move beyond Gross’ analysis and to find ways to strengthen the independence of the herbal profession. Given the financial problems facing the current healthcare system in Australia and the looming ecological challenges, radical changes to the current system are required. The central concepts of herbal practice, in particular vitalism and holism, lead to approaches to healthcare which are potentially both costeffective and ecologically sustainable. A robust and independent profession of western herbalists, with their philosophy articulated and restored, could provide a valuable and sustainable contribution to Australian healthcare. (shrink)

The practicability of the comprehensive FSR concept is problematic. Contemporary FSR must be positioned at the point of overlap between the positivist and constructivist paradigms, which are both grounded in a continual identification with the rational-empirical consciousness, in thinking -being.Spirituality, defined as the process in which one systematically trains the receptivity to gain regular access to transcendental consciousness, emphasizes the experience of just being, of consciousness-as-such. It is an experiential spirituality, which is not based on dogmas, but on do-it-yourself techniques (...) to break the continuous spell of the rational-empirical consciousness. Such a spirituality facilitates the cultivation of societally and environmentally friendly behavior. Sustainability can be defined as the integrative 'emergent property' of experiential spirituality and rational morality based on negotiated agreements.In addition to the outward-oriented approaches of the positivist and constructivist paradigms, an inward-oriented approach, focusing on consciousness development, is recommended. Language-mediated interaction must be supported by consciousness-mediated interaction. (shrink)

A systematic theory of naturalism, bridging metaphysics and the science of complexity and emergence.

Arthur G. Tansley never accepted Frederic E. Clements’ view that succession is a developmental process whose final stage, the climax formation, is determined primarily by regional climate and that all other types of vegetation are some kind of successional stage or arrested successional stage. Tansley was convinced that in a given region a variety of environmental factors could produce different kinds of climax formations. At the heart of their dispute was Clements’ organicist view of succession, i.e., the formation was a (...) complex organism with an ontogeny and phylogeny. As early as 1905, Tansley offered an alternative to Clements’ complex organism, the quasi-organism, but Clements in private and public rejected this compromise. Tansley and other plant ecologists continued to criticize Clements’ theories for the next 20 years, but with no impact on Clements. John Phillips, a South African plant ecologist who was a follower of Clements, published a series of papers in 1934 and 1935 defending Clementsian ecology. These papers were triggered by the publication of a letter by another ecologist working in Africa who claimed that there was a strong correlation between soils and various kinds of climax vegetation, which was contrary to what was predicted by Phillips and Clements. In 1935, Tansley published an attack on Phillips and Clements and their developmental theory of succession. In it, he proposed the concept of the ecosystem as a way to get around Clements’ monoclimax theory by making the physical environment (e.g., soil chemistry, soil texture, soil moisture) as important a factor as climate, plants and other organisms in determining the composition and characteristics of ecological entities, i.e., ecosystems. Tansley’s ecosystem concept quickly replaced Clements’ monoclimax theory as a dominant paradigm in ecology. (shrink)

Integral Theory as developed by Ken Wilber and other contemporary Integral scholars acknowledge many antecedent foundational influences, and proto-Integral thinkers. Curiously, the philosopher-statesman Jan Smuts’ theory of Holism is seldom acknowledged, although it has significantly contributed, albeit often implicitly, to the development of Integral Theory. This paper and presentation has two central aims: To point out that Smuts can be counted amongst one of the great Integral thinkers of the 20th Century; that Smuts’ notion of Holism had a significant influence (...) on the development of Integral Theory. This paper and presentation will provide a brief outline of Smuts’ theory of Holism as developed in his book Holism and Evolution and other philosophical essays. (shrink)

Van der Klaauw was a professor of Descriptive Zoology in the period 1934–1958. This paper presents a concise annotated overview of his publications. In his work three main topics can be recognized: comparative anatomy of the mammalian auditory region, theoretical studies about ecology and ecological morphology, and vertebrate functional morphology. In particular van der Klaauw developed new concepts on functional morphology, based upon a holistic approach. A series of studies in functional morphology of Vertebrates by his students is added. An (...) overview of recent morphological and theoretical studies show that this new approach had a long lasting impact in studies of functional morphology. (shrink)

