I argue in this paper that Gorgias’ Helen has a didactic element that has been overlooked by contemporary critique. I show in section I that Gorgias’ presents a commonsensical pattern of argumentation (the Gods and physical violence) to prepare the reader to the following digressions on logos and on love. I analyze in section II the argument on logos and argue that its reasoning structure depends on the two previous arguments, i.e., that Gorgias transforms logos into a sort of violence. (...) I argue in section III that the argument on love depends on the same transformation. In the end, I show that Helen is both a coherent and a didactic speech. (shrink)

In his Encomium of Helen, Gorgias provides us with a variety of arguments in order to show that Helen was not to be held accountable for having eloped with Paris. The main thesis advanced in this article is that these arguments, despite their apparent diversity, are given a unitary structure by the concept of force, and by the analogy that Gorgias estalishes between persuasion, the emotions, and sense-perception on the one hand, and this concept on the other. If this argument (...) is successful, it shows that practically none of our actions are such that we are morally responsible for them. I discuss the cogency of this argument in connection with Aristotle’s objections to it. (shrink)

Plato's dialogues show discourse strategies beyond purely intellectual methods of persuasion. The usual assumption is that linguistic understanding depends on a match of inner experiences. This is partly explained by an underlying engagement with the historical Gorgias on discourse and psychology, as well as Parmenides on philosophical logos. In the "Gorgias" and the "Symposium," speakers cannot understand alien experiences by philosophical conversation alone. There is no developed alternative model of understanding in the Platonic dialogues. The difficulties in bringing 'philistine souls' (...) into Socratic alignment are the result of possessing an inferior soul, suffering misdirected passions, or missing the philosophy bug. (shrink)

The article argues that the doctrine of Gorgias of Leontinoi, as expressed in his "Encomion of Helen", is not a rhetorical technique but a practice of moral education. The medium of this "ethical speech practice" is perceptual forms, its basic mode being the practice of showing or epideictic speech. The crucial standard of this practice is "epideictic rightness", which is identical to Gorgias’ conception of "truth.". According to this conception, speech is true if it exemplifies morally right conduct and moral (...) beauty. True speech in this sense must also be effective speech, since it will promote right behaviour in the future. (shrink)

What role, if any, does dialectic play in Aristotle’s epistemology in the Topics? In this paper I argue that it does play a role, but a role that is independent of endoxa. In the first section, I sketch the case for thinking that dialectic plays a distinctively epistemological role—not just a methodological role, or a merely instrumental role in getting episteme. In the second section, I consider three ways it could play that role, on two of which endoxa play at (...) least a co-starring role. But in the third section, I argue that endoxa don’t play that co-starring role, by arguing for a deflationary account of what endoxa are. For that reason, the third view emerges as the most plausible; but the third view is, I’ll suggest, Platonic. (shrink)

The label idios apodeixis/logos «particular demonstration or argument» of Gorgias is known to us only from the third section of the little work attributed to Aristotle under the title De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. Its authenticity seems to be unjustly questioned. We try to show that from the Aristotelian perspective we can properly understand the context of Gorgias’ own argument from his lost treatise On Not-Being or On Nature. Parmenides – using implicitly the polysemy of the verb ἔστιν/εἶναι – presented a (...) certain ontological argument «being is, because being is being». Gorgias, however, makes a parody of this by offering a meontological argument: «not-being is because not-being is not-being». Consequently Gorgias then attempts to demonstrate, by means of refutation, that «it is not either to be or not be», i.e. «nothing is». We propose, thus, a reconstruction of Gorgias’ account of meonological and nihilistic argumentation. In this context we find in Plato’s Sophist and in Aristotle’s writings certain allusions to Gorgias’ idios apodeixis, which have not been sufficiently recognized and properly interpreted. (shrink)

Sophists and rhetoricians like Gorgias are often accused of disregarding truth and rationality: their speeches seem to aim only at effective persuasion, and be constrained by nothing but persuasiveness itself. In his extant texts Gorgias claims that language does not represent external objects or communicate internal states, but merely generates behavioural responses in people. It has been argued that this perspective erodes the possibility of rationally assessing speeches by making persuasiveness the only norm, and persuasive power the only virtue, of (...) speech. Against this view, I show how Gorgias’ texts support a robust normativity of language that goes well beyond persuasion while remaining non-representational. Gorgias’ claims that a speech can be persuasive and false, or true and unpersuasive, reveal pragmatic, epistemic, and agonistic constraints on the validity of speech that are neither representational nor reducible to sheer persuasiveness. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to investigate Gorgias’ argument against motion, which is found in his Peri tou mē ontos and preserved only in MXG 980a1˗8. I tried to shed new light both on this specific reflection and on the reliability of Pseudo-Aristotle’s version. By exploring the so called “change argument” and the “argument from divisibility", I focused on the particular strategy used by the Sophist in his synthetikē apodeixis, which should be investigated in relation to the dispute between (...) monistic and pluralistic ontology. In this regard, the puzzle from “divisibility everywhere” and its connection with the void as not-being can provide new elements to grasp the philosophical background in which the Sophist moves. On the one hand, Gorgias’ argument against motion is part of a broader dispute on the divisibility/indivisibility of being; on the other, his original elaboration of this puzzle seems to be perfectly understandable within the controversy between Eleatics and Atomists, and coherent with the argumentative style of the Sophist. (shrink)

Imagine the following situation: an act of violent assault has been committed. And there are only two possible suspects, of which one is a small and weak man and the other a big and strong man. The weak man will plead that he is not strong enough and therefore not likely to have committed the crime, which seems reasonable straight away. But there will also be a loophole for the strong man, as Aristotle tells us, who reports exactly that story (...) in book 2, chapter 24, of his Rhetoric. And he also has a name to assign to the inventor of that kind of argument (1402a17–20):The Art of Corax is composed of this topic. For if a man is not likely to be guilty of what he is accused of, for instance if, being weak, he is .. (shrink)

It is often assumed that the concept of alētheia, or ‘truth’, in Gorgias of Leontini belongs to the art of rhetoric. Along these lines, it is usually understood as an aesthetic concept or even a mere ‘adornment’ of speech. In this paper, it is argued, by contrast, that Gorgianic alētheia is a definable criterion of speech figuring in the practice of moral educa­tion. While the ‘truth’ of a logos indeed has to be assessed on aesthetic grounds, the underlying concept of (...) alētheia is predominantly ethical. For Gorgias, speech is ‘true’ when it promotes virtue (aretē) by being expressive of virtue. The principle stated in the opening passage of the Encomium of Helen, that a speaker has ‘to praise what is praiseworthy and to blame what is blameworthy’, explains precisely this understand­ing of alētheia. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta algumas considerações gorgianas sobre a retórica a fim de contrabalançar a visão da retórica clássica exposta por John Bender e David Wellbery, no interior de suas cinco teses históricas sobre o ressurgimento contemporâneo dessa arte e seu enfraquecimento na Modernidade. Depois de breve introdução ao tema, explico as teses de tais autores, seu conceito de retoricidade e sua concepção da retórica clássica. Analiso então aspectos da retórica grega e três teses de Górgias que contrabalançam a concepção dos (...) autores: a) a indeterminação genérica da retórica, b) a instanciação do discurso sobre a verdade/conhecimento e c) a sua aplicação a contextos não-técnicos e desinstitucionalizados. Minha conclusão é de que Górgias está muito mais próximo de uma situação de “retoricidade” do que julgam tais autores. (shrink)