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Introduction

Matthew Soteriou

In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press (2009)

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What is ‘mental action’?Yair Levy - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):971-993.details There has been a resurgence of interest lately within philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental act/bodily act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition, which arguably further undermine the credibility of the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
Action Unified.Yair Levy - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):65-83.details Mental acts are conspicuously absent from philosophical debates over the nature of action. A typical protagonist of a typical scenario is far more likely to raise her arm or open the window than she is to perform a calculation in her head or talk to herself silently. One possible explanation for this omission is that the standard ‘causalist’ account of action, on which acts are analyzed in terms of mental states causing bodily movements, faces difficulties in accommodating some paradigmatic cases (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 11 citations
Biased by our imaginings.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (5):627-647.details I propose a new model of implicit bias, according to which implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings. I begin by endorsing a principle of parsimony when confronted with unfamiliar phenomena. I introduce implicit bias in terms congenial to what most philosophers and psychologists have said about their nature in the literature so far, before moving to a discussion of the doxastic model of implicit bias and objections to it. I then introduce unconscious imagination and argue that appeal to it (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 19 citations
Mental Activity & the Sense of Ownership.Adrian Alsmith - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):881-896.details I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 22 citations
Mental Actions and Mental Agency.Anika Fiebich & John Michael - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):683-693.details Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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