This paper addresses theoretical challenges, still relevant today, that arose in the first decades of the twentieth century related to the concept of the organism. During this period, new insights into the plasticity and robustness of organisms as well as their complex interactions fueled calls, especially in the UK and in the German-speaking world, for grounding biological theory on the concept of the organism. This new organism-centered biology understood organisms as the most important explanatory and methodological unit in biological investigations. (...) At least three theoretical strands can be distinguished in this movement: Organicism, dialectical materialism, and holistic biology. This paper shows that a major challenge of OCB was to describe the individual organism as a causally autonomous and discrete unit with consistent boundaries and, at the same time, as inextricably interwoven with its environment. In other words, OCB had to conciliate individualistic with anti-individualistic perspectives. This challenge was addressed by developing a concept of life that included functionalist and metabolic elements, as well as biochemical and physical ones. It allowed for specifying organisms as life forms that actively delimit themselves from the environment. Finally, this paper shows that the recent return to the concept of the organism, especially in the so-called “Extended Evolutionary Synthesis,” is challenged by similar anti-individualistic tendencies. However, in contrast to its early-twentieth-century forerunner, today’s organism-centered approaches have not yet offered a solution to this problem. (shrink)

The author rejects the theory of holism and criticises especiallyA. Meyer's works. An important starting point ofMeyer's arguments consists in the opinion that the physiologists of to day are out of days because they still want to base biology on classical physics which has been superseded by the “Quantenmechanik” . As organisms, however, are not microphysical systems — as may be proved —Meyer's arguments become futile. Also the opinion that the qualities of the whole are not determined by those of (...) the parts, but that on the contrary the whole determines the performances of its parts is rejected, since the whole can only work by influences proceeding from its parts. —Meyer's opinion that not physical but biological laws are the more generally valid results from a use of the words „more generally valid” in a sense differing from common usage. Many other results ofA. Meyer also arise through a modified use of language.L'auteur récuse la théorie du holisme et critique avant tout les travaux deA. Meyer. Un point de départ important des arguments deMeyer consiste dans l'opinion que les physiologistes d'aujourd'hui soient arriérés parce qu'ils veulent encore baser la biologie sur la physique classique qui est dépassée par la „Quantenmechanik” . Comme toutefois les organismes ne sont pas des systèmes microphysicaux, ce qui est prouvable, les arguments deMeyer sont mal assurés. Il faut aussi récuser l'opinion que les qualités du tout ne soient pas déterminées par celles des parties mais que, inversement, le tout stipule les traveaux de ses parties, puisque le tout peut seulement agir par des influences partant de ces parties. — L'opinion deMeyer, que ce ne sont pas les lois physiques mais les lois biologiques qui sont d'une validité plus générale , résulte de l'emploi des mots „validité plus générale” s'écartant de la manière de parler. Encore bien d'autres résultats deMeyer ne résultent que d'une manière de s'exprimer modifiée. (shrink)

Nineteenth century hygiene might be a confusing concept. On the one hand, the concept of hygiene was gradually becoming an important concept that was focused on cleanliness and used interchangeably with sanitation. On the other hand, the classical notions of hygiene rooted in the Hippocratic teachings remained influential. This study is about two attempts to newly theorise such a confusing concept of hygiene in the second half of the century by Edward. W. Lane and Thomas R. Allinson. Their works, standing (...) on the borders of self-help medical advice and theoretical treatises on medical philosophies, were not exactly scholarly ones, but their medical thoughts - conceptualised as _hygienic medicine_ - show a characteristically holistic medical view of hygiene, a nineteenth-century version of the reinterpretation of the nature cure philosophy and vitalism. However, the aim of this study is to properly locate their conceptualisations of hygienic medicine within the historical context of the second half of the nineteenth century rather than to simply introduce the medical ideas in their books. Their views of hygiene were distinguished not only from the contemporary sanitary approach but also from similar attempts by contemporary orthodox and unorthodox medical doctors. Through a chronological analysis of changes in the concept of hygiene and a comparative analysis of these two authors’ and other medical professionals’ views of hygiene, this paper aims to help understand the complicated picture of nineteenth-century hygiene, particularly during the second half of the century, from the perspective of medical holism and reductionism. (shrink)

Humanity is facing a crisis of survival. In order to save humanity and nature, we must rebuild their foundations. This paper proposes integral studies and integral practices as a possible new paradigm for the 21st century. First, we investigated the necessity of integral studies and integral practices, which were suggested by the following three evidences: (1) limitations of the Spiritual Revolution and modern philosophy, (2) limitations of the Scientific Revolution and modern science, and (3) contemporary practical problems that threaten the (...) future of humanity and nature. Second, we investigated the purpose and the principle of integral studies and integral practices from a viewpoint of the nature of both human beings and universe. One of the fundamental questions for humanity is how to overcome the egoism of individuals as well as the entire human race. In this avenue, we think the first step is to transcend toraware, which is a Japanese word meaning both “states of being caught” and “what catches us”. The state of being caught manifests itself when the ego emerges while we begin to distinguish between the self and others. Therefore, integrity and intrinsic nature become principles of integral studies and integral practices. Consequently, integral studies and integral practices serve for the sake of nature including humanity. Third, we discussed the methodology of integral studies and integral practices. We argue its core is integral exploration and reframing of the self and others, ourselves and the world (universe), and humanity and nature. It consequently reveals integrity and harmonizes intellect, emotion, and volition as well as goodness, truth, and beauty while revealing integrity and opening up or unfolding the intrinsic nature of the individual and the collective. Finally, we addressed limitations and future agendas of integral studies and integral practices. We suggest it is essential to raise and discuss fundamental questions on humanity and nature as well as to elucidate the truly unknown, which cannot be understood within existing frameworks. However, whether it is correct or not will come to be verified over time. No one in the history of humanity has ever attained universal truth, which is absolutely true in light of absolute criteria that are not relativized by differences in space, time, or people, or which is absolutely true even without referring to any criteria. Therefore, it is necessary for each of us to discern what is right and maintain a critical gaze. (shrink)

Es wird der Nachweis versucht, dass es — ebenso wie in der Physik — auch in der Biologie komplementäre Erkenntnissysteme gibt. Wie Welle und Korpuskel in der Physik, so sind innerhalb der Biologie u.a. Form und Funktion, Innenwelt und Umwelt sowie auch vor allem Vererbung und Anpassung komplementäre Begriffsgefüge. Das wird im einzelnen diskutiert und nachgewiesen.Für die Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit im Ganzen folgt daraus, dass systematisch aufgebaute Erkenntnisgefüge nur in Teilbereichen des Wirklichen möglich sind — nur in der klassischen Mechanik, (...) der Elektrodynamik, der vergleichenden Anatomie, der Genetik usw. — Das Wirkliche in seiner Gesamthet hingegen besitzt keine systematische sondern nur eine historisch-dialektische Struktur. Metaphysisch bedeutet das, dass das Wesen der Wirklichkeit in schöpferischer Freiheit im Sinne etwaGoethes, aber nicht in sturer Notwendigkeit besteht.Se demuestra que — como en laFisica — tambien en la Biologia existen complementarios sistemas de conocimiento. Como onda y corpúsculo dentro de la Fisica, asi son dentro de la Biologia entre otros forma y función, mundo internoy ambientey en primer lugar también herencia y adaptación principios complementarios. Esto será discutido y demonstrado en sus particularidades.Para el conocimiento de la realidad como totalidad sigue de tales consideraciones la conclusión que conocimientos sistematicamente construidos son posibles solo en esferas particulares de la realidad — como p.e. en la mecánica racional, en la electrodinámica, en la anatomia comparada, en la genética etc. —. Lo real en su totalidad posee al contrario ninguna estructura sistemática sino solo un históricadialectica. Metafisicamente hablado significa esto que la esencia de la realidad consiste en una libertad creativa en el sentido deGoethe, pero de ninguna manera en una necesidad absoluta en el sentido deSpinoza. (shrink)

The political engagement of scientists is not necessarily left-wing, and even when it is, it can take widely varying forms. This is illustrated by the specific character of Dutch scientific activism in the 1930s and 40s, which took shape in a society where ‘pillarized’ social divisions were more important than horizontal class structure. This paper examines how, within this context, the Delft physicist Jan Burgers developed a version of scientific politics, built on a philosophy of value-laden science.

In this paper it is argued that nurses should be holists whilst at the same time accepting that ‘holism’ is a contentious concept. One of the problems for a supporter of holism is that of which holism -- an attempt to outline the version of holism advocated is made by identifying only two versions of holism: The Strong theory and the Pragmatic theory of holism. By introducing this device it is hoped to avoid, if only by stipulation, some of the (...) more sophisticated nuances of holism drawn by other commentators. However despite a most judicious use of Ockham's Razor some detailed groundwork remains. In the first part of this paper a simple example is used which aims to articulate what are arguably some of the central issues within the holism debate. These issues are then placed within a wider philosophical context. The second part of the paper will offer definitions of Strong and Pragmatic holism. Drawing on specific examples from the nursing context it will be argued that the Pragmatic theory of holism is the theory of holism most compatible with nursing theory and practice. The methods employed in this paper are philosophical. Since the questions considered are conceptual rather than empirical requiring a discursive approach, utilising thought experiments and case implication to explore the issues. (shrink)

Ziel der Abhandlung ist die Untersuchung der grundlegenden Prinzipien einer autonombiologischen Kausalität. Wenn die Biologie in autonomer Weise auf ihr gemässe Prinzipien gegründet werden soll —wie das die Physik in ihrer Sphäre auch durchgeführt hat —, dann muss das biologische Denken sich zunächst von einem Idol befreien, das ihr von der klassischen Physik aufgezwungen ist. Das ist der Begriff des „Mechanismus”, der bei seiner Schaffung gewiss von grossem Werte auch für die Biologie gewesen ist, der aber heute dem biologischen Denken (...) grossen Schaden dadurch zufügt, dass er es in eine ihm völlig fremde Richtung zwängt.Die Organismen und alle ihre Organe von der einfachsten Zellorganelle bis zum komplexesten Organsystem sind aber keine Mechanismen sondern Holismen . Es wird versucht, die wesentlichen Kriterien des Holismusprinzips zu bestimmen. Zunächst gilt für sie das Axiom von v.Ehrenfels, demzufolge jeder Holismus „mehr ist als die Summe seiner Teile”. Das wird im einzelnen genauer analysiert. Weiterhin gilt für Holismen das Kompensationsprinzip vonGoethe. Damit im Zusammenhang stehen die Prinzipien der „spezifischen Energie” vonJohannes Müller, das Prinzip vonRedi , das Prinzip vonVernadsky über die Konstanz der Biosphäre, das Prinzip der phylogenetischen Kompensationen und das Prinzip von der „Ektropie” der Biosphäre.Alle diese Prinzipien werden im einzelnen diskutiert und analysiert. In engstem Zusammenhang miteinander bilden sie ein autonomes Axiomengefüge für die Biologische Erkenntnis, durch welches wiederum die eigentümlich „biologische Kausalität” charakterisiert ist. Genau in diesem Sinne sind Holismen „verae causae” .El presente ensayo tiene por fin supremo la investigación de los principios basicos de una autónoma causalidad biologica. Si se quiere fundar la Biologia en sus propios principios autónomos —como se lo ha hecho también con la Fisica misma —, entonces será primeramente necesario que la Biologia se delibera de una ideologia completamente extraña para ella, la cual la Fisica clásica le ha transferido. Esto es el concepto del “mecanismo”, que en su origin ha sido de gran valor también para la Biologia, pero que hoydia produce enorme daño a la Biologia.Los organismos y todos sus órganos de la mas simple organela celular hasta el mas complicado sistema de órganos sin embargo de ninguna manera no son mecanismos sino al contrario holismos . Ahora se ensaya de determinar los criterios esenciales del principio del holismo. Primero es valido para los holismos el axioma de v.Ehrenfels que dice que cada Organismo representa “más que la suma de sus partes”. Además vale para holismos el principio de la compensación deGoethe. Con esto están relacionados los principios de la “energia especifica” deJuan Müller, el axioma deRedi , el principio deVernadsky acerca de la constancia de la biósfera, el principio de las compensaciones filogenéticas y el principio de la “ectropia” de la biósfera.Todos los mencionados principios y axiomas serán discutidos y analizados en sus particularidades. En su conjunto representan ellos un sistema de axiomas autónomos para el conocimiento biológico, el cual como tal caracteriza también la asi llamada causalidad biologica. Precisamente en tal sentido son los holismos “verae causae”. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe problem addressed in this paper is the need for fresh resources for enhanced ethical leadership in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa. To respond to that problem the paper uses two valuable but insufficiently known sources from the culture of the Sesotho-speaking people of southern Africa, now found in Lesotho and much of South Africa's Free State province. The first one is a set of concepts that pertain to sound human relationships. The second one is Basotho history in the (...) persons of the founding monarch of the Basotho nation, King Moshoeshoe I and to a lesser extent his remarkable mentor, Chief Mohlomi. A final section of this paper draws these sources together into a set of contentions about successful leadership in which ethical quality is seen as paramount. (shrink)

In the 1930s, two concepts excited the European biological community: the organizer phenomenon and organicism. This essay examines the history of and connection between these two phenomena in order to address the conventional ‘rise-and-fall’ narrative that historians have assigned to each. Scholars promoted the ‘rise-and-fall’ narrative in connection with a broader account of the devitalizing of biology through the twentieth century. I argue that while limited evidence exists for the ‘fall of the organizer concept’ by the 1950s, the organicism that (...) often motivated the organizer work had no concomitant fall – even during the mid-century heyday of molecular biology. My argument is based on an examination of shifting social networks of life scientists from the 1920s to the 1970s, many of whom attended or corresponded with members of the Cambridge Theoretical Biology Club (1932–1938). I conclude that the status and cohesion of these social networks at the micro scale was at least as important as macro-scale conceptual factors in determining the relative persuasiveness of organicist philosophy. (shrink)

This article challenges the neo-Darwinist physicalist position assumed by currently prevalent naturalizing accounts of consciousness. It suggests instead an evolutionary understanding of cognitive emergence and an acceptance of mental capacity as a phenomenon in its own right, differing qualitatively from, although not independent of, the physical and material world. I argue that if we accept that consciousness is an adaptation enabling survival through immediate individual intuition of the world, we may accept this metaphysics as a given. Methodological focus can then (...) shift to investigating the, as yet untheorized, nature of consciousness itself as capacity/interconnectivity/potential. The article accepts Joseph Margolis's recent advocacy of a pragmatist approach that is "natural but not naturalizable" , that is, an anti-reductionist as opposed to an eliminativist position, but it seeks to develop this position further and to give it new direction. (shrink)

This article situates Nathaniel Branden's unique contributions to clinical psychology in the cognitive and behavioral therapy traditions, and describes ways in which Brandenian concepts were prefigured in the work of Alfred Adler and have been echoed in the work of modern behavior therapists, most notably Steven Hayes and Marsha Linehan. A dialectical sensibility common to all these contributors is noted. The article concludes with a reflection on Branden's sociological fate, offering an analogy between Freud's rejection of Adler and Milton Erickson's (...) rejection of Branden, reported here in print for the first time. (shrink)

During the last thirty years, both the mechanism and the vitalism has undergone remarkable changes. While the former, persisting in the strictly mechanistic thesis, has grown independent of its ancient antiteleological attitude, the latter, overcome as the doctrine of “entelechy”, has turned out fruitful owing to its other component, i.e. to the idea of autonomy of life. To-day, then, the contention takes place between two totally different points of view, between “machinism” and “autonomism”. Both interpretations of life are equally theories, (...) and not descriptions of pure facts; both are, also, metaphysical thesis.Le mécanisme ainsi que le vitalisme a subi des changements remarquables pendant les trente années dernières. Alors que le premier, tout en restant fidèle à la thèse strictement „mécaniste”, est devenu indépendant de son attitude antifinaliste d'autrefois, le vitalisme, surmonté en tant que la doctrine sur l'entélechie, s'est montré fructueux par son autre composante, c'est-à-dire, par l'idée de l'autonomie de la vie. Ainsi, c'est le „machinisme” et l'„autonomisme”, revÊtu du holisme, qui sont en dispute aujourd'hui. Toutes les deux interprétations de la vie sont également des théories, et non pas des pures descriptions de faits; elles sont aussi, toutes deux des thèses métaphysiques. (shrink)

Despite the continuous emphasis on globalization, we witness increasing divisions and divisiveness in all domains of human activities. One of the reasons, if not the main one, is the intellectual fragmentation of humanity, compared in the title to the failed attempt at building the Biblical Tower of Babel. The attempts to reintegrate worldview, fragmented by the specialization of education (C.P. Snow’s The Two Cultures) and expected to be achieved through reforms in curricula at all levels of education, were based on (...) the assumption that the design of a curriculum should focus on the wide distribution of subjects of study, as if the distribution was the goal. The key point is not the distribution of themes, but the development of skills in the integration of knowledge. The quantitative assessment of the width of knowledge by the number of disciplines is of secondary importance. We cannot expect the miracle that students without any intellectual tools developed for this purpose would perform the job of integration, which their teachers do not promote or demonstrate, and which they cannot achieve for themselves. There are many other reasons for the increasing interest in making inquiries interdisciplinary, but there is little progress in the methodology of the integration of knowledge. This paper is a study of the transition from multidisciplinarity to interdisciplinarity, and further, to transdisciplinarity, with some suggestions regarding the use of methodological tools of structuralism and the choice of a conceptual framework. (shrink)