It might seem quite commonplace to say that Aristotle identifies fire, air, water and earth as the στοιχεῖα, or ‘elements’ – or, to be more precise, as the elements of bodies that are subject to generation and corruption. Yet there is a tradition of interpretation, already evident in the work of the sixth-century commentator John Philoponus and widespread, indeed prevalent, today, according to which Aristotle does not really believe that fire, air, water and earth are truly elemental. The basic premise (...) of this interpretation is that Aristotle takes fire, air, water and earth to be, in some sense, composite bodies and, as such, analysable into simpler constituents. But, of course, an element of bodies is defined by Aristotle himself as something into which bodies can be analysed, and which does not admit further analysis . So if fire, air, water and earth can be analysed into simpler or more basic constituents, then it would seem to follow that the latter ought to be considered Aristotle's true elements. These are usually identified as the primary contraries hot and cold, dry and wet; many, perhaps most, commentators would insist also upon prime matter as the subject upon which these contraries act. (shrink)

Both literalism, the view that mathematical objects simply exist in the empirical world, and fictionalism, the view that mathematical objects do not exist but are rather harmless fictions, have been both ascribed to Aristotle. The ascription of literalism to Aristotle, however, commits Aristotle to the unattractive view that mathematics studies but a small fragment of the physical world; and there is evidence that Aristotle would deny the literalist position that mathematical objects are perceivable. The ascription of fictionalism also faces a (...) difficult challenge: there is evidence that Aristotle would deny the fictionalist position that mathematics is false. I argue that, in Aristotle's view, the fiction of mathematics is not to treat what does not exist as if existing but to treat mathematical objects with an ontological status they lack. This form of fictionalism is consistent with holding that mathematics is true. (shrink)

Aristotle's use of the phrase τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεȋα is usually taken as evidence that he does not really think that the things to which this phrase refers, namely, fire, air, water, and earth, are genuine elements. In this paper I question the linguistic and textual grounds for taking the phrase τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεȋα in this way. I offer a detailed examination of the significance of the phrase, and in particular I compare Aristotle's general use of the Greek participle καλούμενος (-η, (...) -ον) in other contexts. I conclude that his use of the phrase τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεȋα does not carry ironical or sceptical connotations, and that it ought to be understood as a neutral report of a contemporary opinion that the elements of bodies are fire, air, water, and earth. I leave aside the question as to whether or not Aristotle himself endorses this opinion. (shrink)

The current debate over Aristotle's commitment to prime matter is centered on diachronic considerations found in his theory of substantial change. I argue that an appeal to this theory is not required in order to establish his commitment to the existence of prime matter. By drawing on Physics II.1's conception of what it is for an element to have a nature - that is, to have an inner source of movement and rest - I introduce a synchronic justification for the (...) existence of prime matter. By trading on the relationship between the thing that has a source of change and the source it has , I show that something that has a source in itself cannot be identical with its source, and that a type of matter that has no nature of its own (a kind of prime matter) is required to block this identification at the level of the elements. (shrink)

Hylomorphism and related to it classical concept of the human soul—understood as a substantial form of the human being—are traditionally supported and commented on by the followers of the Aristotelian-Thomistic thought, both in its classical and contemporary approach. At the same time, hylomorphism has recently found a new group of followers, coming from the circles of analytic metaphysics, unrelated to the classical school of thought. This article strives to answer the question of the relation of the new, analytic versions of (...) hylomorphism to its classical definition. Moreover, it also analyzes their application in the debate concerning the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind, as well as the question of their reference to the concept of the human soul. It seems that the mereological and structural reinterpretation of the material and the formal causes departs considerably from the classical definition of hylomorphism. Moreover, the suggestion of William Jaworski – who argues in favor of the new hylomorphism in the mind-body debate – to define mental phenomena as “structured manifestations of powers” belonging to the parts of human body, not only raises some serious metaphysical concerns, but also seems to leave no “space” for the classical concept of human soul. These difficulties notwithstanding, one should appreciate an attempt of the proponents of the new analytic hylomorphism at finding an alternative to the extreme positions of substance or property dualism and eliminative or reductionist materialism in the contemporary discussion concerning the mind-body problem. (shrink)

Este artículo subraya la incidencia de un componente temporal en la doctrina aristotélica de la sustancia y las categorías en la medida en que la distinción sustancia-accidentes se refiere no sólo a la oposición lógica entre el sujeto y el predicado, sino también a la oposición real entre el sujeto de cambio y sus determinaciones. El argumento se basa en la interpretación de importantes pasajes de Cat. 5, Phys. I, 7 y IV 10-14.

Vacuum Genesis and Spontaneous Emergence of the Universe from Nothing in Reference to the Classical Notion of Causality and Creation ex nihilo The article discousses philosophical and theological reflections inspired by the cosmological model of the origin of the universe from quantum vacuum through quantum tunneling and the model presented by Hartle and Hawking. In the context of the thesis about the possibility of cosmogenesis ex nihilo without the need of God the creator, the question is being raised concerning the (...) ontological status of nothingness and of the laws of nature in the aforementioned models. After pointing to the fact that they do not imply an absolute nothingness in the philosophical sense, the main objectives of both models and philosophical-theological conclusions they inspire are interpreted in the light of the classical principles of potency and act, theory of causation and chance events in nature, elements of classical theology of creation and the classification of sciences in terms of various levels of abstraction, proposed by Aquinas. Noting the fact that some cosmologists cross methodological boundaries of their science, we emphasize the role and significance of their research in a deeper understanding of the philosophical aspects of the origins of the universe, especially the role of potency in the first stages of its existence and evolution. (shrink)

In his metaphysics and natural philosophy, Aristotle uses the concept of a material cause,i.e., that from which something can be made or generated. This paper argues that Aristotle also has a concept of matter in the sense of physical stuff. Aristotle develops this concept of matter in the course of investigating the material causes of perceptible substances. Because of the requirements for change, locomotion, and the physical interaction of material objects, Aristotle holds that all perceptible substances must be extended in (...) three dimensions, movable, and corporeal due to their material causes. Thus, perceptible substances are physical substances because they are made out of something physical. (shrink)

Aristotle takes up the topic of change (or coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be) in both the Physics and De Generatione et Corruptione. He distinguishes between simple coming-to-be (substantial change), as when something comes into existence, and qualified coming-to-be (accidental change), as when an already existing thing alters, or moves, or changes in some other way. But he also maintains a persistence principle: that in every change, whether simple or qualified, there is something that persists throughout the change. I examine the question of (...) whether this principle threatens the viability of the distinction between substantial and accidental change by comparing what Aristotle has to say about it in the Physics with what he says in GC. In the process, I discuss several recent treatments of the topic as well as some conflicting views about the role, if any, of prime matter in Aristotle's account of substantial change. (shrink)

Near the beginning of De Gen. et Cor. II.1, Aristotle claims that the generation and corruption of all naturally constituted substances are “not without the perceptible bodies”. It is not clear what he intends by this. In this paper I offer a new interpretation of this assertion. I argue that the assumption behind the usual reading, namely, that these “perceptible bodies” ought to be distinguished from the naturally constituted substances, is flawed, and that the assertion is best understood as a (...) claim that Aristotle has established in the second half of the first book of the De Gen. et Cor. (shrink)