In this paper concerns the adequacy of competing models of the people in the sociological, socio-economic and socio-biological theory tradition for the explanation of complex social phenomena. It is proposed that in the mainstream sociological theory tradition preferred model to modify the socialized man by embedding in an evolutionary theoretical concept which receives the objections of the economic tradition with regard to individual decisions on actions and objections from the biological tradition with regard to genetic influences, without the independent importance (...) of culture to eliminate social science explanations. In an evolutionary sketch is shown that an application of Darwin's theory on socio-cultural phenomena of man is possible to cooperate in the genetic, situational and cultural factors as causal factors unrelated. Culture is seen in it as an adaptive process in which the genetically inherited organism-environment relationships in emergent forms of social systems and cultural environments are expanded. With regard to causal explanations through evolutionary mechanisms, the proportion of human individuals for the dynamic aspects of socio-cultural phenomena is emphasized. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the scientific respectability of delusion as a psychiatric category. First, I present the essentialist objection to the natural kindhood of psychiatric categories, as well as non-essentialism about natural kinds as a response to that objection. Second, I present a nuanced classification of kinds of kinds. Third, drawing on the claim that the attribution of delusion relies on a folk psychological underpinning, I present the mind-dependence objection to the natural kind status of delusion. Finally, I argue (...) that even if delusion as a generic kind stands little chance of being vindicated as a non-essentialist natural kind, we stand to gain from a natural kind methodology regarding subtypes of delusion for which there is evidence of genuine causal signatures and mechanisms. (shrink)

Theoreticians of deliberative democracy have sometimes found it hard to relate to the seemingly contradictory experimental results produced by psychologists and political scientists. We suggest that this problem may be alleviated by inserting a layer of psychological theory between the empirical results and the normative political theory. In particular, we expose the argumentative theory of reasoning that makes the observed pattern of findings more coherent. According to this theory, individual reasoning mechanisms work best when used to produce and evaluate arguments (...) during a public deliberation. It predicts that when diverse opinions are discussed, group reasoning will outperform individual reasoning. It also predicts that individuals have a strong confirmation bias. When people reason either alone or with like-minded peers, this confirmation bias leads them to reinforce their initial attitudes, explaining individual and group polarization. We suggest that the failures of reasoning are most likely to be remedied at the collective than at the individual level. (shrink)

C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 2001.