Epictetus' thought is defined by an antithesis of mine and not-mine, which is an antithesis of externals and self. From this arise a number of questions for Epictetus‘ theology, which are addressed in this paper: How is the self delimited from God, given that God is all-pervading? Is God inside or outside the self? In which way is God the cause, creator and shaper of the self? And how does human agency and self-shaping through prohairesis spell out within this determinst (...) framework? If, as will become apparent in the discussion of the previous questions, the shape and activities of human selves originate from God and should be perfectly aligned with God, in which sense is there still a separate, individual human self? (shrink)

The volume contains 11 contributions of the best experts on the topics of fate, fortune and free will, in reference to Ancient Philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, Epicureanism, Plotinus.

Resumen El propósito del presente ensayo es explorar la comprensión de technê que Epícteto asocia con la expresión technê peri bion ("arte/técnica de la vida"), utilizada por él para determinar tanto la "materia" de la que se debe ocupar la filosofía como el tipo de actividad que ha de aplicarse a dicha materia. Con base en dicha exploración, el ensayo defiende la tesis de que la filosofía de Epícteto acusa un cierto talante individualista que la acerca a conocidas variantes modernas (...) de la filosofía como arte de vivir.It is the purpose of this essay to inquire into the understanding of technê which Epictetus links with the expression technê peri bion ("art of living") used by him to determine both the (subject-) "matter" with which philosophy deals and the kind of activity to be duly applied to such matter. Based upon this inquiry, the essay upholds the thesis that Epictetus' philosophy bares an individualist spirit close to well-known modern versions of philosophy as an art of living. (shrink)

Does the Stoic school really, accepting fate, reject free will? It would seem so, mainly if we read the evidences of Zeno or Chrysippus. The Stoic Senecais central to this particular theoretical inquiry, which hinges on the concepts of causality, of determinism and responsibility.

In his A Treatise of Freewill, Ralph Cudworth argues against Stoic determinism by drawing on what he takes to be other concepts found in Stoicism, notably the claim that some things are ?up to us? and that these things are the product of our choice. These concepts are central to the late Stoic Epictetus and it appears at first glance as if Cudworth is opposing late Stoic voluntarism against early Stoic determinism. This paper argues that in fact, despite his claim (...) to be drawing on Stoic doctrine, Cudworth uses these terms with a meaning first articulated only later, by the Peripatetic commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se sostiene que la filosofía práctica de Aristóteles puede dar lugar a dos sentidos distintos de προαίρεσις, los cuales se encuentran relacionados a su vez con dos sentidos distintos de deliberación. El primer sentido de προαίρεσις hace referencia a las elecciones deliberadas particulares, en las que el fin que se busca alcanzar, el deseo relacionado y los medios empleados son de carácter particular y se encuentran circunscritos a la situación concreta en que se realiza la elección. (...) En cambio, el segundo sentido de προαίρεσις se refiere a las elecciones vinculadas con objetivos de mediano y largo plazo, que si bien pueden ser particulares, buscan fines que trascienden la particularidad de la situación dada. Al primer tipo de προαίρεσις le corresponde la "deliberación descendente", mientras que al segundo le corresponde la "deliberación ascendente". Finalmente se presenta un análisis de las características del silogismo práctico de acuerdo a los dos tipos de deliberación. (shrink)

The paper aims to clarify some features of Epictetus ' specific usage of the concept of proairesis throughout his Discourses. This will be done by suggesting that a number of problematic expressions concerning proairesis and its freedom should be understood as rhetorical-pedagogical expressions of Epictetus ' intellec-tualism. I will mainly focus on a series of problematic passages that have been discussed by several commentators concerning the concept of proairesis, and I will suggest that those passages are best interpreted as rhetorical (...) or, better, pedagogical expressions of Epictetus ' strictly intellectualist approach to the psychology of action. The interpretation I will propose does away with the need to resort to certain interpretations of those passages that threaten to obscure the otherwise clear picture of human action offered by Epictetus ' intellectualism concerning the psychology of action. El articulo tiene por objetivo clarificar algunos aspectos del uso especifico que realiza Epicteto a lo largo de las Dissertationes del concepto de proairesis. Esto se realizara sugiriendo que ciertas expresiones problematicas referidas a la proairesis y su libertad deben ser entendidas como expresiones retorico-pedagogicas del intelectualismo de Epicteto. Me concentrare fundamentalmente en una serie de pasajes problematicos que han sido discutidos por varios comentadores en relacion con el concepto de proairesis, y sugerire que esos pasajes deben ser interpretados como expresiones retoricas o, mejor, pedagogicas de enfoque estrictamente inte-lectualista de la psicologia humana que propone Epicteto. La interpretacion que propondre hace innecesario el recurso a ciertas interpretaciones de esos parajes que amenazan con oscurecer el panorama claro de la accion humana ofrecido por la concepcion intelectualista de la psicologia humana defendida por Epicteto. (shrink)

En la obra que ahora presentamos al público hispanoparlante, reunimos diez trabajos previamente publicados en lengua italiana que abordan importantes cuestiones que ocupan en este momento a los estudiosos de la filosofía helenística y romana. Sus autores son diez de los más importantes especialistas italianos actuales en el estudio de este periodo histórico.

ABSTRACTThis chapter looks briefly at the religious roots of the notion of ‘conscience’ in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, before examining the rise in the early-modern period of a ‘naturalizing’ approach that tries to explain our moral capacities in purely empirical terms, by reference to our natural inclinations and drives. The problem with this approach, highlighted by Joseph Butler, is that it fails to account for the authority or ‘normativity’ of the deliverances of conscience. An examination of the naturalistic approaches of J.S. (...) Mill, Charles Darwin and Sigmund Freud shows that none of them manages to escape the difficulty. It is suggested in conclusion that only a traditional theistic framework may be adequate for doing justice to the role of conscience in our lives. (shrink)