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  1. A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  • Reticulo-cortical activity and behavior: A critique of the arousal theory and a new synthesis.C. H. Vanderwolf & T. E. Robinson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):459-476.
    It is traditionally believed that cerebral activation (the presence of low voltage fast electrical activity in the neocortex and rhythmical slow activity in the hippocampus) is correlated with arousal, while deactivation (the presence of large amplitude irregular slow waves or spindles in both the neocortex and the hippocampus) is correlated with sleep or coma. However, since there are many exceptions, these generalizations have only limited validity. Activated patterns occur in normal sleep (active or paradoxical sleep) and during states of anesthesia (...)
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  • Adaptability of innate motor patterns and motor control mechanisms.M. B. Berkinblit, A. G. Feldman & O. I. Fukson - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):585-599.
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  • Perception and action: Alternative views.Susan Hurley - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):3-40.
    A traditional view of perception and action makestwo assumptions: that the causal flow betweenperception and action is primarily linear or one-way,and that they are merely instrumentally related toeach other, so that each is a means to the other.Either or both of these assumptions can be rejected. Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not theone-way aspect of the traditional view, thus leavingitself open to charges of verificationism. Ecologicalviews reject the one-way aspect but not theinstrumental aspect of the traditional view, so thatperception and (...)
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  • The function of phenomenal states: Supramodular interaction theory.Ezequiel Morsella - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):1000-1021.
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  • Ways of coloring: Comparative color vision as a case study for cognitive science.Evan Thompson, Adrian Palacios & Francisco J. Varela - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):1-26.
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  • Homing in on consciousness in the nervous system: An action-based synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Christine A. Godwin, Tiffany K. Jantz, Stephen C. Krieger & Adam Gazzaley - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-70.
    What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...)
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  • An efferent component in the visual perception of direction and extent.Stanley Coren - 1986 - Psychological Review 93 (4):391-410.
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  • The phenomenologically manifest.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1):115-136.
    Disputes about what is phenomenologically manifest in conscious experience have a way of leading to deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant views. It is this fact, I believe, that leads some to heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I explore the other possible reaction to this fact, namely, the articulation of methods for addressing phenomenological disputes. I (...)
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  • Enactivist vision.Jerome A. Feldman - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):35-36.
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  • Conclusions from color vision of insects.Werner Backhaus & Randolf Menzel - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):28-30.
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  • Color vision: Content versus experience.Mohan Matthen - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):46-47.
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  • Nonreductionism, content and evolutionary explanation.Justin Broackes - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):31-32.
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  • Objectivism-subjectivim: A false dilemma?Joseph Levine - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):42-43.
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  • When the self represents the other: A new cognitive neuroscience view on psychological identification.Jean Decety & Thierry Chaminade - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):577-596.
    There is converging evidence from developmental and cognitive psychology, as well as from neuroscience, to suggest that the self is both special and social, and that self-other interaction is the driving force behind self-development. We review experimental findings which demonstrate that human infants are motivated for social interactions and suggest that the development of an awareness of other minds is rooted in the implicit notion that others are like the self. We then marshal evidence from functional neuroimaging explorations of the (...)
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  • Sensory cortex and the mind-brain problem.Roland Puccetti & Robert W. Dykes - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):337-344.
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  • Conscious thoughts from reflex-like processes: A new experimental paradigm for consciousness research.Allison K. Allen, Kevin Wilkins, Adam Gazzaley & Ezequiel Morsella - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1318-1331.
    The contents of our conscious mind can seem unpredictable, whimsical, and free from external control. When instructed to attend to a stimulus in a work setting, for example, one might find oneself thinking about household chores. Conscious content thus appears different in nature from reflex action. Under the appropriate conditions, reflexes occur predictably, reliably, and via external control. Despite these intuitions, theorists have proposed that, under certain conditions, conscious content resembles reflexes and arises reliably via external control. We introduce the (...)
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  • What are the building blocks of the frog's wiping reflex?Ilan Golani - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):607-608.
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  • Electromagnetic-Field Theories of Mind.Mostyn W. Jones - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12):124-149.
    Neuroscience investigates how neuronal processing circuits work, but it has problems explaining experiences this way. For example, it hasn’t explained how colour and shape circuits bind together in visual processing, nor why colours and other qualia are experienced so differently yet processed by circuits so similarly, nor how to get from processing circuits to pictorial images spread across inner space. Some theorists turn from these circuits to their electromagnetic fields to deal with such difficulties concerning the mind’s qualia, unity, privacy, (...)
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  • Where does the cholinergic modulation of the EEG take place?J. C. Szerb & J. D. Dudar - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):493-493.
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  • Brain-behavioral studies: The importance of staying close to the data.C. H. Vanderwolf & T. E. Robinson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):497-514.
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  • Movement-based embodied contemplative practices: definitions and paradigms.Laura Schmalzl, Mardi A. Crane-Godreau & Peter Payne - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • Codes and their vicissitudes.Bernhard Hommel, Jochen Müsseler, Gisa Aschersleben & Wolfgang Prinz - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):910-926.
    First, we discuss issues raised with respect to the Theory of Event Coding (TEC)'s scope, that is, its limitations and possible extensions. Then, we address the issue of specificity, that is, the widespread concern that TEC is too unspecified and, therefore, too vague in a number of important respects. Finally, we elaborate on our views about TEC's relations to other important frameworks and approaches in the field like stages models, ecological approaches, and the two-visual-pathways model. Footnotes1 We acknowledge the precedence (...)
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  • Agency and Choice in Evolution.Jonathan Delafield-Butt - forthcoming - Biosemiotics:1-7.
