- (13 other versions)Leviathan.Thomas Hobbes - 1936 - Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books. Edited by C. B. Macpherson.details
|
|
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..details
|
|
(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The limits of morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.Douglas W. Portmore - 2011 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Leviathan.Thomas Hobbes - 2007 - In Aloysius Martinich, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Early Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
|
|
A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
|
|
(5 other versions)The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1932 - The Monist 42:157.details
|
|
The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
|
|
Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action.Joseph Raz - 1999 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
(5 other versions)The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - International Journal of Ethics 41 (3):343-351.details
|
|
Whether and Where to Give.Theron Pummer - 2016 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 44 (1):77-95.details
|
|
Contrastive Reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2017 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
What makes reasons sufficient?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):159-170.details
|
|
Oughts and ends.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):315 - 340.details
|
|
Supererogation, Sacrifice, and the Limits of Duty.Alfred Archer - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):333-354.details
|
|
Normative strength and the balance of reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.details
|
|
Reasons for and reasons against.Justin Snedegar - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):725-743.details
|
|
An Opinionated Guide to the Weight of Reasons.Barry Maguire & Errol Lord - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
On the law of war and peace.Hugo Grotius - unknowndetails
|
|
Supererogation.Alfred Archer - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (3):e12476.details
|
|
(1 other version)Making Comparisons Count.Ruth Chang - 2001 - New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Supererogation Across Normative Domains.Brian McElwee - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):505-516.details
|
|
Particular Reasons.Selim Berker - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):109-139.details
|
|
Kantian Ethics and Supererogation.Marcia Baron - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (5):237.details
|
|
Reasons, oughts, and requirements.Justin Snedegar - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:155-181.details
|
|
How to say ought in foreign: The composition of weak necessity modals.Kai von Fintel - manuscriptdetails
|
|
(1 other version)Enticing reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 2005 - In Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophy-Science -Scientific Philosophy, Main Lectures and Colloquia of GAP 5, Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy. Mentis. pp. 10-32.details
|
|
Must I do what I ought (or will the least I can do do)?Paul McNamara - 1996 - In Mark Brown & Jose' Carmo (eds.), Deontic Logic, Agency and Normative Systems. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. pp. 154-173.details
|
|
Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason.Michael Byron (ed.) - 2004 - New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Competing Reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Asymmetrical Practical Reasons.Patricia Greenspan - 2005 - In Maria E. Reicher & Johan C. Marek (eds.), Experience and Analysis, The Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Öbv&hpt. pp. 387-94.details
|
|
(1 other version)Brute rationality.Joshua Gert - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):417–446.details
|
|
(1 other version)Brute Rationality.Joshua Gert - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):145-146.details
|
|
Comparative Value and the Weight of Reasons.Itai Sher - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (1):103-158.details
|
|
Why ethical satisficing makes sense and rational satisficing doesn't.James Dreier - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-154.details
|
|
Beyond Optimizing. A Study of Rational Choice.Michael Slote - 1992 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 54 (2):359-359.details
|
|
Passing the Deontic Buck.Matt Bedke - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 128.details
|
|
Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives.Justin Snedegar - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):682-702.details
|
|
(1 other version)Practical Reasons and Moral "Ought".Patricia Greenspan - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:172-199.details
|
|
In Defence of Non-Deontic Reasons.Margaret Olivia Little - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Making room for options : moral reasons, imperfect duties, and choice.Patricia Greenspan - 2010 - In Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Moral obligation. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Practical Reasons and Moral 'Ought'.Patricia Greenspan - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press. pp. 172-194.details
|
|
How to be a Deontic Buck-Passer.Euan K. H. Metz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3193-3211.details
|
|