    Denis Noble has produced a succinct analysis of the ‘Illusions of the Modern Synthesis’. At the heart of the matter is the place of agency in organisms. This paper examines the nature of conscious agent action in organisms, and the role of affects in shaping agent choice. It examines the dual role these have in shaping evolution, and in the social worlds of scientists that shape evolutionary theory. Its central claim follows Noble, that agency is central to the structure of (...)
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  • Bergson and the holographic theory of mind.Stephen E. Robbins - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):365-394.
    Bergson’s model of time (1889) is perhaps the proto-phenomenological theory. It is part of a larger model of mind (1896) which can be seen in modern light as describing the brain as supporting a modulated wave within a holographic field, specifying the external image of the world, and wherein subject and object are differentiated not in terms of space, but of time. Bergson’s very concrete model is developed and deepened with Gibson’s ecological model of perception. It is applied to the (...)
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  • Simple changes in reflex threshold cannot explain all aspects of rapid voluntary movements.C. Gielen & J. C. Houk - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):605-607.
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  • Passive frame theory: A new synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Christine A. Godwin, Tiffany K. Jantz, Stephen C. Krieger & Adam Gazzaley - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:e199.
    Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousnessis, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.
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  • (1 other version)The inevitable contrast: Conscious vs. unconscious processes in action control.Ezequiel Morsella & T. Andrew Poehlman - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
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  • The mechanisms of human action: introduction and background.Ezequiel Morsella - 2009 - In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer, Oxford handbook of human action. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1--32.
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  • Bridging science and values: A unifying view of mind and brain.Roger W. Sperry - 1979 - Zygon 14 (March):7-21.
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  • Evaluating New Wave Reductionism: The Case of Vision.D. van Eck - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):167-196.
    This paper inquires into the nature of intertheoretic relations between psychology and neuroscience. This relationship has been characterized by some as one in which psychological explanations eventually will fall away as otiose, overthrown completely by neurobiological ones. Against this view it will be argued that it squares poorly with scientific practices and empirical developments in the cognitive neurosciences. We analyse a case from research on visual perception, which suggests a much more subtle and complex interplay between psychology and neuroscience than (...)
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  • On possible perceptual worlds and how they shape their environments.Rainer J. Mausfeld, Reinhard M. Niederée & K. Dieter Heyer - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):47-48.
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  • The ethnocentricity of colour.J. van Brakel - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):53-54.
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  • Independent forebrain and brainstem controls for arousal and sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.
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  • Hitting the nail on the head.Daniel C. Dennett - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):35-35.
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  • Seeing what is not seen.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):503-519.
    This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.
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  • The Natural Philosophy of Experiencing.Robert Prentner - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (4):35.
    A new philosophy of nature is urgently needed. The received ontological view, physicalism, is unable to account for experiential phenomena and in particular for consciousness in all its varieties. We shall outline the concept of experiencing which should figure as a new conceptual primitive in natural philosophy. Experiencing refers to a process which comprises the interaction of an agent with its world through action based on phenomenal experience. This process can be viewed under two different aspects. One regards the subjective (...)
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  • Passive frame theory: A new synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Godwin Christine, Jantz Tiffany, Krieger Stephen & Gazzaley Adam - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.
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  • On the ways to color.Evan Thompson, Adrian Palacios & Francisco J. Varela - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):56-74.
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  • Inner light.Daniel Alroy - 1995 - Synthese 104 (1):147-160.
    Neural impulses from the senses to the brain convey information, not sensation. The direct electrical stimulation of the cortex produces sensations. Hence, such sensations are evoked in the brain, and not received from the senses, nor from the outside world through the senses. More specifically, the experience of light is evoked in the brain and not received from the eyes. Consequently, the born blind, too, would experience light in response to electrical brain stimulation. The luminosity of light is not a (...)
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  • Reply to Jean Decety: Perceiving actions and understanding agency.Christoph Hoerl - 2002 - In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust, Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. pp. 45--73.
    Decety presents evidence for the claim that neural mechanisms involved in the generation of actions are also recruited in the observation and mental simulation of actions. This paper explores the relationship between such neuropsychological findings and our common-sense understanding of what it is for a person to imitate or imagine performing an action they have observed. A central question is whether imitation and imagination necessarily involve the ability to distinguish between one's own actions and those of others. It is argued (...)
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  • In search of the theoretical basis of motor control.M. B. Berkinblit, A. G. Feldman & O. I. Fukson - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):626-638.
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  • Do subprograms for movement always seek equilibrium?Z. Hasan - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):609-610.
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  • Comparative color vision and the objectivity of color.David Hilbert - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):38-39.
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  • EEG desynchronization is associated with cellular events that are prerequisites for active behavioral states.M. Steriade - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):489-492.
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  • Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and Emotion in Intersubjectivity, Consciousness, and Language.Andrea Schiavio - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):735-739.
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  • The Claims of Consciousness: A Critical Survey.Alastair Hannay - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):395-434.
    This article selectively surveys recent work touching consciousness. It discusses some recent arguments and positions with a view to throwing light on a working principle of much influential philosophical psychology, namely that the first‐person point of view is theoretically redundant. The discussion is divided under a number of headings corresponding to specific functions that have been attributed to the first‐person viewpoint, from the experience of something it is like to undergo physical processes, to the presence of selfhood, mental substance, meaning, (...)
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  • Complexity in control of movements.Gyan C. Agarwal & Gerald L. Gottlieb - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):599-600.
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  • More than mere coloring: The art of spectral vision.Kathleen A. Akins & John Lamping - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):26-27.
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  • Do legs have surplus degrees of freedom?R. McN Alexander - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):600-600.